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 My dissertation examines how contemporary American writers have revived and 
revised literary sentimentalism to fashion their engagement with publicized scenes of 
suffering, to critique dominant narratives of national identity, and—in some cases—to 
offer alternate notions of publicness built on fellow-feeling.  I propose that much 
American literature of the 1990s and early post-millennium—texts often characterized as 
postmodern—evinces a profound, yet veiled investment in sentimentalism’s 
characteristic mode of affective pedagogy.  In the texts examined here (including works 
by Philip Roth, Anna Deavere Smith, John Edgar Wideman, Chang-Rae Lee, Jonathan 
Safron Foer, John Updike, and Don DeLillo), one encounters a recurrent mode of 
affective engagement: a suffering figure is spectacularly exposed, sometimes “directly” 
to the reader but much more often through an intermediary figure whose sympathetic, 
affective, and/or diagnostic reaction to the suffering pedagogically models ideal affective 
responses for the reader.  One also encounters many of the tropes and topoi characteristic 
of sentimentalism in the 19th century: a metaphoric linking of domestic, familial spaces 
for the space of the nation, sustained grief for the lost child, and the possibility of a 
redemptive community established through fellow feeling.  Popular American culture has 
never set aside its investments in the power of sympathy, the guile of sentiment, and the 
lure of the endearingly oppressed, but the intertextual recovery of sentimentalism’s 
pedagogical modes, tropes, and topoi by writers renowned for their sophistication, 
experimentation, and reflexiveness would seem more remarkable.  Indeed, this 
 
 
resurrection of an aesthetic mode built on feeling goes directly against the diagnosis of 
Fredric Jameson, who declared famously that postmodern culture is characterized by a 
“waning of affect” (10).  On the contrary, because many “postmodern” writers in the post 
Cold War period have made use of the performative power of sympathetic witness and 
reengaged with the nineteenth-century sentimentalist tradition, I maintain that, if 
anything, the cultural power of affect has been magnified and inflamed. Thus, this 
dissertation studies the ways in which many contemporary American writers, writers 
customarily thought of as literary, academic, and postmodern, have borrowed much from 
a discourse generally considered popular and debased, have employed sentimentalism’s 
tropes for their power, modified its affective pedagogy for their political purposes, and 
revised many of its assumptions about the power of sympathetic witnessing.   
 I attempt to elucidate these literary reengagements and give shape to my broader 
inquiry by situating them in relation to scenes of urban crisis, ruin, and unrest—that is, by 
reading them in relation to the changes characterizing American cities during the post-
Cold War period and in the years immediately preceding it.   Following the 
implementation of neoliberal austerity in the late 1970s, a process of deindustrialization 
and social stratification that had began in the 1960s rapidly accelerated.  During this 
period, urban life in America was marked by the increasing immiseration of the 
underclass, the massive influx of new immigrants from Asia and Central America, 
conflict over scant resources, and an escalation of tensions between the highest and 
lowest elements in society. Using urban conflict to contextualize these postmodern 
revisions of sentimentalism is not an arbitrary choice; I follow the lead of the texts 
 
 
themselves.  In each chapter, I consider how these authors bring the power of sympathetic 
witness and the hope of a coherent social body built of fellow-feeling—bring, in short, 
the power of sentimentalism—to bear on scenes of urban tension, strife, and ruin. The net 
is cast wide enough to include the relative banality of anti-immigrant chauvinism 
alongside the spectacular explosion of the 1992 Los Angeles riots as well as the 
smoldering urban ruin left in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.  Though 
these events and circumstances differ in vast and important ways, each can be thought of 
as fiery evidence against narratives of America’s pastoral unity, coherence, and placid 
omnipotence.  The writers who responded to these sites of turmoil made use of 
sentimentalism’s power and investment in sympathetic projection to engage candidly 
with the suffering of others, to pedagogically mold the affective responses of their 
readers, and to suggest the existence of a social body to which both sufferer, witness, and 
reader belong.  However, these texts reveal a persistent ambivalence over sympathy: its 
nature, its power, and its political provenance.  Furthermore, because many of these 
authors model emotional engagement and witness through the figure of the writer, their 
scrutiny of the politics of sympathy is inseparable from their performative duplication of 
it.  Thus their ambivalence about the community of fellow feeling goes into the text’s 
performance and reception.  Reading these authors for their thematic treatment of 
America’s politics of feeling necessarily leads to reading their modes of sentimental 
ambivalence performatively.  The reading practice governing this study therefore reveals 
the ways in which these writers entangle the publics they address in powerful 
sympathetic bonds while nevertheless calling into question what power feeling really has.
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CHAPTER I: 
INTRODUCTION: SENTIMENT, SPACE, AND CITY 
 
My dissertation examines how contemporary American writers have revived and revised 
literary sentimentalism to fashion their engagement with publicized scenes of suffering, 
to critique dominant narratives of national identity, and—in some cases—to offer 
alternate notions of publicness built on fellow feeling.  I propose that much American 
literature of the 1990s and early post-millennium—texts often characterized as 
postmodern—evince a profound, yet veiled investment in sentimentalism’s characteristic 
mode of affective pedagogy.  In the texts examined here (including works by Philip Roth, 
Anna Deavere Smith, John Edgar Wideman, Chang-Rae Lee, Jonathan Safron Foer, John 
Updike, and Don DeLillo), one encounters a recurrent mode of affective engagement: a 
suffering figure is spectacularly exposed, sometimes “directly” to the reader but much 
more often through an intermediary figure whose sympathetic, affective, and/or 
diagnostic reaction to the suffering pedagogically models ideal affective responses for the 
reader.  One also encounters many of the tropes and topoi characteristic of 
sentimentalism in the 19th century: a metaphoric linking of domestic, familial spaces for 
the space of the nation, sustained grief for the lost child, and the possibility of a 
redemptive community established through fellow feeling. Popular American culture and 
politics have never set aside their investments in the power of sympathy, the guile of 
sentiment, and the lure of the endearingly oppressed. Indeed, the years considered by this 
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study bore witness to numerous iterations of public sentimentalism: era-defining 
declarations such as Bill Clinton's "I feel your pain,” Rodney King's "Can we all just get 
along?"  the popularity of victim’s rights legal discourse, and the rise of what critic Eva 
Illouz calls “the glamour or misery” fashioned by the rise of talk shows such as Oprah 
Winffrey’s (240).  What seems more remarkable, and what this study concentrated on, is 
the intertextual recovery of sentimentalism’s pedagogical modes, tropes, and topoi by 
writers renowned for their sophistication, experimentation, and reflexiveness. Indeed, 
these postmodern deployments of an aesthetic mode built on feeling goes directly against 
the diagnosis of Fredric Jameson, who declared famously that postmodern culture is 
characterized by a “waning of affect” (10).  On the contrary, because many postmodern 
writers have made use of the performative power of sympathetic witness and reengaged 
with the nineteenth-century sentimentalist tradition, I maintain that, if anything, the 
cultural power of affect has been magnified and inflamed in the years since the end of the 
Cold War. While sentimentalism continued to percolate in the broader culture of 
postmodernity, the object of this study is the literary work of authors who were at once 
members and observers of this culture.  In Linda Hutcheon’s terms, these postmodern 
works are capable of a “complicitous critique” of postmodernity (13).  In other words, 
while their work sometimes employs the repertoire dominant within the culture to which 
they belong, it is also often capable of dexterously revising and critiquing its dominance.  
Thus, this dissertation studies the ways in which many contemporary American writers, 
writers customarily thought of as literary, academic, and postmodern, have borrowed 
much from a discourse generally considered popular and debased.  As my readings 
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demonstrate, they have employed sentimentalism’s tropes for their power, modified its 
affective pedagogy for their political purposes, and abandoned or revised many of its 
assumptions about the power of sympathetic witnessing.   
 I attempt to elucidate these literary reengagements and give shape to my broader 
inquiry by situating them in relation to scenes of urban crisis, ruin, and unrest—that is, by 
reading them in relation to the changes characterizing American cities during the post-
Cold War period and in the years immediately preceding it.   Following the 
implementation of neoliberal austerity in the late 1970s, a process of deindustrialization 
and social stratification that had began in the 1960s rapidly accelerated.  During this 
period, urban life in America was marked by the increasing immiseration of the 
underclass, the massive influx of new immigrants from Asia and Central America, 
conflict over scant resources, and an escalation of tensions between the highest and 
lowest elements in society. Using urban conflict to contextualize these postmodern 
revisions of sentimentalism is not an arbitrary choice; I follow the lead of the texts 
themselves.  In each chapter, I consider how these authors bring the power of sympathetic 
witness and the hope of a coherent social body built of fellow feeling—bring, in short, 
the power of sentimentalism—to bear on scenes of urban tension, strife, and ruin.  I 
acknowledge these scenes of urban conflict vary significantly in magnitude and in kind.  
The net is cast wide enough to include the relative banality of anti-immigrant chauvinism 
alongside the spectacular explosion of the 1992 Los Angeles riots as well as the 
smoldering urban ruin left in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.  Though 
these events and circumstances differ in substantial and important ways, each can be 
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thought of as fiery evidence against narratives of America’s pastoral unity, coherence, 
and placid omnipotence.  
Writers who responded to these sites of turmoil made use of sentimentalism’s 
power and investment in sympathetic projection to engage candidly with the suffering of 
others, to pedagogically mold the affective responses of their readers, and to suggest the 
existence of a social body to which both sufferer, witness, and reader belong.  However, 
these texts reveal a persistent ambivalence over sympathy: its nature, its power, and its 
political provenance.  One notes the use of the dilapidated, ruined, or conflict-ridden city 
as a metaphor for national domestic space, but alongside this dystopian image of the 
broken social body lies another: the social body conjured by the network of fellow feeling 
implicit in their texts.  This second, more hopeful spatial valance for nation and 
community can function either as an ideological patch on conflict or a sign of utopian 
potential. Furthermore, because many of these authors model emotional engagement and 
witness through the figure of the writer, their scrutiny of the politics of sympathy is 
inseparable from their performative duplication of it.  Thus their ambivalence about the 
community of fellow feeling goes all the way down, so to speak, into the text’s 
performance and reception.  Reading these authors for their thematic treatment of 
America’s politics of feeling necessarily leads to reading their modes of sentimental 
ambivalence performatively.  The reading practice governing this study therefore reveals 
the ways in which these writers entangle the publics they address in powerful 
sympathetic bonds while nevertheless calling into question what power feeling really has. 
Recovering the legacy of sentimentalism in contemporary culture is difficult in 
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part because of the problem of definition and categorization.  Before the inquiry can 
begin in earnest, one must ask whether sentimentalism is a philosophy, literary genre, 
ethical practice, aesthetic transgression, or something else altogether.  If, with Shirley 
Samuels, we define sentimentalism as "a set of cultural practices designed to evoke a 
certain form of emotional response, usually empathy, in the reader or viewer," then we 
have at least started to move away from the term’s pejorative valance as an aesthetic 
judgment of poor quality (Samuels 4).  Such a value-free definition, while wide enough 
to take on all comers, does not give a sense of the complex philosophical ideas that have 
historically motivated those “cultural practices.”  Therefore, I use the term 
sentimentalism to designate an approach to the nexus of ethical, aesthetic, and emotional 
practices that emerged historically out of philosophical texts from the Scottish 
Enlightenment, especially the writings of Frances Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam 
Smith, and which then developed as a primarily literary sensibility in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Europe and America.  Because this study is concerned with how 
sentimentalism is being revised by writers roughly contemporary, however, it cannot 
relegate itself to such a historical definition, and must therefore, make an effort to distill 
from history a structural sketch of its critical object.   
Such a reduction should only be pondered warily, though, for the very dynamic I 
wish to examine within sentimentalism is its aesthetic and political capacity for mutation.  
The category problem mentioned above demonstrates the need to think about the cultural 
phenomenon differently.  One important way in which this can be accomplished is to 
attend more thoughtfully to sentimentalism's spatial implications.  Consequently, I 
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present a theorization of sentimentalism through a threefold process.  First, I provide a 
judicious overview of its historical models—its roots in the Scottish enlightenment as a 
philosophy, then as a literary and cultural movement, offering along the way special 
attention to the critical conversation about these aspects of sentimentalism.  Second, in 
the spirit of a Deleuzean preference of genetic over structural or categorical modes of 
classification, I sketch what I take to be sentimentalism's singularities, that is, those 
points of orientation to which it tends but which it need not meet.  Finally, I suggest the 
ways in which sentimentalism functions as an aesthetic practice with distinctive spatio-
political features and consequences, drawing on some of the foundational theorists of 
human geography—Yi-Fu Tuan, Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, and Ed Soja—to sketch 
the developments characterizing American cities in recent decades and to which the 
writers of this study respond, concluding with a preview of the chapters to follow.  
Philosophical Sentimentalism 
 Let us first consider the philosophical origins of sentimentalism, located by 
critical commonplace in the Scottish Enlightenment. The reasons for returning to these 
sources are multiple.  First, doing so provides necessary background for my own 
elaboration of a performative model of sentimental witness.  Second, understanding how 
sentimentalist philosophy spoke back to 17th and 18th century moral rationalist discourses 
enables some suggestive comparisons between their aims and those of writers working in 
a set of interpenetrating cultures which have effectively repudiated logocentric meta-
narratives ordering them.  Lastly, one must understand philosophical sentimentalism’s 
ambivalent investment in human benevolence to appreciate the ambivalence of 
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postmodern sentimentalist revisers.  I offer here a brief overview of the similarities and 
differences among the three most important theorists of sensibility in terms of how 
benevolent witness works and what kind of social body is implicitly projected in the 
thought of each. As I have noted, in eighteenth century Scotland, Francis Hutcheson, 
David Hume, and Adam Smith, among others, attempted to produce an ethical system 
grounded in the bodily senses, in part as a repudiation of then dominant discourses of 
rationalism.  
 The earliest of these thinkers to put forward his ideas and yet least-heralded today 
is Hutcheson, who argued for the existence of a "moral sense" comparable to the storied 
five senses over the course of three treatises: the Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, 
Harmony and Design (1725), the Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, (1725), and 
the Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections and Illustrations 
upon the Moral Sense (1728).  Without this moral sense, Hutcheson maintained, "no 
explication can be given of our ideas of morality" (Essay on Passions 255).  The virtue of 
the idea was two-fold.  First, it could avoid rationalist abstractions by grounding morality 
in the materiality of the body.  The sense was not the measure of something external like 
"pleasures of harmony, taste, or smell," but the sensations it produced were nonetheless 
real and occurred within the observer "like all pleasure and pain, happiness or misery" 
(Essay on Passions 257).  Second, "moral sense" could explain the existence of altruistic 
acts in a way that discourses viewing humans as self-interested rationalists could not. 
"Previous to any reasoning or meditation,” Hutcheson reasoned, “we rejoice in the 
prosperity of others, and sorrow with them in their fortunes...without any consideration of 
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our own interest" (Moral Philosophy 14). Thus Hutcheson accomplished his de-
rationation of moral philosophy by declaring an innate disinterestedness, a universal 
benevolence often repudiated by his followers, including all of the contemporary authors 
considered by this study. 
 Disinclined as the philosophers of sentiment were to elaborate the evidence of this 
universal sociability based on anything other than the senses, the feelings of cordiality 
and amiability were proffered as sufficient evidence that humans had been designed by 
their creator with the law of the heart.  The consequences of Hutcheson’s specific 
approach apropos social bodies are twofold and somewhat contradictory.  First, he argues 
the power of affection is, as if it were a force field, inversely proportional to distance.  
Thus, distant bodies will always experience “weaker degrees of love" in relation to each 
other than will closer bodies (Inquiry Beauty 161).  Conversely, "Love of benevolence, 
increases as the distance is diminish'd, and is strongest when bodys come to touch each 
other” (222).  Yet Hutcheson also maintains the tendency toward benevolence is 
universal, "even toward the most distant parts of the species" (218).  Indeed, this leads 
him to maintain that “traces of affection, decency, and moral sense" can be found among 
the natives of the British colonies, though they were "previously identified as savages" 
(Moral Philosophy 165).  Thus, with Hutcheson, sentimentalism already exhibits some of 
the features that would prove most lasting, particularly the emphasis on feeling and the 
use of feeling's universality as a means of arguing (however implicitly) for the universal 
ethical equivalence of humans. 
 That David Hume rejected both the idea of a discrete moral sense and the idea of 
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absolute benevolence—holding that "[m]en are naturally selfish, or endow'd only with a 
confin'd generosity,"—attests to the wide variation of thought within this school (519).  
Nevertheless, Hume was deeply influenced by Hutcheson's emphasis on the role of the 
senses and passions in the production of ethics, with a particular emphasis on the power 
of sympathy.  "The minds of men are mirrors to one another," he declares in his Treatise 
on Human Nature (1740), such that the "animating principle of them [all other passions] 
is sympathy" (365, 363).  Jettisoning all talk of a faculty that could deliver absolute moral 
knowledge while at the same time retaining the senses as epistemological foundations 
results in a moral system still bracingly skeptical. "Morality," for Hume, "is more 
properly felt than judg'd of; tho' this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, 
that we are apt to confound it with an idea. [...] To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but 
to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character" (470-1).  
It is characteristic of Hume's thought that one might mistake one's feelings for something 
else, for this kind of misrecognition and muddying of demarcation is precisely what 
Humean affect tends to produce.   
 Indeed, in Hume's thought, is often difficult to tell who is feeling something, for 
"[t]he passions are so contagious, that they pass with the greatest facility from one person 
to another, and produce correspondent movements in all human breasts" (605).  It is this 
powerful and transportive quality that allows habits of feeling to form the basis of society 
for, "[c]ustom and relation make us enter deeply into the sentiments of others," which our 
imagination absorbs so deeply that it can "operate as if [these passions were] originally 
our own" (389).  Affect's spatial contagiousness explains why, despite his rejection of the 
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idea of a moral sense, Hume follows Hutcheson in arguing that "those rays of passions, 
sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible 
degrees" (365).  In truth, this emphasis on proximity has a two-fold origin: first, the finite 
horizon of the senses, for "pity depends, in a great measure, on the contiguity, and even 
sight of the object" and, second, the dilution of filial blood, for "A man naturally loves 
his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousins, his cousins, 
better than strangers" (483-484).  Nonetheless, cultural likeness seems to be sufficient to 
affectively suture the feeling subject to his nation, for Hume tells us "[w]e love our 
country-men, our neighbors, those of the same trade, profession, and even name with 
ourselves," because "[e]very one of these relations is esteemed some tie, and gives a title 
to a share of our affection" (352).  Cutting loose ethical engagement from the guarantee 
of a fixed universal moral faculty but not from the vicissitudes and finitude of feeling, 
Hume's sentimentalism is far more radically skeptical than Hutcheson's and, despite its 
mellow clubbiness, it strongly suggests an affective ethics may produce many social 
lacunas for all its contagious power. 
 The emphasis Hutcheson and Hume placed on passion and benevolent sympathy 
would prove incredibly influential in Europe and its colonies.  Some scholars suggest the 
American Declaration of Independence is grounded in Hutcheson’s moral framework, 
which Jefferson endorsed (Cogliano 142).  Hutcheson and Hume also guided the thought 
of Adam Smith, who years before he wrote The Wealth of Nations (1776), penned a 
treatise foundational to sentimentalist thinking—Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).  
The two works at first seem quite different, but actually parallel one another in their shift 
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from interpersonal microanalysis to macroeconomic projection.  Smith retained Hume's 
emphasis on the power of sympathy but, in Smith's thought, the emotion is rooted in 
imagination and representation: "the source of our fellow feeling for the misery of others 
[...] is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer," so that "we come either to conceive 
or to be affected by what he feels" (4).  This image of sympathetic witness is decidedly 
not a matter of feeling leaping contagiously from one body to another, as with Hume, for 
as Smith notes, when we observe the newly-killed corpse of a "fellow-creature" "we put 
ourselves in his situation, as we enter, as it were, into his body, and in our imaginations, 
in some measure, animate anew the deformed and mangled carcase of the slain" (99). As 
he famously and emphatically declares,  
 
 
Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our 
senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, 
carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can 
form any conception of what are his sensations. (3-4) 
 
 
 
In order to function well then, sympathetic imagination must possess great power, both in 
its attention to the sufferer's case in "all its minutest incidents," as well as its capacity to 
transform the witness who is engaged imaginatively (22).  When Smith argues that, in 
sympathy, "I consider what I should suffer if I was really you; and I not only change 
circumstances with you but I change persons and characters" one notes the neat 
correspondence between seeing a scene of suffering and reading about it (466).  Smith's 
sympathy, the reading of another's torments by which one figuratively enters their body, 
differs from Aristotelian catharsis in that the reception of another's pain is not primarily a 
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matter of cleansing or purgation of affect, but a conformation and construction of 
community through affect.   
 To understand the social body conjured by Smith's sympathy, however, one must 
begin by noting that, because it retains rather than refuses the suffering of others, Smith's 
sympathy also contains within it the danger of excessive vulnerability and intimacy.  To 
many present-day readers, there is a homoeroticism in Smith's account of imaginative 
consubstantiality, whereby one man enters into the body of others.  As Mary Chapman 
and Glenn Hendler write, "[f]or Smith and his eighteenth-century contemporaries, 
sensibility was an ideology motivated by a logic of affective androgyny, encompassing 
both the republican discourses of manly virtue and benevolent motherhood" (3).  Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick has noted that the literary figure resulting from this tradition, the 
famous Man of Feeling, "dramatizes, embodies for an audience that both desires and 
cathartically identifies with him, a struggle of masculine identity with emotions or 
physical stigmata stereotyped as feminine" (146).  In the context of the present study, 
concerned largely with works written by men, this aspect of sentimentalism has marked 
salience, particularly fictions written by Philip Roth and John Updike, whose investments 
in heterosexual masculinity often sit uneasily with their emphasis on imaginative 
compassion.   
Returning to the historical context, one must note another, related tension within 
Smith’s model: between particulars and generalities.  The androgynous interpenetrating 
power of sympathy and the pleasure derivable from the exercise of this virtue thrives on 
detail and intimacy, but in a move anticipating the abstracted perspective of commerce he 
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offers years later in The Wealth of Nations, Smith sees these interactions and 
refigurations of personality widening to an impersonal climate of affective ethical 
interaction, a god's eye view of the network of fellow feeling functioning unbeknownst to 
its participants, in a passage worth quoting at length: 
 
 
Human society, when we contemplate it in a certain abstract and philosophical 
light, appears like a great, an immense machine whose regular and harmonious 
movements produce a thousand agreeable effects.  As in any other beautiful and 
noble machine that was the production of human art, whatever tended to render its 
movements more smooth and easy, would derive a beauty from this effect, and, 
on the contrary, whatever tended to obstruct them would displease on that 
account: so virtue, which is, as it were, the fine polish to the wheels of society, 
necessarily pleases; while vice, like the vile rust, which makes them jar and grate 
upon one another, is as necessarily offensive. (463-464)  
 
 
 
Sympathy becomes a basis for interpersonal, social, and even national coherence.  The 
self-regulating affective mechanism Smith evokes is a sublime social body, a machine 
operating at close to equilibrium conditions, and yet he embeds within the metaphor the 
threat of social degradation: vice's rust.  Moreover, there is no mode of universal 
sympathetic engagement in this vision; each element, by virtue of its natural affinities, 
fulfills its role and thus buttresses the health of the whole.  The promiscuous imaginative 
transmutation of bodies noted above, therefore, is illusory, or at the very least bound up 
with the production of its own limits, without which differentiation of identities would 
cease to be possible.  Smith is pragmatic about affective alliances, which "[t]hough they 
will never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or required" 
(23).   But, of course, concords have their limits. 
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 Smith's shift from a mode of projecting vision into another's inner space to a way 
of seeing from some uninhabitable outer space signals another corollary distanciation.  
Like Hutcheson and Hume, Smith's account of sociability, though grounded less in bodily 
senses than in imagination, stresses the enervation of feeling across distances.  "Let us 
suppose," hypothesizes Smith, "that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of 
inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake" (192).  What, he asks, would 
be the reaction of a "man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connection with that 
part of the world [...] upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity" (192)?  
Smith's claim, when set alongside his treatise's numerous attestations of compassion, is 
chilling: 
 
 
If he was to lose his little finger to morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, 
provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over 
the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense 
multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him than this paltry 
misfortune of his own. (193)  
 
 
 
Smith pits the comparatively petty dread of bodily loss against the power of abstract pity 
and counts petty dread the victor.  While the spatial field of "human society" as he 
described it in the "immense machine" passage is, though depersonalized, a zone of 
imminence, plentitude, and self-presence, individual experiences of imaginative 
engagement are not nearly so capacious and, on a global scale, appear selfish to the point 
of cruelty.  It is as if Smith, having built an enormous pyramid, wants to show it is, after 
all, composed of nothing but sand.  Yet notice that this passage detailing the culpable 
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indifference of a "man of humanity" is itself written as a call to compensatory pity, a 
hyperbolic show of cruelty-by-complaisance calling for Smith's own reader to bridge a 
gap of feeling.  This sentimental mourning for the loss of compassionate power is one of 
the mode's most sustaining tricks, as I demonstrate in later chapters.  
Literary and Cultural Sentimentalism 
 The ideas of these Scottish Enlightenment thinkers helped to bring about what 
T.S. Eliot called the "dissociation of sensibility" from the late seventeenth century 
onward (64). As a literary culture, Joanna Dobson argues sentimentalism should be 
viewed as an “imaginative orientation […] characterized by certain themes, stylistic 
features, and figurative conventions […] that celebrates human connection, both personal 
and communal, and acknowledges the shared devastation of affectional loss” (266).  Of 
the thematic characteristics of sentimental literature, Dobson writes, “the greatest threat is 
the tragedy of separation, of severed human ties: the death of a child, lost love, failed or 
disrupted family connections, distorted or unsympathetic community, or the loss of the 
hope of reunion and/or reconciliation in the hereafter” (267).  A list of sentimental 
literature’s most frequent tropes include scenes of shared redemptive crying, “abandoned 
wives, widows, orphaned children, and separated families; deathbed and graveyard 
scenes; […] fantasies of reunions in heaven […and] keepsake imagery” (272-273). 
Samuel Richardson, whose Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded (1740) and Clarissa, or, the 
History of a Young Lady (1748) epitomized the early sentimental novel, established 
several of its characteristic gestures, formal devices, and themes: the sympathetic 
identification of reader across class and gender lines, the epistolary mode, and the 
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seduction theme.  Richardson's novels were incredibly popular and influential works, but 
they probably disseminated the doctrines of sentimentalism no more widely than had the 
much earlier essays of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, whose Tattler (1709-1711) 
and Spectator (1711-1712) established the man of feeling—mild, sensitive, and polite—
as the proper mode for bourgeois masculinity long before Hutcheson put quill to 
parchment.  Lawrence Sterne promulgated and satirized both the philosophy and mode of 
masculinity represented by sentiment in The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy 
(1759-1767) and A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (1768).  Here one must 
note that the British model of literary sentimentalism, broadly speaking, tended to be 
dominated by men—as authors and as sensitive protagonists.  The trend reached its 
apogee with Henry Mackenzie's The Man of Feeling (1771), which seems an extended 
revision of the type established earlier by Addison and Steele.  Mackenzie takes as his 
protagonist a sensitive creature, full of benevolence, whose innocence is taken advantage 
of by a hardscrabble London. Mackenzie thus sentimentally mourns the loss of 
sentimental unity in a manner paralleling Smith's technique in the Chinese earthquake 
passage.  In Europe, the vogue of sensibility is often said to end with the French 
Revolution, which occurred, according to conservatives like Burke, because of precisely 
this kind of embrace of passions, a hypothesis partially supported by contemporary 
studies like William Reddy's The Navigation of Feeling. 
 In America, the French Revolution did not end the culture of sentimentalism; on 
the contrary, an emphasis on the moral and salutary power of fellow feeling would 
suffuse American literature and culture for much of the nation's first century.  After its 
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importation from Europe, it gained wide currency rapidly and, by the beginning of the 
nineteenth-century, sentimentalism had begun to inflect textual production in every sector 
of early American culture.  As Elizabeth Barnes observes in, States of Sympathy, her 
study of the sentimental novel in the U.S.: 
 
 
Sympathetic identification emerges in the eighteenth century as the definitive way 
of reading literature and human relations. [...] Examining philosophical and 
political texts alongside literary ones, we see the extent to which sentiment and 
sympathy pervade early national culture.  In all three [philosophical, political, and 
literary] genres, sociopolitical issues are cast as family dramas, a maneuver that 
ultimately renders public policy an essentially private matter. (2) 
 
 
 
America's first novel, William Hill Brown's The Power of Sympathy (1789), follows 
Richardson in its epistolary mode, its use of the seduction theme, and quite obviously, its 
emphasis on sympathy's force.  But, whereas, in Europe, men dominated sentimental 
literary culture, in America, the mode would become intensely associated with women's 
writing.  From the 1820s to the Civil War and beyond, women writers used sentimentalist 
forms to negotiate around separate spheres ideology, which held that a masculine public 
space was counterbalanced by a feminine private space, arguing for social change with 
critiques based in private feeling.  The social causes varied—the temperance movement, 
the abolition movement, advocacy for the claims of Native Americans—but most of the 
texts in this tradition placed a heavy emphasis on Christian soteriology and the power of 
women.  Catherine Maria Sedgwick's Hope Leslie (1827) uses elements of sentimentalist 
tradition with strong advocacy for the role of women and rights of Native Americans.  
Susan Warner's The Wide, Wide World (1850), exemplary of sentimentalism in Dobson's 
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terms, with its broken homes, its tender deathbed scene, and its emphasis on spiritual 
redemption through misery and suffering, is both protofeminist and moralistically 
Christian.  These writers should not be thought of solely as "exemplars," however, for the 
work of each emphasizes differing elements within a gradually coalescing sentimentalist 
repertoire.   
 Accordingly, I have sought, where possible, to link contemporary manifestations 
of sentimentalism to specific iterations in the tradition.  For example, one strand of the 
work of Lydia Sigourney, the "Sweet Singer of Hartfort," and frequent target for anti-
sentimentalist criticism, typifies the death-literature of sentimentalism, particularly the 
child elegy and the keepsake poem.  Her "Death of an Infant," the most famous instance 
of the child elegy, the conventions of which I link to the work Jonathan Safron Foer, 
Philip Roth, and Chang-Rae Lee in the chapters that follow.  More important to my 
reading of Lee's Native Speaker is the poetry of Walt Whitman.  Though he is not widely 
spoken of as a sentimentalist, Whitman's writing should be understood as much in the 
context of his female contemporaries as the masculine pantheon of F. O. Matthiessen’s 
American Renaissance (1941).  Like many of his female sentimentalist peers, Whitman 
wrote a temperance novel, Franklin Evans (1842), but his characteristic emphasis on 
sympathetic witness and affective fusion mark him yet more deeply as a member of this 
tradition, and it is this aspect of his work I seek to connect with Lee in chapter 3.  In that 
same chapter, I link John Edgar Wideman's Philadelphia Fire to the most famous of 
American sentimentalists, Harriet Beecher Stowe, who employing nearly every 
distinctive element of the tradition for her particular mix of proto-feminist, Christian 
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moralist, and abolitionist purposes.  Many of Uncle Tom's Cabin's most famous scenes—
the death of little Eva, Eliza crossing the frozen river with Harry swaddled, Tom's death, 
and Senator Bird's recognition of his own error via feeling—have come to serve as 
synecdoches of cultural sentimentalism more generally. As Jane Tompkins argues in 
Sensational Designs, Stowe’s novel produced tremendous cultural change.  Lincoln is 
said to have greeted Stowe by calling her "the little lady who started this big war," and it 
was that war which brought an end to America's period of high literary sentimentalism 
(Hanne 75).  Crucial to my study, however, is the claim that the history of sentimentalist 
affective pedagogy continues as a powerful force to this day, but before sketching the 
ways in which it continues to operate, one must examine the reaction(s) against it.  
Arguments over Sentimentalism 
 A reaction against sympathy's intimate intercourse of souls has been observed in 
early nineteenth-century American literature such as Hawthorne's attack on women 
"scribblers," but it is only in the second half of the nineteenth century with the rise of the 
realist aesthetic that sentimentalism fell into widespread critical disfavor (Boudreau 7-
10).  The reasons for this reaction against sentimentalism's embrace of shared affect are, 
of course, politically and aesthetically complex.  Elizabeth White Nelson argues the 
"devastation of the Civil War called into question the persuasiveness of sentimental 
rhetoric," and that classes which had employed sentimental rhetoric for political gain, 
such as women, abolitionists, and African and Native Americans, became increasingly 
suspect (13).  Indeed, the calamity of the war affected the American scene much as the 
French Revolution changed the European.  Because sentimentalism was closely 
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associated with the writing of women in the US, however, its repudiation in later years is 
often inseparable from calls for the remasculinization of literature.  While there is no 
space here to detail its successive derogation by realist and modernist writers such as 
James and Pound, there have been important studies of the continuing role of 
sentimentalism in the very writers who claimed to detest it.  Gregg Camfield's 
Sentimental Twain: Samuel Clemens and the Maze of Moral Philosophy and Suzanne 
Clark's Sentimental Modernism: Women Writers and the Revolution of the Word are two 
particularly excellent works in this line.  The present study seeks to perform similar 
reconstitutive work on more contemporary texts written by writers who, in all likelihood, 
would loudly protest a description of their work as “sentimental.”  As I hope to show, 
however, there is more to be gained by such a description than the pleasure of a 
counterintuitive claim.  Seeking out the sentimental in these elite authors demonstrates 
how sentimentalism continues to provide a preferred mode of ethical and aesthetic 
engagement when rationalist schemes have been discredited.  
Returning to the scholarly archive, one must acknowledge the derogation of 
sentimentalism has been continued, to a great extent, by means of the very critical 
conversation that renewed interest in it, a conversation beginning in earnest with what 
Laura Wexler has called the “Douglas-Tompkins debate” (9).  In The Feminization of 
American Culture, Ann Douglas asserts that nineteenth-century sentimentalist writers 
jettisoned the tough community-based religious frame of thinking that was indigenous to 
the early colony and substituted it with a maudlin emotional individualism that was 
amenable to mass commodity culture and merely a “continuation of male hegemony in 
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different guises” (13).   There is, doubtlessly, much merit to these claims.  Despite the 
typical orientation of sentimentalist texts toward a larger community founded in shared 
fellow feeling, the moral individualism Douglas disdains is often quite evident in high 
sentimentalist texts.  Recall that Stowe, at the end of her famous novel, replies to her own 
question "But, what can any individual do?" by declaring famously: "they can see to it 
that they feel right" (511). Douglas’s argument, however, ignores the cultural power of 
nineteenth-century sentimentalist texts, a point sustained at length by Jane Tompkins in 
her Sensational Designs.  Many women writers of the nineteenth century, Tompkins 
argued, deployed the compelling rhetoric of feeling for counter-hegemonic ends, most 
spectacularly in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin.  Tompkins was not alone 
in her championing a reevaluation of sentimentalist writings.  Nina Baym and Judith 
Fetterley were also instrumental in starting a scholarly movement resulting in the 
recovery of thousands of texts written by American women writers of the nineteenth 
century as well as the consequent reevaluation of the standing arguments against 
sentimentalist rhetoric.   
The debate among feminists over the relative complicity or subversiveness of the 
American sentimentalist legacy ignited the critical conversation of which the present 
study is a part.  As many critics have noted, being “for” or “against” a literary and 
cultural movement such as sentimentalism makes less sense than being committed to 
understanding its forms, beginnings, and consequences.  The studies have been numerous 
and impressive: the essays collected in Shirley Samuel’s The Culture of Sentiment, Paula 
Bennett’s Poets in the Public Sphere, Julie Ellison’s Cato’s Tears, Lori Merish’s 
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Sentimental Materialism, and Elizabeth Barnes’s States of Sympathy, to name only a few 
of the historical and theoretical studies in an increasingly crowded discourse.  
Nevertheless, while scholars such as June Howard, Joanna Dobson, and Karen Sanchez-
Eppler have pressed to continue reclaiming the value of sentimental literature, the most 
influential arguments to emerge have tended to be critical of the tradition’s political uses. 
For example, in his collection of essays, Culture of Letters, Richard Brodhead critiques 
the “disciplinary intimacy,”—the personalization and sentimentalization of authority 
figures over their charges—that, he claims, characterizes antebellum domestic novels 
(18-19).  Similarly, in Tender Violence, her reading of turn-of-the-century photography, 
Laura Wexler reveals the ways in which the semiotics of domestic sentimentalism helped 
to normalize imperialist violence.  Though such readings have influenced my own 
(particularly in seeing the insidious power of sympathy at work in the texts discussed in 
chapter 3), I have been at least as engaged with two critiques of the sentimentalization of 
suffering—those of Lauren Berlant and Wendy Brown—which focus as much on the 
present as on the past.   
Berlant and Brown share a critical dissatisfaction with the centrality of violence 
and its specular recognition in the formation of political alliances, though the material 
terrains in which their critiques are fairly divergent. In The Female Complaint: The 
Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture, Berlant objects to 
sentimentalism’s political and ethical consequences primarily on two counts. First, the 
creation of “pain alliances” through narrative commodities are at best “ameliorative, a 
matter not of changing the fundamental terms that organize power, but of following the 
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elevated claims of vigilant sensitivity, virtue, and conscience,” and, at worst, it reiterates 
and normalizes the oppressive violence in an aethesticized, commodified relation (35).   
What Berlant finds paradigmatically wrong about the scene of sympathetic witness is, 
first, that it creates “an ideology of true feeling [that] cannot admit the nonuniversality of 
pain” and, second, the politics of personal feeling cannot address institutional injustices, 
so that the urge to produce “acts oriented toward publicness becomes replaced by a world 
of private thoughts, leanings, and gestures” (41). She does, however, hold that the 
sentimental model is charged with continuing possibility and analyzes, under the rubric 
“postsentimental” or “countersentimental,” texts such as James Baldwin’s “Everybody’s 
Protest Novel,” which distinguish themselves from their predecessors by their use of “the 
powerful language of rageful truth-telling” as well as their refusal of “the fantastical 
optimism central to the sentimental narrative,” and the temptation to “make claims for the 
tactical efficacy of suffering and morning” (Woodward 72, Berlant 57).  In many ways, 
Berlant’s critique repeats Douglas’s unhappiness with sentimentalism’s individualism 
and commodification of feeling. Wendy Brown’s States of Injury is not concerned with 
sentimentalism but with racial, ethnic, and gender identities that are “invested in [their] 
own history of suffering” and cannot give up these investments “in the pursuit of an 
emancipatory democratic project” (55).  In Brown’s view, this nursing of injury, of 
Nietzschean ressentiment, transforms political endeavors into a search for recognition 
instead of transformation and the self-overcoming of genuine freedom (76-77).  In short, 
whereas Berlant rejects sentimentalism as a distraction from the processes of structural 
victimization, Brown finds the identitarian focus on victimization itself to be confining 
 
 24 
and, ultimately, an outgrowth of liberalism’s too-pallid logic, feigned attention, and real 
indifference.  
Structure and Singularities of Sentiment 
These two arguments, which I see as addressing two key limits in the 
sentimentalist model, have deeply influenced my reading of its structure.  Brown and 
Berlant have forced me to attend to, on the one hand, the discrepancy between 
individualist calls to feeling and structural inequalities and, on the other, the limits on the 
universalism of any social body projected by and through representations of suffering. 
Indeed, in her diagnosis of its affective pedagogy, Berlant anticipates my own reading of 
sentimentalism's basic structure: a suffering figure is spectacularly exposed, sometimes 
“directly” to the reader but much more often through an intermediary figure whose 
sympathetic, affective, and/or diagnostic reaction to the suffering figure pedagogically 
models ideal affective responses for the reader.  This tableau vivant is something like the 
“primal scene” of Judeo-Christian ethics, allowing for Brown’s warning against the 
ressentiment into which cherishing such an image always threatens to devolve. Rooted, as 
I have shown, in the philosophies of Hume, Smith, and Hutcheson, the scene’s moral 
valances flow from the notion that morals are based on direct experience and projected 
imagination—sight and empathetic projection—and thus follow the passions rather than 
abstracted reason.  Furthermore, though Berlant does not recognize this explicitly, the 
sentimental scene has not only a procedural element—the emotional witness and 
sympathetic act—but also always projects an implied social body—a community 
responding to, though sometimes also responsible for, the suffering in question.   
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That the scene of suffering, real or imagined, is central to the establishment of a 
social body means that it will likely be subject to Brown’s critique of identity categories 
founded in victimhood. However, this social body need not, as Berlant holds, be 
projected as unconflicted and non-hierarchical, as my readings will demonstrate.  Nor 
does it have to presuppose a basic human benevolence, which she also seems to imply; 
indeed, many classic sentimentalist texts, such as Mackenzie's The Man of Feeling, 
function affectively only by foregrounding general moral corruption and contrasting it 
with the sensitive soul whose affective experiences provide instruction.  Beside these 
essentially minor objections and corrections, I must place a more substantive complaint.  
Both Brown and Berlant tend to read scenes of suffering and the social bodies they 
conjure as performing in advance all of the possible cultural, political, and aesthetic work 
of which they are capable.  To an extent, this is the nature of a certain variety of theory, 
which abstracts underlying causes and offers determinative definitions for literary, 
cultural, and political phenomena. Yet, while they enumerate many of the likely failings 
of such “pain alliances,” I disagree with the implication that every citation of this model 
will result in the same political and ethical effect, namely, a reduction to civic-minded 
liberalism’s recognition, a recognition that, in their view, completely vitiates the power of 
imaginative care.  Indeed, one reason its proponents might embrace an ethics based in 
feeling is precisely because of its capacity to test the standing, inert accounts of the good 
based on structural and rationalist discourses, that is, to use affective intuition to correct 
dominant fields of political, economic, and juridical power.  Feeling can be a means of 
trying out and revising symbolic codifications via experiential and imaginative claims.  It 
 
 26 
is sentimentalism’s openness to revision that most intrigues me, and it is why, in my own 
thinking, I have shifted from an approach emphasizing sentimentalism’s structural, 
generic, or categorical properties to a genetic approach, focusing on how it has been, and 
can be, put to work differently in differing spaces.  
Describing this shift in thought requires a momentary detour into the 
philosophical problem of determination, the conflicting views of Aristotle and Gilles 
Deleuze on the matter, followed by a brief analogy to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the 
habitus.  In essence, the problem of determination concerns what kind of thing a 
particular something is, a way of answering the question: “What is X?”  Without a doubt, 
the most dominant means of resolving the problem of determination in Western 
philosophy was devised by Aristotle, who framed the matter in terms of identities, 
categories, and subject-predicate relations (191-5).  Two things can be the same, for 
Aristotle, in one of any ten categorical senses, the most important of which, for our 
purposes, is essence.  If two things, “though exhibiting differences in kind” share the 
same essence, they may be predicated in the same genus, and in this sense are identical. 
Aristotle’s is a mode of thinking in which a subject can be determined through the 
attachment of fixed predicates that can be ascribed to them and which can be, in theory, 
exhaustively identified and determined (191).  Such a means of determination is, after all, 
an invaluable organizational tool, allowing for the precise categorization of materials, 
placing them in tidy piles of shared predicates, and for this reason, it came to influence 
not only the development of formal logic but of the earliest Western discourses in 
biology.   
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For all its utility, however, it remains a heuristic tool that can, in crucial ways, 
distort our view of what is being thus determined.  In Difference and Repetition, Gilles 
Deleuze argues that Aristotle’s view (and its variations throughout the Western 
philosophical tradition) ought to be jettisoned, at least from a philosophical perspective.  
Instead, he favors a genetic mode of determination, which he, following philosopher 
Salomon Maimon, designates as “differential” by analogy with the formula expressing 
the slope of a curve in Leibnizian calculus.  In this line of argument, a thing is 
determinable only in relation to a set of other variable terms relevant to it.  There is no 
transcendent or independent term--x--only a differential relation constitutive of X that is 
shifting in time.  Thus: “Ideas appear in the form of a system of ideal connections—in 
other words, a system of differential relations between reciprocally determined genetic 
elements” (Difference 173-4).  This model of thinking can be likened to how biological 
speciation works, for rather than really existing genera and species—like papers placed in 
transcendental files—there are in fact nothing but genetic variations of greater and lesser 
diversity, determinable primarily by the way in which their genetic instructions tend 
toward the production of shared attributes.   
“Ideas are complexes of coexistence,” writes Deleuze, and he uses the term 
“singularities,” another idea borrowed from mathematics, to suggest the ways in which 
iterations of a thing or idea converge around certain possibilities more than others 
without being absolutely required to repeat one another (Difference 186, 190).  
Singularities are thus the relational arrangements of coexistence to which ideas trend or 
around which their most likely possibilities condense.  I introduce this brief elucidation of 
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Deleuze’s notion of differential determination to suggest that sentimentalism should not 
be thought of as a stable object of inquiry, at least not in the sense that we could then 
append an exhaustive set of predicates to it and go in search accordingly.  Instead, 
sentimentalism is a set of affective relations structured around sights cathected with 
imaginative compassion, traceable but also highly flexible, and therefore sometimes, as 
with the texts to which I attend in this study, it can go unrecognized as such because 
scholars have decided, in advance, where it can occur and where it cannot.  
Sentimentalism, thus, does not end at a specifiable historical moment, nor is it something 
that can be imported only into certain (pop cultural) contexts but not in other (high 
literary) realms where the difference is specifiable in advance, nor is it something that 
will behave invariably the same way wherever it is encountered, such that this behavior is 
its essence.  In this emphasis on tendencies over determination through predication, my 
hope is to produce an idea of sentimentalism that is both meaningfully descriptive, and 
yet flexible enough to allow for variation across different iterations. A genetic 
determination of sentimentalism is a conceptual means of preserving the inventiveness of 
its cultural practitioners.   
In this sense, it is much like a de-subjectivized version of Pierre Bourdieu’s 
notion of the habitus, which is “an acquired system of generative schemes objectively 
adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted” (95).  A set of received 
rules that enable social improvisations, the habitus, as a concept, allows Bourdieu to side-
step constructivist determinism as well as the kind of no-nothing existentialism that holds 
humans have complete freedom to act as they wish regardless of acculturation and social 
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pressures.  Sentimentalism should be figured as just such a script from which one can 
depart, but on which one can also depend.  The concept of sentimentalism I sketch here is 
the guiding principle in my consideration of these works, but the realization of its 
tendencies, or singularities, differs in each case.  Thus, contained within the genetic 
material of sentimentalism are a set of assumptions and hopes about causality, space, 
cognition, and social ordering that shape, but do not govern, its use. Thus, to think 
sentimentalism genetically means, first, to think it capable of change, modification, 
permutation, and, second, to think it within a field of relations, which is to say, spatio-
politically.  Here then are sentimentalism’s spatio-political singularities. 
Affecting Space 
 As I mentioned above, in relation to Berlant and Brown, the sentimental model 
focuses on a specific, microcosmic scene of witnessed suffering, but from this scene (or 
scenes), by virtue of the repetition of feeling (in the witness, and then in the reader) a 
comprehensive, or transcendent, social body is conjured.  By social body, I mean only a 
kind of imagined community produced by the relation of feeling, or conversely, a 
community is defined against such a relation.  It is, like Benedict Anderson’s conception 
of a nation as an imagined community, figured as “both inherently limited and sovereign” 
(6). In Anderson’s influential view, every nation “is imagined because the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (6).  The 
social bodies in question here, however, need not correspond with culturally established 
or readily legible communities such as state, ethnos, or polis, nor must it correspond only 
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with the network of readers as they figure their own “communion.”  It can be a 
community to come, a community that should be present, and is not.  
Its contours are textually determined by the repetition of affect.  It is this 
repetition of affect, via imaginative projection, that constitutes sentimentalism’s 
rhizomatic network, which can be imagined as a horizontal force for equivalence and 
equalization.  I sympathize; my body marks our sameness; our experiences are virtually, 
but not literally, interchangeable. The conjured social body is a sign of our affective and 
ethical equivalence.  This sameness of feeling, which smuggles with it a claim to 
sameness of worth, can be plotted horizontally across mixed terrain to the point of an 
imagined universality of ethical value or worth.  There is tremendous danger that, in the 
creation of an ethical equivalence, important differences will be collapsed or reduced.  
My reading of Anna Deavere Smith’s documentary theater in chapter 2 shows precisely 
how she manages to reconfigure the politics of sentimentalism through her art to produce 
a form of sympathy crafted through difference, not in spite of it, thus avoiding a threat 
inherent to the sentimentalist model. In that model, as Berlant’s critique implies, the 
original scene of fellow feeling establish itself on the basis of the sharp inequality of 
circumstance, a vertical structuring, between the injured and those protected from injury.  
But when she maintains that “an ideology of true feeling cannot admit the 
nonuniversality of pain,” she only touches on the truth, for the sentimental scene 
necessarily makes admittance of hierarchical difference (how else can suffering be 
figured?), but does so only to efface it as ethically irrelevant (Berlant 41).  Thus, the 
sentimental scene carries with it two virtual elements, one involving production of a 
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horizontal equivalence of feeling while the other requires the elision of vertical 
hierarchies that divide or diminish feeling. 
Because the scene of sympathetic witness carries with it these two virtual 
elements, one must attend to the imagined spaces that are produced by such scenes.  
Indeed, much work produced by scholars concerned with sentimentalism’s relation to the 
domestic novel focuses on the attendant imagined spaces, though they (rightly) cast these 
explorations in terms of separate spheres ideology.  Read in terms of spatiality, the 
domestic was an imagined place in which amoral publicness could be rectified via the 
rigors of feminine Christian feeling.  Tompkins is thus a theorist of space as much a 
historian of the work that this literature performs. Senator Bird’s encounter with Eliza in 
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, a scene I read in greater detail in chapter 3 in conjunction 
with Wideman’s Philadelphia Fire, is a case in point. After Senator Bird admits to his 
wife’s horror that he voted for the Fugitive Slave Act, which sanction those in the North 
who aid escaped slaves, the Birds are confronted with just such a slave woman, Eliza, and 
her son Harry, who have just crossed into Ohio and badly need assistance.  The American 
legislature is figuratively reconvened in the Senator’s den, where his wife dismisses it in 
favor of the fiat of the heart(h).   To read the scene in this way registers the salience of 
separate spheres ideology, but also registers the emendation of that ideology as it 
intersects with other shifting geographical borders, one of which figures the conflict 
between economic modes, coded North and South, as billowing up into Ohio, into the 
houses of the otherwise independent and free who refuse to be enslaved by an invading 
law.  In short, the student of sentimentalism must ask: what geographies are the most 
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salient for understanding the operation of sentiment in the present text—what borders are 
elided and what walls erected?  Worth sketching here are three spatio-political tensions or 
ambiguities that plague the sentimentalist model and which I locate in specific 
contemporary texts.  
The first is the way in which it fuses and confuses privacy and publicity.  
Recalling Berlant’s articulation of sentimentalism’s ambivalence, in which she prioritized 
the ways in which public action can contract into private feeling, one can instead say that 
sentimentalism is a discourse and practice in which the private and public open on each 
other and, in some crucial ways, lose their coherence.  Hence, Berlant is right that 
sentimentalism risks privatizing what ought to be public responses and aetheticizing real 
world problems, but she is wrong not to recognize, as in Stowe, that so-called private 
ethical feeling can be used to address and correct public wrongs.  Or, as in Edmund 
Burke’s conservative revision of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, one can attempt to 
found the state’s publicness on the strength of the family’s privacy, and busy oneself with  
 
 
binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties; adopting 
our fundamental laws into the bottom of our family affections; keeping 
inseparable and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually 
reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our alters (49).   
 
 
 
Though Burke’s usage of it is ideological and reactionary, the logic of sentimentalism 
also carries with it the capacity to upturn such orthodoxies by putting what seems outside 
on the inside.  Thus it can create in comfortable privileged subjects an interior self-
critical nagging that can be nourished to the point of a productive shift in action. 
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Sentiment, in short, muddies the putative boundary between public and private, and does 
so with decidedly mixed ethical and political consequences. As I show in chapter 1, Roth 
domesticates a broiling ressentiment he sees dividing the larger American social body, 
with the result that he universalizes it—thus critiquing fictions of national 
unconflictedness.  In a different way, the authors I consider in chapter 4 respond to the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 by domesticating the nation as a shaken family, an 
imaginative trope widely employed in the media to dispel confusion over historical 
narratives and suture viewers affectively to the imagined community of the nation.  
 This second example introduces another spatial ambiguity characteristic of 
sentimentalism, one that is an outgrowth of the first, namely, uncertainties about the 
expansiveness of imaginative projection.  Ought the conjured social body be identified 
with a family, a novel’s readership, a play’s audience, a city, a nation, the world, or some 
oscillation between these bodies?  To the extent that the conjured social body of fellow 
feeling coincides with the nation-state, then in makes sense to treat it more or less 
explicitly as an Andersonian imagined community.  In fact, however, it is rare that the 
conjured body of sentimentalism’s scenes of suffering corresponds so closely with the 
state, even when there is an evident attempt to connect them, as my readings of work by 
Roth, Foer, and Updike attest.  Instead, their metaphoric correspondence carries with it a 
quality of superimposition.  In this way, as I show in chapter 4, Updike’s Terrorist can be 
converted by sympathy, both his own and the reader’s, from murderous religiosity to 
teenage mediocrity, thus domesticating the global terrain of conflict between the U.S. and 
al-Qaeda to smaller zones of feeling—the nation’s urban collapse, the rise of single 
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mother families—without ever making one identical to the next.  The question raised by 
such a set of superimpositions is this: has global terrorism been domesticated in order to 
permit its readership to bridge otherwise vast cultural domains and come to understand 
the alienated passion of its attackers, or has the novel cast terrorism domestically in order 
to locate it as simply another element in the internal degradation of American families 
and cities?  The first two ambiguities, then, are closely related: the first focuses on the 
uncertain direction in which the affections move, while the second concerns the unclear, 
or multiple parameters of the social body the scene of suffering consequently projects.  
The third and final ambiguity I locate within the sentimentalist model is that it 
often projects (at least) two distinct and often contradictory social bodies: one coherent 
and sympathetically constituted and another obviously broken and conflicted.  One can 
think of the disconnection between Adam Smith’s “immense machine” and the 
indifference of a European man of sentiment to the Chinese earthquake (463).  Terry 
Eagleton holds that sentimentalism is, in this sense, plainly ideological, for it figures the 
violent circumstances to which the witness sympathetically responds as the exception 
rather than the rule.  For a middle class sentimentalist of the eighteenth century, 
“[i]deologically speaking, love and affection must be fundamental; empirically speaking, 
they are nothing of the kind” (40).  The play between these poles of benevolence and 
corruption is central to how Roth’s American Trilogy can at once critique as fantasy the 
pastoralism dominant among post-war suburbanites, yet still sentimentally mourn the loss 
of such a pastoralism through its imaginative projection, as I show in chapter 1.  It might 
also be used to critique Anna Deavere Smith’s theatrical practice, for if a largely white 
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Simi Valley jury is incapable of sympathizing with the beaten Rodney King, as for many 
they proved to be after the first trial of King’s assailants, why should her theatrical 
collation of testimony about the beating and the riots that followed produce a different 
result in her audience?  Yet, Smith’s work demonstrates that such a critique will not 
always hold, for, as I show in chapter 2, with sufficient consciousness of form and place, 
the sentimental model can ignite a greater sense of affective and ethical equivalence 
while at the same time revealing the structural hierarchies that customarily impede a 
sense of parity.  But even if the conflict between these two social bodies is a misfit that 
allows for the annulment of the laws of the land (the nation as it is) in favor of the law of 
the heart (the affective responses of readers or audience members), there is still a 
disconnect between the social body it projects and the social body to which it attends.  
For antebellum abolitionists such as Stowe, the latter broken body could be figured 
simplistically as a matter of North and South. For the period my study concerns, the most 
salient geography of conflict is within urban space itself. 
Pitying the City 
It is for this reason that I claim one cannot understand contemporary 
sentimentalism without also understanding American cities. Economically and 
ideologically, the greatest political conflicts in contemporary American culture occur 
between urban and suburban or exurban populations.  In contemporary America, the 
division between city and non-city is one of the most predictable indicators of political 
divisions, a fact that the news media’s color-coding of the Electoral College map into tidy 
red and blue entities typically erases.  Cities are the locus for ideological conflicts, shifts 
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in the flow of capital, and most importantly for the purposes of this study, the privileged 
site of the spectacular immiseration of minority populations.  This reality explains why 
they have been used so consistently as a setting for sentimentally attended conflicts in the 
literature considered here.  In order to complete my articulation of the relation between 
resurgent sentimentalism, urban struggle, and contemporary literature, however, I must 
start with the thread just established—namely, what I have called sentimentalism’s 
spatio-temporal singularities.   Therefore, I begin this section by conjoining the last of 
those characteristics with contemporary theorizations of space, as exemplified in the 
thought of Yi-Fu Tuan and Henri Lefebvre.  Following this theoretical model, I return to 
the historical specificities to which the authors considered by this study respond, namely, 
the urban processes altering American cities since the early 1970s, of which I can here 
provide only the faintest sketch.  My reading of these processes is based on the influential 
work of David Harvey, who is at once a theorist of the political economy of space and a 
diagnostician of postmodern culture.  Using Harvey’s theory will allow me to prepare for 
this study’s conclusion, which comes full circle to compare my own diagnosis of the 
relation between space, affect, and contemporary literature with that offered by Fredric 
Jameson in his influential 1984 essay, “Postmodernism, or, the Logic of Late 
Capitalism.”  
Recall the spatial polarity described above as the third and last spatial ambiguity 
of sentimental witness—namely the paradoxical tension between specific sites of 
conflict, attended to by emotional projection, and the broad principle of an 
undifferentiated, smoothly functioning social body.  I link this ambiguity to a now-
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famous distinction between place and space, introduced into urban theory by humanist 
geographer Yi-Fu Tuan in 1977, and subsequently revised by Henri Lefebvre.  The 
explanatory usefulness of the distinction between space and place, as well as the way the 
distinction resituated development studies around the experience of living inhabitants, are 
the major legacies of Tuan’s scholarly exploration of the relation between human 
emotions and space.  In a formulation that has become famous, Tuan writes 
 
 
What begins as undifferentiated space becomes places as we get to know it better 
and endow in with value. […] The ideas “space” and “place” require each other 
for definition.  From the security and stability of place we are aware of the 
openness, freedom, and threat of space, and vice versa.  Furthermore, if we think 
of space as that which allows movement, then place is pause; each pause in 
movement makes it possible for a location to be transformed into place. (Tuan 6) 
 
 
 
Thus space is a uniform mechanical volume, a scientifically designated set of parameters 
otherwise empty, abstract, and ready to be filled with activity, while place is established, 
specific, emotionally colored, and characterized by the cessation of activity as well as the 
passive absorption of detail by the senses.  It is not hard to see that the relationship 
between place and space roughly parallels the distinction I sketched above between the 
highly conflicted, emotional site of sympathetic witness—with all its narrative specificity 
and iconic suspension—and the abstract social body projected by such scenes.  The 
parallel does not, in and of itself, add significantly to my reading of the political stakes of 
this ambiguity of sentimentalism, but if we add to Tuan’s reading the contributions of 
Henri Lefebvre, the situation is remedied. 
Lefebvre borrows and amends Tuan’s distinction for his own Marxist reading of 
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the production of space.  Lefebvre argues that, instead of place emerging out of space, as 
individuals grow more familiar with specific surroundings, space is produced 
ideologically through a “trialectical” interaction of material practices, disciplinary 
representations, and cultural products.  In his view, the concept of space as an 
undifferentiated and homogeneous material is unnatural and ideological.  Space, in this 
reading, is what is ready for use by capital, having been first tacitly owned by the state, 
and thus must be regulated and divided by its businessmen and bureaucrats. 
 
 
The ideologically dominant tendency divides space up into parts and parcels in 
accordance with the division of labour. It bases its image of the forces occupying 
space on the idea that space is a passive receptacle. Thus, instead of uncovering 
the social relationships (including class relationships) that are latent in spaces, 
instead of concentrating our attention on the production of space and the social 
relationships that are inherent to it - relationships which introduce specific 
contradictions into production so echoing the contradiction between the private 
ownership and the means of production and the social character of the productive 
forces – we fall into the trap of treating space as space “in itself,” as such.  (90) 
 
 
 
Lefebvre’s point is that the ideology of space makes it appear homogenous, without 
value, mathematically extendible when in fact it is composed of specific places, 
ecologies, materials, and, after the process of urbanization, highly conflicted between the 
interests of various classes.  The disjunction between the ideology of space and our lived 
environment corresponds with the ethical ambiguities and tensions at play in the 
performative model of sentimentalist witness. We will care for those within a place, but 
not in space.  To further extrapolate from Lefebvre’s scheme, because space trades in 
abstractions, those outside the space of nation, wherever this entity is most salient, can be 
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easily relegated to statistical losses.  That both national and supra-national geographies 
are emotionally conceived as spaces allows for other ideological fictions, particularly the 
illusion that American citizenship guarantees evenly distributed protection and care.  In 
this sense, those domestic places of suffering that become visible and publicized—
Rodney King’s beating, the Los Angeles riots, the damage of Hurricane Katrina—can be 
sentimentally attended to as a means of producing them as exceptional places in which 
human value has been degraded while the remaining American domestic space goes on 
functioning healthily.  Such a view omits the degradations of urban immiseration, crime, 
and preventable disease in America’s civic spaces, to say nothing of the condition of the 
nation’s massive prison population.   
The social body conjured by sentimental scenes can therefore function as space in 
Lefebvre’s ideological sense—producing an idea of harmonious interactions underlying a 
terrain that is in fact experientially riven with conflict over resources and concomitant 
suffering.  Putting the ideas in relation to one another underscores the falseness of Francis 
Hutcheson’s claim that sentiments of fellow feeling diminish, wavelike, with increased 
distance. Sentimental connection is less a matter of geographical distance than relational 
place, for I can let my neighbor languish in misery just as easily as I can ignore the 
storied Chinese earthquake, so long as their suffering remains in a realm papered over by 
fond thoughts of my own and my cohort’s benevolence.  As evidence of this parallel 
between ideologically and sentimentally constructed spaces, consider geographer Don 
Mitchell’s observation that the “territorial segregation” of populations based on ethnicity 
may have been legitimated originally by explicitly racist discourse, but is now simply 
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ignored, overshadowed by a “celebration of constrained diversity” (120).  Mitchell 
maintains that  
 
 
The diversity represented in shopping centres, megastructures, corporate plazas 
and (increasingly) in public parks is carefully constructed... a space of social 
practice that sorts and divides social groups according to the dictates of comfort 
and order rather than to those of political struggle... The strategies of urban and 
corporate planners classify and distribute various social strata and classes (other 
than the one that exercise hegemony) across the available territory, keeping them 
separate and prohibiting all contacts - these being replaced by signs (or images) of 
contact. (Mitchell 120)  
 
 
 
In relation to Lefebvre’s theory, we can say that the sentimentalized social body conjured 
by the scene of suffering is an example of producing an ideological space from a 
geographic place.  But, and this fact is critical for understanding sentimentalism’s mixed 
political potential, the affective space produced by scenes of sympathetic witness need 
not be ideologically regressive nor need it distract from an honest assessment of a given 
society’s actual state of care.   It can be utopian as well, as even Lefebvre maintains (39).  
The projected social space of non-alienation as a mode of political risk and possibility, a 
sense certainly suggested in Tuan’s thinking, is also available within sentimentalism’s 
generative schemes. We simply have to attend to the particulars of the text, concentrate 
on the stakes of differences collapsed therein, and note the interests served by the scene 
of sympathetic witness.  Indeed, one of the underlying claims of my study is that the 
authors I consider are each seeking to make a space in their work where real suffering 
and their reader can meet. 
Obviously conceptualizing how and why real suffering occurs the way it does 
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presents an obstacle beyond the reckoning of this study, especially since the historical 
phenomena out of which these texts emerge owe to extremely complex and varied 
changes in American cities over the last thirty years.  Therefore, humility demands some 
reticence.  In my effort to grasp the big picture, however, I have been guided by the work 
of geographer David Harvey, who, in The Limits of Capital (1982) described the logic 
underlying urban shifts through a modified Marxian reading of capital’s processes. 
Agreeing with Marx’s basic claim that capitalism leads to crises of overaccumulation, as 
laborers are increasingly unable to afford the goods that they produce and for which they 
are insufficiently remunerated, Harvey suggests that two different “fixes” keep the 
system from collapsing into panic and revolt, or rather postpone such a collapse.  The 
first of these is a temporal fix, whereby the profits accumulated from production are, 
instead of being reinvested directly in that production, are diverted to the financial sector, 
from which they are lent out on a much longer term, in the hopes that producing 
comparable rates of return without commodity gluts (Limits 324-325).  
Closely related—indeed, perhaps inseparably so—is the spatial fix, which 
requires “the production of new spaces within which capitalist production can proceed 
(through infrastructural investment, for example, [and] the growth of trade and direct 
investment” (Limits 416-417, Condition 183).  The ultimate result of the extension of 
spatio-temporal fixes, however, is simply the ever-widening production of increasingly 
uneven and violently shifting geographies of development and wealth.  Over the course 
of decades of studies and texts, Harvey has argued that this economic system explains 
both the immiseration of the American urban underclass and the culture of 
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postmodernism, which he sees as an outgrowth neoliberal globalization.  A further 
articulation of Harvey’s views of urban development and culture will have to wait until, 
in my conclusion, I consider the narrative of change provided by his theorization in 
conjunction with Fredric Jameson’s diagnosis of postmodern, suggesting finally that the 
authors of this study provide their readers with what Jameson calls “cognitive maps” for 
understanding our affective interrelation within the spaces produced by recent economic 
and urban changes. 
 In order to chart the highly varied spatial and political terrain within which each 
of these authors examines the sympathetic gaze, I rely heuristically on Edward R. Soja’s 
“discourses on the postmetropolis” (xv).  Soja, a notable urban theorist in his own right, 
produced a rough classification of “the different but interrelated schools of thought that 
have consolidated over the past few decades to make sense of the new urbanization 
processes affecting the world in the late twentieth century” (xv-xvi, italics original).  In 
essence, Soja divides the massive bibliography of urban studies into the following 
clusters of “scholarly representations alternatively describ[ing] the postmetropolis” as 
 
 
 (1) a flexibly specialized Postfordist Industrial Metropolis; (2) a globalized city-
region or Cosmopolis; (3) a postsuburban Exopolis […]; (4) a Fractal City of 
intensified inequalities and social polarization; (5) a Carceral Archipelago of 
fortressed cities and (6) a collection of hyperreal Simcities where daily life is 
increasingly played out as if it were a computer game. (xvi) 
 
 
 
Though not each of these discourses is addressed by my study, I am indebted to Soja’s 
classificatory convenience as well as his recommendations within the scholarly archive.  
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For the purposes of this study, deindustrialization leads to three related phenomena: first, 
“white flight” to the suburbs, a migration beginning before the advent of the automobile, 
but exponentially intensified by the racial desegregation of schools; second, the influx of 
cheap immigrant labor from Asia and Central America, populations now joining the 
downwardly mobile African-Americans and poor whites left in city centers; and, third, 
the increased carceral control of the state exerted on urban spaces after upwardly mobile 
populations left.  I tackle each of these developments in my first three chapters.  The 
fourth chapter, as noted above, considers the sentimental trends within the literature 
emerging from the attacks of September 11, 2001, a subject that may at first seem at odds 
with the concerns of the earlier chapters.  Nevertheless, it too attempts to tackle an 
unavoidable, historically novel occurrence within urban development, that is, the natural 
outgrowth of Harvey’s spatio-temporal expansion: global conflict within a global city.  
By connecting the World Trade Center attacks to the urban crisis I do not mean to 
suggest that the threat of terrorism is reducible to class antagonism, a view that 
impoverishes historical specificity, begs the question of justification, and ignores crucial 
cultural and ideological causes.  It would also be thoughtless, however, to ignore the 
connection between the rise of militant Islam and the American economy’s increasing 
implication in the Middle East’s resources, all part of enabling people like Swede Levov 
to commute from growing exurban towns like Old Rimrock to crumbling industrial cities 
like Newark.   
 The first chapter, then, reads Philip Roth’s American Trilogy (American Pastoral, 
I Married a Communist, and The Human Stain) for the ways in which it reveals how the 
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logic of compassionate sentiment and bitter ressentiment become intermingled in the 
subjective experiences of white ex-urbanites who have fled from, but cannot fully 
abandon, cities whose industry historically underwrote their prosperity. Roth’s novels 
both repeat and revise the sentimentalist tradition at two related levels: first, by the 
linking of familial and national domesticities and, second, through the trope of the 
compassionate observer, who serves as nexus of social feeling and textual performance.  
In each of the trilogy’s novels, Roth dramatizes familial failure as coterminous with 
urban discord and national historical strife. In these novels, the agonized and racially 
divided inner city of Newark, NJ after the 1967 riots serves as a locus of suffering in a 
larger American domestic sphere in crisis.  However, Roth sets against these crises of 
communal belonging the sympathetic capacities of his authorial stand-in, Nathan 
Zuckerman, who, in sentimental fashion, performatively models for his reader a redefined 
Americanness rooted in imaginative commiseration.  The intermingling of selves in this 
commiseration mirrors Roth’s depiction of Jewishness as liminal ethnicity, neither white 
nor non-white. I chart a reciprocal relation between white flight and the simultaneous 
sentimentalization and racialization of urban spaces.  Here I draw on Jackson’s 
Crabgrass Frontier and, to a lesser extent, on Soja’s reading of America’s ever 
increasing suburbanization in the form of what he calls “exopolis” or edge cities (250).  
Rejecting the pastoral escapism of suburban, or ex-urban, life, but also participating in 
the spatio-affective logic that undergirds white flight, Roth universalizes ressentiment to 
deconstruct collective identities and to figure Americanness as the intermittent, perhaps 
illusory, transcendence of victimhood. Roth repudiates the most obvious ideological 
 
 45 
valances of the sentimentally unconflicted social body.  He simultaneously jettisons the 
utopian elements so that his universalization of ressentiment is ultimately reactionary.  
Roth’s texts both reflect and critique the larger cultural shift emphasizing victimhood that 
remapped antagonism into the national social space.    
If the first chapter was concerned with the ways in which sentimentalism was 
implicated in the centrifugal disintegration and segregation of the social body along race 
and class lines, the second chapter is concerned with the centripetal forces inherent to 
sentimentalism’s power of communal convocation.  It examines the sentimental mode of 
affective pedagogy at work in three of Anna Deavere Smith’s documentary plays—“Fires 
in the Mirror,” “Twilight: Los Angles, 1992,” and “House Arrest,” which together form 
the bulk of her on-going dramatic project “On The Road: In Search of American 
Character.” I contextualize Smith’s sentimental art by placing it in relation to Soja’s 
“Fractal city,” an urban space of balkanized diversity that emerged when new waves of 
immigrants from Asia and Central America joined the largely poor blacks left in city 
centers.  As in Roth’s novels, Smith seeks to construct a notion of American belonging 
by focusing on urban communities devastated by class and ethnic unrest, taking up the 
complex aftermaths of the 1991 Crown Heights riots and the 1992 Los Angeles riots.  
Smith’s dramatic technique—interviewing hundreds of citizens and community leaders 
and then performing their words herself in a one woman show—reterritorializes the body 
politic onto a body dramatic and seeks to reconfigure the blindly suffering city as its own 
audience, attending to the vicissitudes of its internal differences. While Roth and Smith 
repeat the structure and thematic concerns of nineteenth-century sentimentalism by 
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means of the same auto-referential structure—using the artist as model sympathetic 
witness—the consequences of their revision are vastly different politically and 
aesthetically. Smith spatially reconvenes the city to examine its diversity and its unequal 
power distribution through the conduit of her art and its use of sentimental witness.   
In neither Roth’s nor in Smith’s case, however, is the use of sentimentalism 
intertextually explicit; instead, they redeploy and revise a mode of emotional connection 
that is, as it were, “in the air.”  In my third chapter, however, I consider novels by two 
authors who explicitly take up nineteenth century American sentimentalism to comment 
on urban racial strife in the late-twentieth century.  Chang-Rae Lee’s Native Speaker and 
John Edgar Wideman’s Philadelphia Fire, two minority writers who draw more directly 
on nineteenth-century American sentimental nationalism (as embodied in Whitman’s 
“The Sleepers,” and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, respectively) to reveal, 
in the gaze of sympathy, a mode of hegemonic surveillance.  Like Smith and Roth, Lee 
and Wideman use the figure of the writer to model affective responses for their own 
text’s reception and to sketch a model of American belonging based on the capacity of 
fellow feeling.  Moreover, both draw heavily on the pathos of the lost child, the Ur-trope 
of American sentimentalism, to figure a coterminous familial, municipal, and national 
loss.  However, both Lee and Wideman consciously distance themselves from the 
sentimental tradition’s assurances of social coherence based on shared feeling, revealing 
instead how ethnic partitions linger in civic sentimentalism’s allegedly universal leveling.  
I contextualize this complex response—at once demanding sympathy and yet subjecting 
sympathetic vision to a hermeneutic of suspicion—by means of Soja’s elucidation of the 
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Carceral city.  
Having analyzed sentimental narratives that at once stage and soothe American 
conflict as a matter of domesticity and urban cohabitation, in the fourth chapter, I 
consider how such narratives have been extended in texts emerging from the aftermath of 
the September 11 terrorist attacks—a much different urban ruin.  Here I offer readings of 
novels by Don DeLillo, John Updike, and Jonathan Saffron Foer.   In these more recent 
works, instead of signifying a racialized space of internal conflict that requires the salve 
of active and imaginative sympathy from the citizen reader, the urban wasteland is a 
signifier of white, wounded masculinity and the configuration of fellow feeling is no 
longer a matter of active production but of passive infiltration.  While this final chapter 
does not purport to survey the narratives surrounding 9/11 exhaustively, I argue that 
discussions of 9/11 can be enriched by reaching beyond trauma theory and by engaging 
with how important elements derived from the sentimental tradition continue to play a 
decisive role in dominant notions of American political cohesion.  These writers engage 
with the challenge of thinking the changing role of affective witness within a global 
conflict and in relation to monumental suffering.  I link this to the conceptual and 
affective uncertainties outlined by Soja’s reading of the emergence of a “Cosmopolis,” or 
truly global city. 
In my conclusion, after reviewing how each author’s use of sympathetic bonding 
carries with it a secret spacialization—a map of belonging and un-belonging in which the 
limits of sympathy territorially mark the nation’s borders—I turn to the question of how 
these texts, which emerge from a historical period saturated with the ascendant 
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postulation of neoliberalism and globalization can lead us to a diagnosis of postmodern 
emotion. Having articulated the relation of sentiment to space, and drawn, however 
roughly, the urban discourses relevant to these writers, I briefly take up Fredric 
Jameson’s claim that postmodern culture is characterized by a “waning of affect” (10).  
While this claim ignores the complex continuities between earlier representations and 
performances of feeling and those characteristic of the present, Jameson’s famous essay 
anticipates the literary and cultural phenomena studied here with his notion of “cognitive 
mapping” (54). Though in many ways, Jameson’s essay has proven prophetic, literary 
history has not bourn out his reductive reading of postmodern emotion.   Indeed, it is 
worth thinking about how postmodernism’s characteristic abandonment of modernist 
metanarratives repeats the anti-rationalist conditions that gave rise to the culture, 
philosophy, and literature of sentiment in the first place
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CHAPTER II 
RESSENTIMENTAL EDUCATION: 
PERFORMING SYMPATHY IN THE RUINS OF PHILIP ROTH’S AMERICA 
 
 Although it is fanciful to pretend that any single moment, fictional or otherwise, 
can justly express what Raymond Williams would call an entire era’s “structure of 
feeling,” but I might nonetheless nominate a scene from Philip Roth’s American Pastoral 
as the model of the conflicting affective attitudes composing the muddle of civic feeling 
in late twentieth-century America, particularly the painful conflict between suburban 
ideals and urban realities (Williams 64). It is the moment when Seymour “Swede” Levov 
discovers that his fugitive daughter Merry, whom he has not seen since she began an anti-
Vietnam-War bombing campaign, has been living in downtown Newark, NJ, just a few 
blocks from his workplace, the glove factory that has been the source of his family’s 
fortune.  The reunion is decidedly agonizing.  The Swede struggles to accept the reality 
not merely that his daughter is a murderer (for he has lived in hopeful denial of this fact) 
but that she is also the victim of multiple rapes and beatings in the course of her fugitive 
years.  Now a devout Jain literally unwilling to injure a fly, Merry lives amid “the 
warehouses, the rubble, the garbage, the debris” in fetid squatting grounds near a 
highway underpass, and the Swede focuses his feelings on his fears for her safety (239). 
“That underpass is a home for derelicts—for derelicts who do not play by your rules,” he 
tells her, “[t]heir world is a ruthless world, Merry, a terrible world—a violent world” 
(249).  “They won’t harm me,” she replies, “they know that I love them” (249).    The 
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Swede is struck by what the narrator terms “the sentimental grandiosity of [her] self-
deception,” for, he asks, “[w]hat does she see in the hopeless scurryings of these 
wretched people that could justify such an idea?  Derelicts and love?  To be a derelict 
living in an underpass is to have clobbered out of you a hundred times over the minutest 
susceptibility to love” (250).  The Swede is unable to comprehend how this view of the 
derelicts might just as easily apply to his daughter, a person he has been unable to 
distinguish from these very derelicts as he passed them on his way to work for six 
months, a person who is both the murderer of four innocent people and the brutalized 
target of multiple rapes whom he desperately wants to shield from the urban menace 
around her.  The pathos of this moment derives largely from the father’s incapacity to 
reconcile radically differing notions of his daughter, as both victimizer and victim.  
Linking anagnorisis to catharsis with violent gusto, Roth ends the scene with the 
Swede—dizzied by Merry’s story and nauseated by her fetid room and unwashed body—
vomiting uncontrollably while he cries out “Who are you!” (266).   
For the Swede at this moment, Merry is a not so much a person as a powerful 
affect transforming him—“the smell of everything organic breaking down […] the smell 
of no coherence” (265).  In the larger context of the novel, Merry is less a character than 
a sociological force: the “daughter who transports [the Swede] out of the longed-for 
American pastoral […] and into the indigenous American berserk” (86).  This scene, 
then, allegorizes a larger anagnorisis, a realization that the sentimental yearning for 
unity—a unified family, city, or nation—based in care for the suffering of others is, in 
fact, an incoherent fantasy.  All that is available, the narrative would seem to suggest, is 
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ressentiment, a mode of affective antagonism produced by the capacity to create a 
putatively unbroken and blameless identity out of a moment of perceived victimization.  
And yet this scene of realization is itself sentimentally staged, a moment of a father’s 
heartbreak suggesting a larger cultural suffering.  This chapter seeks to articulate what 
Roth reveals to us about what I call ressentimentality—an unstable affective response at 
the fulcrum of racial resentment and liberal sympathy, the liminal space between utopian 
compassion and internecine conflicts and bitterness, a way of figuring national unity 
while at the same time disavowing it. While I probe the usefulness and limits of the 
concept of ressentimentality more rigorously below, here I use it as a way of 
understanding how Roth problematizes the affective and political status of victimhood.  
Why does he do so, and indeed, why should we be critically interested in his doing so?  
To answer this, one must consider the cultural milieu in which these novels intervene.  
Therefore, before proceeding into a reading of Roth’s novels, I offer a brief elucidation of 
the inter-implicated, Moebius-strip-like relation between sentimental and ressentimental 
views of victimhood by tracing their use in the politics of race and urbanization from the 
civil rights movement to the victims’ rights movement, and frame this movement in legal 
discourse within a description of how the relation between urban, suburban, and exurban 
spaces affected identity categories following the post-War period.   
The movement of more affluent sectors of the population to the periphery of cities 
is longstanding part of the American tradition, preceding the advent of the car (Teaford 
2).  In the post-war era, the process was radically accelerated by the emergence of the 
automobile and the government’s housing subsidies, which until Johnson’s “war on 
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poverty” in every way favored suburban development (Jackson 190). As Kenneth T. 
Jackson, in his seminal study of the suburbs Crabgrass Frontier observed, the suburban 
trend in Newark had been driving away Newark’s most affluent for generations.  Forty 
percent of the city’s attorneys lived in the suburbs in 1925; by 1965, the percentage had 
reached 78 percent (Jackson 275). In Jackson’s view, suburbanization was catalyzed by 
the development of the automobile, but “the polarization of urban neighborhoods by 
function, by income, and by race” was also crucial (274).  These centrifugal forces led to 
the advent of planned communities like the “Levittowns,” the first truly mass-produced 
suburb constructed cheaply and unimaginative by the firm of Levitt & Sons, Inc between 
1947 and 1951 (Jackson 234).  From the beginning, this movement was tied to class and 
race, and the mass production of housing merely intensified the process of 
homogenization. The suburban homogenization of rural space was always double: at once 
the production of an architecturally uniform space amenable to grid-like reductions but 
also the manufacture of the illusion of a political union more ethnically homogenous than 
was actually the case. As William Levitt declared, apropos his uniformly white 
settlements: “We can solve a housing problem, or we can solve a racial problem.  But we 
cannot combine the two” (qtd. in Jackson 241).   
Whether or not developments like the Levittowns “solved” the housing problem is 
an open question. As Soja notes, the effective carpeting of peripheral urban spaces would 
eventually lead to vast swathes of it becoming suburbanized sprawling cities in their own 
right, becoming, like California’s Orange County, edge cities or “exopolis” (233).  These 
evermore patulous zones of suburbanization meant that one had to settle farther and 
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farther out to distinguishing oneself from one’s peers or to get away from the 
encroachments of neighbors.  A. C. Spectorsky coined the term “exurbs” in 1955, 
describing them as the spotted settlements just beyond suburbia.  As he describes it, just 
after World War II, “the biggest influx” of ex-urbanites fled into these hinterlands: people 
very much like the Swede: “junior executives, those who follow the market leaders, the 
up-and-coming eager beavers, men in their middle and late thirties, the ones who wanted 
to do the thing-to do” (21).  Roth is interested in the emotional causes and effects of these 
retreats, considering Swede Levov’s move into a historic colonial house near Old 
Rimrock, a rural village in New Jersey, as well as Zuckerman’s parallel retirement to 
Berkshires. Indeed, Ralph Lombreglia’s review of American Pastoral for the Atlantic 
correctly identifies the story as “the life of Job in exurbia.”   In some senses this is 
accurate, but it neglects the ways in which the emotional motivations for movements into 
pastoral periphery are bound up with what is being left behind: a population and built 
environment increasingly racialized, threatening, and abject.  
While there are multiple sociological reasons for the massive shift in population 
known as “white flight,” highest among them is the resistance of whites to the integration 
of public schools (Kruse, Lassiter). For those whites leaving the urban tenement life of 
their parents, the movement is almost always figured as an atomized achievement.  Each 
migratory movement is viewed as an individual triumph in getting out of the slums, 
establishing a middle class home, and getting kids into “good schools”: in Roth’s words 
“the longed-for American pastoral” (86).  In truth, however, these movements are better 
understood not as a matter of millions of separate Herculean economic efforts but as part 
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of the larger historical migratory movement of whites within the United States.  But since 
the migration also transformed voting concentrations and the geography of revenue, 
several scholars have argued that white flight was "more than a physical relocation. It 
was a political revolution," forming the taproots of the Republican ascendancy (Kruse 6).  
Those now left behind—largely poorer non-whites left to the now “integrated” schools—
were frequently blamed for the sorry state of affairs in the cities. Owing at least in part to 
this socioeconomic balkanization and reduction of metropolitan tax bases, poor services, 
heavy crime, and bad infrastructure became increasingly common in American cities, 
while the communities in these now declining cities felt themselves the targets of 
conspiratorial practices like block-busting.   
Even as one reconsiders the historical and structural changes leading to this 
spatial segregation, one must not neglect the ways in these terrains come to be invested 
with emotion and meaning.  The time of the city dips into a trough of the past, either the 
familial past, or the past of a racially coded primitivism.  For some fleeing whites, the 
once hospitable city becomes an “urban jungle,” a place of anarchic revolution, and 
primordial humanity.  Indeed, this is why Merry’s rebellion is so carefully coded as 
urban, for her childish regression doubles the riotous damage done to Newark.  On the 
other hand, the time of the suburban and exurban periphery is caught up in its inhabitants’ 
own distractions, their sense of disconnection and private march toward death.  A space 
of engagement exists between the past’s desuetude and the future’s deathwardness.  
Within the canon of Jewish-American literature, Saul Bellow’s Mr. Sammler’s Planet 
and Bernard Malamud’s The Tenants are notable examples of novels dealing with these 
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shifting attitudes, and resentments, and they stage the possible resolutions. 
 I argue that Roth’s novels could, however, just as profitably be read in light of the 
emergence of victims’ rights discourse, a legal mode of argument modeled on the 
juridical examples and rhetorical reverberations of the Civil Rights Movement. Few can 
doubt the powerful and often problematic role played by sentimentalist rhetoric by 
advocates for greater equality among the races in America from the Civil War through 
the Civil Rights movement and beyond.  Martin Luther King, Jr’s “I Have a Dream” 
speech would be only the most obvious example of its resonant use. In light of the near 
universal piety about the previously controversial King following his assassination, 
appeals to anti-desegregationist voters could not be voiced in openly racist terms, as they 
had been only years before, but instead had to be couched in more subtle forms: state’s 
rights discourse, for example, or, more pertinently for the present study, fears of urban 
crime.1   The victims’ rights movement promulgated the view that the American legal 
system is more concerned with safeguarding the constitutional rights of alleged offenders 
than it is with the victims of the alleged offenses (Rentschler 220).  The movement 
sought to institutionalize the recognition of new legal rights to crime victims as victims, 
as a coherent group, by bestowing on victims or their families the power to speak at 
sentencing hearings, to be present during the trial of defendants, and to be notified of the 
prison release of offenders (H.J. Res. 64).  In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, 
individual states passed victim's rights amendments, notably “the silent landslide” of 
amendments in 1992, which perhaps owed to law-and-order sentiment after the Los 
Angeles riots (“Victims’ rights” 30).  By 2000, every state constitution had some version 
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of “victims’ rights,” but advocates still pressed for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
(House hearing 47).  In an effort to outdo one another in toughness on crime, both Al 
Gore and George W. Bush supported the amendment during their Presidential race (Dao 
24).  After an extended effort in 2000, however, the amendment has been shelved 
because its advocates cannot agree on a clear formulation and jurisdiction (Palmer 991).   
 While it would be reductive to consider victims’ rights discourse merely as a way 
of talking about race through crime, it is clear that its supporters were largely “law-and-
order” conservatives in favor of “stronger” retributive justice and that “light-skinned 
child murder victims” are the “paradigmatic victim in victims’ rights” (Rentschler 222, 
Dubber 189).   As a set of political claims, Carrie A. Rentschler  notes, the unusual 
quality of victims’ rights stems from the fact that its advocates 
 
 
assert that the identity of “crime victim” constitutes a form of unrecognized 
cultural and political difference. Yet unlike most identity politics, victims’ rights 
activism’s calls for recognition tend not to be based on histories of social 
marginalization and class, race, and sexual oppression. While the U.S. movement 
emerged in part from second-wave feminist anti-rape and domestic violence 
activism, in its current, and hegemonic, incarnation within the field of crime-
victim politics, the identity of crime victim has largely been unmoored from 
histories of oppression. (219-220)  
 
 
 
Thus, what began as the sentimentalization of African American suffering by civil rights 
advocates becomes convertible as ressentiment into a conservative legal program.   
Roth’s trilogy is characterized by a similarly slippery shift in its treatment of victimhood.  
The novels powerfully critique the prospect of unconflictedness and idyllic time typical 
of sentimentalism but also partake of the sentimentalist tradition by linking familial and 
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national domesticities and through the trope of the compassionate observer, who serves 
as nexus of social feeling and textual performance. Furthermore, I claim, Roth aims to 
undo the logic of ressentiment by pluralizing it radically and thus achieving, by a 
perverse reverse, sentimentalism’s universal ethos of shared pain and consequent grounds 
for solidarity. In doing so, however, Roth often plays into the very affective structures 
undergirding the pastoral impulse of white flight: the simultaneous ressentimentalization 
and racialization of urban spaces.  
 Roth’s three novels, American Pastoral (1997), I Married a Communist (1998), 
and The Human Stain (2000), are referred to, both by critical consensus and authorial 
statement, as a trilogy, though critics diverge productively about how to identify them as 
a single creative effort.2  Some critics refer to the three novels as the Newark Trilogy, 
while most call it the American Trilogy, and that such a conflation is possible indicates 
the extent to which the shattered polis serves as a synecdoche for the larger nation, a 
point I pursue at some length below.3  The narrator of these novels, Nathan Zuckerman, is 
the protagonist in several previous Roth novels—The Ghost Writer (1979), Zuckerman 
Unbound (1981), The Anatomy Lesson (1983), (the three of which were collected 
together with an epilogue, The Prague Orgy, to constitute the Zuckerman Bound (1985) 
cycle) as well as The Counterlife (1986). In the earlier novels, Roth had used Zuckerman 
as an authorial stand-in to explore a set of connected themes centering on the 
indeterminate relation between fiction and fact, the place of the writer in contemporary 
society, and the multiple fictions that go into making familial, ethnic, and personal 
identity.4  Though many of these themes continue in the later trilogy, Zuckerman himself 
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seems much changed in the nineties.  The self-obsessed writer whose earlier confessions 
had nearly exhausting the mode of the confessional has, after a battle with prostate 
cancer, become more circumspect, leaving the bustle of Manhattan for the isolated 
Berkshires and preferring to tell the largely tragic stories of others rather than the erotic 
and ironic tales characteristic of his earlier books. 
 The first of these new tragic stories, American Pastoral, from which the opening 
scene of this chapter is taken, is the account of “Swede” Levov, a phenomenal athlete 
hero-worshipped by his peers at Weequahic High, including a younger Zuckerman, partly 
because his Olympian vigor seemed simultaneously to vindicate and transcend Jewish 
masculinity.  The novel details the Swede’s entry into, and eventual fall from, the 
eponymous national idyll: he takes over his father’s Glove factory in Newark, marries the 
Irish-Catholic Dawn Dwyer, a former Miss New Jersey.   The product of their union, 
Merry, grows up to be a Weatherman-like bomber during the Vietnam War, killing four 
people and shattering the Swede’s worldview forever.  Roth continued the trilogy with I 
Married a Communist, in which Zuckerman’s former English teacher, Murray Ringold, 
conveys the sad story of his brother Ira, a man young Zuckerman had idolized as a father 
figure.  During the 1940s and 50s, Ira, as “Iron Rinn,” starred on the radio program, The 
Free and the Brave, impersonating American patriotic luminaries like Abraham Lincoln, 
performances that prove ironic because this former Newark-born zinc miner is semi-
secretly a doctrinaire Communist.  Ira marries silent-film luminary Eve Frame, a closeted 
Jew turned anti-Semite, whose self-absorbed daughter, Sylphid, ultimately drives a 
wedge between Eve and Ira.  Two of Eve’s self-righteous reactionary friends lead her 
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into writing a tell-all book exposing Ira as a Communist.  Ringold’s sad tale concludes 
with Ira dying full of enmity in a shack near an abandoned zinc mine, his career in ruins 
and his political dreams betrayed by Stalin’s crimes.  Roth completed the trilogy with The 
Human Stain, the story of Coleman “Silky” Silk, a Classics professor at Athena College, 
whose reputation is questioned when his use of the word “spooks” is construed as a racial 
epithet.  Coleman had merely asked his class about two absentee students--“Does anyone 
know these people? Do they exist or are they spooks?” (Stain 6).  When Coleman, who, 
unbeknownst to his colleagues, is a light-skinned African American passing as Jewish, 
refuses to be cowed by his colleagues’ sanction and resigns from his position, his wife 
dies.  Alone, with neither work nor spouse to occupy his remaining years, Coleman 
becomes entangled in an affair with Faunia Farley, a middle-aged janitor at Athena.  This 
erotic complication leads to local scandal and eventual tragedy when Faunia’s former 
husband, a Vietnam Vet with PTSD, kills them both by running them off the road into icy 
lake water.  Such a swift summary exposes Roth’s gambit, for were it not for the subtlety 
and gravitas of his presentation, these plots would be elaborate melodrama or farce, and it 
is to that mode of presentation which I now turn.   
 Strictly speaking, it is not Roth who is either subtle or grave, but Zuckerman.  
Within the logic of the American Trilogy, it is Zuckerman, Roth’s presumed proxy, who 
presents these accounts of tragic lives, after having collected biographical facts from 
memory, rumor, and research, and then devising the rest based on his own conjecture.  
The results are remarkable, within Roth’s or any oeuvre, for their compassionate 
presentation of character against a backdrop of national historical change. This 
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presentation depends on the sentimental tradition’s distinctive affective pedagogy, in 
which a reader-proxy’s sympathetic observation of another’s unjustifiable suffering 
models an appropriate ethical response for readers, who in turn are meant to repeat with 
their own acts of sympathetic reading.  By virtue of this repetition, the reader of 
traditional sentimental texts could partake in the natural (and usually national) 
community of fellow feeling projected by that text.  However, Roth revises the 
mechanism of sympathetic identification in such a way that his corresponding vision of 
community is fundamentally ressentimental.  As I have indicated above, I use this term to 
designate the affective fragmentation of the conjured social body into antagonistic 
factions built around competing iterations of suffering.  To pursue this line of reasoning 
with the greatest possible clarity, I proceed through a series of interrelated claims in the 
following order.   
 First, I demonstrate that the American Trilogy represents a kind of sentimental 
education that both Zuckerman and Roth’s reader undergo.  In my view, this progressive 
trajectory linking fellow feeling and community should not be treated as mere 
camouflage for the more despairing vision posited alongside it, but instead critics should 
acknowledge that the novels derive a major portion of their power from their structural 
investment in compassionate imagining.  Second, because Roth uses the figure of the 
writer as the model sympathetic witness, I analyze the mechanism of sympathetic 
identification proffered in the trilogy using the notions of performative and constative 
uses of language.  Doing so allows for a lucid articulation of how Roth parses an aporia 
embedded in the logic of sentimental representation that troubles any notion of coherent 
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community emerging from it.  Third, I trace the trilogy’s projection of a national public 
space in which sentiment—the feeling of compassionate connection with suffering 
others—and ressentiment—the production of Manichean identities based on victimization 
and imagined revenge—are inextricably bound, due to the undecidability inherent in the 
scene of suffering.  Roth universalizes, or sentimentalizes, ressentiment, so that no 
instance of social cohesion—family, city, party, or nation—escapes the ghost of 
antagonisms internal to it.  Fourth, I analyze Roth’s vision of America as a ressentimental 
domestic space linking iterations of divided families to the larger misfortunes of a 
viciously divided metropolis: Newark ruined by the race riots of 1967.  The American 
Trilogy repeats what Leo Marx saw as a structured ambivalence common in the 
American literary tradition in which anti-urbanism strengthens the appeal of a pastoral 
withdrawal to rural spaces, a withdraw nonetheless figured as an inevitable failure.  In 
Roth’s context, this ambivalence plays out in racialized terms that, while deconstructing 
notions of pure communities and pure whiteness, relies on and reaffirms dehumanizing 
images of menacing black populations.  If Roth shows both family and city as 
ressentimental compositions, he does so without abandoning his own resentments.  I 
conclude by returning to the notion of performative sympathy to critique Roth’s 
restrictive “authorization” of sentiment and its regressive political implications.  However 
courageous Roth’s antipastoralism is in confronting national nostalgias and naiveté about 
America’s national future after the Cold War, the implied author exhibits much of the 
ressentiment he ironizes in his characters, wittingly or unwittingly repeating the logic 
undergirding white flight and victims’ rights discourse.  Worse, both his treatment of 
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African-Americans within the narratives of Newark’s devastation, to say nothing of his 
depictions of women within patriarchal familial scenes,5 reiterate the terrified and 
belligerent reactions characteristic of the “white male backlash” increasingly emergent in 
the decade of the trilogy’s composition.   
Sentimental Miseducations? 
 The poignancy of Zuckerman’s sympathy for the men he narrates is central to the 
high critical esteem in which the American Trilogy is held.  Reviewers of American 
Pastoral frequently remarked upon the compassion that distinguished it from previous 
Roth novels.6  A most common way of figuring Zuckerman has been as a kind of Greek 
chorus, which is not surprising, given the tragic tone of the novels and the fact that their 
most dramatic events take place off-stage, separating Zuckerman from the fray.7  Without 
a doubt, they are theatrical in yet another way, for as Murray Ringold suggests, “we learn 
from Shakespeare that in telling a story you cannot relax your imaginative sympathy for 
any character” (Married 277).  But this description of Zuckerman’s role as civic 
bystander to a separate drama diminishes the extent to which he is intimately bound with 
the production of these sympathetic biographical accounts of “great men brought low” 
(Stain 18).   Relying on his imaginative skills as a novelist, Zuckerman models for Roth’s 
reader a mode of active, projective sympathy that, as in the traditional sentimental model, 
instructs the reader through its affective pedagogy to repeat the process and, in so doing, 
to constitute a virtual community built on fellow feeling.  The sentimental model can be 
viewed as an extension of statements Roth himself has made about how "community is 
both subject and audience" for the contemporary novelist (Reading Myself 190).  More 
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unusually, this affective pedagogy is doubly modeled, for Zuckerman himself seems to 
undergo a most unusual sentimental education as the novels proceed.  Roth develops 
three motifs to indicate that Zuckerman undergoes such an education.  First, by setting up 
an implicit relation between, on the one hand, the occupation of each novel’s protagonist 
and, on the other, the mode of sympathetic design Zuckerman presents to his reader, Roth 
indicates that Zuckerman’s sympathy is not mere fantastic projection on blank 
biographies but is a mode of affective learning from each specific life.  Furthermore, by 
linking the novel’s mode of sympathy to the subject’s occupation, Roth implicitly forges 
a notion of sympathy as active work requiring effort and skill and underscores how 
Zuckerman’s status as a writer offers readers a unique mode to imitate.  Second, as the 
trilogy progresses, Zuckerman’s original relation to each protagonist increases in 
affective intensity and moves forward in his own biographical time toward the novel’s 
discourse-present.  Third, as the trilogy progresses, Zuckerman is transformed from a 
reiteration of the American isolato, ruminating on a past and vanished community, to a 
man partially re-socialized, dislodged from seclusion and, at least conceivably, en route 
to serving as surrogate brother in an unlikely family reunion suggestive of a broader 
communal convergence. 
 Consider, first, how each novel’s structure of sympathetic identification can be 
linked to its protagonist’s profession, as if Zuckerman is not only learning about the 
characters he describes, but also learning from them and tailoring his responses to them 
accordingly.  In American Pastoral, Zuckerman dons the guise of the outdated Swede 
Levov like one of the old-fashioned gloves produced by the Levov family at their Newark 
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Maid factory.  The transition between the first person narration of Zuckerman and the 
focalization of the Swede occurs, without great fanfare, during a scene in which 
Zuckerman dances with an old classmate at a Weequahic High reunion.  “So then,” 
begins Zuckerman, “I am out there on the floor with Joy, and […] I am thinking of the 
Swede’s great fall and of how he must have imagined that it was founded on some failure 
of his own responsibility.  There is where it must begin” (Pastoral 88).  Importantly, after 
leaving him like this in the middle of a wistful dance, the novel never returns to 
Zuckerman’s own spatial-temporal story-world for any of its remaining three hundred 
pages.  Instead, Zuckerman produces a carefully manicured mix of figural narration and 
free indirect discourse by which he “wears” the voice of the Swede.8  The text sustains 
the illusion of a complete immersion in the Swede’s world through highly focalized third 
person sentences, but it occasionally switches into first person so that the Swede appears 
to tell his own story.  The Swede even seems occasionally toinvoke his readers in a first 
person plural normative community—coded as white, bourgeois, and besieged by 
resentful others—as when he fumes against his daughter’s rebellion: “[y]ou hate us not 
because we’re reckless but because we’re prudent and sane and industrious and agree to 
abide by the law.  You hate us because we haven’t failed,” though Roth’s reader knows 
this is, in fact, Zuckerman performing (Pastoral 210-214).  This complex recital of 
layered voices compresses the implied perspectives of characters so that when the novel’s 
plaintive conclusion arrives, a conclusion that sharply forces a sympathetic response from 
the reader, that reader must also wonder about perspectival source of the questions: 
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They’ll never recover. Everything is against them, everyone and everything that 
does not like their life.  All the voices from without, condemning and rejecting 
their life! 
And what is wrong with their life?  What on earth is less reprehensible than the 
life of the Levovs? (423) 
 
 
 
The seemingly complete disintegration of the perspectival boundaries between the 
Swede, Zuckerman, and, behind him, Roth himself made many critics wonder whether 
Roth had undergone a neo-conservative conversion.9  Such a deduction dispenses with 
the novel’s political complexity (Seymour Levov is a largely forbearing Democratic 
liberal, not a reactionary), but it also ignores the novel’s own investment in the power of 
imaginative identification.10   If these novels evince a shift in Roth’s politics toward 
conservatism, it would seem a very “compassionate” conservatism.  
 The motif linking the style of sympathetic engagement with the livelihood of the 
protagonist is further developed in I Married A Communist.   Ira Ringold’s career as a 
radio star neatly corresponds with the novel’s basically dramatic form.  Married consists 
largely of a quoted monologue in which Murray tells Ira’s story, with sporadic 
interruptions by Zuckerman, either in voice or in thought.  The second novel thus shares 
with American Pastoral a bifurcated narrative structure where a protagonist’s biography, 
presented in the shifting and imaginatively projected narrative scenes, is embedded 
within a more contemporary dramatic scene, staged on the darkened deck of 
Zuckerman’s Berkshire house (Married 320).  The metaleptic, nested layering of 
imaginative projection (whereby Roth’s reader understands Ira through Murray through 
Zuckerman through Roth) exposes a split within the representative logic of 
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sentimentalism, the rudiments of which can be sketched here, though I explicate this 
tension more extensively in my discussion of sympathy’s performativity.  On the one 
hand, this nested interlinking evokes the bonds of a sympathetic community, with each 
character performing acts of sympathy for another in a set of repetitions leading to the 
final sympathetic repetition in Roth’s reader.  This aesthetic structure corresponds with 
idyllic imagined communities of universal brotherhood based in fellow feeling.11 On the 
other hand, this dramatic form evokes both the mode of gossiping hearsay and 
disingenuous role-playing that the novel suggests is characteristic of the public sphere.   
This second, negative valance casts a shadow on the sympathetic feelings between Ira, 
Murray, and Nathan by suggesting a cynical equivalence between sympathetic 
performance and theatrical persona—Iron Rinn performs as Lincoln, Ira Ringold as Iron 
Rinn, Murray as Ira, Zuckerman performs as Murray, and Roth performs as Zuckerman.  
Hence, while Roth uses the link between Zuckerman’s presentation and Ira’s profession 
to indicate the latter’s empathetic development, this specific presentation carries with it 
doubts about sympathy’s efficacy explored elsewhere the trilogy.  
 The motivic connection between each protagonist’s calling and its novel’s 
respective presentation of sympathetic engagement is most fully developed in The 
Human Stain, since Coleman’s career as a scholar of Greek and Roman classics parallels 
Zuckerman’s own mythopoetic mode of story creation (devising knowing fictions to 
explain the unexplainable).  Many critics have noted the numerous allusions to antiquity 
in this text, primarily emphasizing the novel’s evocation of epic and tragic classics, but 
this misses the extent to which Coleman’s transformation and the multiple projections of 
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Zuckerman seem Ovidian in their emphasis on metamorphosis.12  More than in any 
previous work, Zuckerman employs focalization and free indirect discourse to perform as 
a wide variety of characters and their stories.  Chief among these is Coleman’s own story, 
imagining his various metamorphoses as a son, boxer, bohemian, disinheritor, lover, 
husband, father, and even friend.  However, Zuckerman also interweaves his imaginative 
account of these changes with the stories of others, including Delphine Roux, Coleman’s 
academic adversary who is imagined with a mix of sympathetic engagement and satire.  
Zuckerman also invents a furious and fulminating voice for the traumatized veteran Les 
Farley, a voice that some critics nevertheless considered canned and familiar.13  Whatever 
the originality of the character, Les’s complete incapacity to feel the pain of others serves 
as a powerful foil to Zuckerman, whose performative compassion has never been more 
widely distributed than in The Human Stain.  Zuckerman’s expanded capacity to imagine 
the life of those quite different from himself is particularly evident in his projection into 
Faunia Farley.  Like Coleman, Faunia is a secret-carrier, who invents a persona as an 
illiterate blue-collar plebian, shunning all traces of her upper-class origins.  Like Les, 
Faunia is traumatized, in her case by early experiences of sexual abuse, by the death of 
her two children, and by her subsequent suicide attempts.  Like Zuckerman, she is a 
creator of stories capable of imaginatively projecting into the perspective of others.  One 
sees this in the long interior monologue in which she imagines the interior life of a crow 
(Stain 239-247).  Or, again, in an episode where Faunia has agreed to clean up a hotel 
room after an unknown man has committed suicide, she, like Zuckerman, self-
consciously invents a back-story for the man based on the evidence at hand (Stain 339).  
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In short, by continuing to tailor his mode of performative sympathy to the specific 
profession of each protagonist, Zuckerman is ultimately transformed back into being a 
teller of stories, an Ovidian chronicler of transformations, including his own.    
 Adding to this progressive “sentimental education” is an intensification of 
intimacy between Zuckerman and his principal subject in each book, as well as a 
temporal movement forward in biographical relation to Zuckerman.  Together, these 
three progressive motifs work to piece together Zuckerman’s own story from the 
withdrawn isolato—impotent, divorced, backward-looking, and retired to the 
Berkshires—to an eventual return to Newark as a warily forward looking and partially re-
socialized man.  For most of the trilogy, Roth’s reader is likely to ask, as Murray Ringold 
does of Zuckerman: “Why do you live up there, alone like that? Why don’t you have the 
heart for the world?” (Married 315).14  Having a “heart for the world” is precisely what 
Zuckerman gains as the novels progress.  In American Pastoral, Zuckerman’s knows the 
protagonist as a childhood acquaintance. In his youth, Zuckerman was unable to see past 
his own hero-worshipping projections onto Levov. Furthermore, when Zuckerman and 
Levov meet up as adults, the former entirely misinterprets the latter, eventually admitting, 
“I was wrong. Never more mistaken about anyone in my life” (Pastoral 39).  
Zuckerman’s identification with Ira Ringold is much stronger than was his boyhood link 
to Swede Levov and, though most of the events in the second novel predate those of the 
first, the novel follows Zuckerman into young adulthood and in this manner develops and 
extends the vision of Zuckerman’s childhood in American Pastoral.  Zuckerman had 
grown up under Ira Ringold’s tutelage and viewed him as a father figure, though he 
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ultimately shed this idolization of the star and his politics.  Moreover, the affective 
intensity of Zuckerman’s relation to Ira’s story is underscored by his continuing 
friendship with Murray, who provides a more direct account of Ira than Zuckerman was 
able to draw from the Swede’s brother.   
 The connection between Zuckerman and Coleman in The Human Stain is the most 
contemporaneous and by far the most intensive of the three: it is what the writer calls 
“fall[ing] into a serious friendship” (Stain 43).  Indeed, Zuckerman acknowledges that he 
gushes about his friend in a boyish way, “in the way you [do] when you’re a kid and you 
think you’ve found a soul mate in the new boy down the street and you feel yourself 
drawn by the force of the courtship and so act as you don’t normally do and a lot more 
openly than you may even want to” (Stain 43).  Language such as “act[ing] openly” and 
“force of the courtship” indicate Zuckerman’s acknowledgement that such an intimacy 
between men, such “serious friendship,” contains within it a profound homoeroticism, an 
affective versatility, which in turn (somewhat) destabilizes Zuckerman’s persona in the 
earlier novels as masculinist womanizer.  In Zuckerman’s own view, their friendship is 
sealed when they teasingly dance the fox trot together to Sinatra’s “Bewitched, Bothered, 
and Bewildered” (Stain 24-26).  The eroticized affective bond between Zuckerman and 
Coleman reveals to the former his own increasing loneliness for an “entanglement with 
life” and, indeed, by the novel’s end, he confesses to his readers, “Coleman Silk’s life 
had become closer to me than my own” (Stain 44, 344).  That the trilogy concludes with 
Zuckerman vowing to leave the Berkshires, heading toward East Orange, a largely 
African-American municipality adjoining downtown Newark, to take up his place as a 
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guest in the Silk household, dining with Coleman’s brother and sister, indicates the extent 
to which Zuckerman’s “experiment in radical seclusion” has failed (Stain 339, 44).  The 
unsuccessful experiment of self-containment—of a pastoral withdraw into the exurbs—
denotes the tentative triumph of the sentimental prospect of a community based in 
performative sympathetic identification, but Roth complicates this triumph of sociability 
through his persistent thematization of sympathy’s difficulty, if not its impossibility. 
Performing Feelings / Fictions 
 In Roth, sympathy is an active, performative craft, rather than a wholly passive or 
descriptive spectatorship.  Part of this production is a matter of imagination,  “I can’t 
know,” announces Zuckerman, reflecting on the motives of Coleman Silk, “[f]or better or 
worse, I can only do what everyone does who thinks that they know […] I imagine […] I 
am forced to imagine” (Stain 213).  But the sympathetic connection is also a form of 
observation, memory, and listening that gives access to the “innermost wrongness” in 
others and it is this “wrongness” that authorizes the imaginative endeavor in the first 
place. There is a tension in the American Trilogy over how character emerges that cannot 
be reduced to bland labels such as “intersubjectivity,” and this tension can be illustrated 
in spatial terms.  At one point, after listening to Murray’s account of his brother Ira’s self-
destruction, Zuckerman reflects: 
 
 
How deep our hearing goes!  Think of all it means to understand from something 
that you simply hear.  The godlikeness of having an ear!  Is it not at least a 
semidivine phenomenon to be hurled into the innermost wrongness of a human 
existence by virtue of nothing more than sitting in the dark, listening to what is 
said? (Married 321) 
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The spatial and dynamic tropes—depth, hurling, innermost—assigned to the reception of 
understanding, to the hearing of what is there in others and their meanings, indicates the 
profound exteriority of those others and yet Roth also consistently underscores the extent 
to which sympathetic understanding is a function of conjecture and expressive invention.  
In a strange combination of exteriorized “fact” and interiorized “fiction” Zuckerman, like 
Roth, is always interacting with and listening to “that strange voice he invented” (Stain 
243). By sharpening the reader’s sense of the indisputable materiality of other lives and 
the reality of their suffering by keen verisimilitude, while at the same time underscoring 
an observer’s obligation to perform the interiority of those they sympathize with, Roth 
creates a paradox that avoids the presumption that all suffering is the same and that any 
subjectivity can be an object of definitive knowledge.  This paradox, whereby sympathy 
is at once a mode of involuntary transport into others and a mode of self-production can 
be usefully mapped onto the notions of performative and constative modes of utterance. 
 Introduced by philosopher J.L. Austin in posthumously published work, the 
notion of the performative has become a touchstone for many contemporary theoretical 
models of identity, particularly identities of gender and sexuality as pursued in the work 
of Judith Butler and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick.  While I take up aspects of this “deeper” 
notion of performative identity later in this and other chapters, here I only wish to linger 
momentarily over the “shallower” meanings of identification and performativity.  
Disillusioned with the positivist model of language that conceived all utterances either as 
statements attempting to represent the world or as nonsensical pseudo-statements, Austin 
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proposed that utterances also do performative work: speech acts can bring about changes 
in the world.  Seen through the lens of the performative, a speaker “is doing something 
rather than merely saying something” (222). Austin’s examples of performative 
utterances—“I do” in the marriage ceremony, “I promise…” and so on—at once reveal 
the distinction between the constative element (a description of something which is either 
correct or incorrect) and the performative element (an action undertaken through a speech 
act which either works or “misfires”) (225). Austin maintains that the performative aspect 
of speech acts requires that “the convention invoked must exist and be accepted […and 
that] the circumstances in which we purport to invoke this procedure must be appropriate 
for its invocation” (224-225).  One must be in certain very particular circumstances for “I 
do” to enter one into the legally binding marriage contract.  Performance requires 
appropriate contexts in order to succeed, but Austin maintains that performance can also 
fail in a more difficult, less observable way, as when one congratulates or promises, but 
does so insincerely.  In this case, one’s intentions do not undo or negate the performative 
act, but instead make it “infelicitous” in Austin’s language (224).  One can conceive of 
the problem of performative sympathy by imagining how the utterance, “I sympathize” 
can go wrong. 
 On its surface, “I sympathize” functions as “I congratulate” does, because failing 
to identify genuinely with the pain of another does not, in conversational circumstances, 
nullify the performance of attesting to a genuine identification, but only renders it 
somehow unhappy, were all the facts known.  But on closer inspection, “I sympathize” 
describes a state of subjective affairs about one’s imaginative relationship to the pain of 
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another that can “go wrong” even if stated with sincerity in the proper circumstances.  
For, if I fail to imagine how it must be to experience the affects I believe you to be 
undergoing, in a way that actually does correspond to your experience of those affects, 
my sympathy has failed at a constative level, though neither you nor I can actually know 
of its failure.  Put another way, the process of performing sympathy functions more or 
less felicitously in maintaining affective bonds but it always runs an epistemological risk 
as a constative statement, since one is attesting to one’s own unverifiable affective 
experience as well as those of another.  Moreover, since the act of imaginative projection 
designated by “I sympathize with you” or any similar verbal attestation is, by its nature, 
not a generic act but one specific to “your” circumstances, performing sympathy always 
involves a necessary originality.  The necessity of originality links it with artistic process 
but also would seem to attest to sympathy’s impossibility, since “I” should not be 
originating these feelings but copying them faithfully from “you.”  In tracing this aporia, 
I follow Derrida’s reading of Austin in “Signature Event Context.”  In Derrida’s view 
singular performatives—political, literary, or otherwise—always run against the general 
iterability of language: “Effects of signatures are the most common thing in the world.  
But the condition of possibility of those effects is simultaneously, once again, the 
condition of their impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous purity” (20).  
Reading the sentimental scene of sympathetic reproduction through the idea of 
performativity clarifies the impossibility of the “rigorous purity” of sympathy: one cannot 
author imaginative emotional experiences that represent, in an accurate, constative way, 
the inner life of others…. and yet sympathy goes on doing its work.15  While Roth’s 
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novels are, as I have argued above, deeply invested in the force of sympathetic bonds, 
they are also consistently and fretfully preoccupied with the impossibility of those bonds. 
 Roth’s texts perform Zuckerman’s sympathy through their focalization of 
character, but they also attest to its difficulty by casting doubt on the constative veracity 
of this narration. With Zuckerman, Roth produces the sympathetic witness as split 
between an action—primarily aesthetic but also self-making and ethical—and an 
epistemological description of the inner lives of himself and others.  Zuckerman’s status 
as novelist links sympathy’s logic to the logic of fiction, wherein truthfulness is held in 
abeyance while the performative relationship of reading is created and nurtured.  
Throughout the trilogy, one encounters an insistence that sympathetic projection and 
performance always involve a necessary but nonetheless problematic error.  Moreover, 
the suffering of “getting it wrong” reduplicates epistemologically the textual problems 
facing Roth’s readers, and therefore insinuates into the sentimental repetition of feeling 
the poison pill of uncertainty.  Here, as in the case of Zuckerman’s sentimental education, 
one senses a progressive understanding.  Early in American Pastoral, the epistemological 
quandary seems mild, a problem of understanding “the regular guy,” whose bland 
normativity seems to have no depth.  Zuckerman is “willing to admit that [his] Swede 
was not the primary Swede,” given that he was “working with traces,” but he is simply 
agnostic as to whether or not he had “imagined an outright fantastical creature, lacking 
entirely the unique substantiality of the real thing” (Pastoral 76-77).  One senses 
Zuckerman’s shrugging sanguinity: “it’s up for grabs,” he asserts, “as to whose guess is 
more rigorous than whose” (Pastoral 77).  Here the question is of proximity or rigor, but 
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not impossibility.   
 At other moments in the trilogy, however, the difficulty of correctly assessing the 
inner life of others takes on greater weight, partly because misjudging others opens one to 
betrayal.  Reeling from the impact of his misfortunes, the Swede reflects that everyone, 
including himself, “flash signs,” “shouting ‘This is me! This is me’!” and that one can 
never judge this veracity, in others or in one’s self. “They believed their flashing signs 
too,” he ruminates, “[t]hey ought to be standing and shouting, ‘This isn’t me! This isn’t 
me!’ They would if they had any decency.  ‘This isn’t me!’ Then you might know how to 
proceed though the flashing bullshit of this world” (Pastoral 410).  The possibility of 
making radical error of affective imagining, in one’s self or in others, has high stakes 
both epistemologically and affectively, and Roth often employs a more profound and 
despairing register in which such “wrongness” is a mode of life.  Zuckerman refers to this 
as “this terribly serious business of other people, which gets bled of the significance we 
think it has and takes on instead a significance that is ludicrous, so ill-equipped are we all 
to envision one another’s interior workings and invisible aims” (Pastoral 35).  In this 
fashion, the trilogy contains within it a strain of profound epistemological and affective 
doubt analogous to that of the Calvinist doctrine so anathema to American 
sentimentalism.  As Zuckerman bewails, “It’s all error […] There’s only error.  There’s 
the heart of the world.  Nobody finds his life.  That is life” (Married 319).  This aporetic 
element, though recurrent, does not vitiate the novel’s investment in modes of relation 
closely allied to those prized by the sentimental tradition, which are central, as I have 
argued, to the performative power of Roth’s texts.  Instead, the relentless risk of 
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constative error is the condition that requires the production of performative sympathy, 
even as it also opens the scene of suffering to multiple, competing interpretations—
ressentimental readings.   
Ressentimental Nation  
 Roth’s trilogy is invested in a revision of sentimentalism that pluralizes suffering 
across an affective terrain and that seeks to show how sentiment—“feeling right”—shares 
a taproot with ressentiment.  Roth achieves this, first and most obviously, by extending 
Zuckerman’s performative sympathy to so many: Swede Levov, Ira Ringold, Murray 
Ringold, Coleman Silk, Delphine Roux, Les Farley, and Faunia Farley.  While it is worth 
remarking that, although five of his individuals come from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds, Roth lists unambiguously toward own privileged demographic—three are 
Jewish, all but two are male, all but one are nominally white—and this bias is a crucial 
factor in blunting the power of his trilogy to produce an affective geography 
commensurable to the broad nation his rhetoric evokes.  His is not a representative 
sampling of America’s heterogeneity, a fact made more obvious when compared to the 
diversity of voices in Anna Deavere Smith’s work.16  Setting aside his biases for the 
moment, Roth distinctly marks the ground of human social interaction as one of plural 
suffering, and he does so in large part by examining the framework and consequences of 
the prosecutorial spirit.  Roth’s text dramatizes this “spirit” as being animated by what 
Nietzsche refers to as ressentiment, a mode of affective antagonism produced by the 
capacity to create a putatively unbroken and blameless identity out of a moment of 
perceived victimization.   
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 Ressentiment, “the moralizing revenge of the powerless,” like sentimentalism, has 
its roots in scenes of often humiliating suffering (Brown 66).  But as Nietzsche maintains: 
 
 
 [E]very sufferer instinctively looks for a cause of his distress; more exactly, for a 
culprit, even more precisely for a guilty culprit who is receptive to distress, --in 
short, for a living being upon whom he can release him emotions, actually or in 
effigy, on some pretext or other: because the release of emotions is the greatest 
attempt at relief, or should I say, at anaesthetizing on the part of the sufferer, his 
involuntarily longed-for narcotic against pain of any kind.  In my judgment, we 
find here the actual physiological causation of ressentiment, revenge and their ilk, 
in a yearning, then to anaesthetize pain through emotion […] to anaesthetize a 
tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unbearable with a more violent emotion 
of any sort, and at least rid the consciousness of it for the moment, -- for this, one 
needs emotion, the wildest possible emotion and, in order to arouse it, the first 
available pretext. (Nietzsche 93, italics original)  
 
 
 
Whatever one makes of Nietzsche’s “physiological” explanation or his general disdain 
for compassion, one sees at once how the sentimentalization of pain-scenes differs, at 
least on its surface, from the ressentiment-alization of those scenes. While both function 
through the excitation of affect and both reconfigure the field of social suffering to 
control the lines of difference that bisect that field, sentimentalism proposes a 
strengthened affective and ethical connection between individuals, a solidarity produced 
in the face of pain, that works by eliding differences between a sufferer and a witness.  
The ressentimental subject, having transformed injury into identity, founds itself on a 
Manichean difference between those who suffer blamelessly and those demonic others 
who inflict the subject’s suffering. The sentimental always presupposes that it 
performatively creates a ground of solidarity.  Such a model is always in danger of 
complacency, for the imaginative projection may be a false creation designed to ease the 
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conscience of the spectator. Or worse, it may use the power difference in the sentimental 
scene, between sufferer and witness, to maintain secretly other power differences.  But 
here, we have already entered the realm of the ressentimental, which always presupposes 
and performatively creates identities based on enmity and projective suspicion.    
 Wendy Brown argues that contemporary American culture, where individuals are 
“buffeted and controlled by global configurations of disciplinary and capitalist power 
[…] and are at the same time nakedly individuated, stripped of reprieve from relentless 
exposure and accountability for themselves,” combines to produce conditions perfect for 
ressentiment’s production (69).  The late modern liberal subject is, in her view “[s]tarkly 
accountable yet dramatically impotent,” and therfore “quite literally seeth[ing]  with 
ressentiment” (69).  Apart from this unpleasant seething, ressentiment is bad for Brown 
because it produces politicized identities that “inscribe in the law and in other political 
registers its historical and present pain rather than conjure an imagined future of power to 
make itself” (66).  Ressentiment and sentiment project opposing views of temporality and 
power.  The latter imagines a past or future (or both) as a space of unconflicted fellow 
feeling and radically equivalent power distribution; sentiment is, in its simplified form, 
utopian or pastoral and tends to see present conflict as an exception that, if adequately 
publicized, will generate sufficient sympathetic reaction to correct.  Ressentiment, 
however, internalizes the power disequilibrium of the past as an identity-marker, a way of 
being set apart from others for the future, but consequently past disequilibriums are 
reified and continue indefinitely.   
 Roth rejects the sentimental view of unconflictedness and idyllic time but also 
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undoes the logic of ressentiment by pluralizing it radically and consequently achieving, 
by a perverse reverse, sentimentalism’s universal ethos of shared pain and consequent 
grounds for solidarity.  Avoiding the entanglements of ressentiment is not possible, 
particularly not in Roth.  In each novel in the trilogy, the pathos of the suffering figure is 
at least in part based on the transparent oversimplification of his perceived opponent, 
whom he inevitably fails to comprehend and imagines as a demonic force. An inhuman 
Merry destroys Swede Levov; demonic McCarthyism destroys both Ira and Murray 
Ringold; wretched Sylphid torments Eve Frame; and hysterical Political Correctness 
ruins Coleman Silk.  Nonetheless, one might read these novels to foreground the way in 
which the labels produced by ressentiment, the self-idealization of victims and 
demonization of the guilty, results in a reduction of real complex internal difference 
bisecting these groups, difference to which Roth repeatedly draws our attention.  In this 
way, while Zuckerman’s compassion is extended primarily to men of ressentiment 
seething over wounds received at the hands of their inhuman persecutors, these 
persecutors are dimly revealed also to be creatures of ressentiment, coping with their 
injuries by making them badges of honor.  The internal dynamics of the background 
figures ironize the foregrounded protagonists.  Far from endorsing this culture of 
victimization, or merely dismissing it, Roth exposes it as the context in which real 
sympathetic identification must occur, if it is to occur at all.    
 Few characters in recent American literature better exemplify the power of 
ressentiment that American Pastoral’s Merry Levov.  A tidy synecdoche for the structure 
and violence of this power can be seen in the way her stammering transmogrifies into a 
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profane harangue.  Zuckerman writes: “the impediment became the machete with which 
to mow all the bastard liars down,” as when she “snarls” at Lyndon Johnson’s televised 
image, “‘[y]ou f-f-fucking madman! You heartless mi-mi-mi-miserable m-monster!” 
(Pastoral 100). Doubtless, we are meant to take as a mark of the Swede’s heartbreaking 
forbearance that he defends his daughter’s vituperations to his wife by saying that while 
“[t]here may not be much subtlety in [Merry’s political position], […]there is some 
thought behind it, there’s certainly a lot of emotion behind it, [and] there’s a lot of 
compassion behind it” (102).17  Merry and her friends also borrow explicitly from the 
language of sentiment to make their points, as when Rita Cohen remarks of the Swede’s 
Newark Maid factory, “I know what a plantation is, Mr. Legree—I mean, Mr. Levov” 
(Pastoral 135).  Indeed, a mix of compassionate sentiment and ressentiment can be seen 
everywhere in Merry’s rhetoric, as when she says of New York’s radical groups that 
“[t]hey feel responsible when America b-blows up Vietnamese villages […] [t]hey feel 
responsible when America is b-blowing little b-babies to b-b-b-b-bits […] But you don’t, 
and neither does Mother” (Pastoral 107).   
 Roth, who had himself traveled to Cambodia in 1970 and attacked American 
foreign policy in Southeast Asia with scathing irony18, is not dismissing the reality or 
injustice of the carnage thereby treating Merry’s response to it with some irony.19  He 
also ironizes the Swede’s reaction to televised images of suffering in Vietnam, as when 
he blames Merry’s rebellion on her viewing a broadcast of self-immolating Buddhist 
monks.   
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into their home on Arcady Hill Road the charred and blackened corpse on its back 
in that empty street. That was what had done it.  Into their home the monk came 
to stay, the Buddhist monk calmly sitting out his burning up as though he were a 
man both fully alert and anesthetized.  The television transmitting the immolation 
must have done it.  If their set had happened to be tuned to another channel or 
turned off or broken, if they had all been out together as a family for the evening, 
Merry would never have seen what she shouldn’t have seen and would never have 
done what she shouldn’t have done. (126) 
 
 
  
One must note here both the falseness of Merry’s speaking on behalf of the Vietnamese 
and the Swede’s absurd attribution of culpability to the dying monk, a prime example of 
Nietzsche’s “looking for a culprit” for one’s pain.  One sees this same scheme of doubled 
ressentiment when the Swede, reading Merry’s copy of Franz Fanon, blames the 
“committed Algerian woman” who “does not have the sensation of playing a role,” but 
whose revolutionary fervor raises her “directly to the level of tragedy,” for the Swede is 
convinced that such figures are responsible for his “New Jersey girl descend[ing] to the 
level of idiocy” (Pastoral 261, italics original).  In each case, Merry has sentimentalized 
an oppressed identity to forge her moralistic purity, while the Swede in turn faults the 
oppressed for having influenced his daughter to shatter his sentimentalized view of her.   
 In I Married a Communist, Roth amply demonstrates that political ressentiment-
alization has a long history.  Ira Ringold, his brother tells us, was “a sucker for suffering” 
whose “self-conception was of being virtuous” (Married 181). “[H]umanity to Ira,” says 
Murray, “was synonymous with hardship and calamity. Toward hardship, even its 
disreputable forms, the kinship was unbreakable” (69).  Roth’s reader must be capable of 
differentiating, on the one hand, the desirability of an ethics and politics accountable to 
the suffering of oppressed peoples, even one such as sentimentalism which affectively 
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grounds itself in such a scene of response, and on the other hand, the self-aggrandizing 
romanticism that views every setback as a “struggle of the disinherited up from the 
bottom [as] an irresistible lure” (69).  The various narrators of the novel, Murray, 
Zuckerman, and Roth himself, all seem at pains to demonstrate that, in Ira’s case, the 
rhetoric of suffering humanity and the identification with the oppressed is a cover for his 
more brutal and vengeful desires.  As Murray summarizes: 
 
 
Look, once upon a time all Ira thought about was how to alleviate the effects of 
human cruelty.  Everything was funneled through that.  But after that book of hers 
came out, all he thought about was how to inflict it. […] [W]hen he realized he’d 
lost [his reputation and status] and no longer had to live up to it, he shed […] [a]ll 
that endless rhetoric. Going on and on when what this huge man really wanted to 
do was to lash out.  The talk was the way to blunt those desires. (122-123) 
 
 
 
Ira’s Communism is not, however, the only or even primary target of Roth’s attack in the 
novel, a distinction that properly belongs to Joseph McCarthy’s use of the theatrics of 
moral self-righteousness.  According to Murray, McCarthy knows “the entertainment 
value of disgrace and how to feed the pleasures of paranoia.  He took us back to our 
origins, back to the seventeenth century and the stocks.  That’s how the country began: 
moral disgrace as public entertainment” (284).  The idea that America was founded on 
these displays of theatricalized vengeance is part of what I read as the novels’ 
universalization of ressentiment.  When sentiment ceases to be universalizable, the social 
field it imagines fragments into subsets of ressentiment, but if ressentiment is read as a 
universal condition of sufferers and those who sympathetically crave justice on their 
behalf, it becomes another mode of the sentimental.  Given that I Married a Communist 
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is widely viewed as Roth’s response to the publication of his ex-wife Claire Bloom’s 
memoir, Leaving a Doll’s House, this attack on theatricalized public disgrace carries with 
it a sour ressentiment of its own.  Nonetheless, this should not eclipse the demonstration, 
continuous throughout the American Trilogy, showing how scenes of sentiment and of 
ressentiment inevitably converge, revealing a danger internal to the act of sympathy.   
 The exploration of the prosecutorial spirit fueled by ressentiment is nowhere 
clearer than in The Human Stain, a novel in which nearly all characters are shown to 
define themselves against others whom they blame for doing what they themselves 
furtively do.  Coleman faults his adversaries because they mislabel him as a closet racist 
while he in fact mislabels himself; Delphine Roux faults Coleman for his inappropriate 
desire for a younger woman, while she in fact desires Coleman herself.  While one should 
rightly look askance at the reduction of real political grievances to petty self-deception, 
Roth’s novel offers more than a moralistic attack on moralistic hypocrisy.  At its best, 
The Human Stain is an intensive attack on Manichean notions of conflict that divide the 
social field into “black and white” zones of victims and victimizers.  Instead, I read Roth 
as more interested in revealing numerous acts of moral “passing.”  Reading the trilogy 
through the dialectical complications of ressentimentality should forcefully direct Roth’s 
reader to reject the safety of Faunia’s notion that, “[s]he knew all she needed to know 
about the history of the human race: the ruthless and the defenseless.  She didn’t need the 
dates and the names.  The ruthless and the defenseless, there’s the whole fucking deal” 
(Stain 240). The crude division of humans to victims and victimizers echoes a distinction 
crucial to the stability of Nietzsche’s formulation of ressentiment, between “lambs” and 
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“birds of prey”: “There is nothing strange about the fact that lambs bear a grudge toward 
large birds of prey: but that is no reason to blame the large birds of prey for carrying off 
the little lambs” (25-26).  The novel, as part of what I read as Roth’s broader 
universalization, and hence sentimentalization, of ressentiment, rejects Faunia’s (and, 
with it, Nietzsche’s) reduction and sees this putatively objective division as an artifact of 
its own model of ressentiment.20  Politically, this infinite multiplication of the victim-
victimizer dyad has complex consequences.  First, I show how it enables Roth’s critique 
of the sentimental American pastoral mode, which Roth treats as an alluring but basically 
dishonest erasure of difference and conflict.  I see this critique at work at the level of 
family, body, and party.  Second, I focus on the ambiguous but crucial case of 
ressentimentalized Newark, a space that commingles black and white suffering in a 
manner that reinforces racist differentiations of public pain.  Third, in the final section of 
this chapter, I show how Roth’s universalization of ressentiment also aligns Roth’s 
critique with the reactionary political appropriation of multiculturalism’s mode of victim 
culture. 
Antipastoral Ambivalence  
 Pastoralism and antipastoralism are at war everywhere in the American Trilogy.   
In this section, I offer an overview of three ways in which Roth critiques the pastoral 
dream of withdrawing into sentimental unconflictedness—at the level of the family, the 
political party, and the racialized body—in order to contextualize my analysis of how 
these thematized critiques of sentimental unconflictedness are at play, much more 
ambivalently, in Roth’s treatment of Newark.  Roth’s engagement with the sentimental 
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retreat into the private space of the family is most obviously pursued in American 
Pastoral, as its title suggests, though critics have noted that Roth’s critique of the pastoral 
here seems less total than elsewhere in his oeuvre, particularly in The Counterlife.   Still, 
it is the dominant thematic tension in the text, as the Swede’s life pursuit seems to be to 
attain the sentimental utopia of unconflictedness primarily through maintenance of the 
patriarchal family.  The Swede repeats his father, choosing to take over the Newark Maid 
glove factory and perform the sentimental role of the good son, but he also tries to create 
a perfect American family by losing the distinctiveness of his Jewishness, marrying a 
Gentile pageant winner, and attempting to raise the proverbial “perfect child.”  The 
elision of tension between particularity and generality, which is what the Swede seeks, is 
at the heart of what Zuckerman (and with him Roth) seems to find reprehensibly 
misguided about this social type, as one senses in this description of Thanksgiving: 
 
 
Thanksgiving, when everybody gets to eat the same thing, nobody sneaking off to 
eat funny stuff—no kugal, no gefilte fish, no bitter herbs, just one colossal turkey 
for two hundred and fifty million people—one colossal turkey feeds all.  A 
moratorium on funny foods and funny ways and religious exclusivity, a 
moratorium on the three-thousand-year-old nostalgia of the Jews, a moratorium 
on Christ and the cross and the crucifixion for the Christians, when everyone in 
New Jersey and elsewhere can be more passive about their irrationalities than they 
are the rest of the year.  A moratorium on all the grievances and resentments, and 
not only for the Dwyers and the Levovs but for everyone in America who is 
suspicious of everyone else.  It is the American pastoral par excellence and it lasts 
twenty-four hours.  (402) 
 
 
 
Here, the concluding sentence underscores those conflicts native to the social field in 
America generally.  Within the metaphorical American family, they can only be very 
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temporarily deferred and only through a performance scripted to gloss over difference.  
The novel’s pathos derives almost wholly from the unsustainability of such a 
performance.  The figure of stuttering Merry, “the angry, rebarbative spitting-out 
daughter with no interest whatever in being the next successful Levov,” demonstrates the 
extent to which, whatever his efforts, the Swede’s dream of perfect assimilation into 
unconflicted social space, “his particular form of utopian thinking,” is destined to be 
“blast[ed] to smithereens” by “the indigenous American berserk” (86).  Roth uses 
familial destruction as an index of larger societal disintegration elsewhere in the trilogy.  
In I Married a Communist, Ira’s marriage disintegrates largely because his wife Eve 
sentimentalizes and spoils her daughter Sylphid.  The Human Stain ends on a vaguely 
hopeful note, as Zuckerman, as a kind of surrogate for Coleman Silk, travels to East 
Orange to join the Silk family table to meet Coleman’s brother and sister. 
 Roth’s evaluation of political pastoralism is pursued most obviously in I Married 
a Communist, where one can see that critical evaluation as an extension or permutation of 
the critique of family presented in American Pastoral.   If Sylphid is Eve Frame’s screen 
on which to project fantasies of a deodorized life, then the notion of universal 
brotherhood is Ira’s.  The pathos of this second misrepresentation is at its most acute 
when Zuckerman plays a record, given to him years earlier by Ira, of the Soviet Army 
Chorus and Band performing “Dubinushka,” “a stirring, mournful, hymnlike folksong” 
(Married 73).  While he and Murray listen to the song, Zuckerman reflects on the choral 
refrain—“Heave ho!”—and the pastoral lie that the notion of collective labor contains 
within it: 
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 “Heave-ho!  Heave-ho!” was out of a distant place and time, a spectral residue of 
those rapturous revolutionary days when everyone craving for change 
programmatically, naively—madly, unforgivably—underestimates how mankind 
mangles its noblest ideas and turns them into tragic farce.  Heave-ho!  Heave-ho!  
As though human wiliness, weakness, stupidity, and corruption didn’t stand a 
chance against the collective, against the might of the people pulling together to 
renew their lives and abolish injustice.  Heave-ho. (Married 74-75) 
 
 
 
This poignant disparagement of the possibility of utopian politics and its concession to 
innate human weakness repeats the conservative political realism encountered elsewhere 
in the novel, as when the former Communist Golstine attacks Ira’s attachment to 
universal brotherhood.  In Golstine’s view, whatever its horrors, capitalism 
 
 
works because it’s based on the truth about people’s selfishness, and 
[Communism] doesn’t work because it’s based on a fairy tale about people’s 
brotherhood. […] we know what our brother is, don’t we? He’s a shit.  And we 
know what our friend is, don’t we?  He’s a semi-shit.  And we are semi-shits.  So 
how can it be wonderful?” (Married 95) 
 
 
 
The novel seems at pains to demonstrate that at least Murray’s brother is “a shit,” for 
Ira’s self-righteousness, his ideological fervor, his hypocrisy, and his murderousness 
make him easily the least likable major character in the trilogy.  But the younger 
Zuckerman associated Ira with America’s own sentimental liberatory culture as well, and 
by virtue of this association Roth avoids limiting his political critique to the easy target of 
Stalinism.   
 All of the characters—Zuckerman, Murray, and Ira—seem most deeply moved by 
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the figure of Lincoln, whom Ira resembles and plays.  They are particularly stirred by the 
conclusion of Lincoln’s second inaugural address: “With malice toward none, with 
charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on 
to finish the work we are in, to bind the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all 
which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all 
nations” (18).  This sentence, which Murray Ringold says is “as noble and beautiful a 
sentence as any American president, as any American writer, had ever written,” and 
which he makes the young Zuckerman diagram, typifies the American sentimental 
discourse, both political and nonpolitical, of its era.  The stated dearth of cruelty, the 
universality of charity, and the religiously endowed moral clarity, as well as the figures of 
the widow and orphan, and the fantasy of unconflictedness are all distinctive markers.  
That the novel’s narrator and so many of its characters find this political rhetoric 
powerful is clear, and I suspect that Roth’s reader, also, is meant to feel their own 
susceptibility to it.  Nonetheless, Roth’s texts view this messianic version of American 
political constitution as another pastoral fiction, though a singularly tempting one.  Roth’s 
own views of this discourse, if not of American national identity in general, can be 
considerably more critical.  One observes this clearly when, in response to an interviewer 
asking if he believed that “with September 11, the United States lost its innocence,” Roth 
fumed, “What innocence?  That’s so naïve.  From 1668 to 1865 we had slavery in this 
country.  Then from 1865 to 1955, a society marked by brutal segregation.  What 
innocence?  I don’t really know what people are talking about” (Turlin 4). While Roth 
and his novels reject the sentimentalization of America’s past, his ambivalent critique is 
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one centered on the African American experience: an historical narrative involving the 
liberatory heroism of Lincoln and the dismal, but ultimately progressive story of 
increasing equality for slaves and their descendents.  Roth does not, in short, primarily 
figure American sentimental political utopianism as being underwritten by annihilative 
displacements (a conclusion more likely to be drawn had he focused on the history of 
Native Americans in the U.S.), but rather as a mode of thought that hypocritically 
conceals the violent suppression of (racial) difference. 
 Roth’s critique of pastoralism, both within the trilogy and in earlier texts, is often 
plotted in terms of ethnicity and bodily markers.   The body’s innate imperfection, of 
course, is extensively thematized in The Human Stain, where Roth links repressive pieties 
about bodily wholesomeness with a repressive notion of whiteness as purity.  The titular 
“stain” links, perhaps facilely, the impeachment hearings of 1998 (in which the semen 
stain on Lewinsky’s dress became a matter of public stagings of shame), to the 
incontinence Zuckerman experiences after his prostate surgery, as well as to the “stain” 
of ethnic difference.  All are conflated into “the human stain,” which is, (at least as 
Zuckerman renders her) as Faunia meditates: 
 
 
 “…the human stain,” she said, and without revulsion or contempt or 
condemnation.  Not even with sadness.  That’s how it is—[…] we leave a stain, 
we leave a trail, we leave our imprint.  Impurity, cruelty, abuse, error, excrement, 
semen—there’s no other way to be here. Nothing to do with disobedience.  
Nothing to do with grace or salvation or redemption.  It’s in everyone.  
Indwelling.  Inherent.  Defining.  The stain that is there before its mark. […] It’s 
why all the cleansing is a joke.  A barbaric joke at that.  The fantasy of purity is 
appalling” (Stain 242) 
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In his book’s most famous, and most radical conceptual move, Roth links this fantasy of 
purity to the racially normative category of whiteness.  Zuckerman underscores the 
constructedness of this category when he writes of Coleman that “your art was being a 
white man.  Being, in your brother’s words, ‘more white than the whites.’ That was your 
singular act of invention” (Stain 345).  Some critics suggest that this passage valorizes 
Coleman’s act of self-fashioning.21  Perhaps, but there is also ample evidence that Roth 
views such self-invention as another mode of utopianism.  For Coleman, whiteness is a 
ticket to individual freedom with (or from) his society (Stain 120), but, at least as 
importantly, it is also a way of producing one’s future and identity as carte blanche.   The 
central scene in which Coleman repudiates his mother, echoing Merry’s agonized 
repudiation of her father, begins as an act of sacrificial killing meant to eliminate 
conflictedness in Coleman’s world by enabling his pastoral withdrawal—“[m]urdering 
her on behalf of his exhilarating notion of freedom!” (138)—but it concludes with a 
reversal when his mother tells him, “ You are white as snow and you think like a slave” 
(139), reversing Coleman’s equation of whiteness and freedom and foregrounding 
conflicts internal to him.  Though the novel sustains an antipastoral attack on the purity of 
whiteness, it does so with an ambivalence, characteristic of its treatment of other 
pastoralisms, but with more politically regressive results.  Nowhere is this plainer than in 
the trilogy’s representation of Newark. 
One Big Unhappy Family 
 Roth’s trilogy, like the other works in this study, employs the trope of the urban 
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ruin, here of Newark, NJ, as a ressentimental figure for America’s contested identity.  
Using conflicted urban space as a metonym for the larger nation has no determinate 
political valance; representing cities as places where social conflicts of class and race are 
staged could be part of any naturalist or realist aesthetic, but it can also be symptomatic 
of an anti-urbanism common in much of American canonical literature, which works 
hand in hand with the pastoral mode.  As Leo Marx suggests in his reading of this 
relationship in The Great Gatsby and The Scarlet Letter, “in each work a pastoral figure 
within a vision of an alluring alternative is set against the grim image of urban pain, 
oppression, and ugliness” (225).  The terms of such a contrast clearly favor pastoral 
withdraw into the countryside/suburb, where maintaining the fantasy of sentimental 
unconflictedness is much easier, often with politically regressive results: “[b]y masking 
an upper-class sensibility in the garb of a shepherd or a working man the pastoralist tells 
us that differences between classes don’t matter […] [a belief that] reinforce[s] illusions 
of class harmony” (Marx 293).  But as Marx also points out, a tremendous number of 
canonical American authors, including arch-pastoralist Thoreau, “increasingly have 
tended to compose pastoral romances of manifest failure.  They continue to enact the 
retreat/quest, but it would seem that they do so chiefly in order to deny it, and the 
resulting state of mind is one of structured ambivalence” (222). This ambivalence repeats 
in Roth’s texts by being refracted through the experiences of multiple characters. 
 However longstanding the play between anti-urbanism and failed pastoralism may 
be, the American Trilogy’s fixation on Newark’s dilapidation, as well as the other 
contemporary uses of the city considered in this study, takes on special meaning in the 
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years directly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many critics wondered why, 
precisely, Roth had reacted so belatedly to Newark’s racial conflict, some thirty years 
after the fact.22  While the answer is doubtless overdetermined, one might concentrate on 
the role of cities in the broad postwar history Roth wishes to evoke, a historical moment 
conveyed well by the high school reunion speech Zuckerman pens: “To have lived—and 
in this country, and in out time, and as who we were. Astonishing” (Pastoral 44).  In fact, 
for many living in the nation’s metropolises, the post war period is inseparable from the 
decline of American cities, beginning in the mid-1940s.  As Robert Beauregard argues: 
 
 
The history of the United States after World War II is incomplete without 
reference to the fate of its once-mighty cities.  Urban decline lurks behind every 
postwar story, appears in analyses of national and local economies, figures 
prominently in the evolution of federal, state, and municipal governments, and 
even surfaces as a major event in the history of the American family.  Of the 
many traits that distinguish postwar America from the nearly two hundred years 
of history that preceded it, urban decline is one of the most salient. (4) 
 
 
 
As I have suggested, the predominant pastoralism of the postwar period is white flight, as 
deindustrialization and the growth of service-based economies drove many businesses out 
of cities to seek areas of lower living costs, less congestion, cheaper labor, and more 
favorable tax rates, which in turn left many city centers decaying and racialized.  As 
Liam Kennedy writes, as whites left and cities became increasing Black and Latino, they 
became “more intensely psychologised as sites of racial anxieties, symbolic scenes of 
repression and conflict in which race is projected as a disturbing force of disorder” (7).  
After the 1992 Los Angeles riots, following fast on the nation’s shift in self-perception to 
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being the world’s only superpower, the notion of American domestic space—a 
sentimentalized vision linking familial and political valances—could not fail to address 
the nation’s urban miasma. 
 As noted above, Newark is so central to the trilogy that some critics refer to it as 
the Newark trilogy, rather than the American Trilogy.  All of its major characters—
Zuckerman, the Swede, Ira and Murray, and Coleman—are Newark-born, and each 
character’s relationship to the city complicates the trilogy’s own.  Moreover, although 
these urban representations are generally focalized through sometimes-unreflective 
characters, it is often tempting to attribute its frequent tendency to treat “the presence of 
blacks as a specter of fear” to Roth himself (Tanenbaum 40).  Setting aside this 
possibility for the moment, I here want to analyze three movements in the trilogy in a 
manner roughly analogous to the temporal categories past, present, and future.  First, 
Roth shows how nostalgic sentimentalization of Newark’s past is a mode of self-
forgetting that entails the abandonment of urban realities.  One observes this both in 
Nathan Zuckerman’s own relation to his childhood neighborhood and in Lou Levov’s 
inability to connect his own excruciating life as a working immigrant with the 
experiences of his employees.  One can add to these examples a third: Coleman’s 
abandonment of his family in East Orange as a paradoxical act of “white flight.”  A 
second, “present” moment can be traced through the perspectives of Swede Levov and 
Murray Ringold, in which Newark becomes a contested ground where ressentimental 
identities plot their own vulnerability, abandonment, and suffering.  Both the Swede and 
Murray refuse to abandon Newark based on their own self-images, but this patronizing 
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faux-innocence and liberal guilt give way to racist fears and eventual full abandonment of 
urban Newark.  Third, when Zuckerman returns to Newark, he thematically reverses 
Coleman’s abandonment of it (as well as his own), constituting the possible ground of a 
sentimental reconstitution of the social, a moment explicated in this chapter’s conclusion.  
What emerges from these three moments is an ambivalent pathos mourning a never-
present sentimental cohesion of Newark while marking it as a space destroyed by 
ressentimental demonization, just as the familial spaces considered above proved to be.  
Nonetheless, Roth consistently achieves this effect at the expense of Newark’s black 
residents, thus corroborating the affective logic of white flight.  
 Zuckerman’s Newark experiences before his Berkshire retreat demonstrate the 
extent to which the coherence of the city’s identity is dependent on familial coherence; 
more to the point, the loss of both city and family combine to evacuate individual 
identities of substance. As an author, Zuckerman had expounded on the Newark of his 
youth extensively in Carnovsky, a novel clearly meant to parallel Roth’s own notorious 
Portnoy’s Complaint, and was therefore already conscious of links between family and 
city.  The connections are underscored, however, in the concluding episode of Zuckerman 
Unbound.  After his father dies cursing Zuckerman for his betrayal of the family in 
fiction, and after his brother similarly forsakes him, Zuckerman, returning to New York 
from Newark Airport in a limousine, decides to revisit the house of his childhood, only to 
discover that his former neighbor is a slum (Unbound 221).  “The building’s front door 
was […] torn from its hinges, and, to either side of the missing door, the large windows 
looking into the foyer had lost their glass and were boarded over,” reflects Zuckerman. 
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“There was exposed wiring where once there had been two lamps to light your way in, 
and the entryway itself was upswept and littered with trash,” he reports, concluding, 
“[t]he building had become a slum” (Unbound 222). Zuckerman notes that “[e]xcept for 
the elderly trapped in nearby housing projects, the Jews had all vanished.  So had almost 
everyone white” (Unbound 223).  The current tenant of his former home, “a young black 
man, his head completely shaved,” sees Zuckerman in the limo and asks, “‘Who you 
supposed to be?’” (Unbound 224).  The writer’s reply—“’No one’”—is meant to 
demonstrate the extent to which Zuckerman’s identity has become “unbound.”  He 
reflects to himself, “[y]ou are no longer any man’s son, you are no longer some good 
woman’s husband, you are no longer your brother’s brother, and you don’t come from 
anywhere anymore” (Unbound 224-225).  In this fashion, Zuckerman borrows the 
immiseration of African-Americans in Newark to lend sharpness to his own personal 
pathos, even as that pathos is figured as a mode of disconnection from Newark, a pattern 
repeated in the American Trilogy.  Moreover, it is the suspicion and indifference of the 
home’s current occupants, rather than Zuckerman himself, which are figured as the 
source of this communal disconnection, “[h]ad the fellow cared to ask, Zuckerman could 
without any trouble have told him the names of the three families who lived in the flats 
on each floor before World War II.  But that wasn’t what this black man wished to know” 
(Unbound 224).  Thus Newark, for Zuckerman, is a screen on which elegiac nostalgia 
may be projected but which also serves as a screen to hide the roots of his own self-
fashioning abandonment of familial and communal concerns. 
 The Newark of Lou Levov is similarly split between a nostalgic past and a present 
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unaccountably submerged in racialized chaos, but his perspective is treated with much 
more evident irony.   His sons tell Zuckerman that, before his death, the patriarch 
constantly complained of the city’s post-riot changes: “his beloved old Newark, 
butchered to death by taxes, corruption, and race” (Pastoral 24). The last term in this 
series takes pride of place in Lou’s complaints, and at least in part this seems to be 
because he comprehends the inevitability of taxes and corruption but is thoroughly 
confused by the culture and claims of the city’s African Americans, as when he blames a 
“whole business going down the drain” on “that son of a bitch LeRoi Jones, that Peek-A-
Boo-Boopy-Do, whatever the hell he calls himself in that godamn hat” (Pastoral 163).  
But Lou’s race complaint runs much deeper than cultural misunderstanding.  In one of 
the novel’s more obvious ironic censures on the racialized discourse of characters with 
whom it otherwise sympathizes, Lou recounts an argument with a friend who maintains 
that “they ought to take the schvartzes and line ‘em up and shoot ‘em” (Pastoral 164).  
Lou objects that this is what Hitler did to Jews, but his interlocutor balks at the 
comparison, and the two become entangled in an argument particularly frustrating to Lou 
because “[t]hey are telling me to shoot the schvartzes and I am hollering no, and 
meanwhile I’m the one whose business they are ruining because they cannot make a 
glove that fits […] I am arguing with them, I am arguing against what I should be 
arguing for!” (Pastoral 164).  Lou’s complicity in this pseudo-genocidal dehumanization 
of his employees and Newark’s black population is part of a more general self-forgetting 
that figures his workforce as shrewdly thieving and decadently lazy, while failing to 
recall his own status as a racialized immigrant toiling in Newark’s leather works decades 
 
97 
earlier: 
 
 
The tannery that stank of both the slaughterhouse and the chemical plant from the 
soaking of flesh and the cooking of flesh and the dehairing and pickling and 
degreasing of hides, where round the clock in the summertime the blowers drying 
the thousands and thousands of hanging skins raised the temperature in the low-
ceilinged dry room to a hundred and twenty degrees, where the vast vat rooms 
were dark as caves and flooded with swill, where brutish workingmen, heavily 
aproned, armed with hooks and staves, dragging and pushing overloaded wagons, 
wringing and hanging waterlogged skins, were driven like animals through the 
laborious storm that was a twelve-hour shift—a filthy, stinking place awash with 
water dyed red and black and blue and green, with hunks of skin all over the floor, 
everywhere pits of grease, hills of salt, barrels of solvent. (Pastoral 11-12) 
 
 
 
While one may interpret this passage as a token of respect for the work ethic of a 
generation laboring in merciless conditions for its children’s advantage, one cannot 
ignore its propulsive, heaving intimations of toil half-lit by an infernal glow, which gives 
the lie to nostalgic revisions about the city’s past effulgence.  When Lou scolds his son, 
“Seymour, this city isn’t a city—it’s a carcass!  Get out!” the novel gives us abundant 
reason to understand that the carcass here has been decaying a long while (Pastoral 235).  
As with Zuckerman, Lou Levov transforms the urban immiseration of African Americans 
in Newark into his own ressentimental loss, though in Lou’s case, this process is more 
clearly treated with distancing irony. 
 The most extensive, complex, and problematic representation of Newark emerges 
from the perspective of the Swede, at least as Zuckerman imagines him.  The Swede’s 
view of Newark and the business he runs in it is inseparable from his ressentimental 
identity as a wounded patriarch, betrayed by uncomprehending subalterns. The Swede 
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connects the revolt of his workers with his daughter’s inexplicable rebellion:  “First one 
colossal blow—seven months later, in February ’68, the devastation of the next.  The 
factory under siege, the daughter at large, and that took care of their future” (Pastoral 
163).  Such an attitude suggests Zuckerman’s perspective is precisely the “paternal 
capitalism” Rita Cohen accused him of (Pastoral 135). This view is supported by the fact 
that one of the factory’s employees, Vicki, stays with Levov during the riots telling him: 
“This is mine too.  You just own it,” a phrase seemingly calculated to offer the veneer of 
insubordination while actually downplaying continuing real differences in power 
(Pastoral 162).  While, in my view, the novel holds the Swede’s paternalism at an ironic 
remove, Roth complicates all readings of the broader economic and racial politics 
involved by placing much of novel’s description of the 1967 riots in a lengthy, surreal 
episode in which, seated on his kitchen stool, the Swede deliriously imagines a visitation 
by Angela Davis, “St. Angela,” who he is convinced holds the secret of his fugitive 
daughter’s location.  
 
 
He tells Angela how, after the riots, after living under siege with Vicky at his side, 
he was determined to stand alone and not leave Newark and abandon his black 
employees.  He does not, of course tell her that he wouldn’t have hesitated—and 
wouldn’t still were it not for his fear that, if he should join the exodus of 
businesses not yet burned down, Merry would at least have her airtight case 
against him.  Victimizing black people and the working class and the poor for 
self-gain, out of filthy greed! (162) 
 
 
 
Passages such as this demonstrate how the novel often simultaneously 1.) reiterates 
neoconservative ressentiment and fear about racialized unrest, 2.) ironizes that 
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perspective as dishonest and self-serving, and 3.) ridicules as self-righteousness and 
despotic the ressentimental attacks of the New Left—“the utter otherworldliness of the 
ideal of St. Angela”—a satire anticipating Roth’s attack on Communist rhetoric in the 
trilogy’s second novel (Pastoral 165).  Numerous examples of this dialectical texture of 
voice occur throughout, as when the Swede “decides to explain […] that he is one of two 
white trustees (this is not true—the father of a friend is the trustee) of an antipoverty 
organization that meets regularly in Newark to promote the city’s comeback, which (also 
not true—how could it be?) he still believes in” (Pastoral 165).  To Roth’s great credit, 
when his text is at its most complex, the ceaseless ironic impersonation of multiple 
ressentimental political rhetorics produces Newark as a chaotic cavalcade of contending, 
hyperbolic voices. To Roth’s discredit, however, these voices often serve to obscure the 
material realities of the events they describe in a pattern expressive of its own racialized 
ressentiment. 
 To see how such furtive ressentiment is embedded in the text, it is worth recalling 
the basic facts about Newark’s 1967 unrest, a riot that LIFE magazine called “a 
predictable insurrection,” because the conditions in the city were known to be “[m]ore 
grave and pressing than those of perhaps any other American city of the time” (qtd. in 
Hayden 5).  Far from paradisiacal before the riots, Newark had the highest percentage of 
poor housing, the most crime per capita, and the greatest maternal mortality of any city in 
the nation, also ranking among the worst cities with regard to venereal disease, infant 
mortality, birth rate, unemployment and drug addiction (Hayden 5).  The primary tension 
in the city was between business elites and the growing civil rights movement, a fact that 
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makes a meeting between Angela Davis and a person like the Swede oddly fitting.  
Business elites, not surprisingly, felt that the proper solution to the city’s plight was a mix 
of job training and the restoration of space for prime business conditions, which included 
plans to develop a medical school in the middle of a downtown black neighborhood, a 
step designed, in the words of one Chamber of Commerce newsletter to “overwhelm the 
creeps” (qtd. in Hayden 6).  Fear of the displacements sure to follow such a project as 
well as bitterness over having their political representation in municipal government 
blocked led to the pre-riot tensions among many black Newarkers, though initial violence 
did not begin until a black cab driver—one John Smith—received a set of broken ribs, a 
concussion, and a hernia during his arrest for “tailgaiting” (Hayden 9-10).  As word 
spread of Smith’s treatment, a crowd of angry unruly protesters gathered from the slums 
and projects outside the 4th Police precinct, throwing rocks and eventually two Molotov 
cocktails into the building.  An escalation of reciprocal attacks led to four days of looting 
and violence in which twenty-one civilians, all black, were shot to death, most by riot 
police firing into crowds and apartment buildings, and one, it is alleged, of a bayonet 
wound (Hayden 76). 
 That so little of this is mentioned in Roth’s description of the riots helps to 
explain how the novel, whatever its ironic layering of voices, effectively transfers the 
pathos of brutalization and economic collapse from blacks within Newark’s slums to the 
white business elite who wished to drive them out.  Some of this transference owes to the 
Swede’s own limited zone of sympathy, as he is imagined, but the sympathetic 
investment in the Swede, based largely in the injustice of his family’s collapse, bleeds 
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into sympathy for the fate of his family business.   Their commingling is consistent 
throughout the text, as when, reeling from news of his daughter’s rape, the Swede’s 
focalized fulmination shifts to the novel’s lengthiest description of the riots.  Note how 
the rioters act with ideal strength and employable organization, merits lacking among 
Newark Maid workers, which subtly underscores that the passage begins securely 
focalized in the Swede: 
 
 
Their strength is tremendous, their teamwork is flawless.  The shattering of the 
glass windows is thrilling.  The not paying for things is intoxicating.  […] In 
Newark’s burning Mardi Gras streets, a force is released that feels redemptive, 
something purifying is happening, something spiritual and revolutionary 
perceptible to all. The surreal vision of household appliances out under the stars 
and agleam in the glow of the flames incinerating the Central ward promises the 
liberation of all mankind.  […] the old ways of suffering are burning blessedly 
away in the flames, never again to be resurrected, instead to be superseded, within 
only hours, by suffering that will be so gruesome, so monstrous, so unrelenting 
and abundant, that its abatement will take the next five hundred years. The fire 
this time—and next?  After the fire?  Nothing.  Nothing in Newark ever again. 
(268-269) 
 
 
 
The concluding allusion to James Baldwin’s text marks this passage, and its bitter 
skepticism, as Zuckerman’s (and perhaps Roth’s) own.  Roth’s reader is left to provide 
background on “the old ways of suffering,” which, by all accounts, were the effective 
causes of the riots.  This tendency to erase conditioning motive is underscored in Swede’s 
other mentions of Newark post-riot.  What remains for the Swede is racialized fear, as 
attested by his descriptions of contemporary Newark, where black youths steal cars to 
joyride and pointlessly run over pedestrians (24-26).  The reduction of inner city residents 
to faceless “predatory blacks roaming the Newark streets,” may be a function of the 
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novel’s characters, rather than Roth’s own political perspective, but as I have 
demonstrated, subtle markers indicate their perspectives often coincide on this point 
(Boyers 40).  Moreover, the occlusion of conditions motivating the riot and the 
transference of urban pathos to suburban Swede Levov only serves to undo the critique of 
pastoralism otherwise sustained in American Pastoral, by making white flight not only 
compulsory, but an agonized exodus resulting from victimization at the hands of 
racialized assailants. 
 This conclusion is supported by the ressentimental texture of Murray Ringold’s 
explanation of his wife’s death at the end of I Married a Communist.   In the second 
novel, there is less dialectical negation of Murray’s perspective; Murray’s effort to stay in 
Newark as a teacher clearly represents a more heartfelt commitment to civic cohesion and 
equality than had the Swede’s.  “Even after the riots, when Newark emptied out,” Murray 
relates to Zuckerman, “we stayed on Lehigh Avenue, the only white family that did stay” 
(316).  Again, the specter of a white paternalistic pathos develops in Murray’s description 
of his battles against classroom unruliness, for while “[b]arely able to hold down the 
mayhem, let alone teach,” Murray is unable to abandon: “how could I run away?  I was 
interested in respect being shown for these kids” (316-317).  His desire to stay was 
unaffected by being mugged twice, a fact he now rues for, shortly after his second 
mugging, his wife Doris is murdered “[f]or a handbag with nothing in it” (317).  Murray 
confides to Zuckerman his guilt over Doris’ death, certain that even after abandoning “all 
the obvious delusions—religion, ideology, Communism—you’re still left with the myth 
of your own goodness.  Which is the final delusion” (317-318).  As in American 
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Pastoral, separations between civic pathos and familial pathos are collapsed, but not into 
a sentimental bond—a term that would accurately describe Murray’s mantra: “I can’t 
betray my brother, I can’t betray my teaching, I can’t betray the disadvantaged of 
Newark” (317).  Rather, the novel concludes with the racialized pandemonium of urban 
Newark becoming inseparable from personal, private trauma and loss. Once again, the 
bond is ressentimental and, once again, transforming black presences into shadowy 
menacing clichés of white paranoia produces the desired effect.    
Authorizing America 
 Before considering how the conclusion of The Human Stain attempts to reconcile 
both the trilogy’s critique of whiteness with its racialized ressentiment over Newark’s 
destruction, let us return to the central schema of performative sympathy to understand 
how and where such a model would locate the privileged place of (res)sentiment.  I have 
argued above that, while the performative dimensions of sympathy can produce affective 
solidarities without regard to epistemological certainty, that constative ambiguity about 
the experiences of others opens up the sympathetic witness to ethical fault, especially 
ressentimental projection.  Further, I have shown how Roth’s novels are narratologically 
invested in the sentimental model of sympathetic witnessing while their thematic 
exploration of communal and familial conflict is governed by plural ressentiment, 
contradictory and competing scripts staging diverse subjects as wrongful victims.  I have 
not, however, explored how, in Roth, the volatility of ressentimental force cannot be 
contained, and how contesting claims to virtue-by-means-of-suffering necessarily call 
into question the stability and privilege of the central witness, Zuckerman.  Recall that, in 
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speech act theory, performative utterances require a speaker who is authorized to produce 
the effect in question: a presiding judge’s decision performs effectively while the same 
language from the lips of a panhandler does nothing.  Clearly Roth authors and authorizes 
Zuckerman as sympathetic witness but looking closer at the source of authorization is 
key.  Whatever his claims about the risks of wrongness in imaginative projection, each of 
the novels is figured as Zuckerman’s novel, though this is only made explicit it the 
trilogy’s final pages. Thus the narrative logic of the trilogy is indistinguishable from 
Zuckerman self-authorizing as a sympathetic witness. Moreover his authority to speak, to 
project as a sympathetic witness, to attend to the suffering of others, is conferred at least 
in part by his invisibility as a nominally white man.  Dilemmas over the right to write 
formed a predominant part of the first Zuckerman trilogy, in which the novelist’s 
“betrayal” of the Jewish-American community as well as his family figured prominently.  
Even though the universalization of ressentiment ultimately produces texts that reinscribe 
white male privilege in the guise of yet another form of victimized identity, Roth 
attempts a sophisticated and subtle repudiation of white male privilege in the closing 
passage of The Human Stain.   
 First, I must acknowledged that the political disposition of The Human Stain, even 
more than the preceding novels, evinces a shift toward a politics of reaction.  Roth’s 
manifest disapproval of Kenneth Starr notwithstanding, his novel primarily excoriates 
multiculturalist and feminist appeals for greater sensitivity to continuing inequalities 
across race and gender divisions. The novel strenuously rejects what it calls the assertion 
of “incapacity as privilege,” “[t]he privilegedness of […] suffering,” “de-virilizing pulpit 
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virtue-mongering,” and “the hyperdramatization of the pettiest emotions” (Stain 331, 
234, 153, 147).  To the extent that Roth maps his rejection of victim-identities onto the 
cultural critiques popularly referred to as “political correctness,” he strands his analysis 
on the isle of white male neo-conservative ressentiment.23   Roth’s satire of the moralistic 
self-congratulation not infrequent in progressive circles is most stingingly compelling 
when he aligns it to tyrannizing proprieties of the past, proprieties like those that “H.L. 
Mencken identified with boobism, that Philip Wylie thought of as Momism, that the 
Europeans unhistorically call American Puritanism, that the likes of Ronald Reagan call 
America’s core values” (153).  But this pose of ecumenical disdain from all models of 
decorum, be they in the form of “civic responsibility, WASP dignity, women’s rights, 
black pride, ethnic allegiance, or emotion-laden Jewish ethical sensitivity,” belies Roth’s 
investments in privileged frames of judgment by which the suffering of his protagonists 
can emerge legibly (153). 
 Perhaps the most egregious strategy Roth employs to establish these frames of 
judgment as objective is having Ernestine Silk, the only woman of color to speak at 
length in the trilogy, espouse them.  She decries Urban Renewal plans, the abandonment 
of teaching agreed-upon classics, and the advent of Black History Month.  Particularly 
excruciating is the last of these objections, formulated in the following comparison: “I 
liken having a Black History Month in February and concentrating study on that to milk 
that’s just about to go sour.  You can still drink it, but it just doesn’t taste right” (329).  
As with Newark Maid’s Vicki, Ernestine is authorized to speak only to support the 
positions of the white man to whom she is speaking.  In the earlier case, Vicki’s 
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appropriation had been another ironic indication of the Swede’s own mendacious 
ressentiment.  Aside from enabling the revelation of Coleman’s race and corroborating 
Zuckerman’s biases, Ernestine Silk is a cipher.  If she is meant to bespeak a demographic 
widening of the novel’s sympathetic projection, she only confirms the ethical danger of 
substituting one’s self for another, a danger to which Roth seemed more alive in 
American Pastoral.  This failure of Roth’s trilogy ought not be minimized, for it cuts to 
the heart of Roth’s ambitions.  
 Nevertheless, the trilogy’s concluding scene does much to complicate any facile 
dismissal of the novel’s racial politics.  The scene begins with Zuckerman en route to a 
planned gathering with Coleman’s brother and sister in East Orange, an assembly I take 
to represent the possibility of a reconstitution of Newark’s broken social body as well as 
the divided family structure to which it has been persistently linked.  Instead of 
concluding with this sentimental scene, however, the novel ends with Zuckerman 
meeting face to face with the novel’s villain, Lester Farley, who is ice-fishing on a frozen 
lake.24  A Vietnam veteran with posttraumatic stress disorder, Lester exemplifies the 
bifurcated status of white man as victim and victimizer, as well as the ultimate 
incoherence of identities based in these terms.  His traumatization during the Vietnam 
War is ambivalent: Les was both a murderer of Vietnamese civilians and a young man 
watching as his friends were gruesomely dispatched.  On his return, memories of these 
experiences continue to determine Les’s actions, so that Roth’s reader understands Les’s 
vituperative racism and the physical abuse and eventual murder of his wife, Fauna, as 
consequences of his earlier brutalization.  Importantly, Roth stresses that Les’s 
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sympathetic capacities have been irreparably distorted, so that “I feel like I’ve been hit on 
the side of the head with a two-by-four when nothing is happening.  Then something is 
happening, something fucking huge [here, the death of his two children], I don’t feel a 
fucking thing” (73).  So complete is his numbness that, Les is unable to share in the 
cathartic experience of other soldiers during his pilgrimage to the Moving Wall, a touring 
miniaturization of the Vietnam Memorial. Hence, when Zuckerman confronts Lester on 
the iced-over lake, he confronts an embodiment of the human capacity to lose its capacity 
for fellow feeling, the very archetype of militant white ressentiment.   
 Furthermore, the “empty, ice-whitened stage” on which they meet underscores the 
lethality and barrenness of a pure whiteness, an unfeeling identity convinced of its own 
universality, covering an interior that is, in Les’s menacing words “real dark” (Stain 346, 
358).  For Zuckerman, the meeting is the precise reverse of the sentimental journey he 
has interrupted, for “it is as though we have encountered each other at the top of the 
world, two hidden brains mistrustfully ticking, mutual hatred and paranoia the only 
introspection there is anywhere” (Stain 351).  The antipastoralism of Roth’s trilogy 
culminates in this monstrously threatening emblematization of white flight.  “It’s just a 
beautiful area,” Les muses, “Just peace and quiet. And clean.  It’s a clean place.  Away 
from all the hustle and bustle and craziness that goes on” (Stain 347).  Moreover, Roth 
stages the scene so that Zuckerman’s own authorization as a writer and sympathetic 
witness are at stake.  When Les asks him what kind of writer he is, Zuckerman replies, “I 
write about people like you […] Yes. People like you.  Their problems” (356). 
Zuckerman intends to write a book, called The Human Stain, in which he reveals Les as 
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the murderer of Faunia and Coleman, an act of narration that will mean that “when [he] 
finished the book, [he] was going to have to go elsewhere to live” (360).  That Roth ends 
his trilogy with a symbolic, though not explicit, repudiation of whiteness and the 
fantasies of purity, attests to his interest in problematizing the ressentiment of his own 
subject position.  Nevertheless, the politics of representation continue to dog Roth’s 
work.  His presentation of America as a diverse and conflicting group of affective 
identities ressentimentally composed, while side-stepping the naïveté of both pastoral 
retreat and sentimental communion, draws an implicit equivalence between 
socioeconomic groups with radically divergent scales of grievances.  This implied 
equivalence helps to maintain the normative invisibility of the white male author, to 
whom the authorization of sympathetic performance is still securely entrusted.  In the 
novel’s final image, Zuckerman sees from a distance Les Farley on the ice lake and likens 
his shape to the X of an illiterate’s signature.  This signatory X might also be imagined as 
the mark indicating that we, Roth’s reader, are to sign the concluding lines, and with 
them, sign off on the America that Zuckerman, and Roth, has presented. We should, 
instead, leave this space as blank as we find it. 
 
 Why did Roth return to the problem of Newark’s destruction in the mid-1990s?  
Could the fires of Los Angeles in 1992 have reminded him of that decades-old 
entanglement?  If such literary biographical questions cannot, at present, be resolved, it 
may still be profitable to place his work in dialogue with literature emerging more 
explicitly from the upheavals of the early 1990s.   In the next chapter, I analyze the 
 
109 
affective pedagogy of Anna Deavere Smith’s theatrical work, much of which responds 
directly to the smoldering tensions and occasional explosions evident in American urban 
life in the last decade of millennium.  Surprisingly, Roth and Smith’s approaches to 
affective pedagogy share a great deal.  Though tonally different, Roth’s agony over the 
errors of sympathy and imaginative projection more generally parallels Smith’s own 
abandonment of naïve mimetic notions of sympathetic commingling.  Furthermore, 
though each stresses the impossibility of the exact reproduction of subjective positions, 
both seem to embrace the notion that art’s great ethical virtue is in cultivating a capacity 
for imaginative projection.  Lastly, both use the figure of the artist or writer as the hinge 
by which the door of sympathy swings.  Nevertheless, where Roth’s ressentimental 
leveling furtively reintroduces the priority of white patriarchy, Smith seems with each 
work more intent on revealing the historical terrain of power and challenging the ways in 
which urban populations are made voiceless by the most culturally dominant forms of 
mediation, of which one would have to reckon Roth one unusually sophisticated example.  
Moreover, Smith attends far more carefully to the urban realities characterizing her 
historical moment.  In cities such as New York and Los Angeles, the historically singular 
influx of immigrants from Asian and Latin American severely eroded the salience of 
black-white racial dichotomies, dichotomies that still haunt Roth’s works despite the 
ways in which Jewishness works as a deconstructive supplement.  Smith’s theater seeks 
to sentimentally attend to more recent divides and devastations 
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CHAPTER III 
LITTLE LIFE SENTENCES: 
STAGING THE NATION IN ANNA DEAVERE SMITH’S  
SEARCH FOR AMERICAN CHARACTER 
 
"It's like he's looking at me, doesn't see me, he's just looking right through me"  
(qtd. in Cannon 29).  So spoke Sgt. Stacey Koon, during his first interview with Los 
Angeles Police Dept.’s Bureau of Internal Affairs, regarding his encounter with Rodney 
King, a young African American motorist with whom Koon’s fate was quickly becoming 
entangled.   The archival record of this exchange of glances, or rather the failure of any 
such exchange, bore considerable juridical significance, for it helped to support the claim 
that Koon, along with three other LAPD officers, had reason to believe that King was 
under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP) and thus dangerously insensible to pain.   The 
evidential validity of this statement, the question of how much weight can be given to an 
officer of law’s words and what his suspicions license, was at the heart of Koon’s defense 
against charges that he had abused his position and used excessive force during King’s 
arrest.  The evidence appeared damning: together, Koon and Officer Laurence Powell had 
struck King with a total of thirty-one baton blows even after King had been shot with two 
separate Taser electroshock guns.  All this transpired while another pair of officers, 
Timothy Wind and Theodore Briseno, landed intermittent blows to King’s body and an 
additional six officers stood by with seeming indifference (Cannon 45).  Jurors knew with 
certainty the number of baton blows and uniformed onlookers because George Holliday, 
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a bystander, recorded the March 3, 1991 beating from his apartment’s patio.  The video, 
repeatedly played for the remainder of the year on both local and national news sources, 
showed the cordon of officers illuminated by a helicopter’s spotlight kicking and 
clubbing King’s flailing body without any evident need to fear for their own safety and 
ostensibly incapable of seeing (or indifferent to) the prone man’s agony.  Nonetheless, 
twelve jurors deferred to Koon’s impression, despite what their own eyes, via the 
Holliday video, told them, and acquitted Koon along with two other officers of all 
wrongdoing on April 29, 1992.  What followed was the most costly civil unrest in 
American history and, I suggest, a consequent resurgence of sentimental tropes in popular 
and literary discourse to soothe differences figured as interior and domestic—internal 
divisions, inside the nation, in the inner cities.25  
 Both in their nineteenth-century and late twentieth-century iterations, these 
sentimental tropes—the grieving parent, the abandoned child, and above all, the 
sympathetic witness who models an implicitly or explicitly endorsed response to 
suffering—were aimed at producing a coherent American identity.  More precisely, in my 
reading, early American sentimentalism provided an important theoretical means of 
constructing a collective identity that could claim to transcend legalistic formulations of 
the nation-state without relying on aristocratic and religious justifications for governance.  
This mode of identification was based on the imaginative projection of another’s pain in 
one’s self such that suffering becomes the safeguard of social bonds. It is especially 
ironic, then, that this increased sentimentalization of American citizenship should be 
provoked by a spiral of violence marked at every turn by the repeated incapacity of 
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individuals to see another’s pain.  Koon saw King looking through, rather than at, him.  
Inasmuch as one deems them candid witnesses, Koon and his cohort saw in King’s 
movements not the reflexive responses of a human being in agony, but rather the 
threatening and invulnerable resistance of a drug addict.  The Simi Valley jurors, too, saw 
themselves in the figures of the police rather than in the crumpled shape of the twenty-
five year old black man.26   
 For cultural observers of the period, this persistent imaginative blindness to others 
might have seemed endemic; the phenomenon was an omnipresent yet also a surprising 
and counterintuitive fact in each of its (typically racialized) iterations.  As frequently as 
they played Holliday’s grainy footage, Los Angeles news channels broadcasted 
surveillance video of Soon Ja Du, a Korean American store owner, shooting Latasha 
Harlins in the back of the skull, killing the 15-year-old instantly in a dispute over a can of 
orange juice.  When a California judge sentenced Soon to five years probation, four 
hundred hours of community service, and a $500 fine rather than the 16 years of prison 
recommended by the case’s jury, a similar incapacity to see one’s self as another seemed 
at work (Perez-Pena 28).  Finally, as the riots unfolded, many in Los Angeles’s enraged 
multitude appeared thrilled by the suffering of the motorists and storeowners they 
targeted, even as news helicopters broadcast images of the din and confusion worldwide 
and news anchors dismissed crowds of protestors as “thugs,” “hoodlums,” and “creeps” 
(qtd. in Caldwell 162).  For many, such palpable and violent divisions, such 
unsympathetic “incivility,” seemed to require sentimental attendance to the pain of others 
as a means of making the social body whole.  At a press conference on the third day of 
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rioting, Rodney King famously pleaded “Can we all get along? Can we get along? Can 
we stop making it, making it horrible for the older people and the kids?” (qtd. in Keyes 
22).  Similarly sentimental, if far more aloof, was socially conservative cant espoused by 
Vice President Dan Quayle, exemplified by his assertion that the riots sprang from a 
“breakdown of the family structure,” that is, a lack of family values (qtd. in Rosenthal 
A1).  
Into this disoriented and conflicted landscape, the performer and playwright Anna 
Deavere Smith, on whose work this chapter focuses, attempted to intervene with acts as 
political as they were dramatic.  To show how spectacular suffering produced similarly 
spectacular sentimentalism, in the following chapter I anatomize the mode of affective 
pedagogy at work in three of Anna Deavere Smith’s documentary plays—Fires in the 
Mirror, Twilight: Los Angles, 1992, and House Arrest, which together form the bulk of 
her on-going dramatic project On The Road: A Search of American Character.27  As Roth 
does in his late trilogy of novels, Smith seeks to construct a new notion of American 
belonging by focusing on urban communities devastated by class and ethnic unrest.  In 
Smith’s case, however, the pertinent polis is not Newark, NJ, but rather the civic 
aftermath of the 1991 Crown Heights riot in Brooklyn, NY, and the 1992 riot in Los 
Angeles, CA.   
In both cases, what Smith reveals and in a sense reconstitutes is what Edward 
Soja has called “the Fractal City,” fractal is anything contains in its parts self-similar 
objects of the whole, so that hierarchies within subsets exist (283). Soja employs this 
terms to suggest that cities should no longer be understood as being structured around 
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simple binaries—bourgeoisie and proletariat—or forming neat hierarchies—upper, 
middle, and lower classes neatly puddle—though the polarities in wealth have far from 
disappeared (265).  Instead, Soja suggests that a “more polymorphous and fractured 
social geometry” have taken shape in which “multiple axes of differential power and 
status” produce a new “ethnic quilt” (265).  This situation, in which ethnicity appeared to 
replace class when in fact in simply complicated it, emerged in this period because of a 
widening gap between rich and poor since the 1970s coupled with “a massive influx of 
poor immigrants providing cheap and weakly organized labor supplies” (269). According 
to influential sociologist William Julius Wilson, The result was that increasingly 
downwardly mobile African American communities—largely cut off from the productive 
edge of economic development and information technology spatially and educationally—
were becoming a permanent urban underclass.  Add to this situation entrepreneurial and 
migratory immigrants—Koreans and Latinos, for example—and ethnic niches left behind 
from earlier iterations of the city—Lubavitchers—and a distinctive, disjunctive mélange 
emerges.  As Leo Chavez remarks, the recession and growing discontent over 
immigration lead to a public sector increasingly dominated by concerns over 
multiculturalism and race; in just three years, 1992 to 1994, eighteen of Time’s covers 
were dedicated to one or both of these subjects, accounting for the lion’s share of 
magazine covers for the whole of the 1990s (136).  The rifts between and among 
immigrants and African Americans becomes a major subject in the media earlier, with 
journals such as the New Republic keying into comparatively smaller events such as the 5 
May 1991 riots between African Americans and Latinos, even before the LA riots elevate 
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the matter  (140).  If the riots reflected on conflict between African Americans and 
immigrants, conservative whites were similarly disposed.  Illustrative of this was the 
approval in 1994 of Prop 187, designed to prohibit illegal immigrations from using public 
services such as health care and public education (Soja 402).  This politically, culturally 
and spatially divided social body seems the kind of balkanized space that is absolutely 
decentered, headless, and because of the animosities evident in the fight over resources 
and claims to cultural and legal legitimacy, impossible to give coherence to.  Smith’s 
dramatic technique—interviewing hundreds of citizens and community leaders and then 
performing their words herself in a one-woman show—reterritorializes the fractured body 
politic onto a body dramatic and seeks to reconfigure the blindly suffering city as its own 
audience, attending to the vicissitudes of its internal differences.   
I pursue this reading through an argument structured around three related 
moments.  First, to substantiate the claim that Smith’s method engages with, and revises, 
the affective pedagogy of the sympathetic witness characteristic of sentimentalism, I 
elucidate the mode of identification on which hinges both her dramatic practice and 
cultural critique. Second, I read Smith’s specific mode of affective identification across 
the terrain of identity politics, relying especially on the social ontology of Gilles Deleuze 
to sketch the consequences of Smith’s sentimentalist revision to national and sub-national 
politics.  Third, I read Smith’s projection of social space, from the broken social body of 
the riot-torn city to the geographically broader spaces and historically deeper epochs of 
nation beyond it, and argue that Smith revises the conceptual structure of the 
sentimentalized nation—a community constituted by a repetition of fellow feeling—both 
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by prioritizing difference over sameness and by critiquing the role of structural inequities 
of power as well as in the social body and, autoreferentially, in her dramatic practice.  
While I offer a reading of Anna Deavere Smith’s aesthetic practice that describes her 
dramatic effects more accurately, her theoretic orientation more capaciously, and her 
politics more historically, than have previous analyses, this reading also constitutes a 
paradigmatic example of how America’s urban crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
helped to resurrect sentimental nationalism in creative interventions that often looked 
beyond the space of the nation. 
Roth, Smith, and the Performative Turn 
Before moving forward in this argument, however, I must place Smith's 
documentary theater in relation to my claims about Philip Roth’s novels and 
contextualize her work within broader developments in both contemporary (largely 
American) theater and performance art.  Despite their generic differences, Smith’s 
dramatic work parallels Roth’s trilogy in at least three important and related ways.  First, 
Smith, like Roth, seeks to stage sympathetic identification as a creative performance, 
wherein the artist-observer must pursue affective mimesis by first directly acknowledging 
its impossibility or fictionality. In this respect both writers make use of the metafictional 
aspects of their texts for thematic ends.  For Smith, a hypermimetic impersonation of the 
exact words, intonations, inflections, and mannerisms of her interview subjects-cum-
theatrical-roles simultaneously accentuates her ability to listen and absorb their affect 
even as it marks her difference from them.  Her audience, in turn, is figured as the 
observer, a role that places them in Smith’s own position as interviewer-listener, in this 
 
117 
fashion repeating the affective pedagogical model of classic sentimentalism.  In this basic 
structure, she and Roth are alike.  Second, both Roth and Smith confront and dispel the 
promise of pastoral unconflictedness by taking the riot-gutted urban ruin as the locus of 
the American multitude.  Both are vigorously anti-pastoral, using the locus of the city in 
the aftermath of a race riot to articulate a space of fragmentation and (mis)understanding 
that is at odds with the social field familiar to most sentimental narratives. Third, in a 
manner that is related to but distinct from the use of the riot-gutted ruin trope, both Smith 
and Roth pursue a national imaginary based on plural suffering rather than univocal true 
feeling.  The seriality of these works insists on keeping open the object of the 
sympathetic gaze and in this way refuses the Manichean disconnection that 
sentimentalism traditionally produces through idealized depictions of sufferers. 
There are, however, crucial differences between Roth’s and Smith’s efforts to 
model creative and civic sympathetic responses.  In Smith’s work, one encounters a more 
capacious sampling of characters, and, given the importance of pluralized suffering to 
both of their revisions of American belonging, this is an aesthetic difference with no 
mean consequences.  Whereas Roth’s texts ultimately ask their reader to “authorize” 
Zuckerman’s mode of sympathetic presentation by figuratively signing himself or herself 
into the white male author’s presentation of nation, Smith destabilizes this central figure 
of identification.  She does so, in part, by virtue of her status as black woman, a subject 
position that doubly inverts the tacit racial and gender privileges underwriting 
Zuckerman’s status as universal Man.   Significantly, Smith offers a variety of characters, 
rather than a single narrator, to model sympathetic responses.  By doing so, she subverts 
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the ‘I’, the single space of rational interiority ruling over the body politic in classic 
conceptions of political economy.  In place of this ‘I’ Smith offers multiple selves; 
consequently the macrological body of the nation is founded not on atomistic, single 
beings agglomerated together to become a single full being, but rather multiple 
becomings in connection with yet more highly articulated becomings.  She accomplishes 
this in several ways, and although I treat them in greater detail below, it is worth 
sketching them here.  Smith displaces the priority of the single knowing “I” first at the 
(trans)script level, by focusing primarily on moments in which her subjects misspeak, 
stutter, or lose track of a thought.  This method of selection has the effect of disclosing 
instances in which individuals “aren’t themselves” because they are in the very activity of 
negotiating a new zone of identity, a new way of being themselves.  Smith decenters the 
political subject at a second, documentary level, by parroting their voices and gestures as 
assiduously as possible in order to write their own difference from their gestures and 
actions and thus revealing internal difference in her presentation, between herself and 
those she re-presents.  And finally, she pluralizes the political subject at the level of 
performance, by shifting between characters in reedited versions of her three published 
pieces, in that fashion suggesting that sympathetic performance reoccurs in multiple and 
ever-changing acts, destabilizing the notion of dramatic character.  
One final difference between Smith and Roth must be registered: their explicit 
theorization of art’s relation to the body politic.  Smith’s conception of the artist’s role 
clearly shares some affinities with Roth, if my larger argument holds true, because both 
see in the artist the paradigmatic sympath.  However, Smith sees the role of her theatrical 
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works as much more explicitly political and interventionist than does Roth, whose 
sympathy with modernist theorizations of art’s autonomy have already been 
demonstrated in the figure of Leo Gluckman, in I Married a Communist, who sneered at 
the notion of art as a weapon “in the service of ‘the people’?” (218).  Smith is decidedly 
more open about her hopes for using aesthetic craft for collective, political projects.  As 
she declares in her introduction to Twilight: Los Angeles, 1992: 
 
 
I played Twilight in Los Angeles as a call to the community.  I performed it at a 
time when the community had not yet resolved the problems.  I wanted to be a 
part of their examination of the problems.  I believe that solutions to these 
problems will call for the participation of large and eclectic groups of people […] 
and [we must] encourage many more people to participate in the dialogue.  (xxiv) 
 
 
 
Such ambitions are reinforced by the fact that Smith invites her interview subjects to 
attend the opening performance of her plays for free, in this way (re)producing the 
metonymic structure of the city in her audience.  However, the notion of “dialogue” at 
play in the above quotation risks being a complacent notion, not merely because it jars 
against the obvious fact that Smith’s works are a series of monologues (although this is 
not a literalist quibble given how little her characters listen to one another).  The other 
sense in which Smith’s efforts to promote dialogue runs aground is embedded in the 
sentimentalist rhetoric of communicative and imaginative exchange as a basis for 
national belonging.   As this chapter argues, addressing structural inequalities while 
working within this rhetoric is a challenge Smith does not always meet successfully.  
Before moving forward in this argument, however, I must place Smith's 
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documentary theater in the context of broader developments in both American theater and 
performance art more broadly.  Here it is helpful to envision her work as partaking in and 
contributing to three interrelated movements within contemporary theatrical aesthetics.  
The first of these lineages would foreground in Smith’s work the role of the "communal 
subject" that is produced through a patchwork of monologues, linking her theater to later 
productions such as Diana Son's R.A.W. ('Cause I'm a Woman) (1993), Glenda Dickerson 
and Breena Clarke's Re/membering Aunt Jemima:  A Menstrual Show (1994), and 
Madeline George's The Most Massive Woman Wins (1994).28  Each of these works, which 
stage a sequence of more or less poetic monologues spoken by women and highlighting 
feminist issues, are doubtlessly influenced by the work of Ntozake Shange, particularly 
for colored girls who have considered suicide / when the rainbow is not enuf.  Premiering 
in 1975 and occasioning heated exchanges, Shange's self-described "choreopoem" 
presents a range of African-American women's perspectives through a blend of poetry, 
music, dance and drama, all performed by seven nameless female dancers distinguished 
largely by the color of their clothing (Flowers 51).  Smith’s work is undeniably indebted 
to Shange’s and, as if to acknowledge this, Smith places Shange as the first perspective 
staged in Fires in the Mirror.  However, Smith seems less interested than these 
playwrights in distilling a coherent, unified communal voice, and she is far less intent on 
the identitarian politics which so infuse the work of Shange and her followers.   
A second, related development in contemporary theater is the reemergence of 
documentary drama, or in Melissa Salz’s term the “theater of testimony” (Salz 1-2).  
While the conscious incorporation of documented, recorded, or otherwise found text goes 
 
121 
back to Weimar Germany and Brecht’s theater, the reemergence of this practice in 
contemporary drama is relatively recent.  Smith’s On the Road project, which was first 
staged in 1982, is its first prominent reincarnation.  Another of documentary theater’s 
progenitors, Emily Mann, authored the award-winning Execution of Justice, (1984) an 
ensemble play focused on the assassination of openly gay San Francisco Supervisor 
Harvey Milk and San Francisco mayor George Moscone in 1978.  Mann based much of 
the play—which blends live performance, video, and taped voice—on transcripts from 
the trial of Milk’s killer, Dan White (Hummler 84).  A decade later, Mann would employ 
a method of interview and performance even closer to Smith’s with her play Greensboro 
(A Requiem) (1995), a docudrama drawn from interviews of witnesses to the murders of 
five anti-Ku Klux Klan protesters in Greensboro, North Carolina, in 1979.  
 Far from being alone in the use of the documentary form, Smith and Mann have 
proved remarkably influential.  Here, one must note Eve Ensler’s Necessary Targets 
(1996) and the incredibly successful The Vagina Monologues (1996), which make use of 
multiple interviews presented in collage form.  Similarly seminal is the work of Moises 
Kaufman, who with the Tectonic Theater Project, produced The Laramie Project (2000).  
One must add to these a host of similar works that place material drawn from 
documentary sources presented in fragmented monologues: Ping Chong’s Undesireable 
Elements, Barbara Damashek's Whereabouts Unknown, Julie Crutcher and Vaughan 
McBride Diggin In, and Alan Buchman’s  Guantanamo: Honor Bound to Defend 
Freedom (2004).   
Placing Smith among these playwrights is neither original nor controversial, but 
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placing her works exclusively in these groups foregrounds the “literariness” of the work 
at the expense of its performative materiality. The way in which her theater literally, if 
temporarily, reterritorializes the community she engages can be better gauged if one 
connects Smith to more radical efforts to re-frame the experience of the contemporary 
city by reconceptualizing theatrical performance. Smith’s theatrical model should 
therefore be understood within the broader context of the “performative turn” in the 
visual and dramatic arts beginning in the early sixties.  Following Erika Fischer-Lichte’s 
formulation, I conceive of “performance art” in this context as redefining two 
relationships with regard to the traditional work of art (17-18).  First, the dichotomy 
between subject and object—audience and art—is destabilized.  Second the art object’s 
semiocity—the capacity of the art object to gesture to some meaning beyond itself—is 
undermined by its materiality; that is, its “meaning” becomes less primary than its action, 
being, presence, effect, etc.  An example of this trend worth considering with regard to 
Smith’s work is Deborah Warner’s site-specific performance installation The Angel 
Project.   The project is a kind of theatrical treasure hunt in which the audience, broken 
into individual pedestrians, are given a guidebook leading them through dozens of 
installations in various apartments and businesses throughout a given city, each of which 
suggests poetically the presence or trace of angels (Oddey 18).  Between each of these 
“angelic” sites, a ticket holder will interact with paid performers, or “Angels,” dressed 
otherwise anonymously, though one is never certain of who is part of the project and who 
is outside of it (Oddey 99).  The solitariness of the walker is key to Warner’s project—
which she understands as “a silent communion” producing “a poetic relationship with 
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[the] city” and which is, after completion, “your own rightful property” (qtd. in Gussow).   
While Warner’s stress on the individual observer is diametrically opposed to Smith’s 
orientation, Smith’s troubling of the material boundary between theater and city by 
confusing the difference between bystander and producer (in that any audience member 
may also be the source of the script) links her work to Warner’s investment in 
performatively linking urban subject with theatrical audience as well as an emphasis on 
the unheralded traces of suffering. 
 In Warner’s case, this suffering emerges in the interplay between the idea of 
“angel” and the spectral presence of 9/11 victims in downtown Manhattan.  It is 
intriguing here to ponder the relation between Smith and what Maurya Wickstrom terms, 
in relation to Deborah Warner’s work, ethical materialism.  In Wickstrom’s conception, 
ethical materialism is an insistence on “[t]he singularity of the material object, and our 
affective relation to it” (178)  “This materialism” declares Wickstrom, “refuses the 
commensurate. It refuses the system in which all things, all people, and all relations are 
subordinated to a system of exchange and the circulation of power” (178).  Obviously, 
Smith’s art requires substitution, actually foregrounding the artifice of the theatrical use 
of equivalence.  Nonetheless, Smith’s work, like Warner’s, paradoxically stresses the 
singular and new and forces a new relation with the urban.   I turn now to a fuller 
discussion of that method.  
Sympathy, Agony, and Otherness in Stereo 
Smith initially developed her signature dramatological technique—interviewing 
subjects, then memorizing and mimicking their recorded voices—as a pedagogical 
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method, a means of teaching the craft of acting to her students.  This fact is fitting, for 
this technique would provide the basis for a broader affective pedagogy in her later, more 
formalized dramatic works, works in which she models for the audience an engaged, 
emotive listening to the suffering of others as a political practice.  One should, however, 
trace the invention of Smith’s method further back to another origin: a moment of 
cultural recognition she experienced, again fittingly, while watching a talk show.  As she 
viewed an episode of Johnny Carson’s The Tonight Show in which Sofia Loren appeared, 
Smith was struck by the power and palpability of variant speech rhythms.  Loren, says 
Smith, 
 
 
managed to disrupt the whole show by just refusing to participate in the rhythm of 
the show. She was so quiet and in control, the show was so loud. She defied the 
whole language of the show. Then Joan Rivers came on and she was just bananas. 
All of her jokes were about how beautiful Sophia Loren was and how unattractive 
she was and she went on and on about this European beauty. And then the Hines 
brothers came on and tap danced. And I turned off the TV set and said, ‘This is 
America.’ A European beauty comes and suddenly we have no voice, no culture. 
A comedienne comes on and talks about the European beauty. And some black 
men come out and tap dance. (qtd. in Weinraub C15) 
 
 
 
As this originating episode demonstrates unmistakably, the affective force and cultural 
power of Smith’s practice is not rooted foremost in the reproduction of a set of individual 
idiosyncrasies coded as authentic, even though her attention to detail might otherwise 
suggest this.  Instead, On the Road: In Search of American Character,—the larger work 
to which every Smith play adds--ought to be conceived as a multipart presentation of 
contrasting, differing specificities and performances that together conjure a larger, and 
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impersonal, set of social arrangements—otherness in stereo.  One must therefore 
distinguish Smith’s art of impersonation from efforts to find the other in the self’s 
authentic emotional depths and further efforts to reduce differences, either between the 
self and its subjective other or across any social space.  It is a model for sympathy 
through difference, not despite it.  
Part of this inversion of the traditional model of sympathy owes to the method’s 
privileging of physical, rather than psychological, processes; it literalizes walking in 
another’s shoes.  For Smith, impersonation was a means of circumnavigating the 
dominant psychological realist model, a “self-oriented method” that troubled Smith 
because it held that “characters live inside of you and that you create a character through 
a process of realizing your own similarity to a character” (xxvi).   Instead, Smith’s 
counter-practice relies on the notion that the physical act of speech engages the rest of the 
body in “a kind of cooperative dance […] [that is] a sketch of something […] not fully 
revealed by the words alone” (xxv-xxvi).   Smith’s conception of speech acts views 
bodily materiality and linguistic expression as separable but intimately related attributes 
of character so that, by “record[ing] part of that dance—that is, the spoken part—and 
reenact[ing] it, the rest of the body would follow” (xxv-xxvi).  Smith does not seek to 
justify this view of the self and speech through aesthetic theorization, though she often 
employs the language of contemporary cultural theory to explain her projects; instead, 
she playfully attributes the efficacy of impersonation to her grandfather’s idea that “if I 
said a word often enough it would become me, the reenactment, or the reiteration of a 
person’s words would also teach me about that person” (xxvi). Hence, against the notion 
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frequently asserted by her critics that Smith’s “astonishing plasticity, her complete 
submergence of self,” leads to her “almost literal identification with various speakers,” 
one best understands Smith’s project not as a spectacle displaying accurate identification 
but rather as a practice in which bodies (including the audience’s) engage with and 
become trained by disembodied affects (Rose G1). 
 Nonetheless, Smith also clearly expresses her desire that the practice do more 
than instruct self and audience; it also represents an effort to do justice to the subjects of 
performance in a way thought superior to other models of acting.  Smith figures the 
method as a kind of possession in which others inhabit her body, claiming that if one 
“walk[s] in the speech of another,” then the other’s individuality can be experienced 
“viscerally” (xxvii).  Using the body as a medium to express the incorporeal attributes of 
others is consonant with Smith’s interests in how social “scripts” can be placed over the 
bodies of others and, through a process of inscription, serve to codify them.  It is also, 
importantly, a method that eschews the artist’s self as the framing device.  Instead, at 
least in intention, “the frame of reference for the other would be the other” (xxvii).  
Smith’s use of jargonic critical shorthand can obscure her aesthetic program by 
connecting vague phenomenological terms with clichés of social cooperation as when she 
asserts: “I am not the other and can never be the other […] I can only try to bridge the 
gap” (Talk 53).  Smith does, however, often serve as a lucid interpreter of her own work, 
standing off to the side of theatrical event and rhetorically guiding her interpreters, 
especially about the ways in which her method represents an important departure from 
the assumptions undergirding method acting.  Method acting, according to her reading, is 
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“based on a very humanitarian assumption that we are all the same underneath.  I don’t 
believe that.  I’m interested in difference.  I want to know who the character is, not who I 
am” (Talk 53).  This kind of paratextual guidance, whether disseminated through 
interviews, theatrical reviews, or the prolegomena of production notes, allows Smith to 
suggest, prior to her performance, that her aim is not to parrot but to represent bodily a 
mode of listening that can be both an intervention and self-transformation, not self-
repetition or an effort to faithfully copy the social worlds to which she attends.  
In a manner distinctly sentimentalist, Smith’s work invokes the sympathetic 
witness trope at multiple levels.  She first performs the role during the unstaged interview 
process, then stages these individuals—recast as dramatis personae—for an audience, the 
members of which repeat in her stead the sympathy implied in her careful attention and 
reservation of judgment.  While I consider the spatial and political consequences of this 
process at greater length below, one must first note that Smith’s documentary theater 
exhibits a sentimentalist lineage at the level of characterization, by participating in the 
child elegy and by embedding intermittently characters engaged in imaginative and 
emotional sympathy.  Both Fires in the Mirror and House Arrest are arranged so that 
they culminate emotionally in the monologue of a parent grieving for a dead infant:  a 
conspicuous choice in each case.  In the former play, Smith clearly has held the words of 
an anguished father, Carmel Cato, in reserve for dramatic effect.  The play concludes 
with her performance of Cato’s inconsolable grief for his seven-year-old son, Gavin, who 
was struck and killed by a Hasidi driver in an accident that triggered the 1991 Crown 
Heights riots, as well as his fiery resentment of those in the Jewish community who 
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dismiss him “unless / I go to them with pity” (138).  Since Fires takes the Crown Height 
riots and their aftermath as its subject, Smith’s inversion of chronology and insistence on 
the pathos of a child’s death is noteworthy, all the more so when one compares it to the 
play’s earlier sympathetic but far more ambivalent treatment of Norman Rosenbaum, 
whose brother, Yankel, was stabbed to death by black youths in the first hours of the riot.   
Similarly, in House Arrest, a play otherwise preoccupied with the political theater 
surrounding President Clinton’s White House, Smith inserts an outwardly unconnected 
monologue in which one Paulette Jenkins tearily confesses to looking on while her 
husband beat to death their daughter, Myeshia, and then assisting in dumping Myeshia’s 
body on a highway shoulder.  “My own chile / I let that happen to,” concludes Smith-as-
Jenkins in affecting disbelief.  One can and should read Smith’s decision to insert 
Jenkins’s testimony as an effort to connect this brutal domestic iteration of patriarchal 
power to national modes of authority and subjection, but one must not hastily pass over 
Smith’s use of the death of the infant trope for its affective strength.  Unlike nineteenth-
century sentimentalist’s child elegies, such as Lydia Sigourney’s “Death of an Infant,” in 
which the child’s piety and purity teach adults to defer to God’s will, Smith evokes 
scenes of child death to demonstrate the human capacity for insensibility while at the 
same moment resensitizing her audience. 
The complex pathos whereby the refusal of sympathy itself becomes poignancy’s 
edge is integral to Smith’s project; the bulk of the characters in her plays rebuff 
emotional engagement with the suffering of others in order to consolidate their own 
identity.  The specter of indifferent seeing, diametrically opposed by Smith’s 
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performative practice, haunts most of the social interactions to which she attends and 
provides the justification of the revised, emotive mode of witness Smith’s method 
implicitly recommends.  As if to underscore this, Smith includes in House Arrest a 
witticism by former presidential speechwriter Peggy Noonan on the media’s mode of 
observation: 
 
 
You remember in the 18th century, / in the 18th and 19th century / in the finer and 
more refined circles of England / it became habit to go to um, / homes for the 
mentally ill and go see the people there and be very  / moved by their 
predicament? /  It was a weird  / sort of thing – / You wanted to go see the mad 
people and then feel. /  Then I’m going to show all your friends / ‘See how 
compassionate I am.’ [. . .] / I am deeply moved / by the misery around me. [. . .] / 
The-press-is-the-exact-opposite-of-that. (House Arrest 56) 
 
 
 
In Noonan’s quip, the press’s studied indifference (if not its schadenfreude) is the 
inversion of affective practice of the powerful during the age of sensibility; in both cases, 
however, the line dividing seer and seen is crucial to the maintenance of power relations 
and the identities that codify them.  Neither of the practices comes off well, but both are 
plainly suggestive of the theatrical space which Smith and her audience occupy.  For this 
reason, Noonan’s opposition of contemporary mass media spectacles and the self-serving 
poverty tourism of the aristocracy is not a complete opposition. In both structures of 
seeing, the affective logic only serves to consolidate power differentials and 
identificatory roles based on them. Together, these two ways of seeing and feeling 
constitute the other of Smith’s affective practice, for her dramatic work seeks to figure 
sympathetic witness as an agonizing shift in one’s self-understanding. 
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Smith establishes this clearly in the characters she stages who do demonstrate the 
capacity to see themselves in others; these examples underscore that such a process is 
necessarily painful, partial, and requires a self alienation before any progress can be 
made. In Twilight, for example, Smith includes the ruminations of an anonymous white 
talent agent, who reacts to the riot’s spectacle with self-examination: 
 
 
 “Do I do I deserve it?” / I thought me personally, uh, no / generically, maybe so / 
/ Even though I I / what’s provoked it / it was / the spark / was the verdict / which 
was / ab-surd! / But that was just the spark. / This had been set / for years before. 
/ But maybe, / not maybe, / but uh the / system / plays unequally / and the people 
who were / the “they,” / who were burning down the Beverly Center, / had been 
victims of the system / whether well intentioned or not. / Somebody got the short 
shift / and they did / and I started to / absorb a little guilt, / and say uh / I deserve / 
I deserve it.” (Twilight DPS 92-93) 
 
 
 
This absorption of “a little guilt” may be dismissed as an instance of high-toned 
posturing, but one must note the way in which the speaker, through the process of 
understanding the other not merely as victimizer but also as victim, refigures himself as 
split, at once innocent--deserving of the fruits of his accomplishments--and culpable—
because his accomplishments are built on systemic inequalities. 
To similar effect, Smith stages the reflections of Young-Soon Han, whose liquor 
store was destroyed in the L.A. riots, but who felt “mixed feelings” when the black 
community celebrated immediately after the conviction of Lt. Powell and Sgt. Koon in 
Rodney King’s civil rights trial. 
 
 
I wasah swallowing the bitternesseh. / Sitting here alone, and watching them. / 
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They became all hilarious. / (Three second pause.) / And uh, in a way I was happy 
for them, / and I felt glad for them, / at least they got something back, you know. / 
Just lets forget Korean victims or other victims / who are destroyed by them. / 
They have fought / for their rights / (One hit simultaneous with the word rights.) / 
over two centuries / (One hit simultaneous with centuries.) / and I have a lot of 
sympathy and understanding for them. / Because of their effort, and sacrificing, 
other minorities like / And Hispanic / or Asians / maybe we have to suffer more / 
by mainstream, / you know? / That’s why I understand. / And then / I like to be 
part of their joyment. (Twilight DPS 168-169) 
 
 
 
The disjointed, clipped English bears a fertile ambiguity whereby the “[a]nd then,” and “I 
like to” late in this quotation suggests at once that Han, in the moment of mixed feelings 
she presently recounts, came to share in the “joyment” of the black community, but also 
intimates that this moment of shared feeling is in the temporal distance, as in “then I 
would like to be a part of their enjoyment.” This temporal disjunction mirrors the 
affective and identificatory split Han undergoes here, again refiguring her own 
victimization in terms of the suffering experienced by those who wounded her. In this 
way, Smith embeds within her dramatic text pedagogical models for feeling what another 
feels. 
The complex levels at which these affective and imaginative projections occur 
deserves attention. Here, Smith, an African American woman, performs as two 
subjects—white and Korean respectively—both of whom imaginatively perform a 
revision of themselves in light of a generic African American subject. Such reduplicative 
pedagogical models would seem to invite the use of analytic lenses such as those 
furnished by postcolonial and critical race theory, but Smith anticipates this maneuver 
and includes the language of academic theorists in her performance of the cacophonous 
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social Babel. In Fires in the Mirror, for example, Smith includes the ruminations of 
Angela Davis, who remarks that race “has become / an increasingly obsolete way / of 
constructing community / because it is based on / immutable biological / facts / in a 
pseudo-scientific way” (Fires, 29-30). Smith-as-Davis eschews “the old notion of 
coalition in which we anchor ourselves very solidly / in our / specific racialized 
communities, / and simply voice / our / solidarity with other people,” and instead calls for 
“ways of coming together” that do not reduce the “vastness of our many cultural 
heritages” or render “invisible all of our heterogeneity” (Fires 32). By including the 
words and thoughts of academic theorists like Davis, Smith underscores the pedagogical 
facet of her project, draws the academy into the aesthetic, civic, and national discourse 
her work produces, and also provides her audience with an embedded guide to her work.  
If her work charts the broken city, these voices function as legends to the map. 
Smith capitalized on both her professional success and on the notoriety of the Los 
Angeles riots to draw more academic theorists into Twilight, for which Mike Davis, 
Cornel West, and Homi Bhabha provided interviews.  The play's title derives, in part, 
from Bhabha's illustration of his notion of ambivalence. During his interview, Bhabha 
suggests "this twilight moment / is an in-between moment" in which "we learn that the 
hard outlines of what we see in daylight / that make it easy for us to order / daylight / 
disappear" and which therefore "allows us to see the intersections / of the event with a 
number of other things that daylight obscures for us" (Twilight Anchor 232-233).  Smith 
echoes Bhabha's elusive thought by concluding her play with the words of Twilight Bey, 
the organizer of an L.A. gang truce.  Bey explains that, for him, the word twilight denotes 
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himself in relation to others, that is, twilight as an admixture of his own dark complexion 
and the light of 
 
 
knowledge and the wisdom of the world and understanding others. / And in order 
for me to be, a to be, a true human being. / I can't forever dwell in darkness. I can't 
forever dwell in the idea, just identifying with people like me, and understanding 
me and mine. / So twilight / is / that time / between day and night / limbo / I call it 
limbo. (Twilight DPS 171) 
 
 
 
Among the characters in Smith’s published work, a willingness, like Bey’s, to leave the 
safe house of identity is rare (Talk to Me 23–24). Unlike works such as Roth’s American 
Trilogy or classical sentimental texts, Smith’s affective pedagogical model is more 
suffused into the medium than modeled in characters.  As often as not, she focuses on 
individuals who refuse sympathy with others in order to consolidate their own identity.  
Nonetheless, the entwined voices of Bhabha and Bey here offer a single account of their 
present moment, an account that is a grim description of excruciating social collapse but 
also an expectant prescription to intermingle, to risk one’s self in the space of others.  
Such sympathetic mélange is partially a matter of the affective vulnerability 
demonstrated by the anonymous talent agent and Young-Soon Han, but it is also a matter 
of crossing identificatory lines beyond the self’s scale, especially at the level of race.    
These crossings involve risk, particularly in Smith’s case, for to dramatize the 
transgression of racial classification also entails its reinscription. Though the uniqueness 
of gesture is foregrounded in Smith’s performance of character, a tension between 
specificity and generality haunts her work; a familiar dilemma—can one be a 
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representative speaker?–reemerges.  This quandary beset Philip Roth’s American 
Trilogy, as I have shown, where Roth’s sentimentalism evinces an unreflective 
privileging of the white man writer figure, authorized to speak, imagine, and sympathize 
on behalf of a nation of others.  One could be forgiven for thinking that, given the 
documentary orientation of Smith’s theater as well as her own marginalized subject 
position as black woman, that this issue would not press her as acutely.   Indeed, Smith 
foregrounds the unique attributes of characters.  Her performances are engaging precisely 
because of the sense of their studied investment in tic and quirk.  “My overall goal” 
writes Smith, “was to show that no one acts like anyone else” (Fires xxx).  In Fires in the 
Mirror, for example, Minister Conrad Mohammed’s method of striking the table where 
he is seated with individual sugar packets before opening them attests to the prominence 
Smith gives the singular (Fires 52-58).  Similarly distinctive, in Twilight, is the 
breakneck, sportscaster-like parlance attorney Charles Lloyd employs while narrating 
security camera footage of Latasha Harlins being shot in the head, culminating in a 
breathless: “Isn’t that sad? / Isn’t human life cheap?  / Let’s play it again” (Twilight DPS 
40-41).  Smith’s performance, her painstaking attendance to the rhythms, timbres, and 
gestures of both Mohammed and Lloyd corresponds nicely with her stated emphasis on 
the uniqueness of character.  It would seem to follow that although both are black men 
about the same age, Smith would not treat them as interchangeable representatives of 
black masculinity.  Nonetheless, even though their uniqueness is stressed, each does 
serve as stand-in for the communities to which they belong within their respective play’s 
juxtapositional logic. 
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The problem of being a token speaker repeats in her theatrical works because the 
placement of characters in the play always works to suggest their representativeness. 
Smith doubtlessly makes conscious use of this tension, but it also makes use of her. As a 
representative of the black community, for example, Minister Mohammad narrates a 
gruesomely vivid account of the abuses of slavery—the use of thumb screws in torture 
and the tearing of babies from the wombs of mothers— as evidence that they dwarf the 
suffering of the Jewish people in the Holocaust, even though, in Mohammad’s view, 
“[t]hat, uh, crime also stinks / in the nostrils of God” (Fires 54).  Smith places his 
monologue just before her performance as author and editor Letty Cottin Pogrebin, who 
reads from her memoir, Deborah, Golda, and Me, the story of Isaac, a holocaust survivor 
with a harrowing tale.  Because of Isaac’s Aryan features, his village council charges him 
with the duty of surviving at all costs to expose Nazi crimes.  When his forged credentials 
are questioned, Isaac is forced to prove he is not a Jew by shepherding a trainload of his 
townspeople into the gas chambers.  “Among those whom Isaac packed into the gas 
chambers that day,” reads Smith-as-Pogrebin, “dispassionately as if shoving a few more 
items into an overstuffed / closet / were his wife / and / two children” (Fires 61-62).  
Both Mohammed and Pogrebin, therefore, are made to serve as representative speakers 
on behalf of their respective communities, narrating the traumas of their tribes and also 
modeling a style of affective response to those traumas29.  
If Smith occasionally employs persons as metonyms for their community, she just 
as frequently mines the tension between type and instance, as a closer reading of Charles 
Lloyd’s case, in Twilight demonstrates.  The logic of representation dictates that Lloyd, 
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as an African American man, ought to deplore Latasha Harlins’ murder rather than 
legally defend Soon Ja Du, the store owner who shot her.  Indeed, another Twilight 
character, Gina Rae, remonstrates Lloyd for this perceived betrayal of an ethnic 
belonging she figures as national—“I guess he just / Sold-his-card / He’s not a card-
carrying member / of our community or of us / as-a-nation-of-people-any-longer (42).”   
In this manner, Smith highlights how the logic of representation is at work in the 
racialized city, on the bodies of the play’s subjects before her intervention.  Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that Smith escapes making Lloyd a representative of the failed 
representative—the “sellout” or “Uncle Tom” identity Lloyd repudiates.  Nor does it 
mean that her performance of affects coded as behavioral or linguistic markers of 
ethnicity escapes the most pernicious resonance of racialized mimicry: the stereotype.    
This aspect of Smith’s work has drawn much comment, as when, in his review of 
Fires for the neoconservative Weekly Standard, Andrew Ferguson writes that Smith’s 
presentation of Al Sharpton “sounded like Steppin Fetchit after a night of freebasing,” 
and that her performance of a Lubavitcher woman’s words “might have been a drag 
queen doing Barbara Streisand” (31).  Ferguson’s tangible relish in indulging the 
language of stereotype hints that he may have sought in Smith’s work an opportunity to 
deploy it, and, indeed, although she acknowledges that sometimes such judgments are 
aesthetic appraisals, she attributes much of the negative reaction to “the unease we have 
about seeing difference displayed” (Fires xxxvii).  “Mimicry is not character,” she 
declares, “[c]haracter lives in the obvious gap between the real person and my attempt to 
seem like them […]  I try to close the gap between us, but I applaud the gap between us 
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[…] I am willing to display my own unlikeness”  (Fires xxxvii-xxxviii).  This must be 
unpacked, for Smith is not suggesting that the stereotypical racial markers themselves are 
elements of real difference displayed.  Indeed, the ethnic stereotype is objectionable in 
part because it elides difference in the social bodies it supposedly conjures. On the 
contrary, she underscores that the audience’s discomfort is with the failure of her 
mimicry to coincide with the “original” racial marker.   The obviousness of this failure, in 
a theatrical practice like blackface, is part of the discourse of racial superiority because 
the performer cannot be confused with the subject he mocks, and therefore the purity of 
his putatively superior identity is secured precisely by his failure to simulate the abject 
other convincingly.30   The structural similarity in the representative logic of Smith and 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century minstrelsy—the unwittingly shared method of 
displaying the (in)visible difference—ought not, however, lead us to conflate them in any 
politically significant manner.  To borrow a Deleuzean quip, the difference that “makes a 
difference” between Smith’s work and minstrelsy—between the repudiation and 
replication of stereotypes—lies in the material structure that contextualizes the two 
dramatic practices: the machinic assemblage of Smith’s art (Difference and Repetition 
28).  Rather than being somehow complicit with violent ethnic image-disfigurements 
such as those in blackface and ethnic stereotyping, Smith’s method of cross-racial 
performance works to undo the categories that stabilize difference.  This destabilization 
cuts deep, for Smith’s performance also undoes the notion of established demarcation of 
individual selves.   
One can clarify Smith’s practice by the lights of Deleuze’s conception of the 
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simulacra. Although he takes up the concept from its place in Platonic philosophy, 
Deleuze uses the notion of simulacra to reverse Platonism’s view of representation. In 
Deleuze’s view, simulacra are not copies of copies, but are what put the order of original 
and copy into question.  “The simulacrum is not a degraded copy,” writes Deleuze, rather 
“[i]t harbors a positive which denies the original and the copy, the model and the 
reproduction” (Logic and Sense 299).    What Deleuze perceives in this concept is its 
manner of rendering “the order of participation, the fixity of distribution, the 
determination of the hierarchy impossible” (300). Deleuze’s is not a sociological claim 
about reality dissolving into postmodern hyperreality, as with Jean Baudrillard; instead, 
Deleuze embraces the concept of the simulacrum because it reveals the underlying 
ontological multiplicity that emerges when the dominant Western philosophical apparatus 
fades.   
Perceived through the lens of Deleuzean simulation, Smith’s “willing[ness] to 
display her own unlikeness” becomes a sophisticated manner of producing an 
unsuspected sympathy, a link of sociability akin to the line of sentimental feeling running 
parallel to it in her work. Smith’s performances, though they clearly depend on the model 
bodies and words of her interviewees speaking as themselves in unrehearsed “authentic” 
ways, undo the hierarchy separating herself as copy by underscoring the multiplicity, the 
contingency, and the performativity characterizing both interviewee and performer, thus 
exploding the conceptual scaffolding of racial, social, and gender idealities.  But is this 
explosion just another way of claiming a universalism that is a subterranean nationalism?  
Is this model of simulating otherness merely reproducing the myth of American city as 
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melting pot?  A fuller understanding and theorization of the broader scales of 
identification in Smith’s theater are necessary in order to understand how her work 
figures city, civic society, and nation. 
 Resemblance, Ressentiment, Reassembly 
That Smith staged Angela Davis’s diagnosis of race—an “intransigent / rigid / 
notion” produced by colonialist racism, “not the other way around”—hints at the 
sociological lessons in which she wishes to tutor her audiences (Fires, 29-30).   In these 
theatrical works, racial identity is an after-effect of power, the repercussion of an 
historical order imposed by the past on everyone, but not equally on all.  Following many 
poststructuralist critiques, Smith’s theater figures identity not as innate but as a 
historically contingent construction.  To say this is to say little because so many 
contemporary theorists working within the humanities and arts take this understanding of 
identity as a given.  The question I wish to resolve here is whether Smith’s treatment of 
the relation between identity and difference is fundamentally dialectical or non-
dialectical, that is, whether the social space she charts is one embroiled in contradiction 
and predicated on (mis)recognition or one in which power and becoming function in 
some other manner.  While this may seem an exceedingly fine distinction, it has powerful 
consequences for how one understands the role of affect and spectacle in Smith’s 
sentimentalist interventions.   
 If the arrangement, content, and performance of these plays were governed by a 
dialectical logic, the “cooperative dance” between actor and character Smith envisions 
would be a modification of the life and death struggle envisioned by G. W. F. Hegel or 
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the mirror stage theorized by Jacques Lacan, that is, it would be governed by the haunting 
phantasm of negation such that all identity would prove to be predicated on an underlying 
lack (Hegel 114). Individual differences from the model identity to which they are related 
would signify only a failed performance of one’s subject position.  On this reading, what 
they would reveal most about the urban turmoil they depict would be its pointlessness 
and inevitability.  If, however, Smith’s work can also be read productively through the 
non-dialectical philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, then we are in a better position to use the 
occasion of her plays to ask after the lines of power and affect in both the theater and 
among its real life dramatis personae. 
There are, in fact, two moments of differentiation in Smith's inhabitation of 
characters: a negative and positive treatment of differentiation.  To borrow a notion from 
Gestalt psychology, her performances possess “multistability”: a tendency to shift back 
and forth between two possible modes of reception (Lehar 51).  The relationship is not 
dichotomous, but rather oscillatory.  Though simultaneous or immanent in any 
performance and in any scene, the oscillating modes of reception inhering in Smith’s 
theatrical practice ought to be conceived of as logically consecutive.  The first is a 
diagnostic, negative moment in which Smith's impersonation marks the subject's 
difference from her, so that we understand the subject’s identity (as well as hers) as 
separated by a series of relational markers--she is black, her subject white, she is female, 
her subject male--precisely because she theatricalizes the swapping of these markers.  
This confirms difference, but in a sense that inscribes Smith and her subject with a 
relational negativity.   Her transversal performance confirms, in this mode of reading, that 
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she is incapable of truly being others, of experiencing the pain of other people(s).31  
The second level at which differentiation functions in Smith’s performance is a 
productive moment in which her impersonation marks her difference from the subject, 
the audience’s difference from her, and her own self-difference. The perception of self-
difference as productive results in identity performances that hold out the possibility of 
proceeding otherwise. We must hold this possibility in abeyance, however, for Smith's 
embodiment only serves to show how such performances must always be original.  They 
are repetitions that must produce differences that are relational without being 
oppositional.  In essence, these performances reveal differences emerging by virtue of 
their being performed in time.   Such performances stress the possibility that space can 
change, that the urban ruin can become the theater-turned-meeting-room—the feigned 
naïveté of belligerence or complicity can become an actual openness to the moment 
directly after the repeated show, the scene, the word has passed. “There is an inevitable 
tension in America,” Smith writes in her introduction to the published version of “Fires”:   
 
 
It is in the tension of identity in motion, the tension of identity which is in contest 
with an old idea, but a resonant idea of America.  It was developed initially, or so 
we are told, by men, by White men, but an idea which has in fact, been adapted 
by women and people of color.  Can we guide that tension so that it is identity in 
motion […]? (xxxiv) 
 
 
 
Here, in language signaling the reappropriation of past texts, Smith appeals for a shift 
from oppositional antagonism to a dynamic, if uncertain, passage elsewhere.  I identify 
the former with the division of identities based on dialectical ressentiment and mutual 
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wounding, and that latter with a non-dialectical process of self-differentiation and social 
recombination. 
 The “negative moment” of differentiation in Smith’s dramatic practice—the 
Gestalt axis in which she is obviously not who she impersonates—corresponds to the 
negative moment dividing ethnic, racial, and gender groups from one another in the city.  
Regarding these categories as negatively constituted is not the same as wishing to ban 
them magically from social recognition or yearning for collective colorblindness; 
colorblindness would only defang the critique of power disequilibrium I pursue here.  
Instead, the term “negative” functions to suggest that racial identity and difference 
function through a process of oppositional differentiation, such as those characterizing 
the philosophies of Hegel and post-Hegelians, such as Lacan.  Indeed, many of the early 
segments of “Fires in the Mirror” could be neatly read as racialized versions of Lacan’s 
theory of mirror stage, that is, the process by which a child misrecognizes in others a 
coherence and a unity that he or she then imposes on the “self.”   
Early in “Fires in the Mirror,” Smith includes the hesitant ruminations of an 
“Anonymous Girl” who notes: “When I look in the mirror…/ I don’t know. / How did I 
find out I was Black… / (Tongue sound) / When I grew up and look in the mirror and 
saw I was Black. / When I look at my parents, / That’s how I knew I was Black.  Look at 
my skin.  You black?” (Fires 16).  The teenager’s certainty about the meaning and 
presence of black identity, proof of which is as obvious as her own face in the mirror or 
the features of her parents, is belied by her inability to establish Smith’s racial status 
immediately.  If Smith’s light complexion is the first source of confusion, when the 
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question is posed by Smith-as-Anonymous-Girl to a theatrical audience, the uncertainty is 
multiplied.   This tempts, as I have noted, a Lacanian reading that sees identity 
constituted through an oppositional process and having, at its center, an unsolved, un-
locatable lack.  Such a dialectical account also resonates with a formulation, offered by 
playwright Ntozake Shange, in the first scene of “Fires.”  Shange asserts the need to 
understand the self’s difference from its milieu in order to achieve self-understanding: “I 
am a part of my surroundings / and I become separate from them / and it’s being able to 
make those differentiations clearly / that let’s us have an identity” (Fires 3).  As Shange 
continues, however, her definition departs from dialectical reversals: “and what’s inside 
our identity / is everything that’s ever happened to us. Everything that’s ever happened / 
to us as well as our responses to it “ (Fires 3).  Modified by this second clause, the 
definition of identity is entangled in spatial otherness (milieu), in temporal otherness (the 
past), but also in the mysterious force of activity, response, and agency.   
Though Smith’s interest in mirrors, mimicry, and recognition all suggest the use 
of a theory of identity closely related to the one authored by Hegel and updated by Lacan, 
Bhabha and others, the positive quantum of force in Shange’s definition of identity 
intimates the presence of something apart from the play of oppositions between identity 
and one’s surrounds.  What this quantum cannot be becomes clear when Smith frames 
the difficulty of articulating a mode of identity that is not constituted through a 
differential process by using the words of director George C. Wolfe, shortly after staging 
Shange's pronouncement. With Wolfe, we encounter a complex moment in which the 
effort to communicate indicates the impossibility of the assertion:  
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 “I am – not – going – to place myself / (Pause.) / in relationship to your 
whiteness. / I will talk about your whiteness if we want to talk about that. / But I, / 
but what, / that which, / what I – / what am I saying? / My blackness does not 
resis – ex – re – / exist in relationship to your whiteness. / (Pause.)  / You know  / 
(Not really a question, more like a hum. Slight pause.) / it does not exist in 
relationship to – / it exists / it exists” (Fires 10-12).  
 
 
 
Smith may relish the fecund equivocation Wolfe inadvertently makes between resistance 
and existence, for the claim that race has some ontological value certainly overstates her 
own views.  Indeed, one of the play's thematic implications is that races exist because of 
resistances, power inequalities, and the codification of differences.  Moreover, while the 
language of Wolfe's assertion does not preclude the possibility that what is in question is 
not racial identity but the materiality of the body--blackness as a matter of cells and 
melanin--Smith clearly rejects Wolfe's notion.  She does so not because there are no 
material differences “underneath” linguistic assessment or because blackness can only be 
grasped as the contrary of whiteness.  Instead, undoing the pernicious force of 
ressentiment, Smith engages with the specificity of bodies, actions, and words through a 
differential, but not oppositional process; when she attends to oppositions, it is to trace 
within them the forceful claims of allegiances and organizations more varied and variable 
than any dialectical schema can allow.  Smith’s practice confirms that, for certain of its 
participants, racial and communal dialectics--the tendency of a group to define itself 
through oppositional logics--continue to possess vicious force.  However, she does not 
structure her plays to uphold or echo this oppositional structure, but rather to undo it.   
Before exploring how Smith’s work aims to undo this oppositional, negative 
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structure, we should glance at the ways in which her work catalogues the violent ills of 
that structure while also demonstrating its conceptual persistence.  Reading race naturally 
(“I am this, not that” or “you are not what I am”) can, at best, make such identity 
categories rigid.  More often, it licenses, consciously or subconsciously, the 
dehumanization of others.  In a familiar turn of thinking, embedded in grammar itself, 
those outside the boundary of “us” become “them.”  Smith’s plays contain many 
characters explaining or treating race in precisely this way.  In Twilight, the combative 
Paul Park suggests that all African Americans are enjoined by God to defend their own 
(in this case, the accused assailants of Reginald Denny), declaring boldly: “[w]hen God 
calls you, this is what you gotta do. /  You either stand or you fall. /  You either be black 
or you die” (Twilight DPS 118).  Evident in Park’s words is an aggressive and 
contradictory split in the racial oppositional logic.  In his view, blackness is both 
descriptive and proscriptive.  Here, race is both a categorical and intentional mode of 
being: a way of not-being someone else and a way of being-against someone else.  
However, the contradictory ambivalence of racial positioning, so evident in Park’s 
declaration, can be all the more severe for being passed over in silence, a complication 
Smith demonstrates in her performance of Judith Tur.   
A ground reporter for LA News Service, Tur’s images of the 1992 riot became 
famous; during her interview with Smith, Tur narrated some of her raw video footage of 
the beginning of the unrest: 
 
 
Anna, / This is the beginning of the riots. /  And, uh, / this is the video we’re 
going to be giving you for the show. /  Now watch this, Anna. /  This is 
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absolutely, / I think, / disgraceful. /  Here’s a gang member. /  Here... / This is / a 
live broadcast, by the way. /  These poor... / He fell like a sack of potatoes. /  I 
mean, real brave men, right? /  Now these women here – / you’ll see them later – / 
are taking pictures of this. /  This is sick.  […] Okay, here’s another animal / 
videotaping this guy. / These people have no heart. / These people don’t deserve / 
to live. / Sorry for getting emotional, / but I mean this is not my United States 
anymore. / This is sicko. (Twilight DPS 84-86)  
 
 
 
The irony jars, for Tur scorns those photographing and videotaping riot victims even as 
she herself records the tableau of victim and witness.  Tur professes great feeling for 
those in the video she sees as victims—they are “poor,” “falling like sacks of potatoes,” 
and she is “emotional” seeing them—but those who, very much like herself, record the 
suffering of others without assisting, are “animals,” “sicko[s],” heartless, and insensible 
to what they see. By declaring that they “don’t deserve / to live,” Tur doubly implicates 
herself, evincing the very callous indifference to others she locates in them.  While Tur 
fails to mention race, it is racial (dis)identification that produces her contradictory 
disavowal of the onlooker’s position.  Though Tur’s professional status separates her 
from the locals behind cameras she so disdains, that status stands in for the various other 
ways in which she holds herself as superior to the dark-colored slum denizens into whose 
hearts she claims to penetrate and see. Tur codes her sense of separation from those she 
sees as a moral, just as Park had, though her feeling of separation is doubled by a 
repudiation of nation: “this is not my United States anymore.” Tur’s conflation of moral 
witness and national belonging is consonant with sentimentalism’s logic, but in her view, 
racial others, incapable of fellow feeling, have effectively alienated her from the national 
body.  With figures like Park and Tur, Smith makes obvious the commingled brutality 
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and absurdity of unexamined racial identification, whether posited as natural or passed 
over as if invisible. 
While reading racial communities as a matter of historical rather than natural 
belonging illuminates the contingency of the category of race, it can also furtively reify 
group identity based on a collective humiliated debasement refigured as a virtue.  
Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment addresses precisely this self-congratulatory recitation 
of victimhood and the value systems that flow from it.  Though I read her as profoundly 
at odds with ressentimental identities, I must begin by acknowledging that Smith 
occasionally abets the reinstatement of racialized ressentiment.  Her decision to place 
Pogrebin’s Holocaust account after Mohammed’s recitation of the horrors and 
degradations of slavery partakes in ressentiment even as it calls its usefulness into 
question.  Mohammed explicitly invites the comparison because he thinks that the history 
of slavery represents a more profound suffering than does the Holocaust, while Pogrebin 
expresses to Smith her fears that “trotting out our Holocaust stories / too regularly [will] 
inure each other to the truth of /them” (Fires 59).  Implied in both of these views, 
however, is the shared notion that this historical suffering is sacred—to be preserved and 
monumentalized—a view Smith’s scene sequencing reinforces. Similarly, in Twilight, 
when Cornel West holds forth on the difference between the pathos of whites and that of 
blacks, he accentuates the exclusivity and perverse privilege of the latter: 
 
 
if whites experienced black sadness... (Pause.) /  It would be too overwhelming 
for them. (Pause.) /  Very few white people could / actually take seriously, / black 
sadness and live the lives that / they livin' / livin’ in denial / ‘Oh it couldn’t be that 
bad’ / And they have their own form of sadness / Tends to be linked to / the 
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American Dream / But it’s a very very very different kind of / Sadness. (Twilight 
DPS 108)   
 
 
 
Though an astute cultural generalization—both directing attention to racialized power 
disequilibrium and vividly illustrating the incapacity for fellow feeling across those 
lines— West’s judgment also reinforces the cultural value of suffering, not merely as a 
marker of continuing inequalities or of historical realities too little remembered, but as a 
sign of righteousness, an indicator of might. Furthermore, ressentiment polices the 
boundary between “them” and “us” all the more rigorously by insinuating into the 
opposition the hint that internal, affective experiences peculiar to each group constitute 
its essence, albeit a reactive, melancholic essence. 
 While Smith occasionally reinstates racialized ressentiment, far more frequently, 
she positions herself to one side of competing claims for historical injustices, recounting 
stories of suffering and implying the need to attend to such narratives but also refusing to 
adopt a stance of judgment in which grief is assuaged through adjudication.  Thus, in 
remaining alert to the insidious consequences of racialized ressentiment, one need not 
dismiss the reality of the power struggle nor the possible creative work that may be 
produced out of the injuries emerging from those struggles. For example, in her staging 
of sculptor Rudy Salas, Sr.’s monologues, Smith emphasizes that, for many, racial 
resentments are based on historical wrongs endured by ancestors—Salas’s father came to 
hate “gringos” when he fought for Poncho Villa against Pershing’s army—but they are 
also based on racial violence occurring in the span of contemporary lives.  Salas 
catalogues the ways in which, during the 1930s and 1940s, the white power structure in 
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Los Angeles mistreated him because of his ethnicity.  In first grade, Salas announces, 
“they started telling me / I was inferior / because I was a Mexican! /  And that’s where, / I 
knew from an early age / […] / I realized I had an enemy / and that enemy-was-those-
nice-white-teachers” (Twilight DPS 29-30).  Salas recounts how, as “a zootsuiter” in 
1942, he was arrested and then beaten by four police officers in a precinct basement; 
“from that day on,” Salas confides, “I I had a hate in me” (Twilight DPS 30).  Smith 
performs Salas’s account of learning to hate his “enemy” to evince the trenchancy of 
racial antagonism in Los Angeles but to do so without dismissing or merely decrying that 
antagonism.  Through Salas, her play seeks to contextualize the reaction of African 
Americans and Latinos to the Rodney King beating and subsequent trials as one injustice 
in an ongoing and long-standing series of injustices that extend for centuries.  She does 
not, however, leave the matter there. 
 Instead, Smith rhetorically positions herself to one side of her interviewee’s 
claims for justice.  She performs their monologues with an accuracy she touts but doing 
so while claiming diplomatic detachment. In interviews, Smith often claims impartiality, 
refusing the idea that because she is an African American, she unduly privileges the 
“side” of the black community. “I resist taking sides,” she says, “I know that’s disturbing 
for some people because somewhere, identity in us has to do with what side you’re on. 
[...] But I feel a big responsibility to the people who talk to me not to do this. I want to 
tell all sides of the story” (qtd. in Wolf).  Furthermore, Smith sometimes uses the words 
of characters to insinuate the need for an arbitrator of wrongs (like herself), willing to 
listen without prejudice. For example, a clear affinity exists between Smith’s off-stage 
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claims to avoid “taking sides” and her staged monologue of Police commissioner Stanley 
Sheinbaum’s words.  Sheinbaum’s willingness to meet with gangs, he explains, infuriated 
many in LAPD, who saw this meeting as a betrayal of his bureaucratic position: “at the 
end, / uh, / I knew I hadn’t won when they said, / ‘So which side are you on?’ / When I 
said, I said, it’s... / my answer was / ‘Why do I have to be on a side?’ / Yu, yuh, yeh 
know. / ‘Why do I have to be on a side? /  There’s a problem here!’” (Twilight DPS 27-
8).  In this manner, paradoxically, Smith privileges a character’s words in order to 
suggest that she does not privilege a particular perspective in the conflicts with which her 
plays engage.  While it is clear that genuine neutrality is impossible and probably 
undesirable, Smith’s gesture toward it is meant to underscore her desire to produce a 
space in which competing claims to unjust suffering can be aired to enable a future, more 
peaceful cohabitation. 
Typically, then, Smith’s practice is to attend sentimentally to anguish without 
confirming its ressentimental value, a negotiation of feeling that requires the 
abandonment of the "safe houses of identity" (Talk to Me 23–24). The opposition of “us” 
versus “them” serves primarily to elide differences within such categories and therefore 
artificially fix stable subjective positions: as an individual, as a member of a particular 
ethnic group, or as a “human being”.  As Deleuze argues in his study of Nietzsche, 
ressentiment is not peculiar to a specific group; rather, such “reactive” thinking grounds 
human psychology as such (Nietzsche and Philosophy 34).  Ressentiment is “the 
foundation of humanity in man. […] The question is: are other perspectives available? 
Are there other ways of thinking, feeling and acting? In short, ‘Is there another 
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becoming?’” (Nietzsche and Philosophy 64).  One way in which ressentiment can be 
circumvented is to embed otherness within the boundaries of the self, as Nietzsche seeks 
to do with his particular conceptualization of the friend.  Paraphrasing Nietzsche-as-
Zarathustra, Deleuze explains that the friend “is always the third person in between ‘I’ 
and ‘me’ who pushes me to overcome myself and to be overcome in order to live” 
(Nietzsche and Philosophy 6).  Hence, “the friend” is a way of figuring a relation between 
otherness and selfhood that is not mere détente or languid amity; it is a kind of internal 
difference calling for hurtling beyond the self, the group, or the species.  Likewise, 
Smith’s mode of sentimental engagement—attending to the other, and then interceding in 
the self as the other—represents an attempt to avoid reconfirming established identitarian 
categories, ressentimental and otherwise. 
Smith’s work does resist the regressus of dialectical ressentiment in at least two 
ways: by foregrounding a productive self-difference in the individuals she profiles and by 
suggesting that identitarian categories are based not on oppositional definitions but on 
territorial connections and markers that can be modified and reconfigured to produce new 
identities.  I locate the first of these tendencies—revealing productive internal 
differences—in Smith’s predilection for focusing on moments of stuttering or difficult 
speech. Smith isolates moments in which people hesitate, stutter, change topics 
unexpectedly, and otherwise struggle to articulate their meaning, not to expose an 
inadequacy in their perspective, but rather to find in their speech the production of 
something new and unrehearsed.  Such moments of change and newness are not 
characterized by dialectical reversibility in which one moment’s way of thinking is 
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contradicted by the next’s, and it is certainly not characterized by the promise of a 
resolved, unchanging telos beckoning in the distance.  Smith’s interest in the halting 
stutter is about de-finalizing her own work—relinquishing authorial control and 
foregrounding the evanescence of personhood—as attested when, in her introduction to 
“Fires in the Mirror, she writes: 
 
 
My goal was to create an atmosphere in which the interviewee would experience 
his/her own authorship. [. . .] everyone, in a given amount of time, will say 
something that is like poetry. The process of getting to that poetic moment is 
where ‘character’ lives. […] The pursuit is frequently filled with uhs and ums and, 
in fact, the wrong words, if any words at all, and almost always what would be 
considered ‘bad grammar.’ I suppose much of communication could be narrowed 
down to ‘the point.’ This project is not about a point, it is about a route. It is on 
the road. (Fires, xxxii) 
 
 
 
Note how Smith herself here “stammers,” effecting a change through varied repetition, 
shifting the aesthetic act from a matter of producing a static “atmosphere,” to a “process,” 
and, more vigorously, as a “pursuit.”  Hesitance, drifting, stammering:32 this is how 
Smith negotiates the paradox of being and becoming, both in her presentation of 
character and her exposition of that presentation.  The blunder out of smooth speech is 
the moment in which self-authorship occurs.  Here becoming is not a sublation of being 
and nothingness, of identity and its negation, nor is it to be dismissed as so much 
shuffling through the symbolic order in a deluded attempt to escape one’s position.  
Instead, variation is the position. 
The second means by which Smith’s dramatic art distances itself from dialectical 
ressentiment is its consistent hinting that identity should be understood as a matter of 
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competing claims to turf and of differential, but not oppositional, markers.    Smith ferrets 
out unsuspected links between individuals within hostile groups, destabilizing their 
aggregate antagonism by emphasizing individual and sub-individual relations.  Indeed, 
her own dramatic practice relies on the idea that identities can be conjured effectively by 
displaying the contours of her differences from her subject.  This approximates Deleuze’s 
rejection of Hegel’s emphasis on difference as opposition, as when Deleuze declares that 
"[t]hose formulae according to which 'the object denies what it is not,' or distinguishes 
itself from everything that it is not,' are logical monsters (the Whole of everything which 
is not the object) in the service of identity (Difference and Repetition 49).  Deleuze 
consistently emphasized that other means of aligning, connecting, and creating 
differences are required if one hopes to avoid the diminution of difference to echoic 
sameness: ‘Dialectic thrives on oppositions because it is unaware of far more subtle and 
subterranean differential mechanisms: topological displacements, typological variations’ 
(Nietzsche and Philosophy 157).  A consistent sub-theme of Smith's work is the citation 
of precisely such subtle displacements and variations; one should conceive of her 
particular bricolage of characters, traversed by unrecognized relationships, as an element 
in her effort to rethink imaginative and affective connection with others, to redefine the 
stakes and procedures of sympathy.  If the conventional grammar of sentiment stages the 
merger of discrete passions, and with them separated persons, as objects in the mind of a 
privileged subject of feeling, the affect produced by Smith’s work suggests a more 
jumbled, multi-textured, paratactic mix in which the assembling witness is either utterly 
absent or spectacularly multiplied. 
 
154 
One frequently cited example of Smith’s interest in unpredicted points of relation 
is the “Hair” section of "Fires in the Mirror," in which Al Sharpton's and Rivkah Siegal's 
monologues are juxtaposed in order to demonstrate subterranean connections based on 
how, for both, hairstyle marks an allegiance to one imagined group and defiance of 
another.  Sharpton tells Smith that he straightens his hair to betoken his intimate 
friendship with James Brown, whom he speaks of as a father figure. The slick, 
straightened coiffure Sharpton and Brown share, which was once favored by young 
African Americans because "it was acting like White folks," has since grown unpopular.  
Straightened hair therefore ceased to betoken black self-rejection and became, instead, 
Sharpton's assertion of a more local filial belonging, or as Sharpton avers "I don't really 
give a damn who doesn't understand it [...] it's me and James's thing" (Fires 21-22). 
Sharpton's monologue occurs just before that of Rivkah Siegal’s, a monologue in which 
she explains the significance of keeping women's hair short in Lubavitcher custom and 
her consequent need to wear a wig.  Though Siegal struggles with the embarrassment of 
explaining herself to non-Lubavitchers in her workplace as well as the distress in feeling 
somehow fake, she elects to continue to wear her hair closely cropped.  Siegal’s rationale 
for this decision, assumably owing to her devotion to both religion and religious 
community, goes unstated; what Smith underscores about the choice, therefore, is its 
dissonant blend of private and public consciousness as well as the simultaneous 
awkwardness and doggedness of Siegal’s feelings of belonging.  Juxtaposing these 
performances, which reveal the personal deliberation of Sharpton and Siegal over how 
their hair signifies in larger communities, shows how, for each, hairstyle expresses an 
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esoteric affiliation that is at once an encumbrance and a point of pride.   
The theatrical juxtaposition produces a new element of their possible relation that 
not only destabilizes the opposition of black and Jewish (the dominant antagonism in the 
Crown Heights riots), but also modifies each of them in relation to the other (but only 
through Smith’s mediation).  As Tania Modleski notes of this moment: 
 
 
At odds with their respective groups over the question of adopting the customs 
and styles that signal their difference from the dominant culture, the militant black 
minister and the Lubavitcher woman appear for a moment to have more in 
common with each other than with members of their own groups. (66) 
 
 
 
A similar example of the structural principle by which Smith links unlikely persons 
through their unforeseen and unheralded similarities is the way in which hats mark 
identity for characters in “Fires,” a tendency she discovered in her interviewing process 
as she notes in an explanatory message following the PBS film version of the play (Fires 
in the Mirror).  From Ntozake Shange's African fillet, Rabbi Joseph Spielman's black 
fedora, the Malcolm X baseball cap on activist Henry Rice, to the Rasta tams on the 
anonymous Caribbean youths, Smith encountered the repeated, though differing, use of 
headwear to mark belonging.   Smith encourages her audience to read these forceful 
assertions of belonging as being based, not primarily on oppositionality, but rather on an 
open-ended connectivity.  Although such covert shared markers can be cognitively 
organized as “samenesses” and fitted within a dialectic of recognition and opposition, the 
connections unearthed are better figured as what Deleuze calls a line of flight between 
disparate characters and cultures which Smith’s art produces. 
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To clarify this claim, and its consequences for my view of Smith as a 
sentimentalist reviser, I begin by noting that, before Smith links them, each of the hats 
and both of the atypical hairstyles are elements within an existing assemblage—involving 
various bodies, places of worship, texts, performances, and so on—that together function 
to produce working identities, such as Lubavitcher or Rastafarian.  Here, though I borrow 
one Deleuzean term to explain another, I do so knowingly; Deleuze and Guattari 
developed this vocabulary to sidestep the conceptual tendency to talk about how things 
are, and instead stress how things mutate and connect.  Deleuze writes: 
 
 
What is an assemblage?  It is a multiplicity which is made up of heterogeneous 
terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes 
and reigns—different natures.  Thus the assemblage’s only unity is that of a co-
functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’. It is never filiations which are 
important, but alliances, alloys; these are not successions, lines of descent, but 
contagions, epidemics, the wind. (Deleuze and Parnet 69) 
 
 
 
Deleuze’s understanding of the assemblage avoids the organismic metaphor, which 
figures social affiliations as relations of interiority—individuals within a social body.  
Rather than describe individual elements as organs belonging to a harmonious larger 
body that in turn justifies and regulates the healthy functioning of the elements,33 the 
notion of assemblage figures its relations as a matter of exteriority and heterogeneity.  
The assemblage’s terms do not belong together; they function together through a variety 
of connections.  
Borrowing from a distinction from biological discourse, Deleuze speaks of 
assemblages in terms of three kinds of lines interlinking elements.  A molar line relies on 
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binary oppositions to form sharply defined, tree-like “arborescent” systems; these tend 
toward immensity and are frequently allied with the State and other hierarchical legal 
relations.  A molecular line is more liquefied, less distinctly limned, involving a “supple 
segmentarity” that allows for multiple combinations and improvisations, or in Deleuze’s 
terms “deterritorializations” and “reterritorializations” (Plateaus 205).  A line of flight 
ruptures the other two lines and is capable of transforming the assemblages to which they 
belong.  Returning to Smith, Sharpton’s legal and political identity as a black man 
constitutes a molar line linking his body to others in a raciological schema; his 
characteristic pompadour is a molecular line linking him to James Brown and Brown’s 
bold expropriation of “white” hair style for an unapologetically black persona.  Smith 
produces, through her bricoleur performance of Sharpton, Siegel, and others, lines of 
flight that seek to affect and re-form the multiple assemblages of the city.  To summarize: 
if we conceive of Smith’s dramatic practice as a dialectical process in which identities 
respond to and refract through each other—that is, to read Smith as a late Hegelian—then 
we are left with a melancholic elegizing for a lost, never available civic unity.   If 
however, these communities are understood instead as Deleuzean assemblages, then 
modifications are always occurring at individual and subindividual levels that allow for 
new assemblages, political and otherwise.   Smith’s own re-coordination of elements of 
the city aims at the production of the new (city) not the reproduction of the old (ruin).  So 
the difference in our reading apparatus matters enormously.  
Disorder Words and Political Theater 
Having shown how Smith’s mode of sentimentalism circumnavigates Platonic 
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copy-model mimesis as well as dialectical and ressentimentally constituted identities, we 
are still left to articulate how these performances produce something new in relation to 
the city-subject she presents.  In other words, if Smith seeks neither to capture the city in 
a microcosmic representation nor to resolve through reciprocal interplay social 
differences as if they were contradictions, what does her intervention do?  In a word, 
Smith’s performances produce modifications of the cultural assemblages—the urban 
centers—in which they occur at material and immaterial levels. The disjunctive subject-
voices of each performance are made to resonate together, avoiding the mere mirror play 
of (failed) reproduction, and instead seeking to produce a difference in a cultural field 
already constituted by differences.  The politicized concept and figure of speech 
rendering many bodies as one image, E Pluribus Unum, gives way to a figure revealing 
one to be many.  Smith’s sentimentalism is exceptional in that it relies on an internal, 
generative difference—rather than an implicit sameness—to produce novel 
transformations in material bodies: her own, her audience’s, and those in the broader city. 
Instead of subjects apprehending their likeness to an abject object of suffering, a shift 
occurs at the level of reception in which the display of multiple suffering selves 
emphasizes both the role of power in the subject-positioning of all as well as 
foregrounding internal differences within selves that open up the possibility of change.  
Here again, Deleuze provides a lens for conceptualizing Smith’s documentary 
theater, for in both one encounters an image of language use that is irreducibly plural, de-
centered, but also shot through with power claims and inequalities.  For Deleuze, two 
types of assemblage are important from a human perspective: machinic assemblages, 
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composed of material bodies interacting and disconnecting, and the collective assemblage 
of enunciation, the speaking composite bodies that produce incorporeal transformations 
of bodies through language.34  Deleuze and Guattari reject the idea that speech acts 
should be understood primarily as autonomous statements (parole), but they also refuse 
the notion of language as an airy self-sufficient system (langue) to which parole has 
traditionally been opposed.  Instead, they proffer the concept of “the collective 
assemblage of enunciation,” a kind of multiform social body composed of bodies 
speaking together in which “there are no clear, distinctive contours,” (Plateaus 79).  It is 
a conception that insists that language is both irreducibly and incorporeally social, while 
also being embedded in pragmatic, historical and material disputes.  “The social character 
of enunciation is intrinsically founded only if one succeeds in demonstrating how 
enunciation in itself implies collective assemblages,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “[i]t 
then becomes clear that the statement is individuated, and enunciation subjectified, only 
to the extent that an impersonal collective assemblage requires it and determines it to be 
so” (79).  The concept of the collective assemblage of enunciation is a way of 
circumventing the chicken-and-egg questions that language acts ordinarily invoke, 
questions which are in fact so many microcosmic reiterations of Platonic model-copy 
dilemmas.  
  The two coauthors saw the ideal instantiation of this collective assemblage of 
enunciation in the modernist literary technique of free indirect discourse:35 “indirect 
discourse is not explained by the distinction between subjects; rather, it is the 
assemblage, as it freely appears in this discourse, that explains all the voices present 
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within a single voice” (Plateaus 80).  Similarly, Smith’s expropriation and editing of the 
material language of others is equally illustrative of the dialogic aspects of language that 
Deleuze and Guattari wish to highlight with this concept, though Smith’s is not 
impersonal as she is careful to provide attribution of characters by projecting names on 
the stage behind her.  Staging a miscellany of subjects without prioritizing, plotting, or 
selecting protagonists, Smith produces the illusion of a multifarious speaking subject 
engaged in compound power struggles, antagonisms, and overlapped narrative arcs, all 
against the backdrop of a massive upheaval attesting to the fact of their sharing in a single 
social plane.  Smith does not so much represent Deleuze’s collective assemblage of 
enunciation as she traces it in the words and subject positions of others.  Here it is worth 
recalling that Deleuze and Guattari attempt to articulate how language is constituted by 
pragmatic power through the notion of “order words.”    Expanding on a line of thought 
going back through Foucault to Nietzsche regarding the relation of power and 
knowledge, Deleuze and Guattari claim that a “schoolmistress instruct[ing] her students 
on a rule of grammar or arithmetic,” is not informing her students so much as she is 
“giving orders or commands” that confirm the hierarchical relations of teacher/student, 
textbook/thought, and academic discourse/apprentice participants (Plateaus 76).  Hence 
her words—and, in Deleuze and Guattari’s view, all words—“order” in two senses: they 
enjoin and divide; they both accuse and categorize.    This conception of language, 
sweeping in its implications, seeks to highlight how the meaning-making power of 
language is sewn into (and  productive of) the social dynamics and power arrangements 
in which that language occurs.36   
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Order-words are not merely a subset of language (as in the imperative form), but 
instead show “every act that is linked to statements by a ‘social obligation’,” such that the 
only possible definition of language must be “the set of all order-words, implicit 
presuppositions, or speech acts current […] at a given moment” (Plateaus 79).  At its 
heart, the theoretical apparatus of order-words seeks to highlight how language works on 
the materiality of bodies, resources, and the built environment. “Language is not life,” 
declare the authors of A Thousand Plateaus, “it gives life orders. Life does not speak; it 
listens and waits. Every order-word, even a father's to his son, carries a little death 
sentence—a Judgment, as Kafka put it” (Plateaus 76).  Using this understanding of 
language’s power to affect bodies and materials, one can see how Smith’s sentimental 
practice is an effort to wrest from the found, multivoiced syntax of various citizens “little 
life sentences,” commands that affect the audience affirmatively. Smith expropriates the 
speech acts of others, “repeats” them “perfectly,” but by deterritorializing these acts, she 
alters their pragmatic performative function without changing their linguistic meaning.  
She countermands their order(s) by recontextualizing them. 
 Smith's dramatic practice puts her audience into her position; in doing so, she 
transforms audience and subject.  During their interviews with Smith, many of her 
subjects speak directly to her, calling her by her name, asking her questions, and referring 
to her race and gender.  Smith, in turn, includes these moments in the script.  The often-
unsettling result is that, during her performance as others, Smith seems to speak to 
another version of herself.  The audience takes up the interviewer's place, with the 
difference that they do not ask questions or respond verbally.  Nonetheless, in its ideal 
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reception, the audience is engaged sympathetically with both interviewee and 
interviewer, projecting themselves mentally into both spaces and attending to the possible 
affective experience of both.  This neatly updates sentimentalism's affective pedagogy, 
which requires precisely this kind of receptive repetition: someone suffers, while another 
engages imaginatively in that suffering, repeating it as if they too suffered.  The first 
repetition of suffering in the sympathetic witness functions as a pedagogical as well as an 
ethical act, modeling for onlookers the correct response.  An audience cooperative with 
sentimentalist logic must, so to speak, repeat the repetition of suffering.  
 In the case of Smith's multistable performance, with each character seeming 
interchangeably Smith and not-Smith, the audience should be understood as similarly 
multistable.  The negative Gestalt occurs with the realization that, though the audience is 
asked to become Smith—that is, to become an attentive affective archivist reconnoitering 
the emotions of a vast swathe of citizenry—that, nevertheless, in this repetition, the 
audience must fail and understand its difference from Smith-the-interviewer, Smith-the 
performer, and the interviewees.  The positive Gestalt occurs with the audience's 
awareness of their own transformed capacity to listen; Smith's capacity to conjure others 
attests to the audience's capacity to be absorbed in that otherness.  This alteration of 
reception emerges from, in Deleuzean terms, the power of order-words to produce 
incorporeal transformations in a particular milieu.  Interestingly, Deleuze and Guattari 
take as an unsettling example of such incorporeal transformation the act of terrorists 
hijacking a plane, for by upending the authority structure on the plane through their 
speech, a passenger transforms himself into a terrorist, other "passengers into hostages, 
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and [..] the plane-body into a prison-body" (Plateaus 81).  A similar transformation, 
though one with far more beneficial results, occurs in plays such as Twilight. Smith's 
habit of giving her interviewees tickets to her opening night makes the transformation all 
the more resonant.  Her subjects see themselves being played by another with others, 
observing themselves through Smith's eyes though the eyes of the audience.  Thus the 
reflexiveness of her work, a quality understood as characteristic of postmodernism, must 
be understood equally as a part of her sentimentalism. 
 By conceiving of these theatrical productions as assemblages producing material 
and immaterial transformations, one sees clearly the ways in which Smith's plays seek to 
recreate the polis in the theater, a reassembly as political as it is aesthetic.  Consequently, 
in what remains of the chapter, I consider the implied politics of these works more 
critically by examining two interrelated tensions, two axes along which Smith’s work 
moves.  My discussion of the first of these axes—the disjunction between individual 
grievances and structural inequities—builds on our discussion of Smith’s resistance to 
representation. In some sense, the strain between these two inheres in the sentimentalist 
form, for as Lauren Berlant avers, “when sentimentality meets politics, it uses personal 
stories to tell of structural effects, but in so doing it risks thwarting its very attempt to 
perform rhetorically a scene of pain that must be soothed politically” (641).   However, 
Smith risks compounding this inherent tendency to “personalize” the political through her 
emphasis on the idiosyncratic. Rather than draft individuals as race representatives, as I 
have shown, Smith seeks to avoid the collapse of the singular into a dialectically 
conceived, fictitious whole.  While this strategy succeeds in preserving particularity and 
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therefore does greater justice to individuals within a social field, it can hinder 
assessments of structural inequalities of power.  Over the course of her three published 
documentary works, Smith demonstrates increasing cognizance of this shortcoming, but 
in modifing her dramaturgical technique to address it, she also runs up against another 
political difficulty: centralization of the representative spectacle, which is the second axis 
by which I analyze her political views. This latter tension is between the centralization of 
the body politic through spectacle versus its material segregation and fragmentation.  
Here, the political problem inheres not in sentimentalism’s conceptual models, but in the 
very technique Smith has created.  This second tension cannot be resolved but ought to be 
figured as ongoing and open as Smith’s serialized dramatic project itself is. 
 Though I have argued that plays such as “Fires in the Mirror” should be assessed 
more for what they attempt to do than what they endeavor to represent, by reading her 
plays in relation to the historical events they depict, I see in Smith’s work a progressive 
distrust of sentimentalism’s view that personal stories can sooth structural disparities as 
well as a progressive interest in staging the power landscape in which social actors move.  
In “Fires,” Smith emphasizes the personal rather than the structural.  Doubtless there is an 
effort to convey the neighborhood milieu—the mix of Hasidim, African-Americans, and 
Caribbean-Americans—but the dramatic structure repeats the framing of much 
contemporary media coverage by ignoring the history of that neighborhood.  Smith limits 
the dramatic event of the riots to the deaths of Gavin Cato and Yankel Rosenbaum, 
focusing on pleas for the dignity of all individual lives.  The play “refuses to take sides” 
in that it acknowledges the injustice of both deaths, as well as the respective claims to 
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historical injury—the Holocaust and the institution of slavery—as if these were the most 
pertinent back-story to the conflict.  What is missing is the more immediate history of 
racial conflict in New York, particularly in Crown Heights.   Smith does not, for instance, 
contextualize the conflict by discussing the three racially motivated murders of black 
youths by white mobs—lynchings all but in name—in New York City in the 1980s that 
had progressively alienated race relations in the five boroughs.37  Nor does she stage 
elements from the municipal power structure—Mayor Dinkins, who lost his reelection 
bid over his handling of the unrest, for example, or reporters from the New York Times, 
who covered the riot as a pogrom—but rather she stays at the level of the citizenry and 
community activists.  Hence, even though the play acknowledges the importance of class 
differences and avoids reducing the conflict to a simplistic black-white antagonism, 
Smith does not seek to use “Fires” to address the most pertinent histories of power and 
violence but instead opts to treat the conflict in terms of “an eye for an eye.” In doing so, 
she develops the stage as a space for the soothing of a neighborhood standoff, a 
“facilitating environment” for the therapeutic airing of grievances (Castelloe 207). 
 With Twilight, Smith seems to have become more interested in the interplay of 
structural and individual affects than in the earlier play. This results partly from the larger 
canvas offered by Los Angeles, where it would have been difficult to avoid a measured 
evaluation of social standings.  The Rodney King conflict entangled Korean-Americans 
and Latinos just as much as it did African-Americans or whites, and within each of these 
ethnic groups, Smith samples a wide variety of class backgrounds.  Furthermore, Twilight 
is unmistakably more engaged than was “Fires,” with elements of the police apparatus, 
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political representatives, and media figures-- such as Police Chief Daryl Gates, 
Congresswoman Maxine Waters, and Senator Bill Bradley--who mediate, spin, and 
structure the play of conflicting calls for justice. Smith compounded this feeling of 
mediation and broadcast by including as props televisions playing footage of the riots. By 
acknowledging the ways in which her own theater and the mass media both function by 
disaggregating images from their original contexts, Smith begins to demonstrate a greater 
self-consciousness about her own spectacular status, a trend she builds on substantially in 
House Arrest.  While these developments might also seem inevitable, in that the riots 
were sparked by a heavily publicized police brutality case, Smith’s interest in 
bureaucratic and institutional figures is only one aspect of her widening lens, for she also 
is clearly more interested in the larger geography of belonging and retreat.  Unlike Crown 
Heights, an urban space in which citizens semi-anonymously mix as pedestrians, with 
vastly different ethnicities domiciled often in the same buildings, Los Angeles’s built 
environment famously divides its population along class lines.  As Mike Davis’s 
influential study, City of Quartz argues, L.A.’s new downtown, a series of linked 
privately owned megastructures connected by multilevel highways and access ramps all 
built in the early 1980s, was constructed to accommodate white-collar office workers and 
tourists and to keep out undesirable pedestrians from old downtown, populated almost 
entirely by Latinos, African-Americans, and the poor.  Here, turf claims do not vacillate 
between peaceful coexistence and violent confrontations, but rather invasions and 
withdraws.    
 This increased interest in structural power disequilibrium, a disequilibrium that is 
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distributed spatially, continues with Smith’s next play.  In House Arrest, an often brilliant 
but eccentric examination of the Monica Lewinsky scandal, Smith seems increasingly 
interested in the display of bodies, especially black bodies, as a source of questionable 
power.  By extending her modus operandi and drawing material from historical texts, 
such as Early American newspapers, the poetry of Walt Whitman, and the journals of 
Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln, Smith moves beyond the critique of political 
culture within cities and explicitly attempts an examination of national character in the 
person of the president. Smith’s first two plays had, however, already projected a national 
imaginary, as the title "In Search of American Character" suggests.  In general, 
sentimentalism is inseparable from entrenched conceptual images of a larger ideal society 
at which the exchange of personal feeling only hints. Smith’s specific use of 
sentimentalism suggests an understanding of nation that emphasizes a plurality of 
perspectives embroiled in conflict and disinclined to engage in dialogue. The dramatic 
structure Smith employs partially resonates with representative democracy’s mode of 
governance, for she does not stage a swarm of bodies but rather single figures arguing the 
case for themselves and unseen peoples to whom they feel connected.  Nevertheless, 
something in the play subverts such civic-minded proceduralism: the social body 
conjured is acephelous and profoundly unstable. In classical political conceptions of the 
State, the “head” of state representing the body politic doubles the individual "I," the 
rational interiority inside the cranium ruling over body. This "I" is subverted in Smith’s 
work, where multiple impassioned selves replace it. After all, a riot may be justly 
understood as a social space in which power is violently uneven, but in which no one is in 
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charge.  Finally, the ways in which Fires or Twilight constitute performative 
interventions over and above political representations suggest that the social body Smith 
conjures is not a state at all, but should be understood instead an event. “American 
character,” in Smith’s first two plays, is indeed “[o]n the road.”  What makes House 
Arrest,  different is the intimation that the nation may be traveling in circles.  
 After alerting her audience that House Arrest concerns the Lewinski affair 
through the monologues of Studs Terkel and George Stephanopolis, Smith moves sharply 
backward in time to the colonial era by presenting the monologue of Cinder Stanton, a 
historian at Jefferson’s Monticello manor.  In it, Stanton expounds on Jefferson’s 
conscious use of the “Panoptic” system in his design of the estate in that Jefferson 
initially “bought everything he could see, / and then a hundred yards beyond the line of 
sight,” allowing for increased extension of sight once the house itself was constructed 
(21).  Stanton is particularly interested in an ambiguity in the panopticon structure for, 
while Jefferson “certainly took measure so that he couldn’t be seen. / But / […] / It’s 
interesting, just in relation to what you said in terms of modern / Presidents / That that 
word [panoptic] has a double meaning. / That they are all-seeing, / or being seen by 
everyone” (21).  In this way, Smith introduces early into her play the panopticon, a 
spatial figure that will allow her to link a variety of historical regulative arrangements 
together to problematize the relation between visibility and power: a problematic 
haunting both sentimentalism (with its sympathetic witness) and the distribution of urban 
spaces (in which power and visibility often track proportionately). I will conclude my 
reading of Smith’s revision of sentimentalism by showing how she uses the image of the 
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panopticon to link her theatrical practice more intimately to the broader nation in a mode 
that critiques both.  Specifically, Smith links (1) Jefferson’s slave plantation’s landscape, 
and metonymically the history of racial and gender oppression, (2) the media’s fixation 
on President Clinton’s affair, as an index of politics as a sideshow rather than substantive 
process of empowerment, (3) the surveillance power of the bureaucratic state over the 
bodies of its citizens, and (4) her own sentimental theatrical practice.  
 The panopticon is a schema of  “generalized surveillance” for the improved 
exercise of power in which a mass of people may be observed, and know themselves 
observed by an unseen seer, who may in fact be absent but who nonetheless continues to 
exert power by the threat of his sight (Foucault 209).  In his famous elucidation of the 
panopticism in Discipline and Punish, Foucault emphasizes the doublesidedness of 
panopticism’s knowledge-power structure as well as the fact that it represents an 
understanding in which power is immanent rather than transcendent.  He notes that the 
panopticon structure “arranges things in such a way that the exercise of power is not 
added on from the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the functions it invests, but is 
so subtly present in them as to increase their efficiency by itself increasing its own points 
of contact” (206).  Subjects internalize their own subjection with the suspicion that their 
actions are observed. In its earliest iterations, panopticism developed as an attempt to 
ascertain knowledge about individuals within plague-stricken villages to assist in 
maintaining an effective quarantine.  Embedded in the panoptical structure, therefore, is 
also a historical desire to divide and catalogue the crowd, to organize a social body into 
atomized known objects. Accordingly panopticism maximizes power’s reach—
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minimizing those who exert it, maximizing those subjected to it, and extending the realm 
of control beyond physical coercion into thought itself—by isolating both the source and 
target of knowledge/power as potential spectacles. 
 Returning to House Arrest, one might begin by noting that Smith’s play 
effectively contextualizes panopticism within the history of race and gender oppression 
focusing on its use by Jefferson, a founding father and symbol of American character. 
Jefferson’s estate is structured on the principle of unseen-but-seeing power, and Smith 
links this fact to other elements in the statesman’s life, especially the impassioned debate 
over his relationship with Sally Hemmings, one of his slaves.  Smith compounds this 
already heated imbroglio by staging a reading from Jefferson’s notebook in which he 
ruminates on the different nature of Africans, remarking on their “very strong and 
disagreeable odor,” their more “ardent” sexuality—“a more eager desire, [rather] than a 
delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation”—their “much inferior” capacity for reason, 
all differences Jefferson takes to be “fixed in nature” (31).  He concludes: 
 
 
Their inferiority is not the effect merely of their condition of life.  I advance it 
therefore as a suspicion only, that the blacks whether originally a distinct race, or 
made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to white in the endowments 
of body and mind. This unfortunate difference of color, and perhaps of faculty is a 
powerful obstacle to the emancipation of these people. When freed he is to be 
removed beyond the reach of mixture.  (31-32) 
 
 
 
Given that Smith performed House Arrest in Washington, D.C. before a crowd of 
political insiders, including, on the opening night, President Clinton himself, one must 
remark both on this opening episode’s pedagogical function as well as its clear attempt 
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épater le bourgeoisie. The play thus begins by conjuring American history as a temporal 
space defined, not by enlightened architects of procedural democracy, but by 
Enlightenment slave-owners who fathered children under coercive conditions.  In short, 
Smith uses Monticello’s panopticism to evoke America as a polity claiming equality 
while functioning as an oligarchy. 
 Such an historical approach to politics in the White House, in relation to the 
Lewinsky affair, is damning.  Smith pursues this line of attack with the words of 
Christopher Hitchens, who condemns Clinton as a sexual predator and political 
opportunist, linking his liaison with Jennifer Flowers with his politicized refusal to stay 
the execution of a lobotomized man, Ricky Ray Rector, in Arkansas.   Importantly, 
though Smith’s play is consonant with the priorities of 1990s identity politics, it pursues 
identity categories not primarily as essences to be treasured but rather as systematically 
distributed sites in a field of power.  The acidity of this approach is lightened to some 
extent by the fact that Smith also looks at l’affair Lewinsky as an unhelpful diversion 
from genuine politics, politics that might lead to the redress of the uneven exercises of 
power.  To this end, she includes the views of Gary Hart, Judith Butler, Ed Bradley, 
Brian Palmer, Chris Vlasto, Walter Shapiro and Clinton himself in monologues that 
speak to the pointlessness of such “political theater.”   Consequently, the view of power 
that emerges most distinctly from the play is one of invasive probing, be it in the 
Jeffersonian panoptical form or the shape of Kenneth Starr. 
 The play often sidesteps the Lewinsky affair, however, to consider the less 
familiar casualties of power’s exercise, with a particular emphasis on women of color.  
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Smith stages the ruminations of Anita Hill on the battery of threats, probes, and 
polygraph tests alongside the horrifying confession of Paulette Jenkins on abetting her 
violent boyfriend in the murder of her daughter.  What links these two disparate figures, 
aside from their shared racial and gender identity, are the ways in which their subjection 
to interpersonal patriarchal probing, isolation, and mistreatment is either ignored or 
redoubled by the procedural, juridical power-structure.  Thus, Smith is able to use the 
Jefferson-Hemmings debate, the Lewinsky affair, and the experiences of a variety of 
black women to suggest a link between, on the one hand, the intimate, sexual, “personal” 
dramas of power abuses based on racial and gender differences and, on the other, the 
impersonal spectacles of governance and governmentality. Memorably, Smith includes 
the story of Alexis Herman, U.S. Secretary of Labor under Clinton, who tells of how, at 
the age of five, she cowered in her father’s car while a group of Klansman, who had 
followed her father’s vehicle after a church meeting, beat him while his daughter listened 
to his cries.  Herman narrates this story to illustrate why she found it unfathomable that 
she had been labeled a “Washington insider” by the media when Independent Council 
Kenneth Starr subpoenaed her.  Her position, much like Smith’s, is to feel—as an 
affectively powerful aspect of her racial and gender identity—an alienation from power.  
This alienation is confirmed, her place within the governing bureaucracy 
notwithstanding, through the Starr investigation itself.  The investigation is a process in 
which Herman is treated as a pawn in an entanglement of power, indistinguishably 
personal and procedural, that derives its power from its status as spectacle.  Intriguingly 
then, Herman doubles for Smith—an affective and cultural outsider to power who is 
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nonetheless entangled within a structure of power she does not control.  While House 
Arrest is primarily interested in larger political structures, we can discern, in the 
conflicted space Herman and Smith share, sentimentalism’s mute suffering figure that is 
reinterpreted and repositioned in the sympathetic witness’s eyes. 
Smith’s use of the panopticon structure demonstrates a form of autocritique that 
links the use of state, personal, and artistic power. Like a head of state, Smith has the 
power to see the audience and to see the community she presents in her play, and a 
complex set of powers—to re-form, categorize, record, distort, capture, or mesmerize 
those groups—is conferred by being in the center of spectacular nexus. Smith’s practice 
is similar to the panopticon in that, at least theoretically, her theater produces 
unidirectional seeing: her interviewees are invited to attend her performances, but they 
cannot control how they will be presented.  More pertinently, Smith’s first two plays can 
be thought of as making the undifferentiated crowd knowable by atomizing it, 
cataloguing it, and organizing it into constituent parts, just as the earliest iterations of 
panoptic practice did with plague-stricken villages.  In this way, Smith’s play marks its 
complicity with the broader power structure in the case of both the Crown Heights unrest 
and the L.A. riots.  Transforming these conflict ridden neighborhoods by engaging them 
in a therapeutic reconciliation may only serve to reinstate a status quo in which unequal 
powers continue their work unabated.   
 However, there are also important differences between the panopticon model of 
power and Smith’s theatrical practice.  One important difference is that Smith seeks a 
greater transparency of power’s spectacle.  By inviting her interviewees to her 
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performances, she seeks to make the community visible to itself, and therefore to 
redistribute knowledge/power rather than to horde it.  Whereas the panoptical dissects the 
undifferentiated crowd into particles of knowledge—height, sex, wealth, Social Security 
number--Smith’s practice does not reproduce the crowd in atomized form, but rather 
produces a new crowd that has been modified by an increased knowledge and affective 
absorption of itself. Indeed, her theater is not foremost a matter of ascertaining 
knowledge about the organization of the social body, but rather is a matter of being 
implicated within and affected by a social body without organs; it is a matter of entering 
into a new relation of force where one is redefined by the words, spectacle, and space in 
which one is placed.  Smith makes the social body go through a series of 
deterritorializations and reterritorialisations, but does not attempt to fix them.  The 
jumbled order of each production testifies to this as Smith tries to produce new effects 
and new contrasts, and as new audiences attend her performances the social body she 
affects is augmented and altered further.  Smith’s work should be conceived, in short, as a 
supplementary space of public commingling. 
 In order to advance a new interpretations of Smith’s production of affects, and to 
hint at how we might read more productively the affective pedagogy I characterize as 
sentimentalist—sufferer, witness/model, and audience—I have, throughout this chapter, 
employed the thought of Deleuze in a rather schematic way.  To do so is, of course, un-
Deleuzean, for he encouraged and practiced a mode of thinking that unsettles doxa and 
seeks always to produce something new, but here newness might emerge relationally 
between theater and theory.  Indeed, “between theater and theory” expresses the space of 
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sentimentalism tidely.  Neither fish nor foul, it is a philosophy manqué, scorned by nearly 
all those who deign to consider it: first, by the tastemakers of naturalism, realism, and 
modernism, and then again, for different reasons, by many of the scholars examining it in 
literary and cultural studies.  Many of these critiques have been forceful, convincing, and 
often necessary; nonetheless, to continue to view sentimentalism’s logic as always 
reducible to a critique of its power inequalities is to ignore the ways in which sentimental 
engagements can transform subject positions instead of merely reconfirming them.  Here 
is where newness, rather than recognition, must be foregrounded.  What I experience in 
both Smith’s performances and Deleuze’s sentences is an energetic effort to evoke the 
possibility of new social network, a novel form of philia, a friendship that would make us 
strangers to ourselves.
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CHAPTER IV 
SYMPATHETIC (RE)VISIONS: 
SENTIMENTAL WITNESS IN JOHN EDGAR WIDEMAN AND CHANG-RAE LEE 
 
This chapter contemplates the ways in which two American novelists working in 
the early 1990s, John Edgar Wideman and Chang-Rae Lee—writers characteristically 
figured as postmodern—have engaged with the tradition of nineteenth-century 
sentimentalist intertextually both to produce and critique a notion of American belonging.  
Such an endeavor might easy annoy those who see in these otherwise very different 
novelists a shared aesthetic sophistication anathema to the maudlin, highly conventional 
excesses associated with the term sentimentalist.  Furthermore, it may seem a scholarly 
extravagance to suggest that sentimentalism is capable of the double action of production 
and critique I claim it to possess.  However, those familiar with the numerous lines of 
argument emerging out of the Douglas-Tompkins debate know that sentimentalism is, as 
Philip Fisher has argued in Hard Facts, “a politically radical technique,” that “trains and 
explicates new forms of feeling,” and in particular, extends consciousness to 
marginalized groups (Fisher 17-18).  While at the same time sentimentalism is an 
affective logic that can bolster nationalist and imperialist projects, as argues Laura 
Wexler in her influential essay “Tender Violence” (16-17).  This doubled aspect of 
sentimentalism derives from its central topos—the sympathetic witness.  After all, as 
Laura Hinton argues, sympathy is “implicated as a particularly perverse, panopticon 
strategy,” in that “its spectator is supposed to be a moral authority moved by images: but 
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he is also like the faceless prison guard who reflects bureaucratic violence in the name of 
‘reform’” (Hinton 16).  Indeed, in the novels wherein Wideman and Lee confront the 
urban crisis most directly, each figures sympathy as both the ground for social 
regeneration and the parasitic and voyeuristic means by which collective identities are 
compromised and privacy and specificity are betrayed. But more than an ambivalence 
about sympathy’s power and relation to governance links these novels to the much-
maligned cluster of texts labeled sentimentalist.  Both Lee and Wideman invest heavily in 
the affective strategies of the child elegy as part of a more basic pedagogy to further the 
“extension of full and complete humanity to classes of figures from whom it has been 
socially withheld” (Fisher 92).   Lastly, I offer this reading by means of two intertextual 
traces in the source texts, drawing me to consider how Lee’s Native Speaker demands 
that we reread Whitman, a poet who would doubtless desire exactly such a title; and how 
Wideman’s Philadelphia Fire shows us what Stowe, the little lady who started the big 
war, can tell us about America’s post-war urban collapse, today’s “life among the lowly.” 
But why this linking of urban space, sentimentalizing gaze, and menacing 
voyeurism?  It is a constellation, as I have argued in the last chapter, characteristic of 
Anna Deavere Smith’s later theatrical works, which seem increasingly conscious of the 
Foucauldian power dynamics inherent to making a spectacle of the marginalized. Though 
more distantly than Smith, Roth also addresses the malignancy that lurks in some 
seemingly progressive universalisms, if not in a specifically urban context.  Note his 
attack on the militancy behind the culture of victimization, on the murderous potential of 
the anti-war movement, and, most plainly, on the Stalinist betrayal of socialist idealism. 
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The best means of conceiving Wideman and Lee’s shared concern and ambivalence about 
the politics of sympathy, however, would be to contextualize them within what Ed Soja, 
following Foucault, calls the emergence of “carceral cities, an archipelago of 
‘normalized enclosures’ and fortified spaces that both voluntarily and involuntarily 
barricade individuals in visible and not-so-visible urban islands” (299).  Soja rightly 
credits urban theorist Mike Davis, whom Anna Deavere Smith interviewed for Twilight, 
as the dominant intellectual force in the founding of this “discourse on the 
postmetropolis” (147).  In City of Quartz, Davis offered a sharp critique of the “security-
obsessed urbanism” he saw emerging in material changes in the structuring of social 
services, policing, and built environment (223).  According to Davis, from the late 1970s 
forward, “on the bad edge of postmodernism,” there is an increasing tendency in the 
forces shaping urban development to abandon “old liberalism’s” hopes for the social 
integration of the economically marginal and instead “to merge urban design, architecture 
and the police apparatus into a single comprehensive security effort” resulting in “fortress 
cities” where the poor are criminalized (223-4).  What city planners mendaciously call 
“rescuing” blighted areas amounts to transforming them into “sadistic street 
environments” with pain-inducing “bum-proof benches,” sprinkler systems designed to 
soak homeless sleepers, and razor-wire trash-cages; Davis even mentions an aborted 
measure in Phoenix to add cyanide to the garbage (232-233).  Less polemical studies, 
such as Steve Herbert’s Policing Space, a theorized study of how a single patrol division 
of the LAPD “makes and marks” its space, echo Davis (161). As part of a more 
comprehensive examination of police discourses, Herbert suggests that police construct 
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their own virtue by codifying their incursions into impoverished neighborhoods in 
consistently moral terms, constructing problem areas as “morally impure” zones, 
“cancers” wherein violence is “a fact of nature” and from which citizens-cum-vermin 
must be cleansed (147).  In brief, what these theorists of new urban processes suggest is 
that bureaucratic operational officers of the contemporary American city (Los Angeles 
being the favored test site) increasingly see themselves engaged in a war against a 
sizeable portion of the citizenry often while continuing to employ the rhetoric of liberal 
amelioration, protection, and service.  
The novels of both John Edgar Wideman and Chang-Rae Lee demonstrate a 
concern with this development and both attempt to address it through an aesthetic 
intervention.  They do this by staging, to greater or lesser extent, Philadelphia Fire and 
Native Speaker around historical tragedies resulting from the violent hostility of 
municipal governments to a portion of the people inhabiting their cities.  Both novels 
movingly call their readers to feel for the damage to the lives of many city dwellers based 
on what they see as the government’s persecutional policies.  Both novelists, however, go 
beyond the particulars of the historical wrong they locate; more deeply, they critique a 
mode of vision that conspires against the political and ethical equality of its citizenry 
while under the cover of concern and care.  To lend profundity to this critique, to keep 
from descending into belle-lettristic exposé of local hypocrites in power,  both reach back 
to literary antecedents in the American tradition, as if to juxtapose more sharply the 
adversarial policing of the nation’s present-day “tired, poor, and hungry” with its much-
venerated ideals of political openness, economic opportunity, and social concern.  
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Suffused in the tense air of American cities of the late-1980s and early 1990s, 
Philadelphia Fire and Native Speaker sound a mordant line over “the bad edge of 
sentimentalism,” for the transformation of American cities in the postindustrial period 
into a carceral archipelago is only possible with the consent—sometimes tacit, sometimes 
vocal—of those who claim to feel otherwise. 
A Stop Between Pity and Fear 
Rhodes scholar, Iowa Writers’ Workshop fellow, and the only writer to have 
received two PEN/Faulkner awards for fiction, John Edgar Wideman has been called “the 
black Faulkner, the softcover Shakespeare” by Don Strachen in Los Angeles Times Book 
Review.  Indeed, his ambitious style, with its frequent temporal and perspectival shifts as 
well as its transformation of contemporary vernaculars into dramatic music knowingly 
recalls Faulkner.  The challenge his prose style represents to readers is compounded both 
by his embrace of postmodern metafictionality and his provocative political orientation, 
which steers to the side of Black Arts Movement-style nationalism but remains deeply 
influenced by that movement’s incendiary oppositional vigor.  This is particularly true of 
Wideman’s unswerving resistance to the structural racism he sees condemning millions 
of black Americans to urban immiseration and mass imprisonment. In his treatment of 
urban conflict and the function of race within it, Wideman engages with the 
sentimentalist tradition both by confronting explicitly the value of the sympathetic 
vision38 and by engaging intertextually with writers of nineteenth-century American 
sentimentalism such as Harriet Beecher Stowe and Walt Whitman.   Therefore, while 
Wideman is already viewed as a postmodern innovator and reviser of modernist 
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aesthetics, he should also be understood as a sentimental reviser—consciously engaging 
with this earlier tradition of thought and letters. Doubtless, rich results would flow from a 
lengthier study of how affective politics, visibility, and urban suffering relate across 
Wideman’s larger oeuvre, much of which ruminates on the lives and fortunes of the 
denizens of Homewood, the impoverished, largely black Pittsburgh neighborhood where 
he was raised. Here, however, I focus primarily on his novel Philadelphia Fire, both 
because it evinces most clearly the qualities I wish to highlight and because its critique of 
sympathetic vision parallels Lee’s in Native Speaker.  In my reading of the text, 
Wideman writes as if sympathy is a corrupt modality of politics and feeling—a deeply 
flawed way of seeing—yet he nevertheless seeks to model its functioning through the 
figure of the writer.  While Wideman’s novel repeatedly casts doubt on the possibility of 
a coherent affective community, on the efficacy of sympathetic vision, and on the 
sentimentalization of children, his work remains an effort to persuade its readership, 
through an aesthetic of sympathetic witness, to attend to urban misery ethically, 
personally, and emotionally in a manner consonant with sentimentalism’s logic. 
That a split perspective on the power of sympathy characterizes Philadelphia Fire 
should not surprise its reader, given the numerous contradictions and divisions structuring 
the text.   The novel’s first section relates the abortive efforts of Cudjoe, a black novelist 
who has been living as an expatriate on Mykonos, to locate Simba, a child lost after 
surviving the bombing of the MOVE organization in Philadelphia on May 13, 1985.  This 
fictionalized exploration of the real-life violent confrontation between the city’s 
municipal government and a back-to-nature, Afrocentric cult ends abruptly halfway 
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through the novel, and in part two, Wideman writes under his own name, explicitly 
questioning his need for the Cudjoe persona.  This second section complicates the lost 
child motif established in the first through the anecdote of Wideman’s idealistic and 
doomed effort to stage an adapted version of The Tempest using all black children and, 
much more movingly, through Wideman’s expressions of anguish over his own teenage 
son’s imprisonment for murder.  The novel concludes in a phantasmagoric crescendo 
shifting between three interrelated moments: a former MOVE member-turned-police-
informant throws himself from a high-rise window, a homeless man named J.B. is set on 
fire by a gang of children, and Cudjoe visits a poorly attended memorial service for the 
eleven people killed in the MOVE bombing.  One can easily be lost in such a narrative 
labyrinth, and so I, like Cudjoe, follow the thread of a single name. 
The tension I divine in Wideman’s text between incredulity toward sympathy’s 
power on the one hand and a politicized insistence on sympathy’s necessity on the other 
can be best explicated through an onomastic reading of Cudjoe, the novel’s putative 
protagonist.  His name contains divergent meanings leading to two distinct dilemmas 
facing him, Wideman, and implicitly, Wideman’s reader.  In my reading, the tension 
between these dilemmas is not resolved, thereby sustaining the intensity of the novel’s 
affective and political injunctions.  I connect the first onomastic valance of Cudjoe, 
which links the novel intertextually to Harriet Beecher Stowe, to Wideman’s meditation 
on the inefficacy of sympathetic witness and sentimentalist assumptions about the 
benevolence and innocence of humans, particularly children.39  This aspect of Cudjoe’s 
identity speaks to how the sympathetic mode of relation, practiced inevitably in bad faith 
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or without the will to follow through on sympathy’s demands, leads to complicity with 
the system of immiseration.  In this view, the sympathetic gaze becomes a form of civic 
espionage, unwittingly shoring up an order that, at best, neglects its urban underclass and, 
at worst, targets them with lethal consequences.  
The second valance of Cudjoe’s name, linking him to the Jamaican Maroons who 
successfully fought British forces in the eighteenth-century, reveals another dilemma, 
seemingly opposed to the first: namely the temptation to retreat into defiant isolation and 
pastoral utopianism.  The text figures such isolation as doomed in part because resistant 
closed societies are destined to be crushed by powerful, exploitative forces exterior to the 
resistant communal enclave, but the author also hints that such communities are 
themselves ingrown and cloistered.  Furthermore, Wideman seems to suggest that such 
radical insularity, no matter how oppositional in intent, is but a reverberation of the 
utopian and pastoral modes of American nationalism, modes which underlie the very 
gentrification displacing America’s urban underclass and the isolationalism justifying the 
neglect of the developing world.  I mine the tensions in this name to reveal how 
Wideman arms himself with powerful visions of suffering and self-consciously seeks to 
publicize them to a reading public that the text itself figures as indifferent.  Faithless in its 
own affective pedagogy, the book is an act of defiant failure.  Philadelphia Fire is, 
ultimately, a book of grief—a knot composed of felt estrangements and the entangled 
difficulties of producing a community of fellow feeling.  It is, surely, an expression, if not 
of so-called urban nihilism, then of the pathos of affective exhaustion.  Nonetheless, it 
also refuses to disengage personal suffering from the city it considers and demands an 
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explosion of moral feeling in its reader, though it demonstrates little hope that the polity 
around it is capable of more than a passing acknowledgment  
Wideman signals the importance of onomastic meaning in Philadelphia Fire’s 
first sentences, with Cudjoe envying Zivanias, a Mykonos islander “named for the 
moonshine his father cooked,” because the former would have liked to have been “named 
for something his father or grandfather had done well.  A name celebrating a deed.  A 
name to stamp him, guide him” (3).  On first blush, Cudjoe’s envy is simply the first in a 
long series of yearnings for more sustaining links of filiation.  Wideman, when pressed 
on the name’s significance in interviews, avoids any explicit containment of its meaning, 
commenting that Cudjoe “was a very common name […] that was used in slavery times.  
It’s also a West African name day.  It’s an echo of its time” (qtd. in Olander 167). 
Wideman, nonetheless, coyly acknowledges that the choice was “a conscious thing” 
“point[ing] backward,” which conforms with the investment in onomastic signification 
his fiction consistently demonstrates, from Orion in Dambollah to the ill-fated Cassandra 
in Philadelphia Fire.  It is surprising, therefore, that no critics have pursued the matter 
further, for by linking Wideman’s use of “Cudjoe” to Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin and to 
Captain Cudjoe, the legendary Jamaican Maroon leader, one can answer the questions 
Wideman himself poses halfway through his text: “Why this Cudjoe, then? This airy 
other floating into the shape of my story. Why am I him when I tell certain parts? Why 
am I hiding from myself? Is he mirror or black hole?”  (122) 
The name appears at the darkened edges of the famous scene in Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, in which, after being confronted by the runaway slaves 
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Eliza and her son Harry, Senator Byrd decides to follow his heart, ignore his legal duty, 
and assist the pair’s northward movement.  By foregrounding Stowe’s Cudjoe in this 
scene, probably the scene most paradigmatic of sentimentalism’s “doctrine of right 
feeling” in American literature,40 one sees a crack running through the classic diagram of 
sentimental engagement.41  In Stowe’s novel, Cudjoe is coded as a sympathetic helper of 
the powerless urchin, but he also represents a reaffirmation of black servility and 
continued subordination outside the spatiotemporal confines of slavery.  Hence he is one 
of the split subjects of sentimental engagement.  I will go on to show how Wideman’s 
text presents a corresponding doubleness in the object of sentimental solicitousness: the 
child, who is at once an angelic lost object and a terrifying, diabolic threat.  Finally, 
before moving to the second valance of Cudjoe’s name, I will show how Wideman’s 
novel further complicates the value of sympathetic witness, by linking it to spying, 
voyeurism, and sometimes cruel enjoyment of suffering others, precisely the opposite of 
the reaction anticipated by Stowe’s text.   
Recall that while Eliza and Harry plod through a winter squall having just crossed 
dangerously into Ohio, Stowe shifts her novel unexpectedly to an argument between 
Senator Bird and his wife, who is excoriating her husband for voting for the Fugitive 
Slave Law.  The Senator insists that his wife’s reaction, though based on noble 
sentiments, is ultimately “a matter of private feeling,” and that “great public interests 
[are] involved,” by which assumably he means the imbroglio of tensions leading to the 
Compromise of 1850, of which the law was but a part (144). Mrs. Bird dismisses her 
husband’s rationalizations and upbraids him with a question: “would you now turn away 
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a poor, shivering, hungry creature from your door, because he was a runaway? Would 
you, now?" (144).   At just this moment, they are made aware of Eliza and Harry, 
shivering, soaked and hungry in their kitchen.  The vision of the mother and child 
challenges the Senator’s civic resolve and, ultimately, he relents, proving the rightness of 
affective intuition over law.  The implication is that the legal system—a product of 
rationalized compromises and the calculations of established powerful interests—is 
imperfect, but the very presence of need, the visibility of suffering, will draw the just into 
experiencing a change of heart.   
Where is Cudjoe here? It is Cudjoe, the Birds’ “black man-of-all-work,” who 
“put[s] his head in at the door” “[a]t this critical juncture,” when Mrs. Bird has pressed 
her husband most fully, calling in the wife to the kitchen where the soaked Eliza and 
Harry wait (145).  It is “old Cudjoe” who physically attends to Harry, getting “the boy on 
his knee, […] bus[il]y pulling off his shoes and stockings, and chafing his little cold feet” 
(146). Furthermore, when Eliza and Mrs. Bird tearfully bond over their shared loss of 
children and the runaway mother states “I have lost two, one after another, -- left ‘em 
buried there when I came away; and I had only this one left […] he was all I had,” it is 
Cudjoe who is conspicuously pained by the thought of Harry being sold away (149).  The 
old servant “rub[s] his eyes very hard with his cuffs, and mak[es] a most uncommon 
variety of wry faces, occasionally respond[ing] in the same key [as the weeping domestic 
Aunt Dinah], with great fervor” (150).  This Cudjoe will go on to assist Mr. Bird in 
carrying away Eliza and son in the snowstorm, struggling mightily to work their carriage 
wheels out of deepening ruts in the snow.  He is a character so minor and peripheral in a 
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scene so famous that few if any of Stowe’s commentators seem to notice him at all, and 
yet once we re-center the scene on him, the text’s sentimental doctrine sours 
substantially.  
The vague laboring status and servility of this briefly envisioned “black man-of-
all-work” clearly parallels the status of the slaves of Mr. and Mrs. Shelby, Eliza’s former 
master and mistress, who wrongly believed they have a benevolent relationship with their 
slaves.  Cudjoe is an absent presence in the scene, deconstructing Stowe’s own arguments 
for the moral and affective power of visibility over the logic of legalized oppression.  
When Cudjoe’s face appears in the Bird’s parlor door to announce the arrival of the 
runaways, he is not an object of efficacious sympathy, for the Birds, Stowe, or Stowe’s 
reader.  He might be rightly described as human furniture, a necessary element in the 
domestic space in which the Senator resides and in which the power of his agency is 
confirmed.  While old Cudjoe is overwhelmed by feelings for Harry and stirred by 
Eliza’s tale of lost children, he cannot produce change for those who need it.  He does not 
attend to the mother and son himself, but instead reports their presence to his employer 
and awaits orders.  He readily assists the Senator’s flouting of the law, but is not invested 
with the capacity to violate the hierarchy of the Bird household.  Therefore, it is not that 
some sights occasion a departure of the “law of the land” in favor of the “law of the 
heart,” but rather that certain orders—legal and juridical—may be so upended while 
others—domestic and familial—cannot be.  The pitiable sight can justify actions 
transgressing the letter of the law only on the condition that the viewer was empowered a 
priori to transgress.  Stowe’s Cudjoe, drawn forward in disheartened obedience, is a 
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figure of sympathy and solicitude but also of servility and the failure of sympathy’s 
efficacy; he is both moved and inert.  Once we set on him interpretively, Cudjoe becomes 
a demonstration that Stowe’s affective soteriology—the transcendence of feeling over the 
violent force of law—fails even within the bounds of her own text. Reading Stowe’s 
scene through Wideman’s text, one can recognize in the nineteenth-century handyman his 
twentieth-century counterpart. Wideman’s Cudjoe is invested with pity and fellow feeling 
for Simba, the lost child, but ultimately is relegated to reporting “the weight of arbitrary 
power rationalizing itself” while submitting to its force and logic (Philadelphia 113). 
Such a helpless helper figure might resonate with Wideman for personal reasons, 
reasons he confronts creatively in his metafiction and memoirs. Indeed, this passage in 
Stowe is oddly echoed in the opening scene of Wideman’s Brothers and Keepers: A 
Memoir.  There Wideman describes how, in 1975, his youngest brother, Robby, a fugitive 
from the law since he had killed a man in an armed robbery three months before, arrived 
at Wideman’s home one snowy afternoon in Laramie, Wyoming just as the writer had 
been composing an abortive letter to his sibling (Brothers 3-6).  Wideman fed his brother 
and sent him on his way to Colorado, where Robby was eventually arrested.  A similar 
scene, in which the demands of the law again chafed against the “law of the heart” would 
repeat eleven years later in 1986, when Wideman’s second son, Jacob, appeared at his 
door asking for shelter.  The sixteen-year-old had crossed several states as a fugitive after 
stabbing his classmate, Eric Andrew Kane, to death in his sleep on a fieldtrip in Flagstaff, 
Arizona (Norman 12).  Wideman, after contacting his lawyer and developing a defense 
for the boy, turned his son over to the authorities; Jacob was held for two years, tried as 
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an adult, and given a twenty-five year sentence (“Given Life” 21).  Wideman 
incorporates some of this experience into Philadelphia Fire, though here one encounters 
an anguished ambiance overshadowing a set of interrelated ruminations rather than a 
conventionally plotted and scenically framed memoir.  In a metanarrative move whereby 
Wideman appears as himself, interrupting the story of Cudjoe, Wideman reflects on his 
son’s predicament, complaining that the presiding judge has ignored expert testimony 
indicating that Jacob suffers from schizophrenia. “Why is my son left alone to suffer and 
try to make sense of his imprisonment, the chaos of his personality, his terror and guilt?” 
(116)  Wideman’s predicament, with regard to his brother and his son, mirrors the 
position of Stowe’s Cudjoe, who despite his powerful feelings of solicitousness and 
filiation must submit to the law dividing him from those he would treat as family. In one 
reflective moment, Wideman wonders about his mentally ill son’s experience—“[h]ow 
must it feel to be inhabited by more than one self?”—imaginatively surmising that, for 
Jacob, “[i]f there is ever an I, a me, beyond the separate roles he must play, its burden 
would be to register the damage, the confusion wrought by his condition” (110).  The 
passage might double as a description of the helpless helper, and the ambiguities such a 
figure exposes in sympathy, its usefulness, and its object.  
This ambiguity in the subject of sympathy affects the way the novel figures the 
action of sympathetic investment through vision, as I will argue below, but it also 
parallels the novel’s treatment of the object of sympathy.  That object, represented 
primarily in the figure of the lost child, haunts and motivates Wideman’s novel much as it 
does Lee’s.  Cudjoe speaks of “the child who is brother, son, a lost limb haunting him 
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since he read about the fire in a magazine,” whom he “must find […] to be whole again” 
(7); of “these world hunger poster children” he encounters on Philadelphia’s streets who 
“silently beg to be something other than a disaster” (22); of the “ashy taste of incinerated 
children’s flesh” in the air around Osage street where the MOVE building was burned 
(28); and of “you my tragic lil Indians all in a row, in a line, circled like covered wagons 
on the Laramie Plains, while hostiles swirl around you, howling at the moon, faster and 
faster, tiger churning you to cocoa butter my lost Sambo children” (130). In each 
instance, Wideman mingles dejection with unremitting anger, an anger that leads 
magnetically back to the MOVE fire, as when Cudjoe provides “a list of atrocities that 
prove adults don’t give a fuck about kids […] The lousy school system, abortion, lack of 
legal rights, child abuse, kiddie porn, kids’ bodies used to sell shit on TV, kids on death 
row, high infant mortality.  In that list as one of the latest signs.  Cause the fire burned up 
mostly kids” (91). That the lost child motif is another key aspect of its engagement with 
literary sentimentalism might well go without saying: Stowe’s little Harry is just one 
iteration of a topos endemic to the genre.  However, Wideman directly engages the 
sentimentalized vision of the angelic, poor orphan as sentimentalist topos with his 
description of the statue depicting Charles Dickens and Little Nell, the doomed orphan 
protagonist in The Old Curiosity Shop, installed by Francis Edwin Elwell in 1902 in 
Philadelphia’s Clark Park.  The statue places the writer high on an elevated plinth, while 
“Little Nell at his knee stares imploringly up at the great man’s distant face” from her 
place much lower on the footstall (28). The statue acknowledges, perhaps unwittingly, 
the inequality inherent in the gaze of sympathy and is suggestive of the ways in which the 
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author/witness figure is elevated above his object.  Importantly, Wideman sees author and 
urchin as “separated and locked together by her gaze.  Both figures larger than life, 
greener than the brittle grass. Both blind” (28).  Though their inequality of power is 
emphasized, so is their shared helplessness.  
Nevertheless, while the figure of Nell recalls the lost Simba (who is in fact called 
“Little Simmie” at one point), it also resonates ironically with the novel’s many other 
figurations of children as senselessly murderous, pointlessly cruel, usually as a function 
of their neglect by adults (17).  Timbo, Cudjoe’s old friend who has become a city 
bureaucrat cynically pedaling the mayor’s agenda, complains that “[k]ids today are a 
bitch” because “[n]ow they kill anybody.  Anything” (89). His description of them as 
“[c]old-blooded little devils […] [d]ope dealing and contract killing and robbing and 
beating people in the neighborhood for drug money and full-scale turf wars with weapons 
like in Nam,” typified Wideman’s evocation of maniac children: abandoned and pitiable 
but also murderous, wild, and corrupt.  These two identities are neatly collapsed when 
Cudjoe describes the debauched urban landscape with the following surrealistic equation: 
“the city is a faint tracery of blue, barely visible bloodlines in a newborn’s skull” (45).  
Children’s gangs named “Kid’s Krusade,” “Kaliban’s Kiddie Korp.,” and “Money Power 
Things” run rampant through the novel’s street scenes and each of Wideman’s narrators 
is struck with terror at the idea of a children’s revolt (88).  Such an uprising—“The 
Children’s Hour”—seems inevitable because “[c]hildren have learned to hate us as much 
as we hate them” (187-188).  Wideman caps this motif with the “ha ha ha” and “the pitter 
patter of little sneakers laughing,” when “little white boys” drench, JB, a sleeping 
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homeless man “in kerosene and throw[…] a match ha ha ha” in the novel’s penultimate 
scene (188).  This affective ambivalence about the nature of the indigent child is neatly 
summed up when Cudjoe wonders to himself: “Wasn’t there a stop between pity and 
fear?” (60).   
So pervasive is this meditation on sympathetic and unsympathetic vision, that the 
novel may usefully be described as an aesthetic effort to problematize the witness of 
urban suffering, for, depending on the moment, the text stresses sympathy’s difficulty, its 
failure to effect change, and yet also the desperate need for more of it in order to mitigate 
or forestall the cruelty of violent social antagonisms.   Wideman foregrounds the 
fictionality of the sympathetic process in a surrealistic passage in which he catches 
himself staring into the mind of Melissa, his student: 
 
 
At a small perfect skull, still growing, the bone porous so when I trepanned away 
a side wall my entrance was silent, cunning, a perfect cross section revealed, 
framed by the curve of the skull’s crown, a stage set under a proscenium arch.  I 
sit, unobtrusive as a video camera at a keyhole and observe the goings-on.  
Melissa is at her kitchen table… (134) 
 
 
 
Wideman goes on to “discover” that the pubescent Melissa lives in a disorderly world of 
maternal neglect and sexual threat, in an episode that illustrates of the parallel I have 
sought to demonstrate between postmodern autoreferentiality and sentimental affective 
pedagogy, in which the author serves as model sympathetic witness.  That Wideman 
prefers to ground the metaphor in the language of theater and film—“proscenium arch,” 
“video camera,” and elsewhere when he refers to sympathetic projection as “zooming”—
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rather than that of fiction can be partly explained by the passage’s context.  Wideman is 
seeking to cast Melissa in a play, after all.   Nevertheless, it also corresponds to the 
novel’s general emphasis on sympathy as an optical engagement, a key facet of how 
Wideman figures the experience’s restrictiveness. The author concludes his exploration 
of the “aperture” in Melissa’s mind by declaring that “this fakery, viewer and viewed 
connected temporarily by a hole in a skull, does not allow real questions back and forth.  
Look, don’t talk.  Talking is touching, is disturbing the scene. Keep your seats” (138).  
This passage reveals that it is not merely the detachment afforded by sight that makes 
imaginative projection “fakery,” it is sympathy’s aestheticization that renders it false.  
Wideman stresses this when concludes the passage with a disquieting address to his 
reader: “Don’t upset the delicate balance of our fiction within hers within yours within 
whatever this is twisting and hissing and cracking like a churning rope” (138).  
Wideman’s implication is that being engrossed in a mise en abyme of sympathetic 
visions, so long as the linkages of feeling do not produce material exchanges and actions, 
will only conclude with all perishing in the shared conflagration, once again echoing the 
MOVE bombing.  
The episode typifies Wideman’s insistence on the inadequacy of sympathetic 
vision to address the suffering it registers, an insistence that exists in tension with the call 
for feeling the book itself represents.  Sometimes the inadequacy of sympathy owes to the 
feeling subject’s finitude, as when Cudjoe acknowledges that “[h]e couldn’t make things 
right for the hollow-eyed, big-bellied children even if he had a thousand pockets and 
dumped silver from every one,” but nonetheless his “eyes [are] stinging from shame at 
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having everything and nothing to give” (22).  More often, however, Wideman casts 
suspicion on the possibility of sympathetic engagement, especially via language, 
fictionality, and the book-commodity form. “Words fail me because there are no words 
for what’s happening,” Wideman confesses, “I am a witness.  All I know is that 
everything I could say about what I’m seeing is easy, obvious and, therefore, doesn’t 
count for much except to locate me, outside, record my perplexity” (118).  Furthermore, 
while his alter ego begins the effort to find Simba convinced that a book about the 
bombing will “do something about the silence” in which urban miseries and 
dehumanization are engulfed (19), Cudjoe ends by chiding himself that  
 
 
This is an irresponsible way of looking at things.  There may be survivors in the 
bar-b-qued city who require assistance.  Better to light one little candle than to sit 
on one’s ass and write clever, irresponsible, fanciful accounts of what never 
happened, never will. Lend a hand. Set down your bucket.  A siren screams. (167) 
 
 
 
Philadelphia Fire’s frequent denigrations of the power of sympathetic vision, 
imaginative projection, and fictional representation are clearly forms of paradoxical self-
chastisement.  But as the passage above demonstrates, such urging is itself a textual 
performance, which in turn implicates Wideman’s reader and acts to urge her beyond the 
text.  The book is an act of signification not unlike the siren’s call.  In this respect, the 
novel might be read not a repudiation of the power of sympathy, but as a refinement of it 
and as an index of the desperate need for more of it, to mitigate or forestall the world’s 
cruelty.  Indeed, with what might be thought of as exaggerated vigor, Wideman indicates 
that that cruelty reigns everywhere and that life in the city is characterized generally by 
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indifferent seeing.  The cruelty of the children who set fire to JB (188), the indifference 
of television viewers to the spectacles of mass atrocities within and beyond their city 
(19), the impersonal calculations of corporatized academia jettisoning social work 
departments that are attempting to ameliorate the lot of Philadelphia’s underclass (113), 
and the crowd of pedestrians swarming to see the grisly remains of a suicide (180), are 
just a few examples.  One cannot extricate the text’s attack on textual affective pedagogy 
as an indulgence from an intensification of its own affective pedagogy. 
It may be for this reason that, just as I will demonstrate with regard to Lee, 
Wideman often figures witnessing as an act of spying or voyeurism.  The topos of the 
sympathetic gaze as invasive, transgressive, or voyeuristic emerges early in Wideman’s 
novel when Cudjoe admits to having learned “the parts of a woman’s body” while caring 
for his grandmother.  “Why was he supposed to look away from her nakedness when his 
aunts bathed her?”  Cudjoe reasoned, “He loved her.  Shared her secrets” (7).   The 
scopophilia topos recurs when, near the novel’s close, Cudjoe attends a memorial 
gathering for those killed in the Move bombing as “a spy, a noncombatant” (194).  The 
voyeurism of Cudjoe/Wideman, however, is not always so metaphorical.  Cudjoe 
confesses to masturbating unseen while he watched a colleague’s daughter, Cassandra, 
swim at night on a visit to their family’s beach house: “[v]iolating her privacy, 
[p]oaching the bloom of her young woman’s body” (46).  This act is complicated in 
memory by the fact that “Cassandra would be dead in nine months, a fiery crash in 
Mexico,” and in his apostrophic apology to her father, Cudjoe rationalizes that “[h]e’s 
spying on her because there’s not much time, never enough time. He must learn her 
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secrets, save her” (65).  This last phrase links the connection between Cudjoe and 
Cassandra with that between the young Cudjoe and his grandmother, while her fate 
makes her yet another of the novel’s many lost children.  This association of pity, 
solicitation, and voyeurism repeats again late in the novel, when Wideman is troubled by 
how his own sexualized gaze is turned inadvertently to the swimming figure of the 
prepubescent friend of his children, and whom he is “bound to protect as a daughter” 
(124).  In nearly each case, as with Dickens and Nell or Wideman and Melissa, the 
relationship is one of an adult male writer and a doomed woman-child, a troubling 
connection between pity and desire, just as the oscillation between pity and fear 
dominates the novel’s treatment for young men.  In both cases, what repeats is an 
imaginative projection that involves distance rather than closeness, a distance that 
ultimately changes nothing.   
Here again is Stowe’s Cudjoe, the useless observer of sympathy.  Or, perhaps, one 
might say that such a figure is worse than useless: he is an informer to his master, an 
“evil little CIA covert operations motherfucker, Ariel,” from Wideman’s adaptation of 
The Tempest (144).  In this way, the voyeurism repeats Wideman’s confrontation with 
himself as protective, solicitous, but also guilty and transgressing.  If one connects this 
bifurcation in the novel’s treatment of children to its concern for the continuing role race 
plays in the inequitable distribution of urban goods, privileges, and protections, the 
dilemma is clarified.  As Paul Gilroy writes in There Ain’t No Black In the Union Jack: 
 
 
The idea that blacks comprise a problem, or more accurately a series of problems, 
is today expressed at the core of racist reasoning.  It is closely related to a second 
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idea which is equally pernicious, just as popular and again integral to racial 
meanings.  This defines blacks as forever victims, objects rather than subjects, 
beings that feel yet lack the ability to think, and remain incapable of considered 
behavior in an active mode.  The oscillation between black as problem and black 
as victim has become, today, the principal mechanism through which “race” is 
pushed outside history and into the realm of natural, inevitable events. (11) 
 
 
 
Without reducing the knotty specificity of Wideman’s treatment of affective engagement 
into an allegory of racial identification, one might ask if the modes of solicitous but 
injurious vision that repeat throughout Philadelphia Fire do not track with the oscillating 
poles of racial meaning Gilroy observes.42  Approaching Wideman’s ambivalence toward 
sympathy’s power, necessity, and nature as consonant with an ambivalence about black 
identity as synonymous with victimization leads us in a new interpretive direction:  the 
matter of agency, resistance, and the role of history.  And, as if turning from Ariel to 
Caliban, we must finally shift to Cudjoe’s other onomastic father. 
Captain Cudjoe, or Kojo, the famous Jamaican Maroon leader, would at first seem 
diametrically opposed to the “man-of-all-work” at the edge of Stowe’s novel, but a closer 
look at the historical record sheds light on their possible connection.   A “desperate but 
surprisingly frequent” reaction to New World enslavement, flight or marronage, 
produced communities formed from runaways everywhere the institution of slavery 
spread (Price 1).  Because these communities were internally united by their individual 
refusals to submit to white authority and, indeed, sometimes launched potent guerilla 
attacks on the plantations from which they had fled, they hold special significance—to 
descendents of the African Diaspora and many others—as historical emblems of the 
power of the oppressed to resist degrading, tyrannical order.  The First Maroon War, 
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which began with the English occupation of Jamaica in 1655, incrementally increased in 
intensity over the course of eight-five years and concluded with fifteen years of massive 
revolts, which resulted in the British suing for peace in 1740 (Patterson 246).  The 
Maroon leader to whom they came was Cudjoe “a bold, skillful and enterprising man” 
who led the Leeward Maroon communities in multiple raids against white traders in the 
Caribbean.  For this reason he, out of all the early Maroon leaders, has been given the 
greatest importance “both [by] the Maroons themselves and those outsiders who have 
written about them” (Patterson 260, Bilby 213).  Cudjoe successfully defended 
significant portions of Jamaica and was, by means of his treaty with the British, granted 
fifteen thousand acres of land to rule autonomously (Hurwitz 74-75).  However, Cudjoe 
is not a figure of unalloyed heroism.  After peace negotiations were completed, Cudjoe 
prostrated himself before Colonel Guthrie, the British representative, “embracing [his] 
legs, kissing his feet, and asking his pardon,” behavior which has continued to be viewed 
with some embarrassment by Maroon descendents (Patterson 271-272, 261).  Moreover, 
Cudjoe agreed to join forces with the British against any other Maroon rebellions and to 
return future runaway slaves to the whites for compensation (Patterson 273).  So the 
historical Cudjoe, as with Stowe’s fictional handyman, presents an ambivalent 
intertextual fore-figure.  He signifies the promise of counter-hegemonic communities and 
also, to some extent, their betrayal. 
Figuring the Maroon Cudjoe as an alter ego to Wideman’s—the ancestor he 
wishes he could be proud of and named after—produces the interpretive basis for a 
constellation of rebellious black men within the novel’s motivic structure.  To the 
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Jamaican and Pennsylvanian Cudjoes one can add the transformed Caliban of Wideman’s 
adaptation and, most importantly, the dreadlocked John Africa of MOVE.  Each 
represents the aggressive utopian retreat from established order; each is the servant who 
connives to beat his master; and each has his (ex)isle: Sycorax’s island, Mykonos, 
Jamaica, and the weedy gardens of MOVE’s building, islanded on gray Osage Street.  
Within the logic of Wideman’s text, one might say about each of these what MOVE 
survivor Margaret Jones says about John Africa: “even though he did it wrong, he was 
right” (14).  Indeed, Wideman’s highly selective presentation of the MOVE debacle has 
garnered much criticism, from among others Charles Johnson and Ishmael Reed, for 
Wideman ignores the organization’s murder of a police officer in 1979, the belligerence 
of MOVE’s members, the enmity of its neighbors due to MOVE’s persistent role as 
neighborhood nuisance, and the official explanation that the Philadelphia Police 
Department’s helicopter dropped, not a powerful incendiary bomb, but a targeted change 
which accidentally caught fire to stores of kerosene MOVE apparently kept on their 
building’s roof (Presson 109). Wideman glosses over some of the historical event’s 
complexities in a way that nearly always works to the benefit of MOVE, both in 
Philadelphia Fire and in his short story “Fever,” which links the 1986 disaster 
metaphorically to the outbreak of yellow fever in Philadelphia in the 1790s.  Hence, it is 
understandable why a reader might conclude that the novel advocates, as a viable mode 
of resistance, the creation of a counter-hegemonic community like MOVE, a community 
echoing the defiant Maroons.   Even if this is the case, however, Wideman does not seem 
hopeful about the prospects for the success of this resistance, particularly since it is 
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treated as a pastoral retreat from the city. 
The communal retreats of the resistant Cudjoe figures share both a kind of 
utopianism and, correspondingly, an isolationism.  In this, as Wideman is careful to 
suggest, they broadly echo qualities in the American society to which they are implicitly 
opposed.  The utopianism is most obvious in MOVE, where incidentally it is linked to a 
sentimentalized notion of a universal family.  “We all somebody’s chillren,” avers the 
Book of Life, Wideman’s fictionalized version of MOVE’s holy text, “We all Eden born.  
Eden bound.  All claim same two fader, mother. Who am so dirty take what him don’t 
belong?  Steal from bredder.  Steal from son” (121).  Wideman implicitly links MOVE’s 
pastoral notion of society to the texts that fashioned colonial American society’s self-
image.  The novel takes its epigraph from William Penn’s instructions that “every house 
be placed, if the Person pleases, in the middle of its platt ... so there may be ground on 
each side, for Gardens or Orchards or feilds, that it may be a greene Country Towne, 
which will never be burnt, and always be wholsome" (i).   Hence, Penn’s agrarian ideal of 
wide verdant growth around homes makes him, albeit unwittingly, MOVE’s patron saint. 
Crucially, this pastoral ideal must also be linked to the predilections of the very 
urban development programs championed by Timbo and Mayor Goode: 
 
 
All this mess around in here, warehouses, garages, shanties, all these eyesores got 
to go. When redevelopment's finished, a nice, uncluttered view of the art museum. 
[…] what we're trying to create here is our little version of Athens, you dig?  
Museum’s the Acropolis up on the hill. […] Modern urban living in the midst of 
certified culture. […] You wouldn’t believe the price of real estate. […] The folks 
used to live here. […] Some went north.  A lot got pushed west.  Landlords 
getting fat off that end too. (78) 
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The resistant utopianisms of the Cudjoe figures, Wideman hints, partake in and repeat the 
American national imaginary, where this fervor for communal reinvention has led not 
merely to dislocated urban populations during the late urban crisis but can be traced back 
to the earliest colonialist encounters.  The novel’s vision of  the city is still “[h]aunted by 
Indian ghosts—Schuykill, Manayunk, Wissahickon, Susquehanna, Moyamensing, 
Wingohocking, Tioga—the rivers bronzed in memory of their copper, flame-colored 
bodies, the tinsel of their names gilding the ruined city” (159).  What I have been 
suggesting is simply that the justificatory discourses that aided the removal of Native 
Americans to make room for development in the shape of white settlements and which, 
albeit far less brutally, validates municipal policies that aim to expel citizens rather than 
serve and protect them, is of a piece with John Africa and what Timbo calls “his nouveau 
Rousseau or whatever the fuckism” (84). It is no accident that MOVE’s Book of Life, 
which shifts hands throughout the text, ends up stolen by the gang of white children who 
set JB on fire for cheap amusement. 
Finally, these pockets of black resistance are defined by their isolationism, a 
quality that again is shared with the broader American culture.  This isolationism, which 
views those outside the communal enclave with suspicion or indifference, is obviously at 
play in the community of Leeward Maroons that Captain Cudjoe led in the eighteenth 
century, in as much as it agreed to return runaways and fight against other bands of 
Maroon resistance.  And while MOVE was an organization far more open to new 
members, the frequent obscenity-laced tirades it broadcast via megaphone to the 
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surrounding neighborhood at all hours deriding their lifestyles bespeaks an 
oppositionality at odds with their universalist rhetoric.  Wideman’s Cudjoe has 
experienced this desire for retreat—“I lived on an island.  Learned another language.  
Almost like a new life”—but such a movement is tied to irresponsible and selfish 
distanciation, linked to sight: “like a spectator from a distance watching my country kill 
itself” (130, 87). Yet the novel’s evocation of urban chaos makes the desire for retreat 
often more intense:  “To live on an island[…]  To be the island. […] Ah.  Think of it.  
[…] To prosper you don’t need another island beside you.  You are complete” (146). 
However much the novel stages these visions of isolation as a viable alternative to urban 
miasma, the novel is also at pains to demonstrate that such a retreat to “sanctuary” is not 
only incompatible with the communal, universal vision inherent in the utopian desire, the 
retreat represents a kind of voluntary imprisonment.  Consider the language Wideman 
employs in describing his son’s captivity: 
 
 
Playing mindless, repetitive games, locked in but also grateful for the cage of 
inactivity, the stasis that for a while can pass for peace, control, coherence.  
Sanctuary.  A blessed oblivion consciously sought, an oasis between wrenching, 
explosive takeovers.” (110) 
 
 
 
Wideman’s text insinuates that it may be impossible to differentiate between voluntarily 
chosen islands of exile and externally imposed detention.  Attempting to find a safe place 
outside “the system” will result only in the fullest submission to its demands and an 
assignment to a cage deep within its wall. 
I link this inversion of outside and inside to the novel’s intermittent confrontation 
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with American indifference to suffering in the development world. The most obvious of 
these moments occurs when Wideman, writing under his own name, relates the 
experience of watching television footage of the MOVE bombing with his wife.  The two 
“watch” and “[w]onder whose turn it is now,” certain that because “[w]hole city blocks 
[are] engulfed” “[i]t must be happening in another county.  A war.  A bombing raid.  
We’re watching a Third World shantytown where there’s no water, no machines to 
extinguish a fire” (100).  Wideman deflates the clichés of audience attentiveness by 
stating that “[w]e’d be on the edge of our seats if we were on seats and not lounging in 
our waterbed in Laramie at 9:05 P.M. with nothing better to do than play spin-the-bottle 
sweepstakes of the dial” (100).  By drawing attention to their bodily passivity and 
luxuriation, Wideman, perhaps banally, acknowledges the complacency inherent to the 
mere observation of televised spectacles of suffering, especially inasmuch as the 
suffering can be coded as outside one’s nation, neighborhood, or concern.   
Wideman makes a similar point when he has Timbo relate his memory of Brazilian 
favelas, which he passed through in a limousine while “down in Rio for Carnival” (79). 
Timbo is struck by the enormity of the slum: “[M]iles of it.  Talk bout tent city.  These 
folks lucky if they got a rag to pull over they heads.  Most of them just-plain-ass living on 
the ground.  The ground, man.  Stinks like bad meat.  […]  Acres and acres of it, man.  A 
garbage dump.  A people dump” (79).  What Timbo gleans from the experience initially 
is that “[b]ack in the good ole U.S. of A., we ain't got real poor people” (79).  However, 
as he further articulates this vision of “people jammed up so tight they shitting and 
pissing on top one another [and] Kids playing in open sewers,” the passage’s rhetorical 
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angle shifts to directly compare American and Brazilian poverties; though he was certain 
that it “[c]ouldn’t never get this bad back home in the land of opportunity and the bitch 
wit the torch,” Timbo is “[n]ot so sure now” (79-80). In both of these scenes, an inversion 
of expectation occurs in which the terrain of violence, immiseration, and poverty, terrain 
which has been figured as occurring exclusively outside the boundaries of the nation-state 
where it can be regretted but tolerated as unavoidable, is suddenly made continuous with 
the geography of inequality within the nation-state.  Furthermore, in both cases, this 
inversion foregrounds the protective isolation of the viewer’s own positioning; they are 
islanded in a comfortable bourgeois home and limousine respectively. Both instances 
suggest that territorial divisions such as geographic and political boundaries do not alter 
the status of one’s ethical obligations but do produce an alteration in our felt sense of 
obligation.   
This disjunction between ethical responsibility and emotional compunction 
necessitates that the novelist take up the work of affective instruction, drawing listeners 
and readers into an experiential understanding of their place within a system of universal 
ethical obligation: affective instruction I understand to be at sentimentalism’s core.  
Wideman engages in such instruction often with eloquence that makes extended 
quotation especially tempting, as when Wideman addresses his reader directly, writing: 
 
 
Who am I? One of you. With you in the ashes of this city we share.  Or if you’re 
not in this city, another one like it.  If not now, soon.  Soon enough to make it 
worthwhile for you to imagine this one, where I am.  Sometimes I’ve thought of 
myself, of you, of ourselves, as walled cities each of us a fortress, a citadel, 
pinpoints of something that is the inverse of light, all of us in our profusion spread 
like a map of stars, each of us fixed in our place on a canvas immense beyond 
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knowing, except that we know the immensity must be there to frame our 
loneliness, to separate us as far as we are separate each from each in the darkness. 
(120) 
 
 
 
The pathos of this passage of direct address, which partakes of the same poetic topoi at 
play in the passage that closes I Married a Community, owes to the sharp juxtaposition of 
the dense “profusion” of consciousnesses with their impermeability and loneliness.  This 
sublime metaphorical vista of star-beings provocatively declares a separation of 
consciousness—an affective separation demanding, in turn, that the passage’s reader 
bridge by listening to the address more intently and sharpening the intensity of their 
reception.  Inasmuch as the passage is read well, it is read against itself. Wideman 
chooses to conclude his novel with the redoubled rhetoric of this kind of affective and 
textual incitement, when Cudjoe considers “recruit[ing] a crowd for the memorial 
service” (192)  “Hey fellas,” Cudjoe apostrophizes the swell of urban passersby, “It’s all 
about you” (192).   
 
 
Listen, brothers.  If they offed them people on Osage yesterday just might be you 
today.  Or tomorrow.  Look at yourselves.  If you’d appeared in the vicinity of 
6221 Osage that day the bullets and bombs were flying, if you’d sauntered or hip-
hopped or swooped down on the neighborhood […] youall wouldn’t be 
congregating here on this corner, […]  No, brethren, you’d be burnt an boiled and 
blowed up like the rest, if you showed your bearded faces, your narrow behinds 
on Osage Avenue because that day in May the Man wasn’t playing.  Huh uh.  
Taking no names.  No prisoners.  […] C’mon.  Follow me.  Before they decide to 
sweep your corner clean.   
Cudjoe nods.  Nobody pays any attention.” (192-193) 
 
 
 
The passage denarrates itself, at first presenting itself as actual speech and then 
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retroactively acknowledging its fictiveness.  This self-erasure or sense of abortiveness 
exactly parallels the effect of the passage’s, and indeed the novel’s, affective pedagogy, 
which presents the viewer/reader/spectator of suffering as indifferent while all the more 
vigorously pressing for emotional responses from its readership, instructing them on how 
to better link their own suffering with the suffering of those outside their familial, 
communal, or national enclave. 
Seeing the Fleshed Shape of the Need 
By tracing the ghost of the Whitmanian imaginary in Chang-Rae Lee’s 
breakthrough novel Native Speaker, I seek to show that the sentimental ambivalence 
traced above is not unique to Wideman but is rather detectable in other, quite different, 
novels. As this novel was published in the multiculturalist fervor of the mid-nineties, a 
moment in which the American canon and the dead white males roosting in its towers 
were under vociferous assault and in which a Korean-American novelist such as Lee 
might enjoy an almost fetishized approbation, Lee’s conscious evocation of Whitman as a 
predecessor, suggested at once by the novel’s epigraph, poses a question: why would a 
book hailed (however inaccurately) by the Los Angeles Times Book Review as “[a] novel 
of a newer, rawer immigrant experience,” in an age particularly apt to prize work for its 
status as peripheral to a moldering canon begin with an invocation of one of that canon’s 
most adored incumbents?  This question puts the matter too forcefully, for both Whitman 
and academic multiculturalism share an exultant passion for ad hoc inclusion.   
 It is not, however, the Whitman of triumphant assurance, singing of cosmic 
transcendences already achieved, that courses through Native Speaker, but rather the 
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wavering voice that harmonizes with its own negation, that fears its own impossibility, 
and that proclaims its presence by means of an uncertain and unnerving question.  Lee 
rewrites Whitman’s sentimentalist legacy by suggesting that the poet’s democratic “I,” 
capable of encompassing the immense multiplicity of America, carries with it a sinister 
shadow, the invading “eye” of surveillance.  Native Speaker gives shape to the play 
between these doubled aspects of the Whitmanian imaginary in the figure of one Henry 
Park, a spy, a man both belonging and betraying.  The novel’s conflicts, and Park’s 
correspondent development as a character, are inextricably interwoven with a tension 
central to Whitman’s poesis and I suggest that this intertextual relationship undergoes 
three phases, roughly dialectical, as Native Speaker quotes Whitman with a shifting 
tonality: first as travesty, then as a naïve commemoration, and finally as a sophisticated 
reiteration that retrieves from Leaves of Grass a wariness-in-hoping often lost in readings 
of Whitman. As if to announce his intention to approach Whitman obliquely, Lee selects 
as epigraph three lines culled from “The Sleepers,” which seem atypical both in tone and 
style, their clipped, ambiguous syntax refusing Whitman’s usual, easy parataxis: 
 
 
I turn but do not extricate myself, 
Confused, a past-reading, another, 
But with darkness yet. 
 
 
 
Drawing from these dense lines their full implication for both “The Sleepers” and Native 
Speaker is not a task that can be accomplished by single parsing.  Rather, I will seek to 
allow their multiple valances to radiate from beneath an extended reading of both texts, 
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returning at chapter’s end to draw out their consequences for how I understand Lee as a 
sentimentalist reviser. As I hope to show, characterizing the intertextual link between 
Native Speaker and “The Sleepers” has far-reaching consequences for how I understand 
Lee’s project in relation to the nation, ethnicity, and the politics of multiculturalism. 
 In tracing the possible valences of Lee’s epigraph, critics43 have tended to treat 
Whitman as one might a party platform rather than the dynamic and conflicted poet 
evinced in “The Sleepers.”  This reduction and occlusion of nuance has a long history in 
Whitmanian scholarship, owing in no small part to Whitman’s own later self-
assessments, so that as Leaves of Grass entered the canon, it was accompanied, if not 
supplanted, by the poet’s image: white-bearded and rustic, arms wide in a sanguine all-
embracing pose.  R. W. B. Lewis, deploring the process by which Whitman became 
“more mere representative than sovereign person,” describes the reified image thus: 
 
 
It, or he, was the representative—in nearly the conventional political sense—of a 
rather shallowly and narrowly conceived democratic culture: a hearty voice at the 
center of a bustling and progressive republic, a voice that saluted the pioneers, 
echoed the sound of America singing, itself sang songs of joy that foretold the 
future union of the nation and the world and the cosmos, [and] chanted the square 
deific…(99-100) 
 
 
 
It is not surprising that scholarship on Native Speaker should be content with making 
reference to this shorthand Whitman: what Lewis here describes is an undeniable aspect 
of the poet’s creative and political disposition and what links him most forcefully to the 
sentimentalist tradition. Understanding Whitman’s relation to sentimentalism is crucial if 
one is to understand how Lee borrows from the poet’s affective pedagogy. 
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Is Whitman a sentimentalist?  By his own understanding of the term, the answer 
must be no, for he assures his reader in “Song of Myself” that he is “[n]o sentimentalist, 
no stander above men and women or apart from them” (l. 499). Furthermore, a long 
tradition in Whitman scholarship has sought to distinguish his work from sentimentalism, 
largely to maintain the latter category as an aesthetic waste bin characteristically maudlin, 
didactic, and perhaps most importantly, dominated by women writers.  F.O. Mattheissen 
in The American Renaissance and R. W. B. Lewis in The American Adam both contrast 
the masculine writers Hawthorne, Melville, Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman with 
sentimentalist works, which they equate with the domestic writings of women. This 
critical nostrum was perpetuated by Ann Douglas, whose study, The Feminization of 
American Culture, characterized sentimentality as a “debased religiosity,” the 
“sentimental peddling of Christian belief for its nostalgic value” (5). In opposition to 
sentimentalism, Douglas positioned Whitman, along with the other writers treated under 
the rubric American Renaissance, who in her view attempted to “re-educate, defy, and 
ignore a public addicted to the absorption of sentimental fare” (5).  Yet a hard distinction 
between Whitman’s ethos and sentimentalism’s logic is untenable.  As Mary Louise Kete 
maintains, Whitman’s poetry—both in its early and mature stages—continue to make 
central “the sentimental topoi of death, broken families, childhood innocence, and 
transcendent love,” as well as “[o]ther more formal factors,” including “his didacticism, 
his use of apostrophe, and his celebration of socially and politically marginal people” 
(626).44  Furthermore, by the lights of the present study, Whitman should be thought of as 
an arch-sentimentalist, in that what I term the structural core of the philosophy of 
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sentiment—the affective pedagogy of the sympathetic witness—is crucial to Whitman’s 
mode of presenting a coherent social body, based in fellow feeling and presented through 
the force of his poetic intervention, as a fait accompli.  Nonetheless, as I show, the 
aspects of Whitman that Lee’s text engages most tempers the grandiloquent hopefulness 
of the sentimental vision with trepidation.  Ignoring the profound ambivalence and 
psychic turbulence patent in “The Sleepers,” as well as the complex ideological work it 
undertakes, serves only to conceal the sophistication of Lee’s allusion to a foundational 
figure in the American imaginary and his revision of sentimentalism’s characteristic 
mode of social feeling. 
 The poem that would become “The Sleepers” was first published without a title in 
the 1855 edition of Leaves.  In the 1860 edition, it gains the title “Sleep-Chasings,” but 
numerous passages from the earlier version had been deleted.45  By the time the poem 
had been given its present name, most of its demonstrably sexual segments, as well as its 
mentions of slavery, had been removed.  This textual instability mirrors the variable 
terrain of the poem itself, across which its speaker steps haltingly at the poem’s 
beginning: 
 
 
I wander all night in my vision, 
Stepping with light feet…swiftly and noiselessly stepping and stopping, 
Bending with open eyes over the shut eyes of sleepers;  
wandering and confused…lost to myself…ill-assorted…contradictory. (1-4) 
 
 
 
That the speaker calls himself contradictory and ill-assorted prepares us for the clashing 
elements to follow; segments of seemingly unrelated narratives are jarringly embedded in 
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a lyric rendering of a phantasmagoric nightscape.  The counterpoint of shut and open 
eyes establishes Whitman’s visionary as a kind of spy, who not only observes members 
of every class, gender, and ethnicity as they sleep unawares, but also actually invades 
their beds, enters into their dreams, and becomes them: 
 
 
I go from bedside to bedside … I sleep close with the other sleepers, each in turn; 
I dream in my dream all the dreams of the other dreamers, 
And I become the other dreamers. (28-30) 
 
 
 
At least two things should be noted about this gradual collapse of the boundary between 
self and other, which begins with an imagined movement between their beds, followed by 
a fellowship in sleep, then a sharing of consciousness, and lastly an unqualified fusion of 
identity: first, it is an equation of singular and plural selves, and second it is brought 
about through the agency of a single, spying self, whose own identity seems hollowed out 
to contain multitudes, but who is also uniquely privileged. Whitman’s speaker will 
proceed through the poem, morphing through multiple identities in a long litany of 
selves, many of which are representative of America’s disenfranchised—a slave, an aged 
woman, an immigrant—and yet the speaker abandons these identities as quickly as he 
assumes them. Moving under the cover of darkness, overrunning the consciousnesses of 
the sleeping multitudes, the poem’s speaker seems at once benevolent and sinister, one 
minute passing his hand over the restless to heal their suffering and the next becoming 
the blank heart of death itself: 
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A shroud I see—and I am the shroud…I wrap a body and lie in the coffin; 
It is dark here underground…it is not evil or pain here…it is blank here, for 
reasons. (77-78) 
 
 
 
At the center of “The Sleepers” is a figure whose identity, including his moral bearing, 
remains inscrutable, and yet whose transfigurations produce, via sentimental projection, 
the vast parameters of the American national character. The poetic conceit by which that 
character is reified becomes a kind of impersonation and assault, and the very 
capaciousness of national citizen-space exposes the void at its heart.  As D. H. Lawrence 
quipped about Whitman in his Studies in Classic American Literature, “All his privacy 
leaking out in a dribble, oozing into the universe” (174). 
 I find echoes of this aspect of Whitman’s poem in Native Speaker’s first sentence, 
which announces the personal crisis in the life of Henry Park, whose wife, Lelia, has 
deserted him: “The day my wife left she gave me a list of who I was” (1).  The 
incongruity of plurality (“a list”) and singularity (“who I was”) intimates that the root of 
Henry’s crisis lays in both the multiplicity of his various selves—personal, professional, 
political—and the disjunctions between them.  He, like Whitman’s visionary speaker, is 
“ill-assorted and contradictory.”  The deliberate nature of the allusion to Whitman is 
made more apparent in the fact that Henry initially mistakes the Dear John list he 
receives from Lelia for poetry: “a love poem…an amnesty…dulcet verse” (5)  “But I was 
wrong,” he states laconically, because in fact the list names him as a “stranger / follower / 
traitor / spy” (5).   As in “The Sleepers,” that which was thought a testament to 
communion is recognized, paradoxically, as evidence of incompatibility and deeply 
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unbalanced power.  The evidence of the list, the first of three inventories in Native 
Speaker that serve to evoke the catalogues in Whitman’s poem, initially suggests that 
Lelia’s alienation from her husband stems exclusively from her disapproval of his 
occupation, the nature of which he had kept hidden from her until after they had married. 
Henry, son of a first-generation Korean grocer, works for a private spying organization, 
Glimmer & Co., which caters largely to foreign governments intent on ferreting out their 
native dissidents residing in the US.  In order to procure information on these subjects, 
Henry and his coworkers assume seemingly innocuous personas, relying heavily on their 
ethnic backgrounds as adequate cover: “Our work is but a string of serial identity” (33).  
This spy-work, an extrapolation of the dark inverse of Whitman’s sentimental vision, is at 
the behest of the nation-state, securing supremacy over individual internal dissent; it 
represents the victory of univocality over plurality46 and, in this sense, Henry’s father is 
right when he takes his son to be a civil servant (57): he is hard at work on behalf of 
hygienic nationalisms.    
 But the crisis in Henry’s life is deeper than his choice of work because, for Henry, 
acts of impersonation and spying are a vocation rather than an avocation; they require 
precisely those skills he had acquired as a hyphenated citizen, performing both his 
Korean and American identities as roles, rather than unaffected personalities.   One can 
here an echo of Whitman’s declaration, “I am the actor” (42), when Henry reflects on his 
suitability for spying: 
 
 
I had always thought that I could be anyone, perhaps several anyones at once.  
Dennis Hoagland and his private firm had conveniently appeared at the right time, 
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offering the perfect vocation for the person I was, someone who could reside in 
his one place and take half-steps out whenever he wished.  For that I felt indebted 
to him for life.  I found a sanction from our work, for I thought I had finally found 
my truest place in the culture. (127) 
 
 
 
Because Henry’s multiple and fluid professional selves also serve as a trope with which 
Lee explores the manifold and conflicting identities of hyphenated Americans— 
outsiders both at home and in the world, trying to conceal themselves in the guise of 
insiders—the allusion to Whitman seems all the more bitter.  Lelia’s list, which figures 
Henry as a “genre bug / Yellow peril: neo-American,” hints at precisely this intersection 
of spying as profession and spying as mode-of-citizenship.  The wandering “I” of the 
democratic vision has turned viral, infecting the deepest recesses of Henry’s life, and 
leaving him, to himself and others, an inscrutable cipher, an impediment to the circulation 
of affect critical to sentimentalist conceptions of the social body. 
 Both the personal and professional crises in Henry’s life are linked with his 
tendency to refuse disclosure of information—he is the privileged hoarder of the secrets 
he extracts from his subjects—and his “half-step” assumption of various roles.  Indeed, 
Lee’s reader eventually discovers, through a series of flashbacks, that Lelia’s discontent 
in her marriage is based not only on Henry’s occupation, but also on his posture of 
stoicism at the death of their son, Mitt, another of Henry’s performances, which left Lelia 
alone with her unconcealed grief. We see this theme of role-playing occur again when 
Henry reflects on how his deceased father conceived of family, as well as his own 
experiences in the flux of familial roles:  
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My father, a Confucian of high order, would commend me for finally honoring 
that which is wholly accident. For him, all of life was a rigid matter of family.  I 
know all about that fine and terrible ordering, how it variously casts you as the 
golden child, the slave-son or daughter, the venerable father, the long-dead god. 
(6-7)  
 
 
 
Role-playing and identity performance become the means by which “that which is wholly 
accident,”—i.e., the contingency of national, ethnic, and familial identities—comes to be 
honored, believed, obeyed, and celebrated.  Here, I follow James Kyung-Jin Lee, who 
argues that spying as Henry’s occupation and role-playing as Henry’s mode of being 
should not be seen in Manichean terms, where the former is thought corrupt while the 
latter is taken as a matter of benign necessity.  Instead, both spying and performative 
being must be read as serving the same ideological ends: 
 
 
Henry’s role as a spy is not a schizophrenic distraction from his private struggles 
to be the model father, son, and husband.  Indeed, the assimilated Henry is crucial 
to his capacity to work as a spy, and thus serves perfectly as Lee’s emblem of a 
self-consciously, self-aware model minority.  To this extent Henry is an Asian 
American Ariel, for like the voyeur, the spy’s task is to observe, record, and pass 
judgment on people and communities under surveillance…. Henry is Ariel with a 
paycheck, and these three identities reinforce one another because they all serve 
their respective Prosperos to defeat Caliban.” (247) 
 
 
 
For James Kyung-Jin Lee, the novel critiques what he calls the model minority myth, 
whereby some minorities, like Koreans, are held up as proof of the American dream 
ideology, which in turn confirms that the impoverishment of other minorities, like that of 
African-Americans, is deserved (247).  We can see how Lee’s treatment of role-
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performance unites the seemingly benign gesture of acting out the role of the ideal 
husband, father, or son to simulations of national-belonging, to the practice of neo-
colonialist shadowing, and finally, to the scopophilia and impersonation inherent in 
Whitman’s sentimentalist vision of democratic unity.  The dream and unrestricted 
empathic commingling imagined in the poem are being ironically refigured as insidious 
surveillance: the ideological exclusion and discipline of otherness in the guise of its 
inclusion.  Or, to state the matter more forcefully, Lee reveals a violence that has always 
been present in Whitman’s particular revision of the sentimentalist ethos: a violence of 
troping that collapses differences of power, experience, and suffering in the interest of 
national unity, that edits the nation’s chorale to elide the voice of the slave, and that keeps 
its secret watch on an unwary populace. For Henry, as for Whitman’s speaker, it is, 
indeed, “dark here underground.” 
But this is not the complete story, for Henry’s allegiance to Glimmer & Company 
(and its ethnic espionage) is already in crisis when the novel begins.  Henry’s last job, in 
which he infiltrated “Filipino psychoanalyst [and] Marcos sympathizer” Emile Luzan’s 
confidence by fronting himself as a patient, ended in disaster, when the spy began 
incorporating real elements from his life—particularly the death of his father and his son, 
Mitt— into his “legend,” the biographical concoction Glimmer agents compose and 
memorize as cover.   This interestingly suggests that the collapse of Henry’s family—his 
suspension between dead generations—deranged the larger system of impersonation and 
role-playing on which his career depends.  Shortly after Henry’s boss, Dennis Hoagland, 
has him forcibly removed from the surveillance, Dr. Luzan drowns under suspicious 
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circumstances while boating off St. Thomas.  Stinging with the knowledge of his own 
complicity in the death of a man with whom he had come to share an affective bond, 
Henry is wary of his next assignment: John Kwang, a Korean city councilman 
representing a diverse district in Queens with undeclared mayoral aspirations.  With his 
newly uneasy relationship to Glimmer and his separation from Lelia, nearly all of the 
familial and professional types he has used to stage his identity are unavailable, leaving 
only the seemingly incompatible ethno-national roles of ‘Korean’ and ‘American.’  Lee 
uses the Kwang assignment, in which Henry’s other life-roles buckle as he begins to fall 
under the “ethnic pol’s” sway, to provide a second refiguring of Whitman’s night-vision, 
one I will refer to as naïve, which foregrounds the most hopeful and characteristically 
sentimental elements of “The Sleepers,” emphasizing the possible transcendence of 
difference offered by feeling.  In these passages, the Whitmanian imaginary—the power 
and danger of a mobile, encompassing identity—shifts back from one of predatory 
espionage to democratic inclusiveness.  
In Kwang, Henry encounters a figure that weds his heretofore-incompatible 
notions of what constitutes Korean and American identities. “Kwang was certainly 
arresting to me,” Henry declares, “[n]ot so much paternally, in that grim way my father 
always impressed himself on me […] [instead] I would come to share a different 
difficulty with John Kwang” (139).  Although Kwang clearly does represent something 
of a father figure to Henry, the politician captivates the spy primarily because he 
simultaneously repeats and transcends Park’s image of the Korean patriarch.  Note in the 
following passage the explicit vacillation between Kwang as an actual, specific individual  
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and Kwang as an invented narrative, a trope to be believed in, or a story to be exploited, 
inversely paralleling the manner in which as Henry’s legend begins to incorporate 
elements of his own biography: 
 
 
I suppose it was a question of imagination.  What I was able to see.  Before I 
knew him, I had never conceived of someone like him.  A Korean man, of his age, 
as a part of the vernacular.  Not just a respectable grocer or dry cleaner or doctor, 
but a larger public figure who was willing to speak and act outside the tight 
sphere of his family…. When Hoagland first mentioned Kwang’s name… I 
thought I could peg him easily; were I an actor, I would have all the material I 
required for my beginning method. This is what Hoagland meant when he 
promised the assignment would be simple, that I’d just have to lurk close enough 
and witness the play of the story as we already knew it.  For ours, finally, were 
just acts of verification… 
 I would tell a familiar story…A trope, which is just a way to believe. My 
necessary invention was John Kwang. (139-140) 
 
 
 
The fictionality that Henry has always exploited for his espionage and familial role-
playing, for his attempts to take in the confidence of others, here becomes a means by 
which he can transform his confidence in others. As he continues to work on the 
assignment, Henry’s reports to Glimmer & Co. begin to depart from the unornamented 
factual style Hoagland prefers and slowly transform into more lyric compositions. As 
Henry moves into Kwang’s inner circle, the regenerative powers of fiction, poesis, and 
myth47 begin to eclipse their inherent capacity to deceive and betray. 
 Henry begins to see in Kwang a prototypical American “unafraid to speak the 
language like a Puritan and like a Chinaman and like every boat person in between” 
(304).   The city councilman becomes a marker of Henry’s hope that all ethnic identities 
can be sublated into the larger familial configuration in which the strength of Korean 
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filial structures comes to traverse and transcend lines of ethnicity and citizenship.  This is, 
of course, the Whitmanian dream par excellence, one that figures more prominently in 
“The Sleepers” as it swells to its beatific, and yes, sentimental conclusion:  
 
 
The Asiatic and African are hand in hand, the European and American are hand in 
hand, 
Learned and unlearned are hand in hand…and male and female are hand in hand, 
[…] 
The white hair of the moth shines on the white wrist of the daughter, 
The breath of the boy goes with the breath of the man…friend is inarmed by 
friend, […] 
The call of the slave is one with the master’s call and the master salutes the slave, 
(181-186) 
 
 
 
This apposition and transcendence of oppositional representatives is typical of the poem’s 
larger movements48 and it is echoed most clearly in the promise of the ggeh Kwang 
secretly establishes for the illegal immigrants in his district, a lottery system I take to be 
Native Speaker’s second evocation of Whitmanian inventory.  
 The ggeh, a Korean money club in which members pool resources incrementally 
so that each can enjoy rotating large sums of capital to use as investment, is the means by 
which Henry’s father received “his first infusion of capital” (50).  As Henry becomes a 
more trusted campaign worker for Kwang, he takes on the duty of collecting money from 
the ggeh’s diverse participants.  Importantly, the novel shifts into second-person address 
as Henry describes the process, including the reader into the open transactions by which 
insignificant individual sums swell into aggregate wealth and possibility: “In our ggeh, if 
you give a few dollars you can expect to receive a few hundred.  The more you give, the 
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more you can ask for; everyone comes to learn what’s a fair amount” (280).  As the 
passage progresses, Lee has Henry take on a roomy paratactic rhythm evocative of 
Whitman’s lengthy open breaths, anaphorically repeating “bring,” imparting a sense of 
swelling accumulation: 
 
 
Everything is in private, we deal like family, among ourselves, without chits or 
contracts. This is why I must see your face, hear your voice, make certain that you 
live how you say.  It doesn’t matter what your color is, whether your breath reeks 
of garlic or pork fat or chilis.  Just bring your wife or your husband, bring your 
children.  If you want a down payment on a store, bring the owner of the store you 
work in now.  Bring your daughter who wants to attend Columbia, bring her 
transcripts and civics essay and have her bring her violin.  Bring X rays of your 
mother who needs a new hip. I want to see the fleshed shape of the need, I want to 
know the blood you’ve lost, or that someone has stolen, or tricked from you, the 
blood you desperately want back from the world. (280-281) 
 
 
 
Note Lee’s embrace of the key attributes Whitman borrows from the sentimentalist 
tradition: the use of apostrophe, the explicit embrace of the marginalized and the 
despised, the need “to see the fleshed shape of the need” (281).  Lee stages Park’s 
integration into the ggeh’s maintenance as a mode of citizenship predicated on the 
sympathetic witnessing of others’s pain.  And yet, if the ggeh represents the achievement 
of a sentimental communion and the culmination of the democratic promise Kwang’s 
image evokes for Henry, it is also the means of Kwang’s downfall and the decimation of 
the community of immigrants seeking a small share in the America that Whitman sang 
and, as in the passage above, with which Lee movingly harmonizes.  Under increasing 
pressure from Hoagland to produce dirt on Kwang, Henry relents and gives to Glimmer 
& Co. a copy of the ggeh’s ledger.  He is unaware, however, that he has been gathering 
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information on behalf of the INS, who promptly arrest every member of the money club 
and ready them for deportation.  The novel’s initial view of the Whitmanian voyeur as 
sinister surveillance repeats in a tragic reprisal, a negation of the negation that insists on 
the continuing painful presence of the past: Henry’s past, the pasts of the immigrants, the 
history of the nation. But the rise and fall of Kwang’s ggeh is not the only naïve rereading 
of Whitmanian hope in the novel’s middle section to end so painfully.   
Henry’s son Mitt represents the generative potential of transcending ethnic 
boundaries in a way far quieter and more private than the ggeh; nonetheless, in the use of 
this trope, Lee repeats Whitman and the sentimental tradition generally. Miscegenation, 
for the democratic poet, embodied the hope of ethnic transcendence, the means by which 
the demos of citizenship and the ethnos of blood and nativity could become one.  As 
Karen Sánchez-Eppler49 notes: “[i]n miscegenation Whitman find an extremely potent 
instance of mediation, a blatant demonstration that otherness can be reconciled, that the 
opposites of black and white can meet and blend” (929).  Lee employs the historic hopes 
and dreads present in this trope both in his depiction of what Mitt signifies for Henry and 
in the novel’s several sex scenes.  In one flashback, Henry recalls a moment from Mitt’s 
infancy when, after making love to his wife while the child slept beside them, “we lay 
quiet again, to make certain of his slumber, and then lifted him back between our hips 
into the bed, so heavy and alive with our mixed scent” (67).  The coital sublation of 
opposites repeats the dark scene in “The Sleepers,” when the speaker inhabits the voice 
of a young woman as she has sex with a lover that is both sublunary man and 
embodiment of night.  Note how moisture marks the lingering connection of transcended 
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otherness, just as Mitt’s flesh and the mingled smells of Henry and Lelia do in the 
passage above: 
 
 
I am she who adorned herself and folded her hair expectantly, 
My truant lover has come and it is dark. 
Double yourself and receive me in darkness, 
Receive me and my lover too…he will not let me go without him. 
I roll myself upon you as upon a bed…I resign myself to the dusk. 
He who I call answers me and takes the place of my lover, 
He rises with me silently from the bed. 
Darkness you are gentler than my lover…his flesh was sweaty and panting, 
I feel the hot moisture yet that he left me. (46-55)  
 
 
 
This sexualized transcendence is echoed in the poem’s beatific catalogue of apposition in 
which the speaker “swears they are all averaged now…one is no better that the 
other…Perfect and clean the genitals previously jetting, and perfect and clean the womb 
cohering” (150,160).  But Mitt represents more that the apposition of sexual and ethnic 
difference.  The novel explicitly comments on how his body represents a rupture with 
past categories: “his body’s form, already so beautifully jumbled and subversive and 
historic.  No one, I thought, had ever looked like that” (103).  Mitt’s singularity signifies 
that he cannot find easy equivalence in the ethnic calculus of the past, thus transcending 
it, but it is also, and by the same token, a cherished uniqueness that suffers from and, as 
the novel has it, is eventually extinguished in assimilation.   
 While visiting Henry’s father at his suburban home, Mitt suffocates under a “dog 
pile” of white neighborhood kids.  While the child’s death is figured as an accident rather 
than a malicious racially motivated attack, Lee’s reader cannot fail to notice that 
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symbolically Mitt’s uniqueness (and the transcendence it is taken to represent) is 
irrevocably lost in the amassment of sameness.  This incident, as well as the collapse of 
the ggeh, tease out from Whitman’s promise that “[t]he diverse shall be no less diverse, 
but they shall flow and unite…they unite now” (178), a darker intimation (also implicit in 
the poem) that the ultimate unification of the diverse is in death.  Furthermore, reading 
Mitt’s death through Whitman as a sentimentalist offers a second critical boon.  While, as 
Elizabeth A. Petrino notes in her consideration of the genre, the child elegy can be traced 
back to at least the seventeenth century, its nineteenth-century sentimentalist examples, 
more than their predecessors, stressed “the exemplary and pious nature of the dying child, 
who often teaches a lesson in holy living to its parents,” specifically their death acts as “a 
testament to its faith in God’s promise to prepare a place for it in heaven” (319).  Worth 
considering, then, is how this mode of testimony-through-death was remolded in 
Whitman’s “The Sleepers,” such that death becomes a beneficent equalizer and the lesson 
to be learned from its operation is to maintain faith in the democratic social body.    
If this reasoning holds, then one must ask what Mitt’s surviving parents “learn” 
from his death.  The novel’s concluding pages, which find Lelia and Henry together in a 
multiethnic classroom, might suggest precisely the acceptance of American universalism 
through the sentimental sublimation of death.  This is, however, only a partially the case, 
for Lee’s novel figures the process of national unity to be one of on-going, often queasy-
making, negotiation. Some time after their son’s death, when Lelia and Henry have 
achieved an uneasy, but lasting reconciliation, their lovemaking is described in roughly 
physical, awkward terms.  The transcendence of racial difference that was to Henry so 
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palpable in Mitt’s form has, in the wake of his death, become a struggle, a site of exertion 
and sometimes incapacity, which I take to be indicative of Native Speaker’s third 
rereading of Whitman, a knowing reiteration of how the promise of rapprochement 
always bears with its the risks of disaster: 
 
 
I rolled on to her and grabbed at her at the wrists.  The old carpet was threadbare 
against her back, my knees were scraping the rope webbing.  I kissed her and she 
nibbled at my lips as I pulled away…She wanted me to push down on her harder.  
I couldn’t, so then she turned us around and pushed down on me, the slightest 
grimace stealing across her face.  Her body yawed above me, buoyed and restless. 
I held on by her flat hips angling her and helping her to let me in.  Mixed-up 
memory, hunger. (230) 
 
 
 
One notes that, in addition to the fact that the act is suspended in an uncertain jumbling of 
the past and the future (memory and hunger), Lelia’s body is figured as a sea vessel, 
yawing and buoying.  This image is a node in the novel’s sea-faring motif—Lelia is a 
Mayflower American, Kwang speaks for every boat person from the first settlers to the 
most recent immigrants—a motif culminating in the wreck of the Golden Venture, an 
historical incident Lee integrates into his version of New York and which directly alludes 
to the passage of “the Sleepers” quoted in the novel’s epigraph.  I read, in this 
constellation of boating references (including Lelia’s restless buoying), the locus of what 
Lee seeks in Whitman, the painful truth of continuing struggle and disaster over which 
the dream of national and international unity repeatedly climbs and to which it must 
repeatedly, perhaps ceaselessly, return. 
 In Native Speaker, the Golden Venture is never directly named50, but the incident 
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takes on incredible importance as it is positioned directly before news of the burning of 
Kwang’s main offices, the beginning of his downfall, on a news program Henry and Lelia 
watch, late in the novel: 
 
 
The next story is about a small freighter that runs aground off Far Rockaway in 
the middle of the night.  The boat carries around fifty Chinese men who have paid 
$20,000 each to smugglers to ship them to America.  Men are leaping from the 
dies of the boat, clinging to ropes dangling down into the water…The drowned 
are lined up on the dock beneath canvas tarps. (247)  
 
 
 
This passage directly references the shipwreck section of “The Sleepers,” which begins 
with a description of a “gigantic swimmer,” struggling to swim ashore from the wreck:  
 
 
 I see a beautiful gigantic swimmer swimming naked through the eddies of the 
sea, 
His brown hair lies close and even to his head…he strikes out with courageous 
arms…he urges himself with his legs.  
I see his white body…I see his undaunted eyes; I hate the swift-running eddies 
that would dash him headforemost on the rocks. (ll. 81-84) 
 
 
 
The poem’s speaker—heretofore able to shift effortlessly between consciousnesses, 
leaping across distances and healing the weary—is powerless to assist him.51  The 
swimmer is dashed on unforgiving rocks “and out of sight is borne the brave corpse” 
(91).  It is from the lines that follow that Lee culls his epigraph, signaling that the weight 
of this moment of incapacity, in which both the democratic “I,” and the “eye” of 
surveillance are powerless to do more than witness, is central to the novel’s revision of 
Whitman: “I turn but do not extricate myself; / Confused…a pastreading … another, but 
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with darkness yet…I cannot aid with my wringing fingers” (92-93, 97).  Here, the 
speaker turns his sympathetic vision from the scene, but is unable to disentangle his being 
from that of the giant swimmer.  He has been con-fused with the dying man, made into 
“another,” but unable to see beyond the darkness of the swimmer’s fate.   
 This “pastreading” is precisely echoed in the “pastreading” Lee is engaged with 
for it suggests that the union of souls that Whitman envisions and Henry craves bears 
with it, or perhaps is founded on, fellow suffering52: compassion in its most anguished 
sense.  Little is left for the poem’s speaker to do but pile the unnamed bodies in the cold 
morning, a gruesome variation on poem’s use of inventory: “I search with the 
crowd…not one of the company is washed to us alive; / In the morning I help pick up the 
dead and lay them in rows in the barn” (97-100).  Note that Lee’s choice of comparing a 
fictionalized version of the wreck of the Golden Venture to the wreck in “The Sleepers” 
is particularly apt, for the latter is based on the wreck of the Mexico which Whitman 
witnessed as a child and later recalled in Specimen Days: 
 
 
Several light-houses on the shores east; a long history of wrecks tragedies, some 
even of late years. As a youngster, I was in the atmosphere and traditions of many 
of these wrecks—of one or two almost an observer. Off Hempstead beach for 
example, was the loss of the ship “Mexico” in 1840, (alluded to in “the Sleepers” 
in L. of G.). (“Specimen Days”) 
 
 
 
Whitman in fact misremembers the date, for the Mexico in fact wrecked off Long Island 
in 183753, and this misinformation has been quoted again and again by Whitman scholars, 
beginning with F. O. Matthiessen’s influential American Renaissance (Mattheissen 72).  
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Getting the date wrong suggests that scholars have neglected to research the Mexico’s 
story, for it in fact contained 200 Irish immigrants, who drowned in the freezing waters 
just off Hempstead, within sight of the promised land of America.  This fact, in addition 
to harmonizing with the wreck of the Golden Venture, adds particular poignancy to a 
passage later in “The Sleepers,” in which the speaker imagines immigrants of all 
backgrounds sailing to their homelands in their dreams, no longer exiles: “Elements 
merge in the night…ships make tacks in the dreams…the sailor sails…the exile returns 
home, / The fugitive returns unharmed…the immigrant is back beyond months and years; 
/ The poor Irishman lives in the simple house of his childhood, with the well-known 
neighbors and faces, / They warmly welcome him…” (ll.142-145).  Whitman does not 
choose to end his vision at the desolate moment of the shipwreck, but rather with the 
sentimental dream of reconciliation and warm return.  Lee will repeat his predecessor in 
this gesture, suggesting that what remains important in Whitman’s legacy is this dialectic 
between the painful failure of union and the tenuous but tenacious possibility of it.  
 I hear this complex and tragic moment, in which the self cannot attain complete 
union with the social but cannot refuse its pull, echo in Native Speaker‘s final passage.  
Henry, having abandoned his work with Glimmer & Co., joins Lelia in her work as a 
substitute teacher in an under-funded ESL class.  It is clear from the narration that this 
work will do little to bring these students, mostly children of immigrants, into the fold of 
the American vernacular: “Lelia usually doesn’t like this kind of work, even though it 
pays well, mostly because there are too many students in a class for her to make much 
difference” (348).  One must note that, as with the strain of size in Whitman’s vision, it is 
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the expansiveness and diversity of this mass of students that makes transformation and 
unification unlikely, if not impossible.  The lingering importance of ethnic difference is 
also marked by the fact that Henry plays the “Speech Monster” who “gobble[s] up kids 
but [who] cower[s] when anyone repeats the day’s secret phrase, which Lelia has them 
practice earlier” (348).  But Henry is a Speech Monster not only because Lelia continues 
to be the privileged white, “native” speaker, but because his previous role-playing of spy, 
secret chronicler of lives, and proxy of hygienic nationalism has been clearly marked as 
an abuse of language’s power,54 even as that monstrous potential remains implicit in 
(even Whitman’s) language.  Nonetheless, as the students file from the room, Lelia gives 
each a sticker with his or her name on it, declares that everyone has been a good citizen, 
and pronounces every student’s name, enveloping each with her language’s power: 
 
 
Now she calls out each one as best as she can, taking care of every last pitch and 
accent, and I hear her speaking a dozen lovely and native languages, calling all 
the difficult names of who we are. (349) 
 
 
 
This role calling, the novel’s final reiteration of Whitmanian inventory, synthesizes every 
iteration previous to it, suggesting a sentimentalized democratic mingling that falls just 
short of transcendent synthesis.  First, she is a part of the state’s apparatus, 
simultaneously monitoring its populace, indoctrinating them into the mythos of American 
belonging, and failing to provide for their educational needs, a neglect that can only result 
in their continuing exclusion from mainstream realms of American belonging.  Second, 
Lelia’s struggle to pronounce each name, her efforts to educate these students in the face 
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of certain disappointment, repeats the admission of failure and the significance of 
compassion resonant in Whitman’s wringing fingers. This failure is also present in the 
fact that their son, Mitt, whose mixed blood might have suggested an amalgamation of 
identity subduing all conflict, is dead and the class of foreign children simultaneously 
serves as substitute and cannot serve as substitute. Lastly, the novel’s final passage does 
reverberate with the possibility that the many can become one, that the “dozen lovely and 
native languages” can be tallied by a single speaker, and that the names she calls out will 
be true.  Here, Lelia becomes the Night-Mother of the last passage in “The Sleepers”: 
 
 
I stay awhile away O night, but I return to you again and love you; 
Why should I be afraid to trust myself to you? 
I am not afraid…I have been well brought forward by you; 
[…] 
I will duly pass the day O my mother and duly return to you; 
Not you will yield forth the dawn again more surely than you will yield forth me 
again, 
Not the womb yields the babe in its time more surely than I shall be yielded form 
you in  my time. (196-204). 
 
 
 
For, in the image scheme of “The Sleepers,” as with Wideman’s novel, it is night that can 
offer the stage for difference-in-identity and the sublation of difference and this trope is 
invested with all the positive and negative valances envisioned in the poem: night as 
sinister cover of identity, night as the sphere of potent dreams, night as the harbinger of 
death, and, as in the passage above, night as the womb bearing forth the possibility of our 
shared and individual selves.55  Lee, following Whitman, seeks to locate the American 
dream in the deepest interior of the American nightmare, and we do a disservice to both 
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the nineteenth-century poet and the twentieth-century novelist when we condense their 
texts and refigure them as ready-made, easily legible, known quantities.  Lee becomes a 
writer of “raw immigrant experience,” deploying Whitman only to insert himself and his 
fellow Korean-Americans into the core of the American character for which Whitman is 
nothing but a prime exemplar, a poet who never doubted the rightness of assimilation or 
the compassionate force of America nationalism.  If we are content to summarize them 
thus, we fail to read them at all; we do not call them by their names. 
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CHAPTER V 
HOMELAND INSECURITIES: 
DOMESTICATED TERROR AND SENTIMENTAL STOICISM  
IN THE 9/11 NOVEL 
 
 The spectacle of September 11, 2001, seen from a critical vantage in which 
spatiality and affect are foregrounded, poses a parallel set of problems conceivable on 
scales of proximity and distance.  The attack violently redoubles the idea of New York as 
a space of global convergence in which “worlds collide,” yet images of the destruction, 
and indeed, its annihilative force, place viewers at a distant remove.  The present chapter 
focuses on efforts to “solve” this problem through cultural representations employing the 
structural logic of sentimentalism: investments in the healing powers of sympathy and the 
domestification of larger political antagonisms. While each of the previous chapters have 
tried to shed light on the role sentimentalism plays in reactions to the urban crises of the 
post-Cold-War era, the much different urban ruin produced by the World Trade Center’s 
devastation occasions a mode of sentimental engagement specific to it.  Instead of 
signifying a racialized space of internal conflict that requires the salve of active and 
imaginative sympathy from the citizen reader, the urban wasteland of 9/11 is a signifier 
of white, wounded masculinity and the configuration of fellow feeling is no longer a 
matter of active production but of passive infiltration.  This chapter briefly considers how 
representations of the attacks in the US media have attempted to conjure a coherent social 
body through the affective pedagogy of sentimentalism, and, more extensively, how such 
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affective strategies have been used and revised by three “9/11 novelists”: Jonathan Safron 
Foer, John Updike, and Don DeLillo.  Before advancing to a fuller articulation of claims, 
however, let us clarify the problem as I have posed it.   
We’re (Not) Victims 
 Borrowing a term from Ed Soja’s enumeration of “discourses on the 
postmetropolis,” New York City is the paradigmatic instance of Cosmopolis, or “the 
globalization of cityspace” (145, 189).  If globalization is capable of having a home, it 
would be Manhattan.  In Saskia Sassen’s influential account, New York has developed, 
since the early 1980s and more or less in parallel with London and Tokyo, as one of three 
“global cities.”  Sassen employs this term to designate urban spaces where corporate 
headquarters and producer services (such as finance, insurance, and real estate services) 
have become so highly concentrated that these cities must be understood not as national 
or even regional sites of power, but rather as the focal “command points in the 
organization of the world economy” and, consequently, sites of colossally 
disproportionate capital accumulation (343-344). In the prescient thought of John 
Friedmann, whose work on “world cities” heavily influenced Sassen, such cities are not 
only sites for dramatic concentrations of the earth’s wealth, they are also points of 
destination for migrants from around the world (227).  It is this mix of global capital and 
culture which has spurred some urban theorists—Leonie Sandercock and Engin Isin as 
well as Soja—to conceive of the advent of a Cosmopolis: “the metropolis unbound…still 
a polis, albeit a fragmented, sprawling, and global one” (Isin 123).    
 Probably no urban structure better illustrated the idea of cultural internationality 
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in the service of global capital flows than did the World Trace Center: in name, in 
purpose, in architectural style, and in the national diversity of those who worked within 
it.  This very cosmopolitan breadth, however, creates a problem for comprehending what, 
in a symbolic sense, was attacked: a nation or a global system.  That the attacks 
themselves were international in character—Saudi, Lebanese, and Egyptian militants 
trained in Kandahar, Hamburg, and Florida as part of a network with a global agenda—
only exacerbates the difficulty of sensing the shape of the social bodies entangled by the 
event.  For the many millions watching as footage of the attacks repeated in the weeks 
and months after the tower’s collapse, some narrative emplotment was required to 
explain their relation to these columns of smoke.  Should the catastrophe be understood 
primarily as “blowback”—the unforeseen consequences of American covert operations in 
Asia?  If so, was it a catastrophic meeting of the aforementioned international order with 
its own obverse, an inherent global disorder?  Should the attacks be seen, therefore, as 
Jacques Derrida claimed, as another “autoimmunitary process,” in which the global body 
attacks itself (94)?  Or, should it be figured instead as an exterior force overrunning a 
coherent political, cultural, and affective territory—the American homeland?   In short, 
aside from the individuals who were murdered, for what were the viewers grieving? 
 To these questions, one must add another: is “grief” the most precise term 
available for the affective response of most news viewers? Though its severity may grate, 
there is more than shocking candor in Frank Lentricchia’s observation that 
 
 
for most of us—the very greatest majority of us--the thousands slaughtered are 
abstract.  We have no personal connections with them.  We never really did, or 
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ever really will, grieve for them, though we may think we do so in the world made 
by Oprah, where human beings assume God’s role of feeling everybody’s pain. 
(95) 
 
 
 
If it is true that the most common responses involved some simulation, or performance of 
feeling, in addition to and perhaps indivisible from “authentic” feeling, I see no need to 
treat this affective self-agitation in exclusively disdainful terms. If we are among that vast 
majority of (mere) spectators to the September 11 scene of suffering, if we have no single 
particular love-object lost, we cannot help but grieve abstractly for the dead and volunteer 
sympathy for those gripped in primary grief.  Yet the melancholic arousal and 
performance of affect, already oriented toward perpetual feeling, is compounded by 
messages underscoring terrifying vulnerability to invisible enemies.56   We should also 
not, in an effort to forestall reflexive prejudice against “false” feeling, overcorrect and 
uncritically embrace the cultural moment’s injunction to grieve ad infinitum.  What 
Lentricchia caustically decries as the desire to “feel…everybody’s pain,” should instead 
be seen as the complex legacy of American sentimentalism—by turns progressive and 
reactionary—which here as elsewhere, requires a mix of affective s(t)imulation, 
imaginative projection, and the conjuring of a shared social body.  
 As I have noted, the nature of the social body most relevant to the attacks of 
September 11 is ambiguous.  An entry point here may be “homeland,” the Bush 
administration’s preferred term for US territory, or more accurately, the term the 
administration adopted directly after the attacks on New York and Washington.  The 
term’s ignominious history, as William Safire sketches it, is redolent of nationalisms 
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fixated on ethnic purity and origin.  Note its use by the first Zionist congress in 1897, its 
favor among the fascists of Germany and Austria in the 1920s, its use to distinguish the 
islands of Japan from the annexations of the Japanese empire, as well as its prominent 
place in the 1962 South African legislation that instituted and legitimated apartheid, 
separating tribes based on territorial origins (12).  Whether or not the post-9/11 usage of 
the term remains burdened by these etymological roots in reaction is uncertain, but 
President Bush’s choice of the term over “National” doubtlessly signifies a preference for 
a folksy Gemeinschaft, a conjured domestic space blending state with hearth.  Much as 
the terms “fatherland” and “motherland” transform the relations of citizenship into ones 
of filiation, “homeland” evokes a familial bond; moreover, someone not belong to the 
“fatherland,” “motherland,” or “homeland” in question can employ the term only with 
some measure of cognitive dissonance or knowing irony.  Yet, intriguingly, however 
much the term calls forth associations of rightful domestic order, belonging, and security, 
it necessarily bears—in a way that terms such as “nation” and “state” do not—the trace of 
dislocation, the specter of lands outside the home, and thus of possible external threats.  
One must always remake, restore, or secure a homeland. 
 This blending of household with nation, in a manner that seems ambivalently both 
fait accompli and arduous undertaking, recalls Amy Kaplan’s reading of the role played 
by domestic sentimentalism in nineteenth-century American expansion.  In “Manifest 
Domesticity,” Kaplan argues that while the nineteenth-century’s “culture of sentiment” 
may have empowered some women writers to address matters in the public sphere by 
figuring the nation as home, the “cult of domesticity” also erected a domestic vs. foreign 
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binary enabling imperialist discourses (581).  The reason, according to Kaplan’s 
argument, that the language of domesticity sanctioned imperialist, rather than simply 
protectionist or xenophobic policies, owes to its conceptual instability: it is both a state of 
affairs and an effortful process.  Kaplan suggests that while  
 
 
part of the cultural work of domesticity might be to unite men and women in a 
national domain and to generate notions of the foreign against which the nation 
can be imagined as home […] [t]he border between the domestic and foreign, […] 
also deconstructs when we think of domesticity not as a static condition but as the 
process of domestication, which entails conquering and taming the wild, the 
natural, the alien.  Domestic in this sense is related to the imperial project of 
civilizing, and the conditions of domesticity often become markers that 
distinguish civilization from savagery. (582) 
 
 
 
While guarding against any temptation to collapse U.S. imperial expansion in the 
nineteenth-century with American foreign policy post-9/11, the ambivalence of 
Manhattan as a (post)national space and the corresponding instability of the assaulted 
“homeland” suggest that sentimental cultural investments following the attacks should be 
viewed with trepidation57.   
 But what are these contemporary investments and to what extent do they parallel 
earlier incarnations of popular sentimentalism on which Kaplan bases her analysis?  
Mainstream American media evinced a tendency, in the months and early years following 
the attacks, to s(t)imulate proper affective responses by domesticating the narratives of 
suffering, making them a part of households: a matter of family rather than of global 
forces, ideologies, or resource conflicts. Peter N. Stearns’s study of historical differences 
between American emotional reactions to the attack on Pearl Harbor and those arising 
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from September 11 reveals that, with regard to the latter attack, there was an astonishing 
increase in emphasis both on a sense of paralyzing fear as well as a tendency to 
“personalize” the event in terms of self, family, and children  (42).   Moreover, as 
Angharad N. Valdivia avers, “[o]ut of the ashes and stench of Ground Zero and the 
challenged national identity of a nation who thought of itself as unattackable and secure 
the mythical sign of woman once more carries the meaning of loss, victimhood, and 
nation” (97).  To the extent that this is so, twenty-first century sentimental investments 
neatly parallel those Kaplan identifies in nineteenth-century domestic culture.  Yet 
though she is right to note that the “whole nation identifies with these widows and 
mothers, despite the fact that many of them led lives that few of us could ever dream of,” 
Valdivia’s reading of the mass media’s affective investments neglect the US media’s 
emotion-laden treatment of masculine figures surrounding the disaster.   
 I would suggest that, in fact, the far more dominant means of suturing viewer 
sympathies to an imagined national body was the sentimentalization of the wounded 
white hero.  Paradigmatic of the media’s sentimental investment in injured stoic 
masculinity are the numerous profiles of New York City’s fireman.  Highly mediated 
public adoration of these figures reached such a pitch ultimately that it fomented violent 
resentments among the bureaucratic factions during the clean up of Ground Zero, 
according to William Langewiesche’s account in American Ground: Unbuilding the 
World Trace Center.   Most of the fireman who perished were in Langewiesche’s terms 
“normally brave—as people who are not cowards” but had no idea of the likelihood of 
the building’s collapse and, accordingly, were not engaged in “extraordinary heroism” 
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(156) Indeed, according to Langewiesche, at least one crew of fireman who died in the 
collapse arrived at the burning buildings and wasted no time before they began looting 
Trade Center shopping outlets (161).  Nonetheless, the media fixated hagiographically on 
the fireman—those who died, those who survived, and those who wore the uniform—
who could be invoked as “brawny, square-jawed men, with young wives and children—
perfectly tragic figures, unreliant on microchips or machines” (157).  Over and above the 
Port Authority (which lost its headquarters and suffered disproportionate employee 
casualties in the collapse) and the Police Department, the city’s fireman were treated as 
the wounded American heroes par excellence, and their collective acceptance of this 
mantle, and the privileges that come with it, led to a series of violent confrontations at the 
clean-up site itself over the comparative treatment of the dead (158).  Many have 
commented on how this rhetoric of masculine heroism brought about a resurgence of 
machismo happily taken up by President Bush, Rudy Giuliani, and Donald Rumsfeld, the 
last of whom, at the age of seventy, was short-listed by People as one of the sexiest men 
alive in 2002.58  To emphasize machismo’s ascendancy would, however, diminish a 
crucial point.  The masculinity in the crux of sentiment linking sympathetic viewer to 
national body was not unreservedly macho; its texture involved a wounded stoicism that 
allowed the figure to be conduit for simultaneous but contradictory feelings of 
invincibility and humiliating victimization.  
 The figure of male suffering as a fulcrum for both sentimental emotional 
discharge and staged stoical containment has a long history.  Julie Ellison has argued, in 
Cato’s Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion, that the “positions of stoicism 
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and sensibility” of the man of feeling and the man above feeling have become “mutually 
generating” ever since this affective structure emerged in the late-seventeenth England as 
a correlate to a shift toward republican values among elite, politically active Englishmen. 
(42). When the suffering stoic republican is surrounded by his sympathetic friends—as is 
Cato by Juba in Addison’s play Cato—he must “fend[…] off the temptations of 
downward directed sympathy” (10). Cato, who “rejoices dry-eyed at his son’s honorable 
death,” weeps only for the fate of Rome (56).  Yet this “transcendence of [personal] 
sorrow calls forth compensatory emotion in those around him,” such that the men of 
feeling, who tearfully witness, are moved to greater love for the republic (56).  Ellison’s 
elucidation of the affective economy out of which the man of feeling emerges should be 
connected with what Rei Terada calls “the economy of pathos” whereby the apparent 
diminishment of feeling is capable of producing compensatory feeling: “Emotions arise 
from others’ subsidence, from reflection on emotions, and from the very absence of any 
particular thing to feel. […] Any apparent ebbing of pathos makes more as well as less 
pathos: the less pathetic the end of pathos is, the more pathetic it is that it isn’t pathetic 
any more” (13-14).  What Ellison and Terada illuminate, in their respectively historical-
literary and theoretical veins of research, is the process by which the generation of feeling 
emerges out of its apparent loss.  The victim/hero of September 11 functions as just such 
a productive point of vanishing. 
 Before proceeding into an extended reading of how 9/11 novelists such as Foer, 
Updike, and DeLillo engage with and revise the modes of sentimentalism proliferating 
after the attacks, one must consider the spatio-political consequences of domesticating 
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grief via white wounded masculinity.  Here Lauren Berlant’s critique of sentimentalist 
pedagogy clarifies.  In the context of nineteenth-century sentimental literature, Berlant 
has demonstrated the ways in which the “ideology of true feeling” can be both ethically 
corrupt and politically regressive (41).  For Berlant, the notion that all humans can bond 
over their capacity to suffer erases the ways in which privilege continues to mark the 
social field, such that suffering is deeply unequal despite the appearance of parity implied 
by fellow feeling (41).  Uneven geographies of social suffering are not leveled, but rather 
hidden, by an insistence on imagining the social body via fellow feeling.  In the case of 
September 11, this issue is especially fraught because so many of the thousands murdered 
were wealthy managerial Manhattanites, with all the region-specific privilege this 
suggests, and yet their sheer diversity of race, nationality and creed, as well as the 
dreadful enormity of their number suggest globality.   I refer to this knot of sensitive 
concerns under the rubric “the privileges of mourning,” and while this phrase risks 
appearing both contradictory and disdainful of indisputably genuine bereavement, it 
effectively suggests the ways in which elided structural differences in power link up with 
the exceptionality of the occasion of mourning and the prerogatives that are claimed in 
the name of grief’s compelling intensity.  As a small but important example, one can see 
this privilege at work in President Bush’s historic Sept 21, 2001 address to the special 
session of Congress when he declared: “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim 
friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and 
every government that supports them.”  While distinctions between a terrorist 
organization like Al Qaeda and much more peaceable variants of Islamic worship ought 
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to be loudly declared, what interests me is the link between the rhetorical slight of hand 
that makes Muslims and Arabs “friends” instead of constituent members of the American 
polity and the privilege of being the subject who demarcates “friend” from “enemy,” not 
to speak of the mortal consequences of this demarcation. 
 Novelists are not immune from this tendency, but much can be learned from the 
specific ways in which they deploy and revise the mode of sentimentalism I have 
sketched above.  The authors I have selected engage with that mode in three interrelated 
ways.  First, each conceives of the national trauma as a matter of broken homes, 
consequently domesticating the geopolitical stakes and confusions surrounding the 
conflict.  Foer emplots September 11 from the point of view of a child whom it has 
orphaned and a woman whom it has widowed, focusing on the most customary figures of 
sympathy. Updike allegorizes the contending social forces in a pseudo-family productive 
of terrorist fervor but also capable of sympathetically educating it away.  DeLillo, 
slippery as ever, takes up a family at once brought together and torn apart by the near-
death of one its members in the South Tower’s collapse.  Second, each novel, in quite 
distinct ways, invests in the logic of wounded masculinity sketched above whereby 
stoicism and sensibility mutually generate and ambivalently tangle.  Sometimes, as in 
Foer, the stoic posture itself is mourned as lost, while elsewhere, in Updike, increased 
sensibility to the suffering of others paradoxically re-Oedipalizes the unruly affects that 
occasioned the teenage terrorist rebellion.  Third and lastly, each prioritizes the role of 
sympathy and emotion-laden imaginative projection, often across vast cultural divides. 
The prioritization of sympathy in the individual novels is too complex to inventory here, 
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but before proceeding to readings in which I offer more subtle analyses of its use, I note 
here that, in each, sympathy is made to bridge and annul sites of alterity within the global 
polis, and by extension to fold in the emotional estrangement of even the terrorists who 
killed thousands.  Consequently, sympathy is not merely a means of addressing and 
healing the wounds of the attack, or of “making the nation whole again” as the news 
media’s commentariat might have phrased it. Instead, it is a means of imagining a nation 
beyond the nation, an ambivalent spatial projection paralleling the doubled space of the 
global city sketched above.  This evocation of sympathy’s power and the social body 
produced by it, however, is never presented without corresponding equivocation and 
doubt.  The novels are haunted by the persistent insinuation that such a community of 
fellow feeling is, in fact, illusory, ineffective, or no longer possible.  In an instance of 
Terada’s economy of pathos, the stimulated grief is doubled: first for those who have 
died and second for those who live on. 
Feeling Everything 
 Jonathan Safron Foer’s choice of the naïf as narrator in the form of Oskar Schell 
for his 2005 novel, Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, puts him in line with J.D. 
Salinger and Mark Twain, both of whom also used the naïve child-narrator to critique the 
sentimentality of their eras, while at the same time clandestinely repeating it for their own 
purposes.  Foer seems to hint at this model of double-voiced narration, both expressing 
and denying embarrassing emotion with the first two of Oskar’s many fanciful pseudo-
inventions:  
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What about a teakettle? What if the spout opened and closed when the steam 
came out, so it would become a mouth, and it could whistle pretty melodies, or do 
Shakespeare, or just crack up with me?  I could invent a teakettle that reads in 
Dad’s voice […] Another good thing is that I could train my anus to talk when I 
farted.  If I wanted to be extremely hilarious, I’d train it to say, “Wasn’t me!” 
every time I made an incredibly bad fart.  And if I ever made an incredibly bad 
fart in the Hall of Mirrors, which is in Versailles, which is outside of Paris, which 
is in France, obviously, my anus would say, “Ce n’etais pas moi!” (1).   
 
 
 
This musing, offered on the novel’s first page, establishes Oskar’s immaturity through its 
syntax and subject matter and his precocity through the flaunted knowledge of French 
geography and language, but it also proposes a model of how interior compulsions, 
analogous to emotional intensities, can be relieved through a second voice in a 
paradoxical mix of embarrassed expression and concurrent denial.  These proxy voices, 
with their abject commingling of orality and anality, are at once a means of expression 
(of art, of song. of memory), a method of relieving visceral bodily pressures, and a mode 
of repudiating ownership.   
 I take this to be a model of how Oskar’s voice, and to a lesser extent those of his 
grandmother and grandfather, relates to Foer’s own.  Detailing their familial losses in the 
conflagration of the World Trade Center and, a generation before, in the firebombing of 
Dresden, its three narrators, Oskar Schell, his grandmother, and his estranged 
grandfather, Thomas Schell, Sr., offer remarkably demonstrative emotional accounts of 
their experiences, even if their diegetic behavior is more reticent.  Asked by his 
psychiatrist, “What emotions are you feeling,” Oskar responds characteristically: “All of 
them” (201).  These candidly expressive narrators enable Foer to employ many of the 
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most affecting strategies of sentimentality both to move his audience and to confront 
openly the embarrassing experience of being overcome by grief.  In many ways, the 
novel is irrefutably sentimental. These voices—like open wounds that speak—articulate 
intense and often self-pitying responses to their suffering as well as more hopeful 
sentiments of mutuality and love, redolent of the teary exchanges characteristic of Stowe.  
Less obviously, the novel offers a complex reengagement with the sentimental keepsake 
tradition, whereby material tokens are cathected with displaced affection and, ultimately, 
enable the recirculation of feeling required for the sentimental national economy.  Foer, 
however, also subtly asserts a measure of authorial distance from this sentimentalism by 
attributing it to characters that he has written as fancifully neurotic, stunted, privileged, 
and willfully peculiar beings.59  This unusual, meta-sentimental strategy positions readers 
to respond to character in ways that are simultaneously sympathetic and ironic, and, at 
least potentially, invites both sincere affective affirmation and a more judicious 
evaluation of character.  This second, ironic leg of Foer’s approach also allows for an 
oblique acknowledgement of how the Schell’s socioeconomic privilege sets their pain at 
a distance from those who suffer under institutional violence and depravation, thereby 
partially addressing what I have termed the privileges of mourning.   But, as I 
demonstrate in the following analysis, this self-conscious denial of feeling—this “wasn’t 
me”—also carries with it the risk of implicitly reinscribing the missing voice of the 
perished paternal stoic as the normative goal of all emotional bearing.  Furthermore, this 
ambivalent treatment of sentiment may serve to excuse Foer from any careful 
consideration of the political and ethical causes of the historic suffering he so vividly 
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evokes.   
 On its surface, Foer’s text tracks remarkably well with the distinctive properties 
of nineteenth-century sentimentalism.  As Joanna Dobson suggests, at its broadest, 
sentimentalism can be viewed as an “imaginative orientation […] characterized by 
certain themes, stylistic features, and figurative conventions […] that celebrates human 
connection, both personal and communal, and acknowledges the shared devastation of 
affectional loss” (266).  Of the thematic characteristics of sentimental literature, Dobson 
writes, “the greatest threat is the tragedy of separation, of severed human ties: the death 
of a child, lost love, failed or disrupted family connections, distorted or unsympathetic 
community, or the loss of the hope of reunion and/or reconciliation in the hereafter” 
(267).  A list of sentimental literature’s most frequent tropes would include scenes of 
shared redemptive crying, “abandoned wives, widows, orphaned children, and separated 
families; deathbed and graveyard scenes; […] fantasies of reunions in heaven […and] 
keepsake imagery” (272-273). The unusual emotionalism of Foer’s novel, its particular 
kind of sentimentality, is evidenced by numerous instances throughout all three of its 
narrative threads.  Consider the numerous scenes of weeping, often of the shared 
redemptive variety: the imagined Reservoir of Tears (38), Abby Black crying at the photo 
of an elephant’s tear (96), Oskar’s grandmother weeping over his absence (101); the 
centenarian A.R. Black crying at the sound of his own voice (168); Oskar’s grandmother 
confessing that the ““First time I cried in front of him [her husband] it felt like making 
love” (178), or when she begs him to reveal his crying face to her after she becomes 
pregnant (180-181); Anna’s father weeping at the arrest of his Jewish friend, Simon 
 
246 
Goldberg, in Nazi Germany (209); and, most significantly, the climactic scene in which 
Oskar recounts his father’s last message to William Black (“A tear went down his cheek 
and rested on his finger,” 301). One must add to these tear-stippled moments Foer’s 
treatment of the two historic scenes of massive suffering that, in addition to September 
11, the novel depicts directly, namely, the firebombing of Dresden and the aftermath of 
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.   While the Dresden bombing constitutes a major 
event in the novel’s subplot, the scene in which Oskar’s grandfather assists in killing zoo 
animals to preclude their agony as well as forestall possible predation of humans works 
as a demonstrative supplement to sentimentally underscore the needless loss of human 
life (213).  Likewise, the interview transcript of Tomoyasu, a Hiroshima survivor (which 
graphically details how her young daughter—with peeling skin and maggoty wounds—
expired in her arms) repeats that Ur-trope of nineteenth-century sentimental poetry: a 
mother’s grief at the death of her infant.  Repeated displays of weeping and suffering are 
not, however, the only ways in which Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close marks its 
connection to the American sentimental tradition. 
 Foer’s novel also displays a deep interest in the possibility of emotional 
interconnection, simultaneity, and sameness and in how this sameness might hold 
transcendent value.  In many classic sentimental texts, this emotional interconnection is 
reified in the form of a keepsake, typified by the curls of hair Eva gives to her family and 
their slaves to remember her by in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. As Dobson writes, the sentimental 
keepsake “was a potent and multivalenced remembrance, a material object upon which 
was played out symbolically an all-too-intimate acquaintance with the tragic evanescence 
 
247 
of human life” (274).   Foer’s novel has at least two such sentimental artifacts: the several 
voice mail recordings left by Oskar’s father in the last hour before his death in the World 
Trade Center collapse and, less obviously, the enigmatic key labeled “Black” which sets 
Oskar on a quest to meet every Black in the phone book.  This is, as Philippe Codde 
notes, “a transparent metaphor for the door that will presumably give access to his 
father's past” (244).   However, Codde is too quick to suggest that the key is “a false lead 
that can reveal nothing about his father's last days [because] the key only divulges 
someone else's bereavement as it really belonged to someone else's deceased father” 
(244).  I would instead argue that this second keepsake and the quest it occasions 
literalize the affective community structured around sympathetic identification.  Through 
it, Foer is able to sentimentalize a city for which the only other adequate sign is the 
impersonal phone book.  His peregrination throughout the city, inseparable from the 
novel’s development while at the same time quite obviously quixotic, exposes New 
York’s multiplicity even as it fails to lay bare the mystery motivating Oskar.  The 
resultant affective community is what Oskar gains access to instead of some sought-after 
message from his lost father’s. 
Nor is Oskar’s the only narrative in which such a community of affective 
interconnection is so vividly figured.  In her autobiographical text entitled “My Feelings,” 
Oskar’s grandmother records a moment of dialogue between herself and her husband 
when he suggests, apropos her writing:  “’You could write about other people.’ ‘My life 
story is the story of everyone I’ve ever met.’ ‘You could write about your feelings.’  She 
asked, ‘Aren’t my life and my feelings the same thing?’” (130).  This syllogistic equation 
 
248 
suggests an almost infinite plentitude of affective connections between others and the 
self, as if by consenting to narrate one existence, she would have agreed to tell them all.   
Surely this suggests primarily the difficulty of self-expression, but it also underscores the 
profound significance that Foer’s novel accords to feeling as a transcendent, near-magical 
link between characters, the thematic interest in “intersubjective connectedness at the 
level of the body” characteristic of sentimental fiction (Noble 296).  Moreover, Foer dots 
his text with numerous examples of uncanny simultaneous feeling: be Thomas Schell, 
Sr.’s conviction that he and his son are writing the same word at the same moment (208), 
Schell’s encounter with Simon Goldberg in which he knows that their hearts “were trying 
to beat in unison” (279), or the moment in which Oskar’s mother and grandmother are 
struck telepathically by knowledge of Thomas Shelling, Jr’s death. Trust in the 
transcendence of feeling and its power to forge intersubjective connection suggests a 
sentimental genealogy, but Foer’s novel has in fact a complex relationship to this 
proposition.   
 One can begin to outline this relation by noting Foer’s subtle, partial disavowal of 
sentiment in the scenes cited above because few if any of these moments of 
interconnection can be differentiated from the projections of individual fantasy.  Oskar’s 
grandmother and grandfather might simply be imagining the reality and efficacy of these 
telepathic affective bonds, much as Oskar compulsively ‘invents’ similar reifications of 
feeling linking individual suffering to a collective, intersubjective ‘heart.’   For example, 
he imagines a “special drain…underneath every pillow in New York” feeding into a 
“Reservoir of Tears,” the water level of which would be reported as indications of the 
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public mood by morning weathermen (38). Similarly, he conceives of tiny personal 
microphones and speakers playing each individual’s pulse to all so that “you could hear 
everyone’s heartbeat, and they could hear yours, sort of like sonar,” and he goes on to 
imagine what would happen “if everyone’s hearts would start to beat at the same time” 
(1).  Each of these ‘inventions’ reveals a palpable desire to automate and depersonalize 
emotional states and engagements, as in the fantasy of a device that “knew everyone you 
knew and […] could rate the people you knew by how much you loved them” and which 
could be linked to ambulances, enabling them to project custom tailored messages about 
the patients inside, such as “DON’T WORRY! […] IT’S NOTHING MAJOR! […] IT’S 
MAJOR!” or much more personally and direly, “GOODBYE! I LOVE YOU! 
GOODBYE! I LOVE YOU!” (72).  Oskar’s fanciful inventions allow Foer a means of 
subtly critiquing as fantasy the notion of unobstructed affect flowing between individuals 
without submission to communication’s vicissitudes and the struggles of self-
understanding.  This is exceptionally clear in how Oskar’s daydream of mood-revealing 
water--which in response to heart rate, body temperature, and “brain waves” would color 
one’s skin according to one’s frame of mind—becomes a fantasy about perfect emotional 
self-knowledge: 
 
 
Another reason it would be a good invention is that there are so many times when 
you know you’re feeling a lot of something, but you don’t know what that 
something is.  Am I frustrated? Am I actually just panicky? And that confusion 
changes your mood, it becomes your mood, and you become a confused, gray 
person.  But with the special water, you could look at your orange hands and 
think, I’m happy!  That whole time I was actually happy! What a relief! (163) 
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Foer uses Oskar’s voice, his plaintive whimpers and childish inventiveness, as a means of 
implicitly suggesting the impossibility of a perfect sentimental communion wherein self 
and others are entirely emotionally self-present and self-transparent while at the same 
time sentimentally mourning the loss of this possibility.   
 This meta-sentimental approach stages the plangent reality of Oskar’s suffering 
(and rhetorically demands a sentimental recognition of it) by demonstrating how emotion 
can never be a matter of plain designation (orange is happy; I am happy) and how the 
unfulfillable yearning for self-transparency (or, in strict correlation, the transparency of 
the feelings of others, of the lost and loved other) is itself a marker of emotion.  One 
might think of this slippery process, this emergence, erasure, and consequent 
reemergence of feeling as being paralleled by the hundreds of pages of Oskar’s 
grandmother’s memoirs, entitled “My Feelings,” which prove to be blank due to a 
missing ink ribbon and her “crummy” vision.  Her feelings are, first, made manifest in the 
composition, then are figuratively erased by the fact of the missing ribbon, and yet are 
made present to Foer’s reader in the “My Feelings” sections of the book. Yet another 
example of affect appearing sous rature occurs in Oskar’s father’s tale of how Central 
Park had been carefully transplanted onto Manhattan from its original place on a Sixth 
Borough of the city when it drifted out to sea.  The Park, he asserts, still carries with it a 
spectral feeling which challenges even the most impassive, opening them out of their 
limited present and into both memory and hope: 
Well, it’s hard for anyone, even the most pessimistic of pessimists to spend more  
 
than a few minutes in Central Park without feeling that he or she is experiencing 
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some tense in addition to the present…[m]aybe we’re just missing things we’ve 
lost, or hoping for what we want to come.  Or maybe it’s the residue of the 
dreams from that night the park was moved.  Maybe we miss what those children 
had lost, and hope for what they hoped for. (222) 
 
 
 
The passions of the living are merely the uncanny remainder of the passions of the dead.  
Each of these instances (in which the disappearance of feeling produces feeling) 
duplicates the way in which the disappearance of the loved object excites passion into 
being.   Put differently, the affective rhetoric of Foer’s novel, as well as many of its most 
engaging figurations, replays the loss at its center, the death of Thomas Schell, Jr. and, 
with him, all unjust deaths.60   
 Foer attempts to assert the significance of individual griefs, loves, and 
compassions as well as the impermanence and opacity of these feelings, all while, and as 
a means toward, aesthetically exciting his reader’s compassion for his characters. This 
parallels the novel’s alternation between tropes that reify emotion states (and which lend 
plausibility to hopes for their permanence, significance, and communication) and tropes 
that enact emotion’s erasure (signifying the non-efficacy of sympathetic connection).  I 
read Foer’s complex affective rhetoric as an emotional mise en abyme that calls to mind 
Rei Terada’s notion of the economy of pathos, or “the recirculating infinity of feeling 
living on” as detailed above (13).  Put briefly, Foer deploys patently sentimental 
techniques to arouse in his reader feelings commensurate with the losses of September 
11, techniques that he in turn subtly ironizes, but this irony itself only serves to produce a 
second-order pathos, a suffering at the mocking of suffering.  What purpose does this 
secondary pathos serve?  One might suspect that Foer’s irony is simply reflex, inherited, 
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and thus, in an odd way, naïve, but one can also read this regressus of irony and pathos as 
a means of mourning for the possibility of a genuine affective community, a nation, a 
species constituted and secured by right-feeling, by reticulated fellow feeling.  
 As I have suggested, this ironized pathos gives Foer the opportunity to 
sympathetically critique his characters, but it also at least theoretically permits him to 
critique the body politic that sentimental rhetoric figures.  Foer’s doubts about the 
possibility of community established on right sentiment are related to his lightheartedly 
ironic bearing toward Oskar, who is at once to be pitied the loss of his father and to be 
forgiven for his often-infantile self-centeredness. Although Updike and DeLillo, in their 
own ways, attend to the general affluence of World Trade Center victims, Foer’s 
approach distinguishes him, for Oskar is clearly a child of the Upper West Side: over-
indulged, dilettantish, by turns small-minded and sophisticated.  He is off-handedly 
ethnocentric, a boy for whom Mexicans are lawnmowers (8); who jokes about how the 
Chinese squint 10).  These largely trivial insensitivities play intriguingly against his 
confessed fear of Arabs, a prejudice about which is uncharacteristically self-conscious 
but which also clearly touches on the source of his own pain and self-pity (36). ).  In this 
way, Foer may be satirizing the regressive withdraw into racial and religious paranoia 
which sentimentalized reactions of grief to September 11 licensed.  The novel’s fullest 
consideration of just how privileged its protagonist is, however, pulls punches and 
ultimately demonstrates a complacent justification for inequity. 
One sees this clearly in the episode of Oskar’s visit to Ada Black, the “467th-
richest person in the world.”   In what seems a self-forgetting effort to shame Ada for her 
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obscene wealth, Oskar asks “how it made her feel to know that there were homeless 
people and millionaires living in the same city” (149).  She responds by pointing out his 
own privilege as an Upper West Sider and asks if the homeless might not need his coin 
collection more than he does.  Oskar’s sense of his entitlement, even if it is invisible to 
himself, shows just after this conversation, when he patronizingly flatters Ada’s African-
American maid, Gail, for which Ada rebukes him: “You were talking to her like she was 
a child…[t]here’s no shame in being a maid. She does a serious job, and I pay her well” 
(150).  The scene ends with Ada confiding, “I know what I am…[e]ven if I don’t like 
what I am, I know what I am. My children like what they are, but they don’t know what 
they are.  So tell me which is worse” (150-1).  The context and tone of the scene are 
meant to incline us to take, more or less at face value, Ada’s putative respect for the 
seriousness of her servant’s work, the fact that she pays Gail well, and her confession of 
self-knowledge, and, in my view, this vitiates the critique of Oskar’s privilege.   Foer 
leads his character into a scene in which he might realize that his power to linger in grief, 
to indulge in self-pity, and to follow his every caprice safely, is itself a privilege.  
Connected with this opportunity is the chance to engage his readers in self-reflection on 
their own standing within the privileges of grief, but instead he presents us with an avatar 
of Manhattan’s concentrated wealth that wears her cynicism winningly as a sign of her 
worldliness and even-handed poise.  It is, in my reading, a moment misspent, but it is 
characteristic of the novel’s sometimes-pusillanimous retreat from the broader political 
dimensions of the slaughters he evokes.    
 Here I should address a potential counterargument to this slightly ungenerous 
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view of Foer’s politics, namely the significance of Foer’s decision to place the attacks of 
September 11 in a context of catastrophic historical suffering and to select, for that 
historical context, the American bombings of Dresden and Hiroshima, both of which 
involved the deliberate incineration of thousands of civilians by American bombers.  In 
considering this choice, one must first loudly affirm that Extremely Loud and Incredibly 
Close ought not be construed as weighing the number and type of victim on September 
11 against estimated casualties of America’s geopolitical power abroad in order to 
justifying the terrorist attacks.   One must then note what is circumnavigated by his 
selection of historical context.  Foer does not detach the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center from history, as the shorthand designation “September 11” itself serves to 
do.   Nor does he place the traumatic event against the losses of, say, Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories, which would have unquestionably raised specters of justification. 
He does not contextualize it either by evoking the genocidal slaughters of Rwanda, 
Srebrenica, East Timor, or Cambodia, any one of which might have suggested how 
cultural and ethnic prejudices, coincident with economic interests, make certain 
calamities seem more earth shattering to Western observers than others.  Instead, Foer 
narrates September 11 alongside two slaughters, which are at once moments within a 
historically distant and “just” war and also American war crimes in a conflict central to 
the founding of the United States’ global power.  While this is an audacious choice, one 
must note that it sidesteps the particular motivations and psychology of the terrorists, 
areas of preoccupation in the distinctly more “political” September 11 novels of DeLillo 
and Updike.  More importantly, it circumnavigates what Judith Butler has pointed out as 
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the globally uneven greivability of lives.  Butler, noting how the obituaries of World 
Trade Center victims confer greivability on the dead but that this greivability is not 
extended to war casualties, avers: “The matter is not a simple one, for, if a life, is not 
grievable, it is not quite a life; it does not quality as a life and is not worth a note.  It is 
already the unburied, if not the unburiable” (34).  Instead of attempting to either extend 
the zone of the sentimental circulation of feeling or to show its inherent boundaries, 
Foer’s novel asserts a universal circularity of death, described in narrow arcs of 
individual lives, and therefore it brackets from aesthetic concern all particular political 
motives or causes of violence as well as the broader social effects of that violence.61   
 By framing these moments of mass death entirely at the individual’s scale and by 
attending only to their effects on individuals, Foer repeats those aspects of sentimentality 
to which Laurent Berlant astutely objects when she writes:  
 
 
Because the ideology of true feeling cannot admit the nonuniversality of pain, its 
cases become all jumbled together and the ethical imperative toward social 
transformation is replaced by a civic-minded but passive ideal of empathy.  The 
political as a place of acts oriented toward publicness becomes replaced by a 
world of private thoughts, leanings, and gestures.  (641) 
 
 
 
Especially apt is Berlant’s observation of how sentimentality’s “cases become all 
jumbled together” for while Foer suggests how the World Trade Center, Dresden, and 
Hiroshima are alike in their infernal effects, this does nothing to clarify their 
circumstances and causes.  The novel studiously avoids any of the difficult questions of 
motive, geopolitical causations, or how American privilege, economically and militarily, 
 
256 
sustains an uneven geography of corporeal vulnerability. Indeed, an intriguing parallel 
exists between globalization’s dubious assertion of universal generalizability (an 
assertion undercut by the markedly uneven geographic distribution of its benefits) and 
sentimentalism’s faux-universality, which gestures at a concern for all suffering and yet 
so restricts the scenes in which this concern is staged that its claims seem hollow.  That 
colossal suffering cannot, in its awful sum, be fully represented is too easy an objection; 
its final unrepresentability does not license any and all appropriations of its affective 
power.  The suffering of Oskar, or of his grandparents, is staged in historic, and 
historically, specific terms is certain, but the substance of their grief is familial, specific, 
even idiosyncratic, rather than existential or communal.  To call upon mass-slaughters for 
these more localized affective aims raises serious aesthetic, ethical, and political 
questions. 
 Not least among these questions is, for whom does the novel actually mourn?  
Metonymically linking Manhattan’s dead thousands with the specter of a wise paternal 
figure has profound political consequences.  Thomas Schell, Jr., is a solid, temperate, 
bright, self-made, well-heeled liberal entrepreneur who, in addition to all of this, manages 
to be bravely calm in death.  He is an idealized representative of a late-boomer yuppie 
and his bland self-possession is remarkably dissonant when held against the foibles and 
eccentricities of every other Schell.  Add to this the flat blamelessness of Anna and her 
father, the novel’s chief Dresden casualties and a clear pattern emerges.  These rather 
sparely imagined types are redolent of an idealized Caucasoid nuclear family in strict 
conformity to received gender, class and racial norms.  The lost objects are doubly 
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mourned and doubly dignified paternal figures and a lovely, steady-eyed village maiden 
whose loss of virginity seems to only deepen her emotional innocence.  The idealization 
of the dead, another sentimental legacy, is often an attempt to confer on objects of 
mourning precisely the dignity and decency unjustly taken from them.  Whatever one 
thinks of this strategy, in this case, one has to note the distinctly traditionalist, if not 
conservative, cast of the idealization.  One must ask: what order of identifications makes 
these lives highly grievable?  To whose emotional deportment is Foer’s reader being 
implicitly herded—that of the quirky, openhearted narrators or that of the unwavering 
vanquished patriarchs—and what are the political consequences for this instruction?  
“It’s easy to be emotional,” says William Black, mourning his own father and 
commiserating with Oskar in the novel’s climactic scene, “You can always make a scene 
[…] being reliable is something” (297).  Given that, shortly after this is said, “making a 
scene” is precisely what William and Oskar do by narrating their losses to one another 
and weeping together, one might suspect that Foer sees Black’s stoic platitudes as 
misguided and repressive, stifling the emotional exchanges and self-knowledge which 
make us human.  In fact, however, this faith in the therapeutic powers of open emotional 
expression obscures the novel’s equal, but far less hip, reverence for received modes of 
stoic masculinity. Updike’s Terrorist and DeLillo’s Falling Man, as I will show, also 
demonstrate a fascination with stoic masculinity, but their more direct treatment of 
subject allows them to critique the pose, though in different ways.  The absent center of 
the novel, Thomas Schell, Jr., is the normative ballast offsetting its wilder, more effusive 
turns in Oskar’s narration.  Foer’s version of Lacan’s Name of the Father subtly, but 
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insistently, marks expressive emotion as a symptom of sheltered, emasculated, 
effeminate, and ultimately hysterical subjects.  
 Foer’s novel outwardly flaunts its openness to idiosyncratic, ungovernable 
emotions; more than this, its own affective power thrives on this openness and the 
tantalizing possibility for therapeutic catharsis which emotionalism brings with it.  Yet, 
paradoxically, it also performs nostalgic melancholic grief for a stoical father figure, the 
missing impassive center of the social body.  What consequences does this have for its 
affective pedagogy, that is, for the way of being moved it represents?  First, its 
sympathetic disposition toward its homodiegetic narrators seems to model a form of 
compassion repeated in the text, whether in the scenes of weeping noted above, or in less 
maudlin connections, as, say, between Oskar and Gerald, the limo driver.  This 
allegorical or performative arrangement is the very definition of sentimentalist.  By doing 
this, it implicitly invites us into a motley, ad hoc and unfinished affective community, 
represented diegetically in the random New Yorkers Oskar circulates among.  That they 
are clearly unrelated but share the same surname is a shrewd metaphor for the pseudo-
familial relation of affective belonging.  Thus our compassion, extended to the singular 
Oskar, or his grandmother, or grandfather, begins to suggest a rhizomatic reticulation of 
decent feeling. Like Fo Black, who thinks that the “NY” of “I♥NY” is “ny,” the Chinese 
word for “you,” we begin by thinking we are conferring affection on one and discover we 
have given care to a million, to “everybody” (239).  However, Foer subtly suggests the 
magic, or misunderstanding, by which this occurs and by which the reality of an affective 
community is constituted, might not work.  If it did, how could humans exterminate each 
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other?  How could the pathos at the center of this web of empathy come to pass?  In its 
confrontation with this fact, Foer’s text genuflects to the masculine poise and stoicism of 
Thomas Schell, Jr. but also indicates that it is vanished, no longer unattainable.  Instead, 
we are offered Oskar’s fantasies of time reversal—his flipbook levitating images of a 
WTC suicide—that can be read in either a proscriptive or a descriptive manner. Read 
proscriptively, as a part of Foer’s work and words to us, it suggests that we must 
rearrange our representations in an act of art, which implies the capacity to release others 
from suffering, perhaps to reverse their suffering.  Read descriptively, as Oskar’s and 
America’s fantasy, it intimates that we have regressed into a “would have been safe” 
consolatory fantasy of the world and of ourselves, in which the truth about our suffering 
and our innocence has been reversed.  This concluding ambiguity repeats in miniature the 
novel’s position in relation to its central character and the utopian promise of its own 
sentimental discourse.  
Beyond Nice 
 In his review of Foer’s novel, John Updike called the ending of Extremely Loud 
and Incredibly Close” one of the most curious happy endings ever contrived, and 
unexpectedly moving" (138). It is telling that he should characterize it as a happy ending 
at all, for Updike is the only one of the novelists considered here who elected to end his 
text on an indisputably “happy” way.  Such an ending is doubtlessly easier given that 
Updike, unlike Foer and DeLillo, chose to avoid a direct consideration of September 11 
in his novel and instead focused on an entirely fictional terrorist plot set in New Jersey in 
the years immediately following the 2001 attacks.   Yet Updike’s hopeful emphasis on 
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the possibility of rebounding after the attacks characterizes even his note for the New 
Yorker in 2001, in which he describes watching the attacks.  He and his wife were 
visiting family members in an apartment in Brooklyn Heights with a clear view of the 
towers when the planes struck and buildings fell “with a tinkling shiver and a groan of 
concussion distinct across the mile of air” (28).  “We knew we had just witnessed 
thousands of deaths,” he writes of his feeling after the first tower fell and describes the 
entire experience as “a nightmare ballet” (28).  Nevertheless, Updike’s stress is on the 
capacity of Americans to recover precisely because they are capable of seeing others as 
something more than generalizations shaped by resentments: 
 
 
War is conducted with a fury that requires abstraction—that turns a planeful of 
peaceful passengers, children included, into a missile the faceless enemy 
deserves.  The other side has abstractions; we have only the mundane duties of 
survivors—to pick up the pieces, to bury the dead, to take more precautions, to go 
on living. (28) 
 
 
 
As if to dispel the “abstractions” clouding the figures of the attackers, Updike departed 
from his characteristic interest in things of the middle to take up the challenge of 
representing extremism.  In interviews, the author seems hyperaware of the deep gulf 
separating him culturally, politically, and generationally from his novel’s protagonist, 
Ahmad, admitting his trepidation at the difficulty but assuring himself that “They can't 
ask for a more sympathetic and, in a way, more loving portrait of a terrorist" (qtd. in 
McGrath, E2).  Indeed, the novel’s evident faith in the powers of sympathy is precisely 
what suggests its sentimental pedigree. 
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 Terrorist represents an effort to revisit the scene of terrorist violence and to 
resolve it aesthetically and, though he would have doubtlessly taken issue with the term, 
sentimentally.  This involves redirecting powerful fears of exogenous terrorism—fears 
that envision acute, cataclysmic losses—onto more general, chronic fears of American 
self-diminishment: a Weltschmerz, or more accurately a Staatschmerz, owing to a crisis in 
paternity and solvable only through a sentimental reintegration of the social body, figured 
under the sign of miscegenation.  Updike’s elegiac mode never entirely overcomes his 
hopefulness, a disposition implicit both in his narrative’s empathic immersion in his 
character’s consciousnesses—via focalized free indirect discourse—as well as his 
characteristic dialectical approach to social conflict.62 His novel is sentimental in the 
sense that it presents a vision of social cohesiveness produced though sympathy—both 
the sympathy of the novelist for a terrorist youth and the sympathy that undoes that 
youth’s deadly resolve.  Updike also domesticates the problem of terrorism, treating it as 
a purist reaction of a permissiveness inherent to American society and therefore, 
ultimately, a matter of familial estrangement.  To some extent, this is simply Updike’s 
characteristic domestic realism, for much of his work considers massive cultural shifts in 
the nation refracted symbolically through representative families, the paradigmatic case 
being the tetralogy of Rabbit Angstrom novels.  Even so, the effect of aesthetically 
domesticating the conflict between liberalism and Islamic fundamentalism, coupled with 
the novel’s other contiguities with the sentimental tradition—most especially its 
strenuous emphasis on the power of imaginative sympathy—demand a reading that asks 
after its affective and spatio-political consequences.  Furthermore, like the novels of Foer 
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and DeLillo, Terrorist is transfixed and moved by wounded stoic masculinity.  Genuine 
sympathy, in this novel, requires the abandonment of a permissive sexuality Updike links 
to maternal, as opposed to paternal, figures.  In this manner, Updike links the capacity for 
sympathetic engagement to a masculinity of emotional maturity requiring paradoxically 
the Oedipalization, or renunciation, of affect.  While the novel concludes with an 
unmistakably sentimentalist emphasis on the humanizing and ethically saving force of 
sympathy, and indeed embodies such an effort at sympathy, it also bears with it 
ambivalence over sentimentalism’s final ethical status.  
 It may seem strange to argue that Terrorist is either sentimental or a 9/11 novel, 
because it only glancingly confronts September 11’s attacks and those moments in which 
it does are distinguished by studied emotional distance, as when Jack Levy, one of its two 
central characters, observes an Islamic imam as “a slight, impeccable man embodying a 
belief system that not many years ago managed the deaths of, among others, hundreds of 
commuters from northern New Jersey” (112).  The decidedly regional disquiet over the 
hundreds of New Jersey dead, combined with the circumlocutionary avoidance of the 
phrase “September 11,” suggest an intentional disinclination to recap the “event.”  In 
doing so, Updike immediately shrinks the scale, if not the stakes, of the conflict and, by 
virtue of this indirection, avoids focusing on grief per se, instead remapping the event 
onto a social field where he can scan its implicit lines of religious and ethnic difference.   
While Terrorist’s two main characters only share a few scenes in the novel, they are 
structural foils for one another and Updike handles their differences in rather thoroughly 
oppositional way: Ahmad Ashmawy is an eighteen-year-old, virginal, half-Egyptian 
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Muslim, while Jack Levy is an aged, adulterous, Jewish atheist.63  The two form an 
abortive father-and-son relation in which Ahmad, though a defiant youth, is rather too 
easily lead, and Jack, though a High School guidance counselor, seems incapable of 
guiding.  Their eventual détente annuls their oppositionality and is thus a dialectical 
resolution of larger social tensions.  By emplotting terrorism as a phenomenon of teenage 
alienation—with its familial and sexual vicissitudes— Updike sentimentally subdues and 
domesticates the otherness of Islamic terrorism, replanting it in more familiar soil both to 
understand empathetically its psychic economy and to describe it as a kind of 
autoimmunitary process embedded in America’s own contradictions. 
 However different Ahmad and Jack are from one another, one crucial problem 
which both share is an emotional sense that life may not be worth living, and in both 
cases, their list toward despair owes to an estrangement from their sexual roles and 
material bodies.  For Ahmad, faith in the transcendence of Allah leads him to disparage 
the immanent world, a world he sees as ruled by unrestrained sexuality and empty 
materialism.  To him, the words of the Koran “invade our human softness like a sword” 
(7).  True spirit, in Ahmad’s view, entails the destruction of the flesh and the denial of 
sexual desire.  Even though he finds the exposure of women’s bodies generally sinful 
(“Their bare bellies, adorned with shining navel studs and low-down purple tattoos, ask, 
What else is there to see?”), Ahmad is capable of fantasizing about their bodies while 
simultaneously imagining their punishment in hell, a means of expressing his sexuality 
and desire for control in a manner keeping with his American Protestant worldview (3).  
He envisions the “smooth body” of Joryleen, an African-American girl with whom he 
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timidly flirts, as “darker than caramel but paler than chocolate, roasting in that vault of 
flames and being scorched into blisters” (9).  This type of sadistic fantasy recurs in 
moments of frustration, as when he remembers the members of a black Evangelical 
church as having “the singe of Hellfire on them like the brown skin on barbecued 
drumsticks,” just after he has a run-in with Joryleen’s boyfriend (17).  It becomes clear 
that Ahmad’s devotion to Islam is in large part a means of negotiating the difficulties of 
adolescence by subjecting the complexities of the world to a Manichean reduction and 
sidestepping the relativism he finds rampant in American culture.  However, religion is 
not simply a means of repressing his own sexuality, as is clear when he responds to 
Joryleen’s assertion that “hating your body is like hating yourself”:  “Not hate your body 
[…] but not be a slave to it either.  I look around me, and I see slaves—slaves to drugs, 
slaves to fads, slaves to television, slaves to the unholy, meaningless opinion of others” 
(73). Clearly, Ahmad’s Islam presents him with a means to critique both sexual mores 
and larger economic and social concerns.  The result is a kind of religiously-infused 
mock-Marxism, as when he heatedly asserts: “All America wants of its citizens, your 
President has said, is for us to buy—to spend money we cannot afford and thus propel the 
economy forward for himself and other rich men” (72).  But, at least as frequently, the 
sexual and economic critiques overlap: “Look at television […] how it’s always using sex 
to sell you things you don’t need” (38). Updike’s novel makes terrorism a threat internal 
to a masculinity in crisis.  
 Updike seems at pains to demonstrate that this gendered malaise is endemic in the 
nation and should not be thought of exclusively as a problem besetting an Arab 
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subculture, and the primary means by which he conveys this is through Jack Levy.  
“[T]rapped in a curriculum vitae as tight as a coffin,” Jack, a guidance councilor at 
Ahmad’s school, is also a man apart from that world and fond of opining on the its 
shortcoming though the terms of his critique and the nature of his isolation differ in 
causation from Ahmad’s.  Whereas Ahmad is alienated by his belief, it is Jack’s 
disbelief—his atheistic dread of his approaching death and his present-day 
insignificance—that so separates him from his surrounds.  He senses that his life is nearly 
over; Updike introduces him awaking with the “taste of dread is his mouth” and the 
understanding that his “sinister” dreams were “soaked through with the misery of the 
world” (19).  If this seems over-dire, Updike quickly alerts us to the depths of this 
malaise, in a clowning but dark allusion to Dante distinctive to Jack’s focalization: “In 
the world’s dark forest he had missed the right path. But was there any right path? Or was 
being alive in itself the mistake?” (22).  Jack typifies the moral relativism repellent to 
Ahmad, even as their respective alienations partake of a shared separation from the over-
sexed and affluent lifestyle that television suggests constitutes the American mainstream: 
 
 
He sees himself as a pathetic elderly figure on a shore, shouting out to a flotilla of 
the young as they slide into the fatal morass of the world—its dwindling 
resources, its disappearing freedoms, its merciless advertisements geared to a 
preposterous popular culture of eternal music and beer and impossibly thin and fit 
young females. (23) 
 
 
 
This visualization of his own helplessness reveals how his professional failures as a 
guidance councilor are compounded by his sexual longings and frustrations, which he 
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attributes to his wife Beth’s obesity.  Consequently, both Jack’s and Ahmad’s affective 
disengagement from America (as represented by the fictional New Prospect, NJ) partially 
owe to their respective cosmologies and class alienations, but their isolation is 
determined, in the last instance, by sex.  
 The novel stages the threat of terrorism as a crisis of male potency, but that crisis 
is, in Updike’s motivic terms, inseparable from American society’s larger urban 
degradation.  It is significant that Terrorist is set in the clearly symbolic fictional rust belt 
town of New Prospect.  The town is oddly a mix of rusting postfordism and the verdant 
growth of developing world, in Jack’s words “an old industrial burg dying on its feet and 
turning into a Third World jungle” (33).  Throughout his work, Updike has been 
distinctly aware of the erosion of the manufacturing base, white flight, and consequent 
resegregation, and his reader senses a measure of both guilt (at the system’s festering 
inequity) and fear (of violent reprisals small or great).  The palpable diminishment of 
American urban health as well as the contiguity of this degradation with international 
entanglements is clear when Updike tells us that Jack “reads the dying, ad-starved local 
daily” filled with news “of Bush and Iraq and domestic murders in Queens and East 
Orange—murders even of children aged two or four or six, so young that struggling and 
crying out against their murderers, their parents, would seem to them blasphemy” (19).    
The pathos of bad news, national and international, seems an undivided fabric: a global 
matter.  Therefore, even while Updike eschews the backdrop of Manhattan, he still stages 
his novel in the space of Cosmopolis, albeit an unhappy version: a decrepit city 
emblematic as much of the broader world as of America.  Similarly, Ahmad’s racial 
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status conveys a sense both of threat and recombinant mixing.  As Jay Prosser notes, for 
Updike, “blackness stands as other, love or hatred, guilt or fear, a measure of white 
American consciousness” (76).  Being the upshot of New Prospect’s urban mélange is but 
one of the ways in which Ahmad is ‘mixed,’ for he is “the product of a red-haired 
American mother, Irish by ancestry, and an Egyptian exchange student” (13).  His mixed 
raced status connects him to Updike’s Tiger, the mixed race boy with whom Rabbit 
Angstrom plays basketball in the last minutes of his life (Rabbit 457), which in turn 
suggests he is what both threatens the white middle-America represented by Rabbit as 
well as what will become the next generation of America seekers.  Updike discusses this 
future “soften[ing of] the color line” in his memoir, Self-Consciousness, addressing for a 
moment, Americans of color:  
 
 
America is slowly becoming yours, I want to think, as much as it is anyone’s; 
already, out of the deepest disadvantage, black Americans have contributed 
heavily to what makes the United States a real country, with a style and a 
soulfulness no purely white country has” (195-196)  
 
 
 
Updike’s desire for a society in which race is not a factor mitigating national belonging 
clearly emerges from an earnest anti-racism while, just as clearly, it partakes of racial 
essentialism: blackness signifies style and soul and America becomes a nation that is 
white, but not purely so.  Nonetheless, it is significant that both Ahmad and Jack should 
represent a minimal difference from the white middle-American Updike is renown for 
representing, for in Terrorist, as in Rabbit at Rest, miscegenation is a sign of cross-
cultural fertilization and a sign of the end of white culture.  It is the source of both 
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frustration and hope, of conflict and resolution.   
 One can see how, in Updike’s later novel, the terrorist threat is both repeated and 
safely subdued by figurative miscegenation, in a comic passage, when the Secretary of 
Homeland Security ruminates on being in fact the “Undersecretary of Women’s Purses” 
(45).  He imagines women’s purses, in terms that link with a pattern of fear of the vaginal 
in Updike’s fiction, as “sinkholes of confusion and sedimented treasure in whose depths 
any number of compact terrorist-weapons—retractable box-cutters, exploding sarin 
pellets, lipstick-shaped stun guns—could be secreted” (45).   In Updike’s novel, female 
sexuality becomes the source of a threat to national security.  Hermione, the Secretary’s 
assistant and Beth Levy’s sister solves this problem by developing search protocols for 
“this crucial area of darkness,” which include wooden sticks so that security officers will 
not “give offense with the rummaging touch of their naked hands” (45).  Race is the 
source of the problem, for “[t]he majority of security personnel were recruited from the 
minorities, and many women, especially older women, recoiled from the intrusion of 
black or brown fingers into their purses” (45-46).  Here national security becomes 
coercive interracial coupling, waking the “dozing giant of American racism, lulled by 
decades of official liberal singsong” (46).  A repetition of this miscegenation occurs when 
Jack Levy begins an affair with Ahmad’s white mother Terry.  Although Jack’s Jewish 
status marks him as nominally white, marrying him, in the sarcastic words of Beth’s 
sister Hermione, was “the next-best thing” to marrying a Muslim, yet another link to 
Ahmad (131).  The affair between Jack and Terry briefly resuscitates Jack’s “last reason 
for joie du vivre,” and thus solves his existential crisis (210).  For Jack, Terry is whiter 
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than white, she is “Irish-white,” a phrase the text repeats no fewer than four times to 
describe her skin (116, 158, 170, 207).  Penetrating this hyper-whiteness allows him to 
reconnect with, paradoxically, his own ethnic character as when he meditates:  “The Irish 
in her, […] That’s what he loves, that’s what he can’t do without.  The moxie, the defiant 
spark of craziness people get if they’re sat on long enough—the Irish have it, the blacks 
and Jews have it, but it’s died in him” (207).  In addition to bolstering Jack’s status as a 
pseudo-father to Ahmad, Jack’s liaison with Terry allows him to duplicate the racially 
coded and sexualized confrontation Updike seems to envision as central to American 
Aufiebung.  
 Terry symbolizes the American motherland that promiscuously mixes with all-
comers, all immigrant suitors, and the over-indulgent, tolerant liberal who suckles an 
enemy at her breast.  Given Updike’s seeming investment in miscegenation as political 
threat and hope, one should read the ground for this mixing as similarly ambivalent; she 
is a figure of innocent evil.  Terry should be read as a local iteration of Updike’s long-
standing mythicizing of woman as “primal Eve[s]” (Verduin 74). “Cast as ancillary to a 
devouring earth goddess,” avers Kathleen Verduin, “women in Updike’s work 
transmogrify into adversaries of a patriarchal religion that presumably demeans their 
natural prerogatives” (65).  In their “tacit negation of Christian supernaturalism” Verduin 
suggests, Updike’s women blithely accept both promiscuous sex and death as “nature’s 
imperatives” (64-65).  Terry clearly represents both: her promiscuity is the pivot on 
which Ahmad and Levy’s stories turn and her career as a nurse insinuates her comfort 
with death’s everydayness.  That she is also a painter manqué indicates the generative 
 
270 
potential she represents, a power that is both necessary and dangerous to the men 
surrounding her.   While Jack “resists [her] New Age side” (82), he thrills at her vitality.  
Against Jack’s identity as a guidance councilor, Terry represents a more open acceptance 
of life’s possibilities.  “Your life isn’t something to be controlled,” she tells him, “We 
don’t control our breathing, our digestion, our heartbeat.  Life is something to be lived.  
Let it happen” (91). Though Jack pulls energy from this insouciant vitalism, or rather 
because he does, Terry must reject him: “Don’t be a leach.  I bet you’re a leech on Beth, 
too.  Sucking, sucking the life out of a woman (208).  The consequences for Ahmad are 
more profound, in as much as Terry represents the ground of his being; as he quotes from 
the Koran, “Our mother is the Earth itself, from which we drew existence” (241).  But her 
carefree spirit and her basic irresponsibility mean that Ahmad’s ground is of doubtful 
dependability.  As he confides to his friend Charlie: “She is a warm-natured woman, and 
no doubt cares for her hospital patients, but I think has as little talent for motherhood as a 
cat.  Cats let the kittens suckle for a time and then treat them as enemies” (212).  
Although she is nonreligious, Ahmad sees her as a devotee and sacrificial victim of a 
competing faith; she is, he thinks “a victim of the American religion of freedom, freedom 
above all, though freedom to do what and to what purpose is left up in the air” (167).  
Terry is, as Jack playfully reflects, “a wild one, a rule-breaker.  Terri-ble.  A holy Terr-
or” (164).   
 By locating female sexual liberation as the founding wound leading to both 
Islam’s radicalization (Ahmad’s problem) and the disintegration of American sense of 
purpose (Jack’s problem), Updike inscribes terrorism into the bedroom in a manner 
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fundamentally misogynistic.64  Terrorist stages the emergence of radical Islam—and 
metonymically America’s autoimmunitary disorder—as a problem of re-Oedipalization, 
that is, a problem owing to the initial absence of a father, which later requires the too-
forceful renunciation of affection.  In the absence of his father, Ahmad has to negate by 
dint of will his own interest in his mother’s proximate body:  
 
 
For some years it has been awkward their bodies sharing the limited space of the 
apartment.  Her ideas of healthy behavior include appearing before her son in her 
underwear or a summer nightie that allows the shadows of her private parts to 
show through […] When he rebukes her attire as improper and provocative, she 
mocks and teases him as if he is flirting with her. (169) 
 
 
 
Ahmad’s rejection of this body leads to his repression of all bodily desire and his 
replacement of paternity via Islam.  He seems aware of this psychic maneuver himself, 
for “[h]e thought he might find in this religion a trace of the handsome father who had 
receded at the moment his memories were beginning” (99). Moreover, Islam 
conveniently requires women to “withdr[aw] into wrinkles and a proud shapelessness 
[where] an indecent confusion between a mother and a mate was not possible” (170).  
Were this the only way in which Updike’s novel made a scapegoat of female sexuality, 
one might choose to read it as a descriptive comment on radical Islam’s constitutive 
response to American sexual permissiveness.  It was, after all, this aspect of American 
culture that so repulsed Sayyid Qutb, the progenitor of the strain of radical Islamic 
thought that in time influenced al-Qaeda as well as Updike’s fictional Sheikh Rashid 
(304).   
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 However, nearly every character in the novel, aside from Terry, locates the failure 
of paternity, the diminishment of patriarchy, as the source of America’s degradation 
and/or vulnerability.  Men of the cloth, unsurprisingly, are among the loudest in this 
claim.  The Evangelical pastor Ahmad observes in his visit to Joryleen’s church 
proclaims in his impersonation of the weak sinners in his community: “we have our 
underage crackhead girlfriends to bear our illegitimate children that we can leave in a 
shoebox in at the disposal and recycling facility on the edge of town—don’t send us up 
that hill, Lord” (60).  Shaikh Rashid, Ahmad’s imam, implicitly agrees: “The lack of 
fathers, the failure of paternity to keep men loyal to their homes, is one of the marks of 
this decadent and rootless society” (145).  Jack opines similarly, in his tone-deaf way, to 
Terry about how “You see that in a lot of […] black families, the kids idealizing the 
absent dad and directing al their anger at poor old Mom, who’s knocking herself out 
trying to keep a roof over their heads” (89).  When Terry takes offense and reproaches 
him, Jack grumbles to himself: “Single moms, he thinks. What a cutesy, sentimentalizing, 
semi-militant phrase” (89).  Charlie Chehab, a complex character who appears to lure 
Ahmad into a terrorist plot and is later revealed to have been an undercover CIA agent, 
chimes in agreement, this time blaming irresponsible Hollywood celebrities: “these kid 
movie actors […] make these poor black teen-age girls think it’s just the thing, to bring a 
baby into the world without any father. Except Uncle Sam.  He gets the bills, and no 
thanks from them: welfare’s their right” (261).  Again and again, the figure of the single 
mother is scorned as the source of American anomie.   
 In this respect, the missing paternal figure provides Updike with terrorism’s 
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second American parentage, this time not in a re-Oedipalization via Islam, but rather in 
an a form of envy read as ressentiment.  While I have examined ressentiment extensively 
in relation to Philip Roth’s revision of sentimentalism as well as Anna Deavere Smith’s 
diagnosis of group identities in contemporary urban space, Updike makes distinct use of 
it.  In his novel ressentiment is the means by which the emotional disorder flowing from 
the crisis of paternity can be transformed (horribly) into a violent retributive agenda that 
justifies any death as the death of an evildoer.  One sees this clearly in a scene, narrated 
via freed indirect discourse, in which Ahmad recalls an agonizing visit to a shopping 
emporium with his mother years earlier: 
 
 
The spectacle revives a sensation buried in the folds of his childhood—the false 
joy of shopping, the tempting counterfeit lavishness of man-made plenty.  He 
would go with his mother up the escalators and through the perfumed aisles of the 
last, failing emporium downtown […] the mother and son were besieged on all 
sides by attractive, ingenious things they didn’t need and could not afford, 
potential possessions that other Americans seemed to acquire without effort but 
that for them were impossible to squeeze for the salary of a husbandless nurse’s 
aide.  (151) 
 
 
 
The hunger for the “man-made plenty” consumer goods, because unfulfillable, becomes a 
humiliating reminder of his father’s absence and an almost public sign of his 
abandonment.  This suggests that Ahmad becomes radicalized against American culture 
because of his social weakness and consumer envy.  As Sianne Ngai points out, 
Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment, a “diseased passion” that “transforms social 
weakness from an undesirable situation one must struggle to overcome into a 
‘blessedness’ or virtue,” collapses “genuine political impulses” and “private 
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dissatisfactions” into it in order to dismiss the former as the latter (Ngai 33, 128).  
Importantly, Ngai suggests, “the feminization and moralization of envy have operated in 
collusion to suppress its potential as a means of recognizing and polemically responding 
to social inequality” (130).65  This is particularly important for a reading of Terrorist’s 
affective diagnosis of terrorism, for it helps to explain why Updike consistently feminizes 
Ahmad, particularly for his slender body. 
 If to envy is to take up a feminized position in affective gender norms, Ahmad’s 
feminization underscores that his strident moral indignation is merely a form of 
ressentiment, a bitterness at being unable as yet to access America’s “man-made plenty” 
that marks him as unmanly.    Tylenol Jones, Joryleen’s boyfriend and Ahmad’s high 
school adversary, hails Ahmad as: “You weird queer.  You faggot” (16).  Later, when 
Tylenol publicly confronts Ahmad over his attendance of Joryleen’s church, Ahmad’s 
corporeal vulnerability is distinctively feminized: “vulnerable, near-naked in his running 
shorts, […] his long limbs bare, as beautiful, beauty being an affront to the brutes of the 
world” (97). That his self-perceived “beauty”—a function of his weakness—reveals those 
around him to be the “brutes of the world” is a model case of gendered ressentiment of 
the kind envisaged by Ngai.  The altercation ends with Ahmad escaping unharmed, but as 
he leaves “there are whistles and hoots behind him, as if he is a white girl with pretty 
legs” (98).  This might be taken as simply the homophobia omnipresent in American high 
schools were it not for the fact that adults in the novel also demonstrate anxiety over 
Ahmad’s sexual orientation.  His “friend” Charlie Chehab jokes with him repeatedly 
about losing his virginity and eventually pays Joryleen to have sex with him; Terry, in a 
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hasty moment of self-reflection, wonders whether her promiscuity had affected Ahmad, 
thinking: “Maybe that’s why her own kid is queer, if he is” (165).  Updike, always alive 
to the possibility of motivic oppositions, plays the ressentiment he signals by Ahmad’s 
womanly slenderness against a privileged corpulence, but what must be realized, apropos 
Ahmad’s feminization is that it is neither a given nor is it emotionally or politically 
value-free.  By encoding Ahmad’s critique of inequalities inherent to global capitalism in 
terms marking him as feminized and sexually exposed, indeed by offering a critique 
appearing to flow from this exposure, Updike excites pity for him in a way that both 
minimizes the reality behind Ahmad’s critique (by transforming it into Nietzsche’s 
“vengefulness of the impotent” (37)) and bears out the novel’s consistent attribution of 
terrorism to female sexuality. 
 Updike employs a fat/thin opposition as a means of suggesting another 
autoimmunitary reversal in which leisure and consumption mortify the body.   This 
obesity motif is one way in which the novel implicitly shares in Jack’s Weltschmerz and 
his elegizing of American exceptionalism. As Jack reflects on the deterioration of New 
Prospect, particularly the substitution of fast-food establishments for local groceries, he 
remarks to himself: “America is paved solid with fat and tar, a coast-to-coast tarbaby 
where we’re all stuck,” but those who seem most stuck are working-class whites (27).  
There is Jack’s wife Beth, “a whale of a woman giving off too much heat through her 
blubber” (20).  Beth’s obese body becomes an abject entity; an odor rises from “the deep 
creases between rolls of fat, where dark pellets of sweat accumulate” (135).  This 
repugnant surplus of flesh correlates to the material excess characteristic of late 
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capitalism as well as (punningly) to the “fleshiness” of sexual licentiousness.  As such, 
Beth’s body becomes a symbol of self-destruction inherent in abundance:  “the world has 
conspired to make her soft and overweight, insulate against the precision and danger that 
crackle wherever people truly rub against one another” (126). Ahmad’s feminine 
delicacy, when read within this motivic opposition, becomes an indication of his 
separateness from this other femininity, which denotes a self-victimization by means of 
one’s privilege.   One sees this clearly in Sheikh Rashid’s admonition to Ahmad: “Do 
without these women of non-Heavenly flesh, this earthly baggage, these unclean hostages 
to fortune!!  Travel light, straight into Paradise!” (108).  Or again, when Ahmad 
contemplates the white sunbathers along the Jersey shore he notes how “the guts of the 
men sag hugely and the monstrous buttocks of the women seesaw painfully” (191), while 
a moment later, when he meets an Arab member of a terrorist sleeper cell, he approves of 
the man’s trim body: “There is a wiry tension to his whole body; his stomach is 
admirably flat” (191).  Updike uses obesity to mark yet another way in which the promise 
of American consumer culture is self-consuming and self-defeating.   
 Updike punningly links this corporeal softness to a soft-heartedness American 
culture has putatively acquired (related to the parental permissiveness embodied by 
Terry) in recent decades that betrays its Puritan and Revolutionary legacies.  Updike 
attributes Beth’s discomfort in her Shaker chair to the fact that “the Quakers and the 
Puritans [had] different philosophies about comfort and necessity,” presumably better, 
less relativistic philosophies (134).  One can see how this nexus of fears about 
consumption and idleness elicits an inconsistent nostalgia in Jack for the laws of the very 
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“Third-World jungle” he fears has overtaken New Prospect:  
 
 
To be on the safe side, they changed the label ‘capitalism’ to read ‘free 
enterprise,’ but it was still too much dog-eat-dog.  Too many losers, and the 
winners winning too big.  But if you don’t let the dogs fight it out, they’ll sleep all 
day in the kennel.  The basic problem, the way I see it is, society tries to be 
decent, and decency cuts no ice in the state of nature. No ice whatsoever.  We 
should all go back to being hunter-gatherers, with a hundred-percent employment 
rate, and a healthy amount of starvation. (136) 
 
 
 
It is difficult to imagine a more contradictory critique of American society than to decry 
its unjust brutality and its unnatural decency simultaneously, but this contradiction flows 
from Updike’s ambivalent reaction to the idea of the American sentimental network.  One 
the one hand, America once possessed a fierce and brutal vitality that connects New 
England’s ascetic and stoic past with, perversely, al-Qaeda; on the other hand, America is 
also figured as having been a peaceable egalitarian society bound by fellow feeling.  The 
stark alternatives correspond to stereotypical gender identities and, while each has its 
desirable elements, neither seems fully available. 
 Having mapped political alternatives onto a scheme of bodies—fat and thin, male 
and female, promiscuous and chaste—Updike can draw connections between Ahmad’s 
drive to establish independence from his mother via terrorism and America’s war of 
independence, further strengthening the domestification of national narratives.  All of the 
comparisons between al-Qaeda and Revolutionary America are embedded in the 
pontifications of Charlie Chehab, whose own bifurcated status as both terrorist rebel and 
CIA patriot echoes the unparsable contradictory loyalties of his rants. Nevertheless, the 
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values of many of his claims about Washington harmonize with concerns over America’s 
excessive kindness and compassion, which I have established in the text.  In the 
following crucial passage, Charlie compares George Washington to present-day terrorist 
organizations and, accordingly associates present-day America with the British Empire: 
 
 
That was Georgie.  He learned to take what came, to fight guerilla style: hit and 
hide.  He retreated but he never gave up.  He was the Ho Chi Minh of his day.  
We were like Hamas.  We were Al-Qaida. […] The British wanted […] a model 
of pacification—winning hearts and minds, you’ve heard of that.  They saw what 
they did on Long Island was counterproductive, recruiting more resistance, and 
were trying to play nice here, to woo the colonists back to the mother country.  At 
Trenton, what Washington was saying to the British was, “This is real.  This is 
beyond nice.”  (181) 
 
 
 
Being beyond nice, being sufficiently merciless to achieve independence, reduplicates the 
logic of Jack Levy’s “healthy amount of starvation,” as well as the implicit renunciation 
of affection entailed in re-Oedipalization: separation from the mother-country.  It entails 
the upturning of the rules by which the sentimental community coheres: one must make 
oneself pitiless in response to one’s enemies and read their suffering as one’s own victory 
instead of one’s shared defeat.  However, Charlie’s historical homily, by writing 
American history as a process of self-betrayal, figures America’s enemies as versions of 
itself, albeit former selves.  In this way, at least, the defeat of one’s enemies is one’s own 
defeat. So while Charlie goes on to claim that “The jihad and the [American] Revolution 
waged the same kind of war, […] the desperate and vicious war of the underdog claiming 
fouls by the fouls he has devised for his own benefit” (286), he has, wittingly or 
unwittingly, inscribed in the heart of Islamic fundamentalism the tenets of dried-eyed 
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American expediency. 
 These Hegelian inversions of identity, or recognitions of shared sameness across 
difference, also play out in the novel’s conclusion and its sentimental reabsorbing of the 
outcast into an American community of affection.  This community is established, and in 
terms at once sentimental and ironic, well before the novel’s conclusion, during Ahmad’s 
graduation ceremony.  Jack, though an irrepressible cynic, always find himself moved by 
the Commencement ceremony.  In the following musings, he employs precisely the 
rhetoric that characterizes the American sentimental civic religion, though throughout 
one senses his ironic edge: 
 
 
Contribute to America, they are told.  Take your places in the peaceful armies of 
democratic enterprise.  Even as you strive to succeed, be kind to your fellow-man.  
Think, in spite of all the scandals of corporate malfeasance and political 
corruption with which the media daily dishearten and sicken us, of the common 
good. (110) 
 
 
 
Jack Levy begins to tear up at the “docility of human beings, their basic willingness to 
please,” and begins to weep fully when he imagines the graduating students walking 
slowly to shake their principal’s hand as “Europe’s Jews dressing up in their best clothes 
to be marched off to the death camps” (111).  This pathos, madly exorbitant in its 
context, functions as a prelude to the would-be holocaust of the novel’s conclusion.  But 
unlike at the novel’s end, this wave of sentimental dread, though powerful enough to 
draw Levy’s tears, comes too late: Levy has had his opportunity to act on behalf of these 
students and now that semester’s end concludes his duties, he is at liberty to feel without 
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consequence.   
 Unlike Levy’s, Ahmad’s sentimental conversion, the novel’s climax, is effective 
and clearly endorsed by the text. Ahmad, with Jack Levy helpless at his side, drives his 
truck freighted with explosives in the Lincoln Tunnel but at the last moment decides not 
to detonate the charges, which would have destroyed the tunnel’s walls and resulted in 
thousands of deaths by drowning.  Updike’s staging of Ahmad’s change of heart is 
unmistakably sensational and sentimental: it works by a progressive set of emotional 
identifications the experience of which convinces Ahmad of the value of other lives.  
Though these values, and the sentimental means by which they are conveyed, are the 
novel’s implicit emotional and ethical disposition, Updike does introduce ambiguities in 
this conclusion that effectively refuse complete closure.   The sentimental conversation 
occurs through four interwoven sets of identifications: 1.) Ahmad’s vision of a grassy 
slope at the entrance to the Tunnel sentimentally echoes earlier pastoral elements in the 
novel and initiate the power of pity; 2.) Ahmad confronts in Jack’s despair an echo of his 
own, which in turn, drives him to renounce this despair in himself; 3.) Ahmad is moved 
by the children he observes in the Jersey tunnel who allow him therapeutically to revisit 
his childhood abandonment; and, 4.) Updike’s deployment of the entomological motif 
culminates in an ambiguously sentimental dénouement.  I trace them in a roughly 
chronological way, and one senses an authorial intent to build toward more sophisticated 
modes of reflexive sentimental identifications as the climax progresses, but they are best 
thought of as narrative durations braided together, sometimes awkwardly, often skillfully.   
What is to be noted here is how Updike repeatedly folds Ahmad’s sentimental 
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recognitions onto themselves, so that, for his reader, they become recognitions of their 
own sentimentality.  At the level of reception, this becomes at once a process of self-
estrangement and self-implication.   
 In the first of these moments of affective identification, Ahmad has an eerie, 
sentiment-infused flash of connection with a “triangle” of grassy slope at the Lincoln 
Tunnel’s on-ramp, which echoes the novel’s pastoral motifs earlier focalized though 
Jack.  Ahmad is surprised to find “trees and greenery” at the tunnel’s entrance and, 
fastens onto a small triangle of mown grass “that no one ever stands on or picnics on or 
has ever noticed before with eyes about to go blind,” thinking “This is the last piece of 
earth I will ever see” (297).  Later, as the moment of decision approaches, Ahmad 
experiences a hallucinatory apparition of the embankment: “A shimmer like a heat 
mirage has possessed his mind’s eye: that triangle of tended yet unused grass hung above 
the tunnel mouth hangs in his mind.  He had felt pity for it, so unvisited” (299).  The land 
functions as, at the very least, a mirror for Ahmad’s own self-pity, which until this point 
has not been acutely engaged as he has been absorbed in the platitudes and pieties of 
preparing to be a martyr.  This affective identification with land, with lawn, echoes Jack’s 
first scene in the book, when he nostalgically mourns the shift from “houses” to 
“housing” and the concomitant erasure of lawns: “within his memory back and side yards 
had once included flowering trees and vegetable gardens, clotheslines and swing sets, 
now a few scruffy bushes fight for carbon dioxide and damp soil between concrete walks 
and asphalt parking spaces stolen from what had been generous margins of grass” (26).  
While, as in Ahmad’s case, this pastoral elegiac projection neatly parallels Jack’s own 
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problem (not enough space from his wife Beth), neither of these moments should be read 
as entirely private, for these two reveries also are suggestive of the promise of unbounded 
American land and, before this, the Great Commons. The poignancy of its enclosure—the 
wholesale privatization of the commonweal—carries with it the beginnings of a 
movement toward a sociality of shared affection 
 The second identification occurs when Ahmad confronts in Jack’s despair an echo 
of his own, which in turn, drives him to renounce this despair in himself.  After hopping 
into Ahmad’s truck’s cabin to avert the planned disaster, Jack begins, to his own surprise, 
to urge on the suicidal bomber, at first clearly in anger and then with a genuine desire for 
self-annihilation. “I’ve become a drag on the world,” he declared, “taking up space.  Go 
ahead, push your fucking button” (304).  Jack’s despair repulses Ahmad, but his suicidal 
renunciation of the world tangibly echoes and hence defamiliarizes the young man’s own, 
hastening Ahmad’s change of heart.  Updike depicts the climactic affective event—
Ahmad’s epiphany—as an imaginary spiritual explosion of creation: 
 
 
Behold the semen you discharge: did you create it, or We? God does not want to 
destroy: it was He who made the world. The pattern of the wall tiles and of the 
exhaust-darkened tiles of the ceiling […] explodes outward in Ahmad’s mind’s 
eye in a the gigantic fiat of Creation, one concentric wave after another, each 
pushing the other farther and farther out from the initial point of nothingness, God 
having willed the great transition from non-being to being. (306) 
 
 
 
One could note how the italicized text, taken from the fifty-sixth sura of the Koran, 
figures creation as masculine dissemination, which here explodes in what would be the 
Lincoln Tunnel’s figurative vagina, completing the motif of security through coital 
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supplement to female sexuality. Following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, however, one might 
queer Updike by emphasizing the profound homosociality of the novel’s plot, and this 
mode of sentimental education more generally—wherein Terry shuttles between the 
Muslim and Jew in order to defuse ethnic and religious tensions—thus emphasizing how 
the underlying homosexual tension at play in Ahmad’s search for a father figure is 
unwittingly echoed in this conclusion for, after all, all three “mouths” of the tunnel are 
named for men, not women “(Manny, Moe, and Jack),” (297 italics mine) suggesting not 
procreative heterosexual coitus that plugs the dangerous void of female sexuality, but 
rather a secretive, conspiratorial, homosexual oral exchange (of words) while the world is 
none the wiser.  This reading, though against the grain, is less far fetched than it seems, if 
we return to Julie Ellison’s claim about the relation between stoic and sensible 
masculinities.  Ellison insists these become “mutually generating” positions in the late-
seventeenth century precisely to defuse homosocial tensions arising from a shift from 
monarchy to republicanism, a then-conspiratorial political mode requiring an 
intensification of fellow feeling but also a scheme in which dominance and submission 
are not mediated in advance.66  In Updike’s hands, Ahmad’s progression to a tacit liberal 
humanism repeats this sexually vertiginous step.  
 Ahmad’s third, and most powerful, sympathetic encounter intriguing troubles the 
distinction between pity for others and self-pity. Ahmad observes two black children in 
the Tunnel whose efforts to gain his acknowledgment move him by recalling his own 
childhood yearning for recognition from his father.  Given my reading of the novel’s 
racial politics, it is hard to miss the import of the sibling’s race when in a maladroit bit of 
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indirect discourse we are told: “They are not neglectfully dressed but in the same 
carefully careless, ironically gaudy clothes that white children would be wearing on a 
family expedition.  This black family was doing well, until Ahmad waved them ahead of 
him into line”  (299).  Clearly their apparel is meant to revise white-ward the children’s 
racial and class identification, reclassifying them as racially miscellaneous, like Ahmad, 
like America’s future: not white but in whiteness’s orbit.  He estimates the girl’s age to 
be three, the age at which “his father turned his back on him and fled: he had often 
reflected that at three a child can talk, he can run, he is a person, he can plead and grieve 
and shed sore tears.  He must have wept but remembers nothing of this time” (303).  This 
re-visitation of the unremembered traumatic kernel returns us to the novel’s Freudian 
strain of affective diagnosis, so that Ahmad’s need for Oedipal closure can be effected by 
his sympathetic identification with a self-substitute: here, the young girl.  After he 
changes his mind, “he lifts the fingers of his right hand from the steering wheel and 
waves them, like the legs of a beetle on its back.  Recognized at last, the children smile, 
and Ahmad cannot but smile back” (307).  While this sentimental moment of mutual, 
smiling acknowledgment passes when the children sense their safety and begin to make 
faces, Updike’s somewhat awkward insertion of the entomological motif into this scene 
confirms, as I conclude below, that what occurs here is as much a self-recognition—a 
means of confronting and caring for the self—as it is a recognition of the value of other 
lives.  Updike has staged his conclusion in a way that makes the act of taking pity on 
those around him necessarily a form of redirected self-pity, and as recognizable as such.  
Ahmad loses his God because he comes to understand his forbearance on behalf of others 
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as form of leniency on himself.   
 This helps to make sense of the novel’s concluding use of its entomological motif, 
a symbolic pattern that Updike establishes in the novel’s earliest pages. Ahmad’s 
mundane encounters with the crushed bodies of insects and worms on his walk to school 
become a way in which he can (safely?) ponder the likelihood of suffering’s cosmic 
irrelevance: “The deaths of insects and worms, their bodies so quickly absorbed by earth 
and weeds and road tar, devilishly strive to tell Ahmad that his own death will be just as 
small and final” (5).   This symbolic node wherein an abject insectile body conveys 
human smallness and defenselessness continues when Joryleen’s preacher riffs on a 
biblical comparison between Israelites and grasshoppers, which he says, “live in the weed 
for a few quick days, in the hay of a meadow before it is cut, in the outfield of the 
baseball field where nobody ever hits the ball, and then are gone” (54).  Sheikh Rashid 
figures unbelievers as insects to dehumanize them and bridles at the possibility of pitying 
them (which is, of course, a means of soliciting pity):   
 
 
The cockroaches that slither out from the baseboard and from beneath the sink—
do you pity them?  The flies that buzz around the food on the table, walking on it 
with the dirty feet that have just danced on feces and carrion—do you pity them? 
[…] They would take over your table, your kitchen; they will settle into the very 
food as it passes into your mouth if you do not destroy them.  They have no 
feelings. (77) 
 
 
 
What is dishonest in pitying insects, then, is that it attributes to them what they do not 
have but which, by virtue of this, defines us, defines the human: feeling.  In this way, 
Ahmad’s imam undoes his metaphor’s rhetorical strength, for the young man is certain 
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that “Joryleen, though an unbeliever, did have feelings” (77).  By making feeling, from 
auto-affection to complex passion, the basis of ethical value, Shaikh Rashid undoes 
religious logic; it becomes clear that the distinction between earthly sensations and the 
movements of the soul is a matter of gradation, not opposition.   
 This clarifies a later moment in which Ahmad, the day before his planned suicide, 
observes an upturned beetle, which though “many a boy—Tylenol, for instance—would 
simply crush this irritating presence with his foot,” Ahmad squeamishly attempts to save 
(253).  He is too late, however: the uprighted beetle squirms confusedly and then expires. 
“For five minutes that partake of the eternal,” we are told, “Ahmad watches” incapable of 
comprehending how, though “[i]t had been on its back in its death throws and now is 
dead, leaving behind a largeness that belongs not to this world.  The experience, so 
strangely magnified, has been, Ahmad feels certain, supernatural” (254).  Ahmad’s 
spiritualization of the most common form of death on Earth—that is, his 
sentimentalization of all suffering, carries with it the curious scalar inversion by which 
human suffering and desire is transmogrified and minimized to the insectile level.  This is 
the inverted corollary of Shaikh Rashid’s unfortunate comparison: if ethics is a matter of 
mere feeling, then humans are undifferentiated and inseparable from the lowest forms of 
life.  And so, after the sentimental delivery from catastrophic death and the seeming 
remediation of Ahmad’s character, this is the vision of Manhattan the novel offers: 
 
 
All around them, up Eighth Avenue to Broadway, the great city crawls with 
people […], all reduced by the towering structures around them to the size of 
insects, but scuttling, hurrying, intent in the milky morning sun upon some plan or 
scheme or hope they are hugging to themselves, their reason for living another 
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day, each one of them impaled live upon the pin of consciousness, fixed upon 
self-advancement and self-preservation.  That, and only that. (310) 
 
 
 
Is this humanism from which the triumph has been cut?  Is this a genuine reversal of 
sentimental logic?  Isolate beings, self-occupied and homely—it would be a truly chilling 
reversal were it not in fact a return to a scene of suffering which the novel has 
assiduously pushed to the margins.  “That and only that” is both what is there and what is 
lost in Manhattan, and Updike directs this pathos at his readers in a way which exactly 
parallels how Ahmad sees and takes pity on himself in the form of the young black girl in 
the Lincoln Tunnel.  We are meant to return, imaginatively, to the scene of the 
(terrorist’s) crime, and there confront the unaccountably monumental smallness of the 
loss.  This renunciation of the sentimental view of humankind, this ostensible reserve 
over September 11’s loss, becomes a more insistent call to feel and mourn. 
Organic Shrapnel 
 Approaching the events of September 11 from the vantage of a single family, Don 
DeLillo’s Falling Man domesticates 9/11 in the partial, knowing way in which Foer’s and 
Updike’s texts do.  Just as Foer’s Schells and Updike’s uneasy triad of Ahmad, Levy, and 
Terry clearly function as synecdoches of the culture to which they belong, so too does 
DeLillo’s Neudecker family, such as it is. When Keith Neudecker escapes death by 
walking out of the collapsing South Tower at the novel’s beginning, he boards a cab and, 
without thinking, directs it to the address of his estranged wife, Lianne, thus rekindling 
their passion briefly and beginning what will ultimately prove a failed attempt to reunite 
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as a family.  The possibility of a broader affective network—of survivors, of those in 
grief—is hinted at by Keith’s short-lived affair with Florence Givens, the woman whose 
briefcase he accidentally carries from the collapsing tower. This union too proves 
precarious and untenable; though they share their feelings, their feelings cannot be 
shared.  The domestic and affective connections at the center of Falling Man are at once 
consolidated and ruptured by the horrific, historical attacks, and this doubled, 
contradictory motion of abortive cohesion and dispersal is precisely what the suggests has 
occurred at larger cultural levels. September 11, in this sense, simultaneously “brings us 
together” and “tears us apart.” 
 If the tragedy produces tensions between centrifugal and centripetal affective 
forces in the larger community, tantalizing with the possibility of new connections and an 
undivided social body, but finally unable to stabilize and make good on its intersubjective 
promise, then this owes, in part, to the instability of representations themselves, a theme 
running throughout DeLillo’s work. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, I begin by 
showing how, in DeLillo’s novel, representations of suffering—far from being a steady 
ground on which to build shared communal feeling  or factual national narratives—are, 
though powerfully plangent, unstable and shifting fields characterized by projection and 
erasure.  I then examine Lianne and Keith’s uneasy coupling as paradigmatic of the 
relation between stoic askesis and sympathetic openness to the feeling of others.  Keith 
emblematizes the very figure—white, wounded male stoic—I have suggested was crucial 
to the consolidation of national feeling following September 11.  DeLillo does not 
facilely sanction this mode of (un)emotional engagement;  instead he offers a subtle 
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exploration of how such seeming impassivity is an attempt at communion, expression, 
and memorialization of loss.  Ironically, though wounded stoicism is an effort to preserve 
a small, human core of volition and individuality in the face of impersonal disruptions, 
DeLillo suggests that it results in the complete erasure of personhood. Unsurprisingly, 
given the gendered stereotypes surrounding emotional styles, the contrary mode of 
emotional engagement—sympathetic projection—is emblematized in the novel by 
Lianne, a character keenly interested in understanding the feelings and suffering of 
others, including her husband Keith. DeLillo shows that sympathetic mimesis is often 
vital and successful; indeed the novel’s subplot, focalized in the fictional 9/11 terrorist, 
Hammad, is an attempt to empathize with a figure few would pity.  Yet, sympathy too 
has its own profound risks and failures: it may enable self-deception and the ultimate 
erasure of the self in the collective other.  Therefore, DeLillo suggests that, like stoicism, 
sympathetic mimesis contains the material for its own negation, for it is the basis of 
collective emotions, and consequently the substance of the “us vs. them” binary 
underpinning dehumanization and alienation.   If his doubled and parallel deconstruction 
of these two affective responses to the suffering of others suggests an exhausted 
resignation, this is at least partially tempered by DeLillo’s resolute assertion of the 
persistence of our material vulnerability and corporeal interconnection.  I conclude, 
therefore, on a note suggesting that, while a collective global feeling may be impossible, 
ours is one world.  
 First, let us consider the novel’s problematization of representations of suffering.  
Neither of the two novels considered thus far represent September 11 as directly as does 
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DeLillo.  But this assertion at once begs the question: what does it mean to represent such 
an event “directly”?  Directly from what vantage?  Does faithful representation mean the 
presentation of objective historical realities—a catalogue of the names of its dead, the 
tonnage of the building’s collapsed steel, the temperature of conflagration, the chemical 
composition of its ash—or is fidelity a question of collating subjective responses, 
recording the varied, contradicting, and fading memories of its survivors? The persistence 
of the subject/object split in Western philosophical thought bedevils the very notion of 
“the historical event,” since human events, no matter their objective reality, can only be 
defined as such by virtue of their (inter-)subjective import.  What’s more, how suffering 
is depicted, how it is witnessed, has tremendous consequences on how sympathy 
functions.   Indeed, one can say that DeLillo’s fictional treatment of September 11 
complicates the subjective/objective divide by means of the question of feeling.  Feeling, 
after all, is that odd slippery formation that, on one of its sides, interfaces with the 
empirical, indubitable world in the form of sensation and, on its other side, winds into the 
folds of personality in the form of emotion. Far from being a solution to the 
subject/object division, feeling becomes a battlefield on which this division can reinstate 
itself.  On the one hand, the objective, inert world invades sensation and deadens it; on 
the other, subjective ideas of the world—regardless of their verifiability or fidelity to the 
material real—come to define that world.  DeLillo approaches September 11, perhaps 
necessarily, by means of this epistemological and affective problem, attending both to 
how it plays out in the human body and in the “heart” of narration. I suggest that 
DeLillo’s novel problematizes representations of suffering in at least three ways—the 
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image of the Falling Man, media coverage of the event, and personal testimonies—but it 
is crucial at every turn to understand that DeLillo’s own novel—another Falling Man, 
another mediated treatment, another subjective declaration of experience—is implicated 
in each of these three.  
 DeLillo’s first means of exploring the problem of representing suffering emerges 
in the titular photograph, “Falling man,” and the fictional performance artist of the same 
name whose work responds to this artifact of aesthetic journalism.  The picture, of one of 
the many hundreds of individuals who leapt to their death rather than be burned alive in 
the World Trade Center towers, captures an anonymous man in a business suit, frozen in 
eerie serenity, mid-air and upside down.  Lianne’s reading of the photograph itself 
produces a split in reception, for there is a trace of artifice in its professional 
compositional framing and yet its ballistic affective power is unquestionable: 
 
 
 [T]he composition, she thought, darker stripes for the nearer tower, the north 
lighter for the other and the mass, the immensity of it, and the man set almost 
precisely between the rows of darker and light stripes.  Headlong, free fall, she 
thought, and this picture burned a hole in her mind and heart, dear God, he was a 
falling angel and his beauty was horrific. (222) 
 
 
 
When a performance artist begins to appear unannounced at different New York locales 
recreating the photograph by dressing like the anonymous dead man and suspending 
himself with the aid of an imperceptible safety harness, the reception he receives is also 
(though somewhat differently) split. “There were people shouting up at him, outraged by 
the spectacle, the puppetry of human desperation,” Lianne notes, but then subtly shifts to 
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a consideration of what gives the subject its force: “It held the gaze of the world, she 
thought.  There was the awful openness of it, something we’d not seen, the single falling 
figure that trails a collective dread, body come down among us all” (33).  Thus, the 
powers of the photograph and of the performance lie in their generalizability: the 
anonymity of the man, the way in which each spectator performs an empathetic 
substitution of his identity.  The aethesticized suffering of this single figure, in the 
photograph and then in the seemingly unmediated form of the performer who quotes it, 
produces the “us all” to whom this vision of suffering belongs.  One might think of this as 
the classic problem of sympathy: the simultaneous obviousness and mystery of another’s 
suffering.   
 It is an encounter that can result, too easily, in the erasure of the sufferer’s 
specific predicament and a substitutive focus on the feelings of the sympathetic witness.  
Three years after her encounter with the photo, Lianne happens on an obituary for the 
performance artist, one David Janiak, who has died of an apparent heart condition.  But 
learning the details of the man’s life—of his origins, of how his brother assisted his act, 
or of his planned final and suicidal performance—only makes it more difficult to connect 
him as an individual with the figure she witnessed in his performances: “She tried to 
connect this man to the moment” when she had seen Falling Man, but “[t]here were no 
photographs of that fall.  She was the photograph, the photosensitive surface.  That 
nameless body coming down, this was hers to record and absorb” (223).  She is unable to 
revise her memory of the performance to accommodate this new information because the 
central figure of suffering, the falling man, who gives a center to the scene in which he 
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performs and creates his audience through his act can have only a general and not an 
individual identity.67  DeLillo’s text suggests that the central problem of representing 
suffering, particularly aesthetically, is that it is always an imagining from without, 
precisely when it demands its audience to empathize and project themselves within.  It 
hollows out the subject it seeks to understand and honor. DeLillo also takes the name 
“Falling Man” as his title, thus thrice removing it from the real anonymous suicide and 
underscoring the inevitability of aesthetic abstraction from reality.  Because the title also 
refers to Keith Neudecker, DeLillo is signaling how our sympathetic engagement with 
this character is in a sense foreclosed by the inarticulable specificity of his suffering.  But 
it also anticipates DeLillo’s own inability to escape this logic in writing a “9/11 novel,” in 
which he attempts to draw his reader into sympathetic identification. 
 DeLillo’s treatment of the repeated television coverage partakes of a similar 
critique, suggesting how putatively objective news footage of the plane attacks cannot 
avoid being a space in which subjective fantasies are projected.68  This fantastic 
projection helps to explain the novel’s other critique of televisual mediation, namely the 
way in which it subverts and distorts one’s intimate relationships and one’s self-
understanding more generally.  The clearest instance of dangerous fantastic projection 
onto September 11’s “event” occurs when Lianne’s and Keith’s son, Justin, creates with 
his friends the mysterious figure Bill Lawton, a confabulated double of Osama bin Laden, 
who threatens a second attack on New York, vowing “This time the towers will fall” 
(102).  Though his parents delicately try to remind him that the towers have already 
fallen, Justin and his friends seem irreversibly submerged in their fantasy, which 
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ostensibly alleviates psychic tension by denying the collapse of the buildings but which 
paradoxically promises an even grimmer future.  Keith and Lianne later note their own 
fantastic projections onto the news footage.  In Lianne’s recollection of the video “the 
skies […] were dramas of cloud and sea storm,” but when she encounters the video again, 
she sees that reality was “different, a clear sky that carried human terror in those 
streaking aircraft” (134).  Keith’s projection is subtler, but more intractable; “It still looks 
like an accident, the first one,” he notes, but “by the time the second plane appears […] 
we’re all a little older and wiser” (135).  Thus DeLillo underscores our capacity to take 
our fictions as reality. 
 The reverse of this, however, is equally possible, inasmuch as our reality, at 
moments of tremendous affective intensity, may seem more fictional than real.  The 
attack’s disagreeable reiteration of disaster movie conventions upset the boundary 
between fictional mediated projections and reality, which in turn subvert those 
relationships one thinks of as “the realest” and most natural.  Hence, when Keith and 
Lianne are surprised by their own physical passion in the back of a taxi, Lianne murmurs, 
“it’s a movie, it’s a movie” (104).  Or, similarly, after Keith’s compulsive gambling 
increases the distance between the couple, Lianne is seized by the desire to see her 
husband in a televised poker game, even though he was in fact “twenty feet away at the 
desk in the next room reading back statements and signing checks.” (213).  In this later 
fantasy, her very being is transformed and mediated as she “imagine[s] herself in cartoon 
format, a total fool, hurrying to Justin’s room, hair flying, and dragging him out of bed” 
(213).  This motif subtly suggests the ways in which the very proof of September 11 as 
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event—the broadcasts that gripped hundreds of millions and made the spectacle truly 
global—itself remains stubbornly open to the renarrating fictions of its viewers.  These 
fictions do more than contextualize the spectacle; they revise the one who watches.  The 
sense that mediation pervades experience, a theme sounding throughout DeLillo’s work, 
has sharp consequences when we turn to how the affections function, for to be enveloped 
in ready-made narratives or to be uncertain about one’s own fantastic projection into such 
narrative explodes the coherence of the feeling self.  Locating feeling in relation to the 
subject becomes the foremost difficulty, and because DeLillo’s novel is but another effort 
to narrate this horrific event, it is bound up in the very difficulty it exposes. 
 Falling Man confronts the problem of representing suffering in yet a third way, 
namely, the mode of personal testimony.  Keith Neudecker proves essentially incapable 
of narrating his own escape from the burning tower; he has blocked a significant portion 
of his memories and reveals what he does recall in infrequent, terse reports.  He prefers to 
listen to the account of Florence Givens, the woman whose briefcase he accidentally 
carries from the collapsing tower and with whom he begins a short-lived affair.  But for 
Florence, too, narrating her narrow escape and the collapse of the buildings poses an 
emotional and ethical challenge: “I know I can’t sit here alive and safe and talk about 
falling down some stairs when all that terror, all those dead” (56).  Crucially, Keith’s 
desire to hear Florence recite her memory of the trauma is connected with his desire to 
“try […] to find himself in the crowd” she describes (59).  He seeks an understanding of 
his own loss by means of her narrative; indeed, long after the affair has ended and his 
recollection of it dims, he remembers her “in the tower as she’d described it, in forced 
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march down the stairwell, and [he] thought he saw himself at times, in split instants, 
unshaped, a false memory too warped and fleeting to be false” (228).  This is both the 
power and danger of narrative.  It can preserve identity and connection but also 
overwhelm and distort it.  
 The work of narration is never complete because no self, no possessor of 
language, is capacious enough to make itself equal to the task.  The “storyline” sessions 
Lianne moderates in which Alzheimer’s patients write short responses to prompts such as 
“Remembering my father” to improve their morale demonstrates this problem clearly 
(29).   Lianne comes to know Anna C. and Omar H. in a manner commensurable with 
their truncated surnames.  Their texts are produced in twenty-minute increments, at the 
mercy of their reticence and diseased memories.  Nonetheless, this narrative work merits 
continuation for, as Lianne reflects when she is finally asked to narrate her own 
recollections of September 11: “For nearly two years now, ever since the storyline 
sessions began, with her marriage receding into the night sky, she’d listened to these men 
and women speak about their lives in funny, stinging, straightforward and moving ways, 
binding the trust among them” (126).  And yet, once she enters into the autobiographical 
project, into the possibility of exteriorizing her interiority, she founders at its edges: “she 
almost told them about the brief case, the fact of its appearance and disappearance and 
what it meant if anything. […] Wanted to tell them but did not.  Tell them everything, say 
everything.  She needed them to listen” (127-8).  As in the other mediations discussed 
above, narrative reproduces the truth but with holes, gaps consciously and unconsciously 
produced, into which the reader must project.  Beyond this one must note that the urge to 
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narrate, in this novel, itself emerges as a condition of loss.  For the elderly members of 
the sessions, their memories are being lost; for Lianne, the prompt “Remembering my 
father,” would pose its own lacunas, because her father committed suicide to stave off his 
own dementia. DeLillo’s acknowledgement both of the problems of narrative mimesis 
and the power of other stories to overwhelm and replace our own profoundly affects the 
way in which we read his text.  It pushes us to ask ourselves what meaning we expect his 
book to add to our own experience of this spectacular loss of life. 
 Having detailed the ways in which DeLillo figuratively repeats the problem of his 
own text’s production, I wish to show how the book diegetically and stylistically reveals 
two emotional styles, two means of coping with suffering, however it is represented: 
stoical askesis and sympathetic mimesis. By askesis, I mean, the (anti-)sentimentalism of 
a demonstrative cutting out or a flaunted elimination of feeling, precisely the unfeeling 
feeling Julie Ellison’s study of “the making of Anglo-American emotion” details.   Here, 
stoical askesis is the attempt to anesthetize and block emotion, or to exert self-discipline 
and endure silently as a means of controlling what otherwise escapes the individual’s 
scope of control.  Although this endurance of pain is fundamentally passive, as I have 
argued above, it is also culturally figured under a sign of masculinity and, through a 
paralogical association, is misread as a mode of activity, as vigorous pursuit of one’s own 
agency in the world over and above the obstacles of one’s own dangerous passions.  Just 
as DeLillo displays his own investment in Lianne’s form of sympathetic mimesis by 
including within his novel an effort to understand the emotional experiences of the 
terrorist through fiction, so too does DeLillo’s text partake in some of the same qualities 
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characteristic of Keith’s stoic reserve.  At the level of technique, I associate Keith’s 
attenuation of expression with DeLillo’s well-established prose style, which owes to 
Hemingway in its laconic spaciousness.  It is this arid, ironic, but often incantatory voice 
that allows DeLillo to avoid the change of sentimentality, even as he narrates scenes of 
suffering that partake of elements from that tradition.  In a sense, just as Ellison argues 
with regard to the mutual generation of stoic and sensible masculinities, one allows the 
other: a performed stoicism makes the furtive expression of male emotions safer, just as 
Keith is first able to recall “a waking image” of his friend Rumsey’s death when he is put 
under anesthetic (22).  Thematically, this askesis is most clearly visible in Keith’s 
melancholic re-appropriation of the mundane ritual of a weekly poker night with his male 
buddies, “ready to sit and play, game-faced, testing the forces that govern events” (96).  
DeLillo wryly plays with the ambiguity of the ritual, for it is a means of socializing—of 
hosting friends, of imagining their perspective, of reading their tells—as well as a mode 
of intense competition, in which friendship is negated and all affect is papered over 
beneath the impassivity of the “poker-face.”   
 Both aspects of the poker ritual, its severity and its conviviality, become 
sharpened as the group spontaneously begins to “reduce the dealer’s options. […] The 
banning of certain games started as a joke in the name of tradition and self-discipline but 
became effective over time” (96).  The poker-askesis, both game and mode of self-
punishment, is clearly coded as masculine, as when the group considers “narrow[ing] 
their intake to darkish liquors, to scotch, bourbon, brandy, the manlier tones and deeper 
and more intense distillations” (98).  But this establishment of “structure out of willful 
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trivia,” is not simply a jovial diversion but a means of deepening the barely-sublimated 
antagonism at play on the table, for “with the shrinking of choice came the raising of 
stakes, which intensified the ceremony of check-writing for the long night’s losers” (98, 
97).  Consequently, the apparent impassivity of the poker-askesis is in fact an 
intensification of the affective experience, of both belonging and agonistic struggle: 
 
 
All the action was somewhere behind the eyes, in naïve expectation and 
calculated deceit.  Each man tried to entrap the others and fix limits to his own 
false dreams. […]  They used intuition and cold-war risk analysis.  […] They 
waited for the prescient moment, the time to make the bet based on the card they 
knew was coming.  Felt the queen and there it was.  They tossed in the chips and 
watched the eyes across the table. […] There were elements of healthy challenge 
[…].  There were elements of one’s intent to shred the other’s gauzy manhood.  
(97) 
 
 
 
Here the sentimental network of reticulated fellow feeling becomes interchangeable with 
the malevolent network conspiring against the subject’s manhood, a trope at least as old 
to American letters as Emersonian self-reliance.  “Somewhere behind the eyes” allows 
for the mingling of calculation, motive, desire, aggression, anxieties over one’s own 
vulnerability, as well as the effort to identify with others, if only to understand them well 
enough to defeat them.  And, just as sociality and its opposite are collapsed into one, so 
too cognition and sensation conjoin in this “feeling the queen.”  
 The paradoxical (anti)-sociality of poker before the attacks is mournfully repeated 
after them, for most of the participants in this Wednesday ritual die in the towers, making 
Keith’s later compulsive poker playing as much a mode of remembrance and 
memorialization as it is an increasingly isolating activity.  After he abruptly cuts off his 
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affair with Florence, a relationship that allowed him to confront his traumatic experiences 
even if obliquely, Keith begins to compete in international poker competitions, an 
occupation that also pulls him from his revived marriage with Lianne.  He finds himself 
“self-sequestered, as always, but with a spatial measure now, one of air miles and cites, a 
dimension of literal distance between himself and others” (212).   The change is a 
compulsion, not a choice, but increasingly Keith sees his card playing as a mode of self-
assertion, an exercise of his agency, and a substitute for his desire for violence: “Too bad 
I can’t join the army, “ he comments to Lianne, “[t]oo old, […] or I could kill without 
penalty and then come home and be a family” (214). The reintegration of the domestic 
network of feeling can only be obtained, in this fantasy, by exporting retributive violence.  
His belligerence increases the more that plays, until he no longer sees playing as an 
attempt to win but instead a form of “invalidation,” a way of paining adversaries of his 
creation: “Make them bleed.  Make them spill their precious looser’ blood” (230).  But as 
noted above, this form of masculine, bellicose activity is also, and more profoundly, a 
form of passivity, a means of asserting an illusory control over the contingencies that 
govern all life and which emotion serve to navigate.    
 What is preserved in this affective withdraw is the hope for a coherent and 
consistent self, and here one does well to invest in Keith the full allegorical force 
connecting him, and other figures of white wounded stoicism following 9/11, to the 
mediated narratives about American identity following the attacks. Thus Keith avers:  
 
 
It was finally who he was that counted, not luck or naked skill.  It was strength of 
mind, mental edge, but not just that.  There was something harder to name, a 
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narrowness of need or wish, or how a man’s character determines his line of sight.  
These things would make him win but not too much, not winning of such 
proportions that he’d slip into someone else’s skin. (227) 
 
 
 
The governing fear is of identification: the threat to pure autonomy posed by any feeling, 
but especially fellow feeling.  One must lose, occasionally, must make oneself endure the 
pain of loss to assure that one’s choice is independent of the external world, apart from 
the rules that govern likelihood: “the choice of yes or no […] the little binary pulse 
located behind the eyes, the choice that reminds you who you are” (212).  Here, what is 
“behind the eyes” has been sterilized of otherness, anticipation, and response, but this 
sterilization inadvertently kills what it sought to preserve.  Keith dramatized his complete 
emotional askesis for the purification and preservation of subjectivity, but discovers that 
this exertion of discipline cleans him of personhood as well: “He wondered if he was 
becoming a self-operating mechanism, like a humanoid robot that understands two 
hundred voice commands, far-seeing, touch-sensitive but totally, rigidly controllable” 
(226).  Keith’s fate seems to imply the equivalence of total control and absolute 
enslavement, for to subdue one’s emotions truly is to expunge the very quality that 
constructs subjective experience. At the table, Keith no longer studies players for tells; he 
“didn’t care why they coughed or seemed bored or scratched a forearm.  He studied the 
cards and knew the tendencies” (197).  What began as a complex and knotty mode of 
identification, acknowledgment, and Hegelian struggle for recognition turns into an 
unhappy revision of a Deleuzean desire-machine sans desire, sans becoming.  Ultimately, 
Keith’s individual emotional response to his own corporeal vulnerability allegorically 
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tracts a broader cultural response, and thus DeLillo’s novel offers an image of the nation, 
confronted by painful alterations, failing to imagine itself.   
 DeLillo confronts the novel’s other emotional style, sympathetic mimesis, 
primarily though Lianne.   As suggested above, however, the novel itself offers a 
performative corollary of the style in DeLillo’s focalization of Hammad, a fictionalized 
September 11 hijacker.  Sympathetic mimesis is the imaginative projection of one’s own 
consciousness into another person, precisely what Keith fears in “slipping into someone 
else’s skin.”  It is this imaginative projection that served, in the eighteenth-century, to 
define sentimentalism as a moral philosophy.  As Adam Smith writes in the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments:  
 
 
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea 
of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves 
should feel in the like situation...[Our senses] never did, and never can, carry us 
beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any 
conception of what are his sensations...By the imagination we place ourselves in 
his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it 
were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and 
thence form some idea of his sensations. (3-4) 
 
 
 
It is this crossing over what the senses can deliver to us of other minds that provides 
sympathetic mimesis with its strength, but which also makes it dangerous for one might 
imagine wrongly or altogether lose the distinction between one’s self and another. This 
erasure of distinction can lead to groupthink and us vs. them antagonisms.  The last, but 
perhaps most severe problem associated with sympathetic mimesis, particularly as a 
theory of moral action, however, is the possibility of its spontaneous failure and/or its 
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systematic demolition. 
 Regardless of the failures and possibility difficulties of sympathy, the novel does 
occasionally invest in moments of its beneficial, healing success. One must begin by 
noting that not all of the moments of self-other connection need be airy imaginative 
affairs.  Sex, too, can be a means of sympathetic commingling.  Keith and Lianne re-
initiate their marriage on precisely these terms: “She wanted contact and so did he” (35).  
His brief affair with Florence Givens also seems to operate on this logic; it is not merely 
a physical diversion, but a question of love for her.  As he says to himself of the affair 
“There was emotion, yes, but generated by external conditions he could not control” 
(166).  Hammad’s girlfriend, too, seems to be attempting to connect with him in this deep 
manner: “She wanted him to know her whole presence, inside and out” (82).  
Nonetheless, while the novel’s interest in the capacity for exploding the boundaries of the 
self through sex links up with its final affirmation of our bodies’ shared materiality, one 
must note that in none of the instances mentioned above is there a permanent connection 
made.  Just as in the case with more imaginative projections, sex unites and comforts 
individuals in contingent, provisional, and not always successful ways.   
 Sympathetic connections are always—sometimes literally—a gamble, as is made 
explicit when Keith, resolving himself to come clean about his affair with Florence, 
attempts to mirror Lianne.  Walking to meet her with his son, Keith begins by trying to 
telepathically anticipate what route she would take through the crowded streets on 
Manhattan, an almost impossible feat akin to what Martin calls “Gedankenubertragung, 
or the [telepathic] the broadcasting of thoughts” (191).  As he feels his way to her on the 
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streets, however, he also attempts to imagine her reaction to the revelation of his affair: 
 
 
He would tell her about Florence.  She would get a steak knife and kill him. 
He would tell her about Florence.  She would enter a period of long and tortured 
withdrawal. 
He would tell her about Florence.  She would say, After we’ve renewed our 
marriage. She would say, After the terrifying day of the planes has brought us 
together again.  How could the same terror? She would say, how could the same 
terror threaten everything we’ve felt for each other, everything I’ve felt these past 
weeks. (162) 
 
 
 
In total, he imagines a dozen possible reactions.  This diffracted, multiple and 
contradictory imagining has a clear parallel in Keith’s approach to gambling, his effort to 
“know the tendencies.”  DeLillo resolves this scene of double imaginative effort in a 
curious but telling way.  The empathetic anticipation of Lianne’s reaction to his affair 
proves to be ineffective, or rather it serves as a substitute for the real revelation and 
subsequent conversation.  But the more unlikely effort to read Lianne’s mind and 
randomly predict her location among the crowds of Manhattan actually works.  This 
reunion of the family, at once miraculous and inconsequential, forms a kind of climax to 
the novel, signaled in the language of this passage, depicting Lianne’s surprised 
discovery of their faces in the crowd:  “They were bright and undisguised, moving past 
people wedged in routine anonymity.  The sky seemed so neat.  They were bright with 
urgent life, that’s why they were running, and she raised a hand so they might see her in 
the mass of faces, thirty-six days after the planes” (170).  But this climax does not have 
permanent weight.  The sentimental prospect of everlasting familial belonging is illusory.   
 DeLillo clearly suggests that domestic unity is untenable largely because of 
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Keith’s ultimate unwillingness to share his interior feelings.  He never confesses his 
relationship with Florence to Lianne, nor does he narrate for her the depth of his feelings 
of loss.  This caginess marks a way in which he is deeply incompatible with Lianne, 
whose hunger for intimacy seems never ending:  
 
 
This was the man who would not submit to her need for probing intimacy, 
overintimacy, the urge to ask, examine, delve, draw things out, trade secrets, tell 
everything.  It was a need that had the body in it, hands, feet genitals, scummy 
odors, clotted dirt, even if it was all talk and sleepy murmur. (105) 
 
 
   
Lianne’s almost parasitic hunger for the suffering of others, so at odds with Keith’s 
approach to self-disclosure, carries with it also a proprietary desire to be the sole 
possessor of knowledge about him, particularly his suffering. When acquaintances begin 
to call her soliciting news about Keith, each predictably eager to angle a closer 
relationship with the catastrophe he survived, Lianne is surprised by her own reaction: 
“She didn’t want to believe she was being selfish in her guardianship of the survivor, 
determined to hold exclusive rights.  This was where he wanted to be…” (20).  An 
irreducible tension exists between this desire for privacy—for ownership over an 
emotional zone, either one’s own individual realm of affection or constructed zones of 
belonging such as the family—and the effort to take in otherness which otherwise 
characterizes her: “She wanted to absorb everything, childlike, the dust of stray sensation, 
whatever she could breathe in from other people’s pores. She used to think she was other 
people.  Other people have truer lives” (105).  Being at once one’s self and one’s other 
does not disentangle the knots of emotional conflict and misunderstanding that can arise 
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between them. It risks comprehensive self-alienation. 
 Far from facilely endorsing the mode of sympathetic mimesis over stoical askesis, 
DeLillo demonstrates the irreducible problems it too poses.  First, sympathetic mirroring 
can be a profound obstacle to one’s self-understanding.  When Lianne witnesses a second 
performance of the Falling Man routine, which figuratively repeats the colossal trauma of 
September 11, she is overwhelmed and proves incapable of differentiating her own 
reactions from those around her: “This was too near and deep, too personal.  All she 
wanted was a look, catch someone’s eye, see what she herself was feeling” (163).  Lianne 
is here seen in purely reactive terms, defining herself in relation to others.  DeLillo 
clearly ties Lianne’s incapacity to understand herself to this affective/epistemological 
problem with regard to art and fantastic projection.  She cannot differentiate her 
absorption of the meaning of the art-act (and thus of the act of suffering it represents) 
from her projection onto it: 
 
 
She wondered if this was his intention, to spread the word this was, by cell phone, 
intimately, as in the towers and the hijacked planes. 
Or she was dreaming his intentions.  She was making it up, stretched so tight 
across the moment that she could not think her own thoughts. (165) 
 
 
 
The ambiguity Keith discovered in himself, the destruction of his core of being by means 
of the very process meant to preserve it, finds a corollary in this profoundly isolating 
uncertainty and self-estrangement.  The very technique, which was meant to guarantee 
the honest engagement with the world, leaves one incapable of understanding even one’s 
self.   
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 DeLillo again shows this kind of self-alienation when Lianne examines her image 
in the mirror, “She stood in the bathroom looking in the mirror.  The moment seemed 
false to her, a scene in a movie when a character tries to understand what is going on in 
her life by looking in the mirror” (47).  Intriguingly, this parallels and anticipates 
Hammad’s incapability of seeing himself in a mirror shortly before he embarks on his 
suicidal course: “He sat in a barber chair and looked in the mirror.  He was not here, it 
was not him […] He is thinking again, looking past the face in the mirror, which is not 
his, and waiting for the day too come, clear skies, light winds, when there is nothing left 
to think about” (175, 178).  That Lianne and Hammad share this self-blindness indicates 
that DeLillo sees in sympathetic mimesis the seeds of its own undoing, for this kind of 
identification can lead, perhaps inevitably leads, to the construction of exclusive groups.  
By opening the self to communitarian affective belonging, one loses the capacity to stand 
apart and critique the community’s disposition. 
 In fact, even though (or perhaps because) her emotional modus operandi is the 
characteristically liberal openness to others, DeLillo takes pains to reveal that Lianne 
demonstrates many of the most malignant attributes of politically chauvinistic fears and 
hatreds.  One can understand this paradox as an outgrowth of the privileges of mourning, 
for Lianne’s antipathies are clearly religious and racial, that is, they stem from a desire 
for vengeance against the Arab perpetrators of the attacks.  DeLillo’s novel relates the 
kind of projection involved in emotional and aesthetic connection to the projection of evil 
onto a generic category of people.  Lianne’s anxiety and anger over her neighbor’s 
playing of vaguely Middle Eastern music, even as she acknowledges its beauty, explodes 
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into a heated confrontation (70, 119-20).  She seems incapable of controlling her 
antipathy, even as she understands it to be false and pathological: “They’re the ones who 
think alike, talk alike, eat the same food at the same time.  She knew this wasn’t true.  Say 
the same prayers, word for word, in the same prayer stance, day and night, following the 
arc of sun and moon” (68 italics mine).  Lastly, when she has evidence that her mother’s 
lover, Martin was possibly a member of a Baader-Meinhof-style terrorist organization, 
Kommune One, Lianne is troubled by her willingness to accept him: “Maybe he was a 
terrorist but he was one of ours, she thought, and the thought chilled her, shamed her—
one of ours, which meant godless, Western, white” (195). 
 DeLillo brilliantly illuminates the emotional mechanics of belonging and isolation 
at the heart of identification in a passage recalling Lianne’s trip to Cairo as a young 
student, worth quoting at length: 
 
 
Those nearby saw her, smiled, some of them, and spoke to her, one or two, and 
she was forced to see herself in the reflecting surface of the crowd.  She became 
whatever they sent back to her.  She became her face and features, her skin color, 
a white person, white her fundamental meaning, her state of being.  This is who 
she was, not really but at the same time yes, exactly, why not.  She was 
privileged, detached, self-involved, white.  It was there in her face, educated, 
unknowing, scared. She felt all the bitter truth that stereotypes contain.  The 
crowd was gifted at being a crowd.  This was their truth.  They were at home, she 
in the wave of bodies, the compressed mass.  Being crowd, this was a religion in 
itself. (184-5) 
 
 
 
Basing her identity on the reaction of others, their responsiveness, their willingness to 
smile or speak, leaves her vulnerable to redefinition.  While this redefinition is potentially 
an enlightening one that would allow her to confront her cultural and racial privilege, a 
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privilege that has invisibly underwritten so much of her experience, yet it also becomes 
an instance in which the “bitter truth [of] stereotypes” are re-inscribed.  Expelled from 
the crowd’s belonging, she can for the first time understand the dangers posed to the 
isolated individual by the crowd, but instead of extending this knowledge to her own 
identification with her culture, she attributes it to the other. 
 This partial extension of sympathetic identification, DeLillo suggests, can enable 
the most pathologically anti-social responses.  The novel’s focalization of Hammad, a 
daring effort of DeLillo’s part to imagine the experiences and psychology of the 
September 11 terrorists, confirms this.  Crucially, it is not that Hammad is incapable of 
identification.  Indeed, he becomes “total brothers” with his jihadist cohorts (83).  This 
conspiratorial brotherhood is founded in fellow feeling: “They felt things together, he and 
his brothers.  They felt the claim of danger and isolation.  They felt the magnetic effect of 
plot” (174).  What is desired, then, is the infinite and complete expansion of this circle of 
fellow feeling so that no exception is permitted: “The world changes first in the mind of 
the man who wants to change it.  The time is coming, our truth, our shame, and each man 
becomes the other, and the other still another, and then there is no separation” (80).  The 
relationship between conspiratorial belonging and the totalitarian erasure of the 
individual has been a preoccupying theme for DeLillo in several of his works, not least 
Libra and Mao II, but the roots of his treatment of Hammad are most clearly visible in his 
essay in Harper’s, December 2001, entitled “In the Ruins of the Future.”  There, he 
imagines the terrorist in the supermarket, incapable of sympathetically identifying with 
those around him.  “Does the sight of a woman pushing a stroller soften the man to her 
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humanity and vulnerability, and her child’s as well, and all the people he is here to kill?”  
DeLillo asked rhetorically.  “This is his edge, that he does not see her…There is no 
defenseless human at the end of his gaze” (34).  This sentimental failure of the 
sentimental scene (the mother and her child being the tradition’s foremost means of 
softening hearts), is repeated in Falling Man almost verbatim (171).  But intriguingly, in 
the novelistic treatment, DeLillo implicates the imaginative identification integral to 
sentimentalism as being part of the creation of this deadly us vs. them, for, as Hammad’s 
coconspirator, Amir (clearly Mohammed Atta) avers: “there are no others. The others 
exist only to the degree that they fill the role we have designed for them” (176). 
 Consequently, for DeLillo both the control represented by stoical askesis and the 
affective connectivity represented by sympathy are necessary aspects of our emotional 
response to suffering.  By dramatizing the malignant inversions each of which is capable 
if left unchecked, he implicitly argues for emotional sophistication on his reader’s part.  
DeLillo’s reader is asked  to employ both restraint and compassion in order to navigate 
the emotional arcs and cultural diagnoses Falling Man contains.  Nonetheless, the novel 
also suggests that a more immediate and less studied set of responses underlie both 
empathic identification and emotional self-restraint, namely the body’s commingling with 
the world.  The body represents a way of confronting polarities of interiority and 
exteriority; at the level of matter, there is no line strictly demarcating the shared spaces of 
intimate bodies, violent incursions, and global claims to sovereignty.   Elizabeth Grosz’s 
elucidation of Merleau-Ponty’s complex conception of the flesh of the world is here 
helpful: 
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Merleau-Ponty suggests a notion of flesh as a designation of the world’s capacity 
to turn in on itself through the living and the non-living as modes of their mutual 
entwinement and necessary interlinkage.  The flesh of the world does not just 
clothe all—subjects, objects, and their relations—with its touch; it double back on 
itself, it reduplicates itself as the invisible underside of the visible. (125) 
 
 
 
I connect this material reduplication of itself with the grotesque notion, mentioned briefly 
in Falling Man of organic shrapnel.  While Keith is being treated for his injuries 
immediately after his escape from the burning towers, his doctor tells him of how the 
remains of suicide bombers can become organic shrapnel in their victim’s bodies: “The 
bomber is blown to bits, literally bits and pieces, fragments of flesh and bone come flying 
outward with such force and velocity that they get wedged, they get trapped in the body 
of anyone who’s in striking range” (16).  The grotesqueness of this image reduplicates 
our horror at the bomber himself; the process of weaponizing one’s body seems the most 
profound and enigmatic betrayal of humanism.  But viewed from a different angle, it can 
be treated as a metaphor of the ways in which our others, our enemies, are already 
embedded in ourselves.  In this respect, the novel is a turning away from the figure of the 
social body—projected by the purist delusions of stoicism and the representational traps 
of sympathy—and a wary affirmation of our shared materiality and, consequently, shared 
global space. 
 Consider two climactic moments in which the corporeal becomes a site of 
discovery.  The first occurs at the climax of Lianne’s struggle with her grief over her 
mother’s death and her consequent turn to religion for consolation.  In a moment which 
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appears to be the culmination of a religious conversion, it occurs to Lianne that God’s 
existence might be the profound source of human loneliness as well as the means by 
which this loneliness is assuaged, but then she realizes that this would-be dialogue with 
God was in fact her own neurological performance: 
 
 
She was arguing with herself but it wasn’t an argument, just the noise the brain 
makes. 
She had normal morphology.  Then one late night, undressing, she yanked a clean 
green T-shirt over sweat she smelled […] it was just her, the body through and 
through.  It was the body and everything it carried, inside and out, identity and 
memory and human heat.  It wasn’t even something she smelled as much as knew. 
It was something she’d always known. […] She was ready to be alone, in reliable 
calm, she and the kid, the way they were before the planes appeared that day. 
(236) 
 
 
 
It is significant that DeLillo treats this moment not as a failed effort to transcend a state 
of spiritual poverty and isolation, but instead the realization of the reality of the world 
and a consequent rebirth, albeit one marked by the abandonment of her marital 
attachment.  The second instance of corporeal “discovery” represents DeLillo’s 
acknowledgment that the body is not simply the ever-rejuvenating site of becoming, but 
also the zone of agonizing pain, of fragility, vulnerability and death.  It comes in the 
novel’s concluding description of the destruction of the towers, when Keith confusedly 
attempts to save his mortally injured friend, Rumsey: 
 
 
He found Rumsey in the smoke and dust, facedown in the rubble and bleeding 
badly.  He tried to lift him and turn him […]. He looked at Rumsey, who’d fallen 
away from him, upper body lax, face barely belonging.  The whole business of 
being Rumsey was in shambles now.  Keith held tight to the belt buckle.  He 
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stood and looked at him and the man opened his eyes and died. (242-3) 
 
 
 
Keith’s traumatic realization of the fragility of human identity, the flimsiness of the 
“business of being” anyone, so quickly converted to shambles, comes when he “smelled 
something dismal and understood it was him, things sticking to his skin, dust particles, 
smoke, some kind of oily grit on his face and hands mixing with the body, slop, paste-
like, with the blood and saliva and cold sweat, and it was himself he smelled, and 
Rumsey” (244).  Rumsey’s blood, sprayed onto his friend, awakens Keith to the 
feebleness of being, a feebleness which Keith spends the rest of his life attempting to 
deny.  The fantasy that the body’s limits can be transcended, in the afterlife of the jihadist 
or, far less ruinously, by the stoic’s masterful control over himself, is revealed as the 
novel’s ultimate object of pathos.  
 Having stretched sympathetic projection beyond its customary bounds and having 
critically assessed the treacherous terrain posed by representations of suffering, DeLillo 
seems to conclude warily that there is not an adequate form for the proper, imaginative, 
and ameliorative repetition of feeling, neither the promiscuous embrace of sympathy nor 
the protective retreat of stoicism.  Yet he also emphasizes that the problem of confronting 
suffering is unavoidable, an obvious but oft-elided fact he emphasizes by repeating, at the 
beginning and end of the novel, his description of the World Trade Center attacks.  A 
deconstructive shift occurs between DeLillo’s essay “In the Ruins in the Future,” (in 
which the terrorist’s incapacity to sympathize was his strength) to his novel (in which 
sustained communal emotion—the family, the lovers, the poker players, the nation, even 
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the terrorist network—are all degrading, collapsing in on themselves or exploding 
outwards like the buildings at the center of his book).  This is perhaps why the novel, for 
its elegiac fineness, is curiously unsatisfying, though nearly every passage read in 
isolation can achieve poignant strength. There is no cumulative forceful affective 
movement, but rather conflicting gusts like whirls of ashy air.  If we began this chapter 
by looking at the way the popular media used the attacks to conjure coherent social 
bodies where there may have in fact been none, DeLillo’s mournful attention to our 
material bodies, their fragility and vulnerability can remind us, in an odd 
sentimentalization, that we at least share that. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Having now considered specific iterations and revisions of sentimentalism within 
contemporary literature, I now turn to the task of accounting in the form of a sketch the 
relation between these revisions and the rise of postmodernism.  In order to do so, I begin 
by reviewing David Harvey’s account of the major political and economic shifts of the 
last thirty years that conditioned both the changes in urban space and, in his view, the 
corresponding emergence of postmodern culture.  Following this, I turn to an earlier, 
related line of argument, offered in Fredric Jameson’s influential Postmodernism, or, the 
Logic of Late Capitalism, on the relation between feeling, spatio-political change, and 
culture   After having situated Jameson’s claims in relation to my own, I take up his idea 
of “cognitive mapping” and use it to review very briefly a distilled formulation of the 
findings offered in these chapters.  What is at stake here is understanding the modes of 
emotional engagement available to those writing, thinking, and living in a culture 
dominated by our contemporary philosophical assumptions, epistemological doubts, and 
spatio-economic practices—a culture broadly describable as postmodern.   
Before going further, however, one must consider terminology. I take on the term 
“postmodern,” to describe these artists with great reluctance, even though the term 
remains, however flaggingly, a critical touchstone for nearly all of the authors considered 
by this study.  Indeed, the burden of previous diagnoses, celebrations, and condemnations 
with which “postmodern” is loaded only discourage its further use to describe these 
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writers.  First, one must mark the gulf that exists between a culture that is postmodern 
and an aesthetic practice that goes by that name.  My presentation of the views of Harvey 
and Jameson should contextualize broad changes in cultural belief and urban living 
relevant to these authors.  To say that the work of the authors considered here cannot be 
separated from these shifts emphatically does not mean they should be blithely equated 
with them either.  In short, these are postmodern writers, but their postmodernity stands 
in critical relation to that of the culture surrounding them. The problem of using the term 
is further complicated by the fact that the change in formal elements toward a 
characteristically postmodern aesthetic begins in a period decades before the parameters 
of my current study, that is, in the early 1960s—with John Barth’s The Sot-Weed Factor 
and Giles Goat-Boy, Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire, and 
Thomas Pynchon’s V, among other groundbreaking texts. Furthermore, the shift from a 
Keynesian to a neoliberal approach to political governance and economic distribution 
also occurs significantly after the initial emergence of a postmodern aesthetic in literature 
and culture. Therefore, while here I consider these authors as writing within a 
postmodern tradition, one must understand them as making use of a set of innovations—
“a heightening of artifice, a delight in verbal play and formal manipulation of fictive 
elements, the widespread use of fantasy and surrealism, a tendency to present obviously 
fictive characters working out their destinies in languages of pure language, dream, or 
other fiction”—characteristic of an earlier period by grafting them to a more realist 
aesthetic, a trend within postmodernism that began in the 1970s (McCaffery xiii).   
Therefore, it may be better simply to suggest that these works are postmodern to the 
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extent that they 1.) reflect to a greater or lesser extent postmodernism’s characteristic 
metafictional self-reflexivity, 2.) are conscious of their own positionality within the 
culture they describe and therefore largely eschew the impersonally hierarchical narrative 
distance characteristic of realism, and 3.) take as their subject individuals within a 
contemporary milieu who strain to locate elusive realities behind highly mediated 
representations.  That such a set of qualities could, as aptly, describe some works 
characterized as modernist demonstrates the difficulty of classification in this case. 
Let us then return to the material grounds out of which these texts emerge, for 
there we might be on slightly firmer ground.  As I discussed in my introduction, 
influential geographer David Harvey has traced the manifold consequences of the 
urbanizing process—a process he sees as inseparable from capitalism— throughout his 
work, which cannot be surveyed here.  Nonetheless, it is worth reviewing his assessment 
of the general consequences of our economic system, as well as the specific shape those 
consequences took in America’s cities.  For our purposes, at a most general and 
theoretical level, capitalism’s spatial and temporal fixes result in three key consequences.  
First, the politico-economic processes he details result in the creation and expansion of 
cities, because dense cities are the social form most enabling to capitalism’s structural 
needs.  As Harvey avers urbanization will inevitably increase as 
 
 
Vast concentrations of capital and labour […] come together in metropolitan areas 
of incredible complexity, while transport and communication systems, stretched 
in far-flung nets around the globe, permit information and ideas as well as 
material goods and even labour power to move around with relative ease. 
Factories and fields, schools, churches, shopping centres and parks, roads and 
railways litter a landscape that has been indelibly and irreversibly carved out 
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according to the dictates of capitalism. (Limits 373) 
 
 
 
Second, these evermore urban spaces are characterized by the geographical distribution 
and segmentation of populations based on ever intensifying social stratification.  Third, 
the distances and times it takes to accumulate capital and circulate commodities shrinks, 
and, because our experience of distance and temporality follows suit, we feel an 
increasing “time-space compression” (Conditions 147). This explanation led him, in 
1987’s The Condition of Postmodernity, to conclude that the resulting fragmentation and 
depthlessness of our experience of space and time under global capitalism conditioned 
the rise of postmodern culture.  The postmodernism, here, is understood as a change in 
architecture, philosophy, visual arts, and narrative in which style, meaning, and value 
judgments all seemed somehow bereft of stable moorings in a rational worldview—and 
that are reflexively aware of this predicament. Abstractly speaking, therefore, the system 
Harvey describes would be characterized by the increasingly uneven distribution of 
economic suffering and a simultaneously mounting sense of sharing a single world. 
Within postmodernity, then, is a contradictory feeling of both the fragmentation of 
“worlds” (an increasing awareness of the juxtapositional gulfs between cultures, locales, 
and levels of privilege) and the interconnection or interpenetration of these multiple 
worlds in a sublime, global space.  These two contradictory trends increase the necessity 
of both the sentimental soothing of pain and the explanatory projection of a coherent 
social body.   
 But what is the relation between postmodernity and the economic shifts producing 
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changes in urban living in the last thirty years?  To understand Harvey’s answer, we must 
shift from his elucidation of postmodern culture, which he sees as emerging initially 
between 1968 and 1972, to his polemic on the rise of neoliberalism and its effect on 
urban life (Condition 38).  In brief, neoliberalism holds that social “well-being can best 
be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms” while  
 
 
State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum 
because, […] the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-
guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably 
distort […] state interventions […] for their own benefit. (Neoliberal 2) 
 
 
 
In other words, neoliberalism requires an abandonment or severe diminishment of state-
based welfare protections and other Keynesian stimulation of demand because, on this 
view, no privileged place exists within a society from which to objectively judge social 
needs and their solutions.  It is common knowledge that this line of argument, by dent of 
its most persuasive advocates—Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, in particular—
came to shape the political rhetoric, the philosophical assumptions, and the governmental 
budgets of the vast majority of capitalist countries from the late 1970s well into the post-
millennium.  Harvey’s contention, however, is that neoliberalism began in earnest in 
American cities, particularly in New York City in the 1970s (Neoliberal 45).  After 
industrial restructuring and suburbanization eroded the economic base of many American 
cities, the resulting acute social unrest in the 1960s led the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations to solve the problem through an “expansion of public employment and 
public provisions” (Neoliberal 45).  In 1973, however, as one civil servant put it, "Nixon 
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has simply declared that the urban crisis is over" and sharply reduced the federal aid to 
the municipalities, with the result that within two years time in the midst of a recession, 
New York City fell woefully short of meeting its budget due to its service outlays 
(Neoliberal 45).  The city was pushed into technical bankruptcy after President Ford and 
the city’s financial institutions refused to roll over the debt, leading to the famous New 
York Daily News headline “Ford to City: Drop Dead” (Neoliberal 45-6).  A group of 
investment bankers agreed to bail out the city on terms that gave them control of the 
city’s budget “to implement wage freezes and cutbacks in public employment and social 
provision (education, public health, transport services)” (Neoliberal 45).  The explicit 
goal of the bankers was to write a budget that would be, in the approving words of Ford’s 
Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, “so punitive, the overall experience so painful, 
that no city, no political subdivision would ever be tempted to go down the same road” 
(Simon 151). As Sen. William Proximire told Mayor Koch “It is cruel that it has to come 
out of the hide of the workers, but that’s the way it is” (qtd. in Lichten 186).   The 
immediate result, according to Harvey, was a manifest deterioration of both the social 
and physical infrastructure of the city: “daily life in New York became grueling and the 
civic atmosphere turned mean” but “demoralized, working-class New Yorkers reluctantly 
assented to the new realities” (Neoliberalism 46).  Harvey’s view is that this experiment 
in strategically imposed austerity was the pilot case for the neoliberal program, which 
would be enforced more broadly within the US, Britain, and then throughout the world 
(Neoliberal 48).  Whether or not New York’s case was as crucial as Harvey argues 
matters less than the fact that these policy shifts away from Keynesian liberalism’s 
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emphasis on full employment and reducing the human costs of private enterprise through 
state expenditure lead to the political, economic, and cultural conditions to which the 
authors of this study respond. So if there long background of this study is 
sentimentalism’s history, its shorter durée is the economic decline of American cities and 
the evisceration of its social protection network following the abandonment of Keynesian 
economics and embrace of neoliberal reforms. 
Harvey attributes the rise of neoliberalism to class warfare, but this minimizes the 
ways in which the emergence of neoliberal budget priorities coincides with a broader loss 
of faith in Keynesian liberalism’s technocratic acumen.  Exemplary of this shift is the 
demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis, on March 16, 1972, which 
Charles Jencks declared to mark “the day Modern architecture died” (9).  The massive 
building complex, designed by Minoru Yamasaki, who later went on to design the World 
Trade Center, had replaced the dilapidated slums of an extremely poor black ghetto of St. 
Louis in 1955.  By the late 1960s, the projects had such low occupancy that they were 
effectively abandoned.  The complex had deteriorated into a crumbling, crime-ridden 
neighborhood, with muggings and rapes common in the building’s corridors (Patterson 
336).  Its architect lamented: "I never thought people were that destructive" (qtd. in 
Patterson 336).  Jenck’s attributes the significance he does to Pruitt-Igoe’s demolition 
because it represents the repudiation and abandonment of “the most progressive ideals of 
CIAM (the Congress of International Modern Architects) […] the intelligent planning of 
abstract space to promote healthy behavior” which the buildings represented, thus in his 
mind demonstrating that “the philosophies of Rationalism, Behaviorism, and 
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Pragmatism” were, however paradoxically, irrational (9).  It was an abandonment of the 
hope that these compassionate ambitions could be realized that, for Jencks marked the 
moment as historically significant.  In The Conditions of Postmodernity, Harvey see 
postmodernism—this repudiation of “abstract, theoretical, [and] doctrinaire ideals” and 
embrace of “the vernacular landscapes” such as “suburbs and commercial strips”—as a 
function of capitalism’s logic. In this reading, he followed Fredric Jameson’s 1984 essay 
“Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.”   Jameson’s essay is a 
particularly apt text on which to conclude our study, for Jameson sought to explain the 
relation between multinational capitalism and postmodern culture directly through the 
question of how it feels to inhabit new urban spaces.  Therefore, I conclude with a brief 
critical appraisal of Jameson’s claim that postmodernity is characterized by a “waning of 
affect” and thus am able to address the selection of the authors for my study (10).  
 In his essay “Postmodernism, or, the Logic of Late Capitalism,” first published in 
the New Left Review in 1984 and subsequently reprinted in a book by the same name in 
1991, Jameson argued that “this whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is the 
internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military and 
economic domination throughout the world” (5).  Among its other distinctive attributes, 
Jameson claimed, postmodernism was characterized by “the waning of affect,” an 
affective experience that occurs because of a deconstruction of the depth vs. surface 
binary on which, he declares, the theory of emotional expression depends (10, 12).  
Though Jameson notes that it would be inaccurate to suggest that “all affect, all feeling or 
emotion, all subjectivity, has vanished” from postmodern images such as Andy Warhol’s 
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Diamond Dust Shoes, all that remains is “a strange compensatory decorative 
exhilaration” (10).  The shift from modernism to postmodern emotional registers is 
therefore, for Jameson, an elimination of the pathos that Van Gogh produce via his image 
of badly worn peasant shoes or that Walker Evans and James Agee created with their Let 
Us Now Praise Famous Men (10).  This loss of pathos owes to what Jameson considers 
to be postmodernism’s “radically antianthropomorphic” orientation, which in turn flows 
from an urban architectural aesthetic for which “the representation of space itself has 
come to be felt as incompatible with the representation of the body” (36).  
Postmodernism, in this view, is the end “of radical isolation and solitude, anomie, private 
revolt,” because “the alienation of the subject is displaced by the latter’s fragmentation” 
(14).   
Jameson’s claim about the modes of emotional engagement available within 
postmodern culture was—or at any rate has become in historical retrospect—terribly 
overstated. As the present study shows through an examination of characteristically 
postmodern literary texts—texts that are, by various turns and in variant degrees 
decentered, fragmentary, metaleptical, reflexive, conscious of their own positionality, 
suspicious of representational logic, and given to ironic intertextual appropriation—the 
arousal of pathos for political ends continues and, indeed, has been invigorated by the 
very spatial and economic changes Jameson notes.  Though it would be churlish to fault a 
twenty-five year old essay for forecasting with insufficient precision all the emotional 
possibilities of a culture just emerging at the time of its composition, all continued use of 
vague terminology such as “waning” should be emphatically rejected.  Such an approach 
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ignores the by-now-obviously complex way in which contemporary writers who work at 
the intersection of late realism and postmodern reflexivity make use of more traditional 
emotional forms for their political and aesthetic ends.  To his credit, Jameson farsightedly 
notes that postmodern art and literature may yet produce works that re-conquer “a sense 
of place and the construction or reconstruction of an articulated ensemble which can be 
retained in memory and which the individual subject can map and remap along the 
moments of mobile, alternative trajectories” (51).  Jameson calls this “reconquest” of the 
relationship between subjective experience and real conditions “cognitive mapping,” and 
I suggest that we consider the resurgence and revision of sentimentalism by writers 
working within postmodern culture as precisely such an effort to locate us in relation to 
each other (51).  When read in this light, the value of the present study—incomplete and 
imperfect though it is—lies not only in the prospect of a better articulation of 
sentimentalism and its legacy.   Rather, because it examines in detail how the reflexivity 
characteristic of postmodern literature (its consciousness of the conditions of its own 
production and its status as fiction) works with and amends the affective pedagogy of 
sentimentalism (a mode often derided precisely for its too self-conscious production of 
feeling) it has also taken up the task of sketching postmodernism’s circuitous affective 
maps through the city. The function of reflexivity here calls to mind Linda Hutcheon’s 
observation apropos the best postmodern literature that  
 
 
This self-reflexivity does not weaken, but on the contrary, strengthens and points 
to the direct level of historical engagement and reference of the text. Like many 
postmodern novels, this provisionality and uncertainty (and the willful and overt 
construction of meaning too) do not cast doubt upon their seriousness’, but rather 
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define the new postmodern seriousness that acknowledges the limits and powers 
of reporting or writing the past, recent or remote. (117) 
 
 
 
Although the authors of the 9/11 novels considered here each domesticate the space of 
global conflict, s(t)imulate their reader’s grief, and draw us into comprehensive 
communities of feeling, they also each embedded powerful ambivalences over the 
possibility of our sharing each other’s world—ambivalences flowing from an autocritique 
of their own status as fictions.  Philip Roth, Anna Deavere Smith, John Edgar Wideman, 
and Chang-Rae Lee each used the figure of the author—Zuckerman, Smith herself, 
Cudjoe, Wideman, Henry, writer of “legends,” as well as the historical figures of Stowe 
and Whitman—as a means of both modeling and critiquing sympathetic witness as a 
means of negotiating the deeply disjunctive social space of America. These writers 
provide us with emotional maps through worlds of deepening inequalities and perceptual 
disparities.  They make us conscious of the fact that their maps are provisional, in some 
sense fictional, but they also can reveal to us the ways in which such maps are also 
necessary received and historical.  They demonstrate the promises and problems of pain 
alliances, even as they draw us into one produced through their own textual performance.  
Thus, by having traced how the affective vocabulary of sentimentalism—an emotional 
repertoire that foregrounds mutuality and care—has taken shape in these individual 
literary texts in relation to changes in urban processes that were above all about austerity 
and the abandonment of state-based “care,” we have begun a fuller examination of the 
contradictory emotional modes demanded by postmodern space(s) than has been 
undertaken in literary studies heretofore 
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NOTES 
 
 
 
                                                
1 For an engaging consideration of how this shift in the acceptability of racist discourse 
following King’s assassination affected African American fiction in the 1980s and 1990s, 
consider Andrew Warnes’s “In the shadow of the gun: African-American fiction and the 
anxieties of nostalgia.” 
2 See Roth’s interview with Charles McGrath:  "Zuckerman's Alter Brain."  New York 
Times Book Review  7 May 2000 
3 For example of a critic preferring “Newark Trilogy,” Kimmage, Michael. "In History's 
Grip: Philip Roth's 'Newark Trilogy'." PhiN: Philologie im Netz 32 (2005): 15-31.   For 
the more common reference—American Trilogy—see Philip Abbot’s Bryan, Bryan, 
Bryan, Bryan: democratic theory, populism, and Philip Roth's American Trilogy. 
Canadian Review of American Studies (37:3) 2007, 431-52., as well as Mark Shechner’s 
Roth's American Trilogy. The Cambridge companion to Philip Roth. Parrish, Timothy,  
ed.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007: 142-57 
4 For a brief, insightful account of the Zuckerman Bound trilogy, see Donald M. 
Kartiganer’s “Zuckerman Bound: celebrant of silence.” The Cambridge companion to 
Philip Roth. Parrish, Timothy,  ed.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007: (35-
54) 
5 Marshall Bruce Gentry offers an intriguing reading of American Pastoral suggest that 
the novel critiques the patriarchal figure.  While I follow Gentry’s exploration of how 
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Roth’s male talker’s are often ironized rather than figures of pure sympathetic 
identification, I do not think that Roth offers an extended feminist rereading of himself.  
6 For example, Michiko Kakutani’s “ A Postwar Paradise Shattered From Within,” 
Kakutani, Michiko, “A Postwar Paradise Shattered from Within,” in New York Times, 
April 15, 1997. C11, C14. 
7 David Zucker, for instance, in “The Breath of the Dummy: Philip Roth’s Nathan 
Zuckerman Trilogies,” suggests that “Zuckerman […] transforms himself into the chorus 
of three tragedies,” whereas I would suggest, following Zucker’s own argument that Roth 
is engaged in a complex literary ventriloquism through Zuckerman, that Zuckerman is 
often engaged in ventriloquisms of his own. Bonnie Lyons’s “Philip Roth’s American 
Tragedies” connects Zuckerman’s role in the trilogy to Murray Krieger’s description of 
the dramatic chorus as “a deconstructionist God, who saw chaos and said—not that it was 
good—but that it was and that he could tell it” (qtd in Lyon 126).  
8 For an astute and persuasive reading of Roth’s use of this technique in American 
Pastoral as well as his debts to Henry James in doing so, see Posnock 113-115. 
9 See Norman Podhoretz’s “The Adventures of Philip Roth.” Commentary, 106.4 (1998): 
25-36.  
10 See especially, Tanenbaum, Laura. “Reading Roth’s Sixties.” Studies in American 
Jewish Literature. 23 (2004): 41-54. 
11 The novel explores the relationship between empathy and collectivism explicitly and at 
great length.  As Zuckerman recalls wondering in his youth: “Wasn’t that what the 
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fascination with “the people” was really all about?  What is it like to be them?” (Married 
207). 
12 For an analysis of the use of Sophocles and the Oedipal myth in The Human Stain, see  
Rankine, Patrice D. "Passing as Tragedy: Philip Roth's The Human Stain, the Oedipus 
Myth, and the Self-Made Man." Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 47.1 (Fall 
2005): 101-112 
13 See Lorrie Moore’s  review of The Human Stain, in which she writes, “Faunia's 
psychotic ex-husband and Vietnam veteran, whom Roth seems to construct from every 
available cliché of the Vietnam vet” (Moore 8) 
14 Roth’s 2007 novel, Exit Ghost, which takes up the Nathan Zuckerman persona once 
more, reveals that Zuckerman moved to the Berkshires after receiving a series of death 
threats from an angry reader, though the novel occasionally casts doubt on the neatness of 
this explanation as when “She” of Zuckerman’s dialogue scenes suggests that “death 
threats don’t explain the extreme things you’ve done with your life. […] a man who 
sequesters himself, secludes himself the way you did, does so for a much larger reason.” 
[…] “What might that larger reason be?” “Escaping pain.” What pain?” “The pain of 
being present.” (Exit Ghost 136-167). 
15 The way one views this problem always speaks to one’s deeper methodological 
assumptions.  A Deleuzean reading might see in the sympathetic model inherited from 
Adam Smith (i.e., that compassion is based in imaginative empathetic work) a 
contamination of the more non-representational view of sympathy held by Hume, 
wherein the replication of feeling outside our own direct affective experience is not so 
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ethically weighted.  The substantial difference between these positions matters.   In this 
particular exegetic case, since the model of sympathy on offer in the American Trilogy is 
clearly reduplicative (both in Zuckerman’s projection and in the reception of the novels) 
and imaginative, a Derridean deconstruction of the representational logic of sentiment 
works best at revealing the stakes of Roth’s affective investments.   
16 In fairness to Roth, it is difficult to think of works comparable to Smith’s in diversity 
of voice. 
17 Though even such heartbreaking forbearance can be viewed as a ressentimental self-
staging, performed by Zuckerman either to strengthen his affective links to the Swede or, 
more complexly, to undermine the illusion of his righteousness.   
18 See “Cambodia: A Modest Proposal,” where he writes “Who in his right mind would 
plunge this country of peasants into yet another battle for ‘minds and hearts’? Who in his 
right mind would ever drop anything on these people other than food, medicine and 
clothing?  And then it occurred to me: why do we try it? […] To be sure, we have our 
winning ways: the free-fire zone, the relocation camp, the search-and-destroy mission, 
the defoliants, the napalm, etc. At times one wonders how they can possibly resist us—
but these are inscrutable people.” (Reading Myself 187-188)  
19 Several critics have suggested that Roth is revisiting and self-critiquing his own 
rebellions during the 1960s through Merry Levov.  See Timothy Parrish, “The End of 
Identity: Philip Roth’s Jewish American Pastoral” (esp. 139-140) as well as Mark 
Shechner, who, in Up Society’s Ass, Copper: Rereading Philip Roth, asks, “could Roth 
not say, ‘Merry Levov c’est moi?’” (163). 
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20 Fredric Jameson’s discusses ressentiment as a nineteenth-century ideologeme in The 
Political Unconscious that, where he notes that “[w]hat is mot striking about ressentiment 
is its unavoidably autoreferential structure […] It may therefore be concluded that the 
theory of ressentiment, wherever it appears, will always itself be the expression and 
production of ressentiment” (268). 
To this we should certainly add Sedgwick’s reading of sentiment and Nietzsche 
ressentiment as fundamentally interwoven for both involve—in her view—vicariation 
and misrepresentation: The re- prefix of ressentiment marks a space of degeneration and 
vicariousness: the nonsingularity of these laminates as redoubling of one’s own motives, 
and the nonoriginality as reflexes of the impulses of others. Thus the sentimental 
misnaming, in the aftermath of the whole class of emotions and bonds which Nietzsche 
was the privileged analyst. […] Sentimentality, insofar as it overlaps with ressentiment in 
a structure we would not be the first to call ressentimentality, represents modern emotion 
itself in Nietzsche’s thought: modern emotion as vicariousness and misrepresentation, but 
also as sensation brought to the quick with an insulting closeness. (Epistemology 150) 
Sedgwick posits a version of Jameson’s observation of the vicious cycle of critique 
involved in the discourse of sentiment, concluding that “neither rehabilitation nor 
rubbishing, wholesale, is […] possible […] with these presentational meaning” of 
sentimentality, antisentimentality, or ressentimentality. Instead, “they stand for 
rhetorical—that is to say relational—figures […] of concealment, obliquity, 
vicariousness, and renaming, and their ethical bearings can thus be discussed only in the 
multiple contexts of their writing and reading” (157). For her, each can be seen as “a 
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form of bad faith” or as “a figure of irrepressible desire and creativity” (157). 
21 See Mark Maslan’s “The Faking of the Americans: Passing, Trauma, and National 
Identity in Philip Roth’s Human Stain,” where Maslan maintains that Roth intends us to 
read “Coleman’s renunciation of his past as evidence that he embodies America’s 
[tradition of self making]” (386) Maslan then problematizes founding a notion of 
community based in the heroic renunciation of community.  
22 For an extended consideration both of the critical response to Roth’s revision of the 
1960s as well as a subtle correction to the common views, see Laura Tanenbaum’s 
“Reading Roth’s Sixties” in Studies in American Jewish Literature. 
23 For an especially helpful reading of the ressentimental roots of white backlash, see 
Jeffrey T. Nealon’s Alterity Politics: Ethics and Performative Subjectivity, particularly 
pp. 138-164. 
24 Timothy Parrish’s insightful, “Becoming Black: Zuckerman’s Bifurcating self in The 
Human Stain,” earlier published in an altered version in Contemporary Literature, as an 
article entitled “The Invisible Man in Philip Roth’s The Human Stain,” traces the 
relationship between Roth’s Coleman and Ralph Ellison’s life and fiction.  As I do, 
Parrish makes much of the averted homecoming trip, by which, he suggests “Roth calls 
attention to his novel’s dangerous and risky ambition: to hazard one’s identity in a 
gesture of affiliation that abolishes the authenticity of race” (222).  
25 According to Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson, Jr., and Walter C. Farrell, Jr. in 
“Anatomy of a Rebellion: A Political-Economic Analysis,”  16,291 people were arrested, 
2,383 were injured, roughly 500 fires were set, and 52 people were killed (119).  
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Although this is fewer than the number of casualties--over 120 people--killed during the 
New York Draft Riots in 1863, the nominal cost of the property damage stemming from 
violence between 29 and 30 of April 1991 is estimated at $1 billion (Oliver et al 119).   
26 For more on this point, see Judith Butler’s essay “Endangered/Endangering: Schematic 
Racism and White Paranoia.” 
27 Smith has continued her project after House Arrest, but at the time of this writing, none 
of these other projects have been published, though all are considered to be part of “In 
Search of American Character.”  Because she sometimes recycles interviews from 
previous projects into more recent incarnations, separation between projects is difficult.  
Nonetheless, Smith has performed at least two distinct dramatic entities in the years since 
House Arrest. The first of these, Let Me Down Easy focuses on the notion of grace and 
involves incidents of suffering as separate and topical as “the genocide in Rwanda, the 
tragedy of Katrina and the ailing American health-care system” (Isherwood G1).  The 
second, The Arizona Project, focuses more exclusively on women in relation to the 
American judicial system. 
28 Here I follow Ryan M. Claycomb’s superb “(Ch)oral History: Documentary Theatre, 
the Communal Subject and Progressive Politics.”    Claycomb argues that works 
following Shange, Smith, and Mann should be understood along the following lines:  
"These oral history plays take the discourse of history- and life-writing, and shift their 
discursive conceptions of the subject from the single protagonist to the greater 
community.  This radical approach to subject formation not only disrupts the empowered 
status of the subject's authority, but also encourages the integration of the audience into a 
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tenuous sense of community created by the theatrical event itself" (95).  My argument 
differs from Claybomb’s in its emphasis on 1.) the literary-historical mode of 
sentimentalism, and 2.) Deleuzean ontology with its attendant conceptual tools: 
simulation, deterritorialization, and lines of flight.  
29 Other critics have noted this tension as when Gregory Jay observes, in “Other People's 
Holocausts: Trauma, Empathy, and Justice in Anna Deavere Smith's Fires in the Mirror” 
that “Although Smith's mimicry of these idiosyncratic voices and gestures suggests their 
utter uniqueness, their carefully designed place in the text sets them up as representative 
types, or as testimonial voices embodying two different collective memories” (129).  Jay 
also proffers an argument suggesting that Smith’s dramatic practice involves what he 
calls “performative empathy.”   “Performative empathy,” as Jay defines it, “is an ‘acting 
out’ that includes the cognitive dimension inherent to all emotions, but it is also a 
‘working through’ that challenges us to understand the ‘other’ through a radical crossing 
of identity boundaries. Performative empathy helps us see the gaps between our own 
understanding and the perceptions of the subject whom we reenact” (124).   
While I share much of Jay’s views on Smith’s practice, I go further by a.) historicizing 
the genre of sympathetic identification in which Smith intervenes, b.) theorizing the 
relation between Smith’s acting practice and social commentary through a 
poststructuralist social ontology capable of grasping greater gradations of difference as 
well as the spatial consequences of those differences, and finally c.) linking this practice 
to broader socio-historic concerns, especially the urban crisis of the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  Though I employed the term “performative sympathy” in my reading of Roth, I 
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more explicitly drew on the work of J. L. Austin and other theorists of the performative to 
articulate the limits and ingenuity of Roth’s emotive poesis by using the notions 
constative, performative, and perlocutionary.  
30 Here I follow the arguments of several astute scholars who have remarked on the 
possible liaison between Smith’s politically progressive theatrical work and the history of 
minstrel theater.  Of particular note here are essays by Tania Modleski and Dorinne 
Konda.  In “(Re)Visions of Race: Contemporary Race Theory and the Cultural Politics of 
Racial Crossover in Documentary Theatre,”  Konda points out that “most of the literature 
on crossracial identification, including the phenomenon of racial passing, remains within 
a black-white binary that still limits our ways of thinking about race” (83).   Part of the 
confusion over Smith’s performances, she suggests, is because American audiences are 
still unable to answer “[w]hat happens when the story is no longer one of black passing 
for white or the White Negro and minstrelsy, but people of color performing each other?” 
(83).    But this question, while it ought to remain open, side steps how the stereotyped 
image—required for cross-performances like blackface but not interchangeable with it—
contains an ambivalence that does not require the black-white binary to proliferate.   In 
her essay "Doing Justice to the Subjects: Mimetic Art in a Multicultural Society: The 
Work of Anna Deavere Smith," Modleski offers a reading of Smith’s use of the 
stereotype through Homi K. Bhabha: “Here we see the dual aspect of mimicry: its 
aggressive aspect, so obvious in minstrelsy, which reduces people to stereotypes and robs 
them of their complexity, and the utopian aspect Bhabha assigns to the mimicry--the 
promise of solidarity embedded in Smith's artistic practice of identifying with an ‘other’ 
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whose differences are scrupulously observed and preserved. We have simultaneously 
imitation as theft and imitation as the sincerest form of flattery” (65). 
31 Note how this negative “failure” to be others relates to the impossibility of sympathy as 
I explored it in Roth’s novels under the rubric of the constative, or descriptive level.  
There are differences as well.  Given that Smith works with the quoted words of actual 
individuals, and that this fact is stressed, means that fictionality is probably not the best 
rubric for viewing her work.  Another note: if, in this study, I use the term “failure” for 
the non-coincidence or perceived non-coincidence of a sufferer’s experience and the 
imaginative projection of another of that first experience, I do so for clarity and no out of 
censure.   
32 Deleuze’s interesting in stammering as a mode of literary style is not unrelated, 
although neither is it an exact correspondence with Smith’s.  Deleuze writes, of art that 
seeks after newness: “It's easy to stammer, but making language itself stammer is a 
different affair; it involves placing all linguistic, and even nonlinguistic, elements in 
variation, both variables of expression and variables of content. A new form of 
redundancy, AND ... AND ... AND ... There has always been a struggle in language 
between the verb etre (to be) and the conjunction et (and) between est and et (is and and 
[which in French are identical in pronunciation— Trans.])” (ATP 98).  I link this 
ambivalence between being and conjunction to Smith’s own interest in the non-
dialectical by which individuals produce their own style of being from hand-me-down 
blocks of language and idealized identities available to them. 
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33Consider as rougly parallel Deleuze’s rejection of the organistic metaphor and the 
critiques of urban ecology in urban theory.   In his discipline-founding essay, “The City: 
Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Enviornment,” Robert 
E. Park argued that the city should be understood as a living organism, the 
interconnecting parts of which function together organically, and going so far as to term 
his method urban ecology.  In American uban studies, this view remained pervasive from 
1915, when Park first published his essay until the 1960s and 1970s, when a number of 
scholars and thinkers with diverse agendas began to question the assumptions of the 
Chicago School, who were roughly speaking Park’s followers (Kleniewski 31-43). 
Paradigmatic of these critiques is the famous work of David Harvey, for whom urban 
spaces ae a record of capital accumulation and class conflict.   
34 As I argue apropos of the notion of a head of state, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
the collective assemblage of enunciation means that the stable subject that serves as 
representative speaker—monarch, prime minister, president, commissar—must be 
abandoned as a myth.  “There isn’t a subject; there are only collective assemblages of 
enunciation,” declare Deleuze and Guattari in their study of Kafka (Kafka 18).   Or, 
again, in A Thousand Plateaus, they declare that “[d]irect discourse is a detached 
fragment of a mass and is born of the dismemberment of the collective assemblage; but 
the collective assemblage is always like the murmur from which I take my proper name, 
the constellation of voices, concordant or not, from which I draw my voice. [...]   I is an 
order-word." (ATP 84) 
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35 The difficult task of refusing the primacy of individual speech acts (parole) without 
affirming, much less prioritizing language as differential, bodiless system (le langue), is 
not always successfully managed by Deleuze and Guattari.  However, the opposition of 
direct versus indirect discourse provides, in my view, at least one practicable model for 
thinking outside Saussure’s influential binary.  
36 I should here note that this understanding of the relation between symbolic and 
material orders (between language and bodies) is opposed to neo-Marxist’s notion of 
ideological interpolation.  Largely, this is because, for Deleuze and Guattari, ideology 
requires structuralism’s artificial conceptual separation (and more importantly, 
hierarchicalization) of actually interacting systems such as language and economics.  “If 
the external pragmatics of nonlinguistic factors must be taken into consideration” in any 
theorization of language, Deleuze and Guattari reason, “it is because linguistics itself is 
inseparable from an internal pragmatics involving its own factors” (ATP 91).  Deleuze 
and Guattari are abruptly explicit about the consequences of reading language in this 
manner: “Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There is no 
ideology and never has been” (ATP 4). This is because, in their use of the word, “[a]n 
assemblage has neither base nor superstructure, neither deep structure nor superficial 
structure; it flattens all of its dimensions onto a single plane of consistency upon which 
reciprocal presuppositions and mutual insertions play themselves out” (ATP 90).  In 
short, this understanding of language refuses both the formalism that argues of 
language’s autonomy from social power dynamics (economic positioning high among 
them), and also refuses the schismatic determinism of neo-Marxist readings that read 
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texts as merely symptomatic of the present mode of production.  It attempts the difficult 
task of thinking language and power at once, on the same plane, on the same stage.    
37 Willie Turks beaten to death by a white mob in Brooklyn in 1982; Michael Griffith, 
chased onto a highway by a crowd of white youths who had beaten him and his friends 
and then run over him, in Howard Beach, Queens in 1986; Yusef Hawkins, suspected of 
dating a white girl, was shot twice in the chest by a white youth in a baseball-ball-
wielding crowd of 30 in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn,1989. 
38 For a fuller consideration of the ethical and aesthetic valences of vision in Wideman’s 
work, see Bonnie TuSmith’s “Optical Tricksterism: Dissolving and Shapeshifting in the 
Works of John Edgar Wideman.” 
39 Another very astute intertextual reading of the novel is offered by Leslie Lewis, who 
explains Wideman’s metafictional shift nicely by reading in through James Baldwin’s 
The Fire Next Time, in “Philadelphia Fire and The Fire Next Time: Wideman Responds 
to Baldwin” 
40 Though it is arguable whether Wideman intends to allude to either of these figures is a 
matter of debate, of course, until he clarifies, although he does allude unmistakably to 
Stowe’s novel when he compares Prospero to Simon Legree (131).  Nonetheless, I hope 
to demonstrate that reading Wideman’s Cudjoe through Stowe’s proves an interpretive 
boon. 
41 I take this to mean, here as elsewhere, when a sympathetic witness attends to another’s 
suffering and, in so doing, pedagogically models for a second audience a correct affective 
engagement.  
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42 Wideman has demonstrated a deep and lasting concern with the ways in which racial 
identities in the United States are coarticulated through the process of ghettoization.  Of 
note here in particular is Tyrone R. Simpson II’s “‘And the Arc of His Witness Explained 
Nothing’”: Black Flanerie and Traumatic Photorealism in Wideman’s Two Cities.” 
43 I follow Liam Corley and Christian Moraru in their discussions of Whitman’s place in 
Native Speaker, both of whom read Whitman as a rather invariant presence, a known 
quantity, at the edge of Lee’s project.  In his essay “’Just Another Ethnic Pol’: Literary 
Citizenship in Chang-Rae Lee’s Native Speaker,” Corley correctly observes that 
Whitman’s canonical status permits Lee to engage metaphorically with the exclusion of 
ethnic writers from the highest ranks of literary estimation, but he altogether misreads 
and flattens Lee’s sophisticated dialogue with “The Sleepers” when he writes:  
Lee is not here invoking Whitman as an example of how an allseeing eye 
colonizes the subjects it surveys. Likewise, Whitman's role in my argument about 
Native Speaker and literary citizenship should not be construed as casting 
Whitman into the role of unproblematic touchstone of American literature and 
identity. This is, however, very nearly the way that Lee uses Whitman, but only, 1 
think, in order to link Whitman to a revised understanding of American identity as 
inclusive of Asian American immigrants. (Corley 80)   
On the contrary, I suggest that Lee is supremely conscious of the problematic nature of 
the Whitmanian gaze and, consequently, that we must read the novel as doing more than 
simply revising American identity to include its Asian minority.  This difference in 
interpretation cuts to the heart of how spying and surveillance and their relationship to 
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national identity are to be understood in the novel.  Moraru’s “Spies, Sleepers, 
Multitudes,” to some extent following Corley’s cue, reads Park’s progression as a move 
from a colonial espionage to a “cosmopolitan spying,” an agon pitting a monolithic 
version of Whitman’s empathetic voyeurism against Hoagland’s corporate and 
neocolonialist espionage, a conflict in which Whitman proves the victor (24), though 
Moraru reads Whitman’s poesis as being “creolized” in the process (3). My own reading 
seeks to address the ways in which Hoagland is a manifestation of the nationalist 
espionage inherent to Whitman’s speaker and sentimental project. 
44 In this claim, Kete is explicitly following the work of Michael Lasser and M. J. 
Killingsworth, who in their separate articles have sought to demonstrate the role played 
by sentimentalism in the development of Whitman’s homoerotic conception of camaradie 
as the root of a natural social cohesion. 
45 I will employ the original 1855 version of the poem for my analysis, both because it is 
crucial to my understanding of the poem’s relation to the novel and because the vast 
majority of scholarship on the poem uses this version as subject-text.  The punctuation in 
these quotations, particularly their use of ellipsis, reflects the choice of editors Cleanth 
Brooks, R. W. B. Lewis and Robert Penn Warren to cleave as closely as possible to the 
earliest completed version.   
46 I strongly disagree with the argument that Henry’s spying should be thought of 
primarily as an activity subversive to the nation state.  Tina Chen’s article “Impersonation 
and Other Disappearing Acts in Native Speaker by Chang-Rae Lee,” flirts with this 
position but my central argument is with Crystal Parikh’s “Ethnic America Undercover: 
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The Intellectual and Moniority Discourse.”  Parikh argues for this in his reading of the 
novel, comparing the ethnic spy to Said’s conception of the ethnic intellectual:  
The figure of the ethnic spy, like the minority intellectual, challenges 
conventional models of knowledge-power relationships by calling into question 
the extent to which the material processes of race mediate the class and 
professional affiliations of intellectual and institutional power…[Lee’s novel] 
attests to Edward Said’s observation that “the intellectual is best and 
remorselessly challenged by the problem of loyalty” to national, religious, or 
ethnic communities.  Knowledge production occurs within and against these ties, 
at once constituting and compromising them. (Parikh 251) 
47 I would like to suggest, as an aside, that the passage in Whitman’s poem in which 
George Washington weeps at the slaughter of the Delaware braves, pressing his tearful 
cheeks against the faces of his comrades, is echoed in Native Speaker when an abandoned 
Kwang, grieving the loss of the ggeh’s participants as well as his own political career, 
shields Henry with his “wide immigrant face.”  I do not pursue this in the body of my 
essay, indeed I neglect the narrative arc of John Kwang’s rise and fall, largely because 
this territory has been covered well in Corley’s essay (see endnote 1), from which I here 
quote:  
Whitman’s literary star has brought him from the margins of American literary 
studies to the center.  Throughout Native Speaker, Lee performs an equivalent 
claim to universality that depends, as Whitman’s did, upon the narcissistic focus 
on the embodied self as the representative of humanity.  Instead of escaping from 
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the particularly of a ‘wide immigrant face,’ Lee focuses upon it and the 
contradictions it presents to an American national culture that has repressed 
knowledge of its hybridity and the racially based categories subsumed within the 
concept of abstract citizenship.  Through his narrative, Lee revises Whitman’s 
heritage of representative Americanness to include the immigrant as central” 
(Corley 73-74).   
I think my reading of Kwang as Washington supplements Corley’s assertion rather 
nicely, but I am not content to reduce Whitman’s importance in Lee’s novel to a means 
by which Lee can symbolically engage with and enter into the canon, though that is 
clearly an aspect of the intertextual link. 
48 See Carol Z. Whelan’s "'Do I Contradict Myself?': Progression through Contraries in 
Walt Whitman's 'The Sleepers,'" Walt Whitman Quarterly Review 10.1 (Summer 1992): 
25–27. Whelan sees an overarching structure in this oppositional movement that in part 
corresponds to the dialectical revision I see in Lee’s novel:  
’The Sleepers’ progresses through a flexible pattern of opposites. Whitman's 
familiar "I" oscillates between I-as-witness and I-as-Other through visions that 
move from I-as-singular to I-as-plural, young female to old widow, anonymous 
giant to historical giant, father to mother, night to day. If we include the poem's 
two deleted sections the pattern is not disrupted: a young male's voice follows the 
young female's voice; later a black slave's section follows the vision of a red 
squaw (contrasting gender, color and social state). This pattern suggests that 
under Whitman's apparent disorder sleeps an organic coherence.” (25) 
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49 In her essay “To Stand Between: A Political Perspective on Whitman's Poetics of 
Merger and Embodiment, “ Karen Sánchez-Eppler reads Whitman’s temperance novel, 
Franklin Evans, as a story of closet miscegenation in which the protagonist is racially 
muddled as is the more explicitly creolized Margaret.  Though Sánchez-Eppler is 
extrapolating the importance of miscegenation for Whitman from a text that does not 
directly confront miscegenated unions, one can surmise Whitman’s interest in the 
mingling of blood from his consistent interest in the synthesis of categories. 
50 Here I follow Corley’s explication of the shipwreck (see above), though one should 
also see Rachel C. Lee’s “Reading Contests and Contesting Reading: Chang-rae Lee’s 
Native Speaker and Ethnic New York,” for an excellent analysis of both the 1993 
shipwreck and the political relationship between New York and Native Speaker. 
51 Sánchez-Eppler reads this powerlessness as something of a ruse, belying the ways in 
which Whitman wills the death as a visceral, sexualized demonstration of his pity:  
Whitman presents himself as willing the death the subsequent lines describe.  
Indeed, the entire description of the drowning occurs in the anticipatory 
formulations of the poet’s questions.  At the moment of questioning violence, 
Whitman demonstrates the ways in which his poetry requires and is complicitous 
with the act of wounding. (937) 
I think this overstates the matter, for by this logic any and all descriptions of death are 
complicitous with it.  Whitman does sexualize the swimmer at least in part in order to 
ironically link the failure of union between swimmer and spectator to the success of 
union with the female lover and night.  However, though I diverge from Sánchez-
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Eppler’s reading of these lines, her insight about the violence embedded in Whitman’s 
poetics supports, rather than contradicts, my claims about the insidious aspects of 
Whitmanian espionage generally. 
52 Tenney Nathanson suggests that the entire poem should be read as a conflict between 
erotic energies and the self-division and limitations inherent to language:  “The troubled 
protagonist of Whitman’s 1855 poem ‘The Sleepers’ is caught up in an often disturbing 
erotic economy his involvement is associated with writing and reading, in a difficult 
passage that seems to connect these activities with mediation and self-division” (102).  I 
agree with his reading of the term “pastreading, in this context:  
The past would presumably consist of the fragmented and seemingly foreign 
dream material the poem records, which seems to predate its individual 
embodiments.  The poet himself would be simply the composite of all the erotic 
inscription he reads, enigmatic desires that tie him to others as functions of the 
same erotic writing or code; he would be a text, or a fragment of one. (104)  
This helps to support my claim that Lee’s pastreading is not different in kind from 
Whitman’s; the novelist has read and rewritten the poet’s desires and, in a sense, is just 
another fragment of a larger text. 
53 I do not have access to hard-copy records of the Mexico’s fate, but I determined the 
date of its destruction and the fate of its immigrant cargo from a triangulation of 
genealogical sources available on the web.  Below is a full account of the ship’s wreck as 
well as the near-synchronous wreck of the Bristol, which was also carrying Irish 
immigrants.  Together, the two constitute the worst sea-faring disaster of the coast of 
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Long Island:  
Raynor Rock Smith was a famous wrecking master before the United States Life 
Saving Service was established, and was in charge at many ship disasters, the 
most notable being on January 2, 1837 when the ships “Bristol” and “Mexico,” 
both from Liverpool and carrying Irish emigrants, were stranded in heavy 
weather. All aboard the “Bristol”, to the number of eighty perished, and of the one 
hundred and sixteen on the “Mexico” all but eight were drowned or frozen to 
death. The “Bristol” was wrecked at the westerly end of Long Beach, opposite 
East Rockaway, and the barque "Mexico," 300 tons burden, came ashore at Long 
Beach on the more easterly part, opposite Christian Hook (Oceanside).  
    About sixty of the dead from the “Mexico,” all stiffly frozen, were brought 
from the beach, piled crosswise on wooden sleds, and placed in the barn of John 
Lott, at Hicks Neck until a plot in Old Sand Hill Cemetery at Pearsall’s 
(Lynbrook), donated for the purpose by Peter T. Hewlett of East Rockaway, could 
be made ready for the burials. Lumber for the burial cases was furnished by 
Oliver S. Denton of East Rockaway. The monument which stands at the end of 
the trench grave was purchased and prepared at Sing Sing, New York, and 
brought to East Rockaway by sloop. (“Raynor Rock Smith”)  
54 Lelia, on the other hand, is comparatively transparent, sharing her emotions openly in 
both the poems she composes and her comportment as a speaker; as she says of herself: 
“An average white girl has no mystery anymore, if she ever did” (10).  Indeed, it is 
Lelia’s openness and volubility that initially attracts Henry to her: “even before I took 
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measure of her face and her manner, the shape of her body, her indefinite scent, all of 
which occurred so instantly anyway, I noticed how closely I was listening to her.  What I 
found was this: that she could really speak” (10).  Lelia’s privilege as a speaker in the 
novel should not be reduced exclusively to her racial heritage, though this is indeed one 
of the implications.  Importantly, she is an honest, forthright and compassionate speaker, 
someone for whom, as an example, the name of Henry’s Korean nanny is important, even 
though Henry himself does not know the woman’s name, and someone who writes a 
poem attempting to imagine the inner consciousness of Henry’s father after he has died. 
55 Mutlu Blasing points out this contradictory aspect of Whitman’s use of night, in his 
essay “The Sleepers: The Problem of the Self in Whitman,”: 
In transcending identity, however, one negates the possibility of personal life at 
the same time that he transcends personal death. When consciousness rises above 
identity, time, space, and therefore death, the self as identity as the only possible 
concretization of consciousness has literally died. Accordingly, the night/darkness 
imagery reflects the paradoxical nature of self-transcendence, for the night 
signifies a force that is at once creative and destructive. (112) 
While I agree with Blasing’s general insight, I tend to see this as a generative and honest 
paradox rather than a problem or fault. 
56 Judith Butler intuits and articulates a similar phenomenon which she refers to as the 
loss of “First Worldism,” but her definition of that loss, as “the loss of the prerogative, 
only and always, to be the one who transgresses the sovereign boundaries of other states, 
but never to be in the position of having one’s own boundaries transgressed” (39).  
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Butler’s argument persuasively suggests the ways in which mourning for September 11 
victims can serve as the beginning of an ethical reconsideration of how corporeal 
vulnerability is distributed globally.  Here, however, I am interested more in how 
September 11 produces a historically specific affective turmoil by foregrounding both the 
constructedness and the incongruity of personal, national, and global narratives of 
hierarchical belonging, justice, safety, and identity.   
57 Worth considering here are Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s remarks concerning 
sentimentality and the division of public and private spheres in her reading of (Ann 
Douglas’s reading of) Melville’s Billy Budd.   There, she notes how sentimentality often 
functions as crossing this constructed boundary precisely by pretending not to: for 
instance, in the form of a suffering individual hiding his pain in a manner plain for all to 
see.   As she reasons:  
“Suppose for the moment, however, that we are willing to accept the definition 
implicit in Ann Douglas’s work according to which sentimentality is the 
commingling of public and private realms, especially through—let us add—any 
rhetoric that claims to differentiate them conclusively.  Under such a definition, 
Captain Vere is […] consummately a sentimentalizing subject, an active wielder 
of the ruses of sentimentality for the satisfaction of needs that can be stably 
defined nether as public nor as private.” (Epistemology 120-1) 
Although Sedgwick settles on a notion of sentimentality more complicated that this, one 
can here see clearly how sentimentality—based as it is on the universalization of 
individual acts of sympathetic identification with suffering others—will always serve to 
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both raise and raze the divisions of publicity and privacy, performance and innermost 
secrecy.   
58 For a fuller consideration of this trend, consider Elisabeth Ankar’s “Villains, Victims 
and Heroes: Melodrama, Media, and September 11” 
59 Another important consideration in assessing Foer’s motive in narrating through these 
eccentric, pitiful, and emotionally forthcoming characters might be found in Suzanne 
Keene’s insight: “[Readers] may respond with greater empathy to an unreal situation and 
characters because of the protective fictionality, but still internalize the experience of 
empathy with possible later real-world responsiveness to others’ needs” (220, italics 
mine).  Thus foregrounding his character’s fictionality while still repeating those tropes 
which the sentimental tradition has established as particularly effective allows Foer a 
greater access to his reader’s empathic reaction while at the same time insinuating the 
subtle ironic distance detailed elsewhere in this chapter.  
60 In this sense, Oskar’s playful narrative parallels the “children’s play” Freud discusses 
in a much analyzed passage of Beyond the Pleasure Principle in which Freud observes 
his grandson coping with the periodic absence of the boy’s mother by means of a 
linguistic game—fort and da—demonstrating that “there are ways and means enough of 
making what is in itself unpleasurable into a subject to be recollected and worked over in 
the mind” (XVIII: 14-15, 17).  One might add that, in a less quoted passage directly after 
the fort-da game, Freud describes how the boy, a year later, would vent his anger on toys 
by throwing them across the room and pronouncing “Go to the fwont!” that is, to the 
front, where the boy’s father was current engaged in fighting World War I.    According 
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to Freud, the boy “was far from regretting his [father’s] absence; on the contrary he made 
it quote clear that he had no desire to be disturbed in his sole possession of his mother” 
(XVIII: 16).  Here one might pause to consider what consequences emerge from Foer’s 
choice to have Oskar’s father pass away. 
61 This is not entirely unrelated to what Derrida, in reference to the September 11 attacks, 
calls the numerous “autoimmunitary” processes that link victim with victimizer:  “As we 
know, an autoimmunitary process is that strange behavior where a living being, in quasi-
suicidal fashion, ‘itself’ works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against 
its ‘own’ immunity” (94).  Derrida uses this term to connect numerous ironic reverses he 
takes to be related phenomena: the U.S. funded and trained the Mujahideen in 
Afghanistan before it turned against them; the U.S. media did the work of Mohammed 
Atta and bin Laden by broadcasting and replaying the destruction of the towers, and the 
U.S. aggression in response to the attacks will inevitably produce more attacks.  
However, I do not collapse what I call Foer’s circularity of death with this notion of 
autoimmunity because the former makes no direct link (much less a quasi-suicidal one!) 
between American efforts to excise or monitor its other(s) and damage inflicted on the 
United States by terrorists.  Foer’s cycle is far more universalized and politically 
defanged.  See below for autoimmunitary fears in Updike and DeLillo.   
62 This approach in Updike has been much noted, though it is worth pointing out that 
Updike’s dialectical approach often resists easy sublation. Typical of Updike is “a 
dialectical approach to religious issues in which defining oppositions do not resolve into 
a satisfying synthesis but rather remain in sustained tension and ambiguity” (Boswell 43) 
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63 One can here view Jack Levy as another instance of Updike writing in what Sanford 
Pinsker calls “Jewish-American drag.”  Pinsker argues that, for Updike, Henry Bech, as 
Jew is  “the consummate outsider, […] the ultimate Other.  With Bech, Updike tries to 
imagine (perhaps “impersonate” is the better term) a character as far from himself […] as 
possible” (92). 
64 It is worth pointing out that the threat of death in the Lincoln Tunnel, which is the goal 
of the novel’s terrorist plot and the original anxiety from which the book emerged ("’That 
picture was the beginning,’ he added. ‘The fear of the tunnel being blown up with me in 
it — the weight of the water crashing in.’”), is also suggestive of mortal vulnerability in a 
vaginal space.  For a fuller discussion of fears of the vagina in Updike, cf. Kathleen 
Verduin’s reading of the relation between the vaginal and Karth Barth’s das Nichtige in 
Updike’s S. (Verduin, 69) 
65 Ngai relies heavily on Fredric Jameson’s discussion of ressentiment as a nineteenth-
century ideologeme.  Jameson astutely notes, in The Political Unconscious that “[w]hat is 
mot striking about ressentiment is its unavoidably autoreferential structure […] It may 
therefore be concluded that the theory of ressentiment, wherever it appears, will always 
itself be the expression and production of ressentiment”  (268).   
 To this we should certainly add Sedgwick’s reading of sentiment and Nietzsche 
ressentiment as fundamentally interwoven for both involve—in her view—vicariation 
and misrepresentation: 
The re- prefix of ressentiment marks a space of degeneration and vicariousness: 
the nonsingularity of these laminates as redoubling of one’s own motives, and the 
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nonoriginality as reflexes of the impulses of others.  Thus the sentimental 
misnaming, in the aftermath of the crucifixion, of its observers’ sensuality and 
will-to-power as pity becomes the model for the whole class of emotions and 
bonds which Nietzsche was the privileged analyst.  
[…]  
Sentimentality, insofar as it overlaps with ressentiment in a structure we would 
not be the first to call ressentimentality, represents modern emotion itself in 
Nietzsche’s thought: modern emotion as vicariousness and misrepresentation, but 
also as sensation brought to the quick with an insulting closeness. (Epistemology 
150) 
Sedgwick posits a version of Jameson’s observation of the vicious cycle of critique 
involved in the discourse of sentiment, concluding that “neither rehabilitation nor 
rubbishing, wholesale, is […] possible […] with these presentational meaning” of 
sentimentality, antisentimentality, or ressentimentality.  Instead, “they stand for 
rhetorical—that is to say relational—figures […] of concealment, obliquity, 
vicariousness, and renaming, and their ethical bearings can thus be discussed only in the 
multiple contexts of their writing and reading” (157).  For her, each can be seen as “a 
form of bad faith” or as “a figure of irrepressible desire and creativity” (157).  
66 Sedgwick claims that patriarchal order both depends on, and is destabilized by, male-
male desire (or homosociality) such that this sociality has to be regulated by means of 
misogyny and homophobia.  As she writes in Between Men: “”in any male-dominated 
society, there is a special relationship between homosocial (including homosexual) desire 
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and the structures for maintaining and transmitting patriarchal power: a relationship 
founded on an inherent and potentially active structural congruence” (25) 
67 One might note that, far from being an exception, the Falling Man is part of a trend in 
Lianne’s life.  Lianne repeatedly grapples with men she only half understands: Keith, 
whom she was attracted to for this reason (105); her father, whose suicide leaves her 
confused (40-1); her own son Justin, whose fictionalizing of Ben Lawton leaves her 
chilled; and Martin, her mother’s lover, whose possible alter ego as Ernst Hechinger, is 
never resolved.   
68 For a fuller consideration of the intersection of fantasy and September 11, see Zizek’s 
“Welcome to the Desert of the Real,” for, as he notes, the event was a space of fantasy 
even before it occurred: “The unthinkable that happened was the object of fantasy: in a 
way, America got what it fantasized about, and this was the greatest surprise” (132).  
